You can
search the entire site.
or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices.
D.H. v. State (12/20/96), 929 P 2d 650
<![CDATA[
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are requested
to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the
Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501,
phone (907) 264-0607, fax (907) 276-0878.
SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE: Due to its unavailability in
electronic format, this Opinion was retyped by Touch N' Go
Systems. Every effort was made to ensure accuracy, but
Touch N' Go Systems can not be held responsible for any
errors.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
D.H., )
) Supreme Court No. S-7590
Appellant, )
) Superior Court No.
v. ) 4FA-95-109 CP
)
STATE OF ALASKA, Department ) O P I N I O N
of Health & Social Services, )
)
Appellee. ) [No. 4446 - December 20, 1996]
______________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of
Alaska, Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks,
Ralph R. Beistline, Judge.
Appearances: James M. Hackett, Fairbanks, for
Appellant. D. Rebecca Snow, Assistant Attorney
General, Fairbanks, and Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney
General, Juneau, for Appellee.
Before: Compton, Chief Justice, Rabinowitz,
Matthews, Eastaugh, and Fabe, Justices.
RABINOWITZ, Justice.
FABE, Justice, dissenting.
I. INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal of an order adjudicating T.H. a child
in need of aid pursuant to AS 47.10.010 (a)(2)(F). The superior
court determined that the child's mother D.H. was addicted to
drugs at the time of her pregnancy, that she continues to be
addicted, and that T.H. has been neglected by both D.H. and her
father F.H. since birth. Based on the evidence before it, the
court adjudicated T.H. a child in need and placed her in State
custody for a period of up to two years. D.H. contends that T.H.
was improperly removed from her custody and appeals the superior
court's adjudication, asserting that there is insufficient
evidence under AS 47.10.010 (a)(2)(F) and Child in Need of Aid
(CINA) Rules to support the superior court's determination.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
T.H. was born on July 5, 1995, to D.H. and F.H.1 The
newborn tested positive for cocaine when a urine toxicology
screen was performed. The State took emergency custody of T.H.
shortly after birth, based on this positive toxicology as well as
concerns for T.H.'s safety should she remain in the care of an
allegedly drug addicted mother.2
On July 17, 1995, D.H. signed a stipulation granting
the Department of Health and Social Services (Department) custody
of T.H. through October 8, 1995. With the agreement of D.H. and
F.H., the State placed T.H. with Eva and John, the paternal
grandparents.3 For a few weeks D.H. resided with Eva and John
and T.H. Thereafter, the parties came to an understanding
regarding visitation which allowed D.H. and F.H. to take T.H.
from her grandparents' home between 10:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m.
daily. D.H.'s visits were sporadic, though it "never reached a
point where [visitation] wasn't happening at all."4
During this period the State attempted to assist D.H.
in her expressed desire to participate in a substance abuse
treatment program. This effort included various evaluations and
programs, all of which D.H. left prior to completion. D.H.'s
mother testified that D.H. stated "she wanted to go, but her -
for some reason or another she'd say, but I'm not going to go if
I can't have the baby. I'm not going to go if I have to go to
group because I don't like talking."5
On September 25, 1995, the department filed a Petition
for Adjudication of Child in Need of Aid. Temporary State
custody of T.H. was extended through completion of the hearing.
On February 23, 1996, the superior court entered a judgment
placing T.H. in the custody of the State for a period not to
exceed two years, pursuant to AS 47.10.080 (c)(1).6 In so doing
the court found that D.H. suffers from a serious drug addiction
that she is "not currently motivated to seriously address or
resolve."The superior court additionally determined that
[d]rugs and alcohol remain the single most
important part of [D.H.]'s life. . . .[D.H.]
is not motivated to care for or nurture
[T.H.]. [D.H.]'s refusal to take part in
these proceedings demonstrates a lack of
interest on her behalf. . . .[D.H] has
neglected [T.H.] since [her] birth. There has
been no real bonding efforts on [D.H.]'s part
and no significant nurturing has taken place.
. . . The evidence is clear and convincing
that neither [D.H.] nor [F.H.] have provided
[T.H.] with a home since [her] birth or
displayed any sincere desire to do so. It is
in [T.H.]'s best interest to be placed in the
custody of the State of Alaska. [Eva and
John] appear to be the appropriate custodians
for [T.H.] however this matter has not been
fully addressed or litigated in these
proceedings.
The superior court's findings were later amended nunc
pro tunc to reflect its determination that "[t]he State actively
pursued efforts to prevent removal of [T.H.] from her parents and
made reasonable efforts toward reunification."D.H. appeals the
superior court's judgment granting custody of T.H. to the State.7
III. DISCUSSION
A. Did the State Present Sufficient Evidence for the Superior
Court to Adjudicate T.H. a Child in Need of Aid Under AS
47.10.010 (a)(2)(F)?8
D.H. argues that the State's evidence of abuse or
neglect is insufficient to meet the threshold requirements of AS
47.10.010(a)(2)(F).9 In interpreting this statute, we have said
that the legislature intended that the State "assume custody of
minors only to remedy severe parenting deficiencies and prevent
significant harm to children." In re J.L.F. & K.W.F., 912 P.2d
1255, 1261 (Alaska 1996). D.H. asserts that the State failed to
present sufficient evidence to make this showing.10
The State contends that the record fully supports the
superior court's determination that T.H. was a child in need of
aid as a result of her mother's neglect since birth. According
to the State, the evidence before the superior court demonstrated
the mother's failure to make any sustained
effort after her daughter was born to
establish a parent-child relationship with
[T.H.] by remaining available to provide for
her daily care. The explanation for [D.H.'s]
neglect lay at least partially in her
polysubstance abuse which had gone on for
several years. Neither her pregnancy nor the
birth of her daughter changed her priorities.
The superior court determined that by failing to take
responsibility for T.H. or to make any appreciable effort to do
so, D.H. substantially neglected her daughter. We conclude that
the court had an ample evidentiary basis for adjudicating T.H. a
child in need of aid pursuant to AS 47.10.010 (a)(2)(F). Thus,
the superior court's finding is not clearly erroneous.
B. Is the Superior Court's Finding that the State
"Actively Pursued Efforts to Prevent Removal of [T.H.]
from Her Parents and Made Reasonable Efforts Toward
Reunification" Adequate under CINA Rules 15(g) and
17(c)(2) and Supported by Sufficient Evidence?11
Once the threshold jurisdictional determination called
for by AS 47.10.010 is made, the superior court is required to
make findings of fact under the appropriate CINA rules. D.H.
asserts that the superior court's requisite CINA findings are not
adequately supported by the evidentiary record.12
CINA Rule 15(g), governing the adjudication hearing,
requires that in cases where the trial court authorizes removal
of the child from the parent, the court make findings pursuant to
42 U.S.C. 671(a)(15) "as to whether, under the circumstances of
the case, reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate
the need for removal of the child from the home and to make it
possible for the child to return to the home." Rule 15(g)
(emphasis added).
CINA rule 17(c)(2), regarding disposition of a child
who has been adjudicated a child in need, requires additional
findings of fact in cases involving an Indian child. Before
removing the child from his or her parents,
[t]he court must find. . . by a preponderance
of the evidence that the party requesting
removal of the Indian child has shown that
active efforts have been made to provide
remedial services and rehabilitative programs
designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian
family, and that these efforts have proved
unsuccessful.
Rule 17(c)(2) (emphasis added).13
The State concedes that in its initial preparation of
the written findings and order, the superior court "overlooked"
the provisions of CINA Rules 15(g) and 17(c)(2) that require it
to make explicit determinations related to services provided to
the family. Upon a motion by the State the superior court
entered an amended order which included a finding related to the
State's efforts. The State claims that this amendment rectified
the superior court's initial oversight.14
D.H. asserts that the superior court's inclusion of
these required findings was "simply pro forma, and not supported
by the evidence."She alleges that the State wrongly assumed
emergency legal custody of T.H. immediately following birth,
contending that the State's action was based solely on
"unsupported concern . . .for what the mother might do in the
future (or might never do)." D.H. further claims that
subsequent to this emergency legal custody, "[t]he Division
apparently made no efforts whatsoever to leave the infant with
her mother."
The State correctly asserts that "[t]he primary obstacle to
the mother having custody of the child was her substance abuse,"
and describes in detail the evidence pertaining to its efforts
to arrange for D.H.'s admission to a treatment program.15 Based
upon our review of the relevant evidence, we conclude that there
is substantial evidentiary support for the superior court's
findings under CINA Rules 15(g) and 17(c)(2). In short, the
State's attempts to assist D.H. in enrolling and completing drug
rehabilitation programs qualify as "active efforts to provide
remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to
prevent the breakup of the Indian family."
C. Were the Superior Court's Findings Adequate on the
Issue of Likely Serious Physical or Emotional Damage
to T.H. if She Were Placed in Her Mother's Custody?16
Under CINA Rule 15, the State has the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the child is in
need of aid. When the case involves an Indian child the court
must also find "based on clear and convincing evidence,
including the testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that
custody of the Indian child by the parent or Indian custodian is
likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the
child." Rule 17(c)(2)(emphasis added).17
D.H. contends that the superior court's finding
regarding the likelihood of serious harm is not supported by the
evidence.18 In particular she argues that the testimony of the
State's only expert witness, Kaye Wallis,19 is insufficient to
carry the State's burden. D.H. characterizes Wallis's testimony
as follows:
Wallis described the matter [sic] as "an
excellent mother" when she was not using
drugs. Wallis did not know the nature and
extent of the mother's drug problem, if any.
Wallis conceded that the infant's
grandparents were part of the infant's
traditional and cultural home. The mother
would have had this cultural support system
in place, independent of the State's
involvement. . . .Wallis herself never
articulated with any conviction that either
of the mother's two children was "likely to
suffer physical or emotional damage"if left
in the mother's custody.20
Apart from challenging the sufficiency of the expert's
testimony, D.H. asserts that the State's additional witnesses did
not present clear and convincing evidence that T.H. would likely
suffer substantial harm if left in the custody of D.H. In support
of this contention D.H. points to medical records suggesting that
during hospitalization the mother properly cared for T.H.; John's
testimony that in his view D.H. loves her child; and T.H.'s
social worker's admission that she had never seen D.H. with the
child and thus had no information as to how D.H. cares for her.
The State claims that the evidence before the court
fully satisfies the requirements of CINA Rule 17.
[Wallis] testified that D.H.'s "chemical
dependency"created concerns that T.H. would
suffer serious physical or emotional damage
if she were left in her mother's care. She
based her opinion on her realization that a
chemically dependent person is not able to
put her child first or to care properly for
her.
The other evidence at trial supports Ms.
Wallis's opinion. D.H. argues that because
the mother handled the baby acceptably in the
hospital for a day with the help of the
nursing staff, T.H. was not at risk for
physical or emotional damage in her mother's
care. She would have the court ignore the
fact that if T.H. were discharged from the
hospital to her mother's custody, T.H. would
no longer have had the assurance of
professional adults supervising her care or
even of other sober and attentive adults.
Neither of T.H.'s grandparents thought she
would be safe with her mother until D.H.
controlled her drug program.
With respect to the likelihood that T.H. would suffer
serious damage if left in D.H.'s custody, we conclude that
although there was arguably support for such a conclusion in the
record, the superior court never made a determination which
specifically addressed the requirements of the ICWA and CINA Rule
17(c)(2). The nearest formulation is the superior court's finding
that "[t]he evidence is clear and convincing that neither [D.H.]
nor [F.H.] have provided [T.H.] with a home since her birth or
displayed any sincere desire to do so."The State attempts to
equate this finding with the conclusion that "placing T.H. in the
custody of D.H. would have likely led to serious physical or
emotional damage to her." And yet the State implicitly
acknowledges that the two findings are hardly synonymous, stating
that "[e]ven if the trial court's formulation of [its] conclusion
was inartful, it can be upheld on the basis of the evidence in
the record as a whole."
Given that the superior court made no specific findings
which focused explicitly on this issue of likelihood of future
harm, as well as the importance of such a determination, we
believe that question should be remanded to the superior court.
On remand the superior court is directed to enter findings of
fact which specifically address the criteria of CINA Rule
17(c)(2) and 25 U.S.C. 1912(e).21 Pursuant to our remand the
superior court has the discretion to conduct such supplementary
proceedings it deems appropriate. In order to expedite the
resolution of this case we retain jurisdiction of the matter and
direct the superior court to forward to this court its
supplemental findings of fact within thirty days of the date of
this opinion.
IV. CONCLUSION
The superior court's decision is AFFIRMED in part and
REMANDED in part. The case is REMANDED to the superior court for
the purpose of permitting that court to enter supplemental
findings of fact under CINA Rule 17(c)(2) and 25 U.S.C.
1912(e). Jurisdiction of this appeal is RETAINED.22
FABE, Justice, dissenting.
I dissent from the court's conclusion that the superior
court did not satisfy the requirements of Alaska Child in Need of
Aid rule 17(c)(2) and the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The
record is replete with evidence of D.H.'s serious drug addiction
and the detrimental effects that this addiction has had on her
relationship with T.H.
When D.H. visited the emergency room during her
pregnancy, she had needle tracks on both arms and admitted using
cocaine and marijuana. The treating physician was so concerned
for the safety of D.H. and the fetus that he arranged to hold
D.H. in the hospital for seventy-two hours.
After T.H.'s birth, the State placed T.H. in the
paternal grandparents' home so that D.H. could maintain contact
with the child. However, the record demonstrates that D.H.
visited only sporadically and that when she did so, she was not
particularly attentive to the baby. By the time of trial, D.H.
had departed for Barrow, without providing the paternal
grandparents with any means of contacting her.
The record also reveals that D.H. repeatedly failed to
follow through with drug rehabilitation, even though doing so
could have allowed her to be reunited with T.H. Indeed, D.H. left
three residential treatment programs against staff advice within
a five-month period, without making any significant progress
toward recovery.
At trial, ICWA expert Kaye Wallis, who was acting as a
consultant for T.H.'s tribe, was asked whether T.H. would be at
risk of serious physical or emotional damage if she were left in
the care of D.H. Wallis responded that the tribe "would have
concerns . . . because of [D.H.'s] chemical dependency." Thus,
she concluded that D.H. "cannot at this time care for her child
without seeking treatment."In particular, Wallis was troubled by
the fact that because of D.H.'s drug addiction and the priority
that drugs were taking in her life, T.H. would lack "consistency
in . . . care,"leading to "dysfunction[al]"emotional health.
The superior court recognized all of this evidence when
it drafted its written findings. It noted that D.H. had more
concern for drugs and alcohol than for T.H., and it concluded
that due to her drug addiction, D.H. had repeatedly demonstrated
that she "is not motivated to care for or nurture"T.H.
I cannot agree that these findings are inadequate. In a
recent child custody case, we recognized that a trial court's
findings are important because they permit us to review the
factual and legal steps in the trial court's decision. Bird v.
Starkey, 914 P.2d 1246, 1249 (Alaska 1996). Consistent with this
conclusion, we stated that findings "need not be extensive" if
they allow us to glean from the record the considerations
underlying the trial court's decision. Id. At 1249 n.4. For
example, in Julsen v. Julsen, 741 P.2d 642, 649 n.10 (Alaska
1987), we noted that the trial court did not make express
findings on all statutorily mandated factors. Nevertheless, we
affirmed its decision because "the record reflect[ed] that [the
trial court] . . . considered those factors pertinent to the
case"and had reached "a sound decision."Id. We concluded that a
custody determination need not be overturned "merely because a
judge fails to tally the statutory factors like runs, hits and
errors in a box score."Id.
Although Judge Beistline may not have made an express
finding that return of T.H. to her mother at this time would be
"likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage" to
T.H., he gave careful consideration to the record, which
established that D.H. was placing her need for drugs above the
needs of her baby. Judge Beistline recognized that D.H. made
drugs her highest priority and that she was not taking the steps
to recover from her addiction so that she might care for her
child. He also determined that D.H. had "neglected"T.H. since
her birth, noting that "[t]here has been no real bonding
effort[t] on [D.H.'s] part and no significant nurturing has taken
place." His findings on these issues were tantamount to a
determination that T.H. would likely suffer serious emotional or
physical damage if returned to her mother. Indeed, given the
trial court's findings, it would be hard to imagine how T.H.'s
emotional and physical well-being would not be at serious risk if
she were placed in the care of D.H. These findings are consistent
with the evidence in the record, which establishes that D.H.'s
chemical dependency substantially interferes with her motivation
and ability to care to T.H. Therefore, I would affirm the
superior court's decision.
_______________________________
1 T.H. is an Indian child within the meaning of the federal
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). 25 U.S.C. 1911 et seq.
2 After receiving a referral from the hospital informing the
State of T.H.'s positive toxicology, an investigation revealed
that D.H. had been treated in the hospital emergency room in
March 1995, at which time she admitted using both cocaine and
marijuana. Needle track marks on both arms indicated chronic
drug use, and D.H. appeared to be under the influence of a
controlled substance. A toxicology screen confirmed the presence
of both marijuana and cocaine.
3 At the time of the CINA adjudication, T.H.'s placement with
Eva and John had been continuous. What apparently motivated the
State to file its CINA petition was the fear that D.H. would
increasingly assert her legal rights as parent, to the detriment
of T.H., were these rights not curtailed. The State indicated as
much in the proceedings below:
[I]f the court dismisses this petition
and does not end up ordering the child into
somebody's custody, the child goes back to
the parents[`] custody. And even though the
child would stay with [Eva and John] until
the parents showed up on the doorstep and
asked for the child . . ., they couldn't keep
the child from the parents. . . . Entirely
how much influence, how much persuasion can
the grandparents bring to bear on the parents
to leave the child where she would best be
cared for. WE would submit that the evidence
is pretty strong with regard to Samantha
[D.H.'s other daughter] that the parents have
not been willing to leave her where she would
best be cared for, that is with the
grandmother. They have dropped her off there
when it was convenient for them and then
they've come and picked her back up again and
they've dropped here off there again and then
they've picked her up there - from there
again. And it's entirely based on their
whims and convenience and it is our position
. . . that kind of treatment of this age
child is going to cause her emotional damage.
4 Regarding this period of time, the superior court stated in
its factual findings that D.H. made "no real bonding efforts"and
that "no significant nurturing"took place. The superior court
also determined:
Immediately after her birth, [T.H.] was
placed by the State in the custody of her
paternal grandparents . . . . [They] have
cared well for [T.H.] and have bonded with
her. Their successes, however, are not due
at all to either [F.H.] or [D.H.]. [The
parents] cannot assume credit for the efforts
of John and Eva [], nor can their neglect be
justified or excused by the good works of
[T.H.]'s grandparents. The "home"in which
[T.H.] now resides is the home of John and
Eva[]. It is not the home of [D.H.] or
[F.H.]. To suggest that [D.H.] and [F.H.]
have provided a home for [T.H.] is factually
unfounded, ignores the role of the State, and
gives [D.H.] and [F.H.] far more credit than
they are entitled to.
5 The discharge summaries from D.H.'s treatment efforts
indicate that she was concerned with access to her child while
participating in in-patient treatment. Other factors possibly
contributing to D.H.'s premature departures from the programs are
alluded to throughout the summaries.
6 AS 47.10.080(c) reads:
If the court finds that the minor is a child
in need of aid, it shall
(1) order the minor committed to the
department for placement in an appropriate
setting for a period of time not to exceed
two years . . . except that the department
may petition for an the court may grant in a
hearing (A) two-year extensions of commitment
that do not extend beyond the minor's 19th
birthday if the extension is in the best
interests of the minor and the public. . .
7 D.H. has another child, Samantha, born April 14, 1991. At the
time of the hearing Samantha was in the custody of D.H. Her
custody is not at issue in this case. Nor is the parental fitness
of F.H. at issue on appeal.
8 This court reviews adjudication decisions and the factual
findings that support them under the clearly erroneous standard,
unless they raise questions of statutory interpretation. E.g.,
In re J.L.F. & K.W.F., 828 P.2d 166, 170 n.12 (Alaska 1992).
9 AS 47.10.010 reads in relevant part:
Jurisdiction. (a) Proceedings relating to a
minor under 18 years of age residing or found in
this state are governed by this chapter, except as
otherwise provided in this chapter, when the court
finds the minor
. . .
(2) to be a child in need of aid as a result
of
. . .
(F) the child having suffered
substantial physical abuse or neglect as a
result of conditions created by the child's
parent, guardian, or custodian.
10 The only argument that D.H. makes to support this claim is
that T.H. was born, and continues to be, a physically healthy
child. As the statute and this court's treatment of it make
abundantly clear, however, the superior court is not meant to
confine its inquiry to the physical well-being of the child.
11 Whether the findings were adequate to satisfy the CINA rule
is a question of law. This court interprets statutory language
and rule language, such as the requirements of the CINA rules at
issue in this case, de novo. Langdon v. Champion, 745 P.2d 1371,
1372 n.2 (Alaska 1987). The question of whether the findings were
erroneous is reviewed for clear error. A.H. v. State, 779 P.2d
1229, 1231 (Alaska 1989).
12 D.H. argues in particular that the trial court's findings
under CINA rule 10 are unsupported by the evidence. However, as
noted by the State,
[t]he trial court did not claim to make any
findings under CINA Rule 10 nor was it asked
to. CINA Rule 10 relates to temporary custody
hearings. CINA Rule 15 controls adjudication
decisions like the one appealed from this
case and CINA Rule 17 controls disposition
decisions.
In any case, since "Rules 15 and 17 do include substantive
requirements similar to those in CINA Rule 10 that D.H. argues
were not proved, "the State proceeds to address the substantive
arguments made by D.H. as if they reference the appropriate CINA
Rule. We treat D.H.'s claims in a similar manner.
13 This language is derived from the ICWA at 25 U.S.C.
1912(d), which reads:
Any party seeking to effect a foster care
placement of, or termination of parental
rights to, an Indian child under State law
shall satisfy the court that active efforts
have been made to provide remedial services
and rehabilitative programs designed to
prevent the breakup of the Indian family and
that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.
14 The superior court simply amended its order to include one
additional finding of fact: "The State actively pursued efforts
to prevent removal of [T.H.] from her parents and made reasonable
efforts toward reunification." See R.R. v. State, 919 P.2d 754,
756 (Alaska 1996) (rejecting a claim that a superior court's
findings as to reasonableness were inadequate solely because they
were only "mentioned in passing"and holding that "CINA Rule 15
(g) does not require that each element of the `reasonable
efforts' be discussed individually and in detail.").
15 The State also contends that it made efforts more directly
targeted at preventing the breakup of the family. It notes that
the Department placed T.H. in the home of relatives, "where the
mother could have stayed with her, participating in her daily
care and establishing the parent-child relationship the family
needs."
Further efforts described by the State specifically intended
to foster the development of a relationship between D.H. and T.H.
were attributable to the child's grandparents - not to the State
- and thus are relevant only to the extent they suggest that
certain actions not taken by the State might have been
duplicative.
16 Whether the findings were adequate to satisfy the CINA rule
is a question of law. This court interprets statutory language
and rule language, such as the requirements of the CINA rules at
issue in this case, de novo. Langdon v. Champion, 745 P.2d 1371,
1372 n.2 (Alaska 1987). The question of whether the findings were
erroneous is reviewed for clear error. A.H. v. State, 779 P.2d
1229, 1231 (Alaska 1989).
17 The ICWA mandates that this determination be made. 25 U.S.C.
1912(e).
18 D.H. incorrectly makes this claim under CINA Rule
10(c)(3)(B), which is identical to the applicable Rule 17(c)(2).
19 Wallis is an ICWA specialist and consultant for the Native
Village of Ft. Yukon.
20 In fact, when asked whether there would be a risk to T.H.
"of serious physical or emotional damage"if left in D.H.'s care,
Wallis answered: "Yes, during the time of her chemical
dependency." Noting that D.H. "take[s] her child out of the
environment" when she uses drugs, Wallis added that "when the
focus is on getting the next fix or the next high . . . she
cannot at this time care for her child without seeking
treatment."
21 See In re J.L.F., 828 P.2d 166, 172 (Alaska 1992) (holding
that CINA Rule 15(g) requires an explicit finding of
reasonableness). We believe that CINA Rule 17(c)(2) requires a
similarly explicit finding regarding the likelihood of serious
physical or emotional damage to the child. See, e.g., K.N. v.
State, 856 P.2d 468, 475 (Alaska 1993) (upholding the trial
court's express finding that "the evidence shows beyond a
reasonable doubt that the children would continue to suffer
substantial and serious harm in the future, physical and
emotional, if they were placed with [the father].").
22 Our disposition of the issues discussed above obviates the
need to address any of the other issues raised in this appeal.
]]>
