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Hamilton v. Blackman (5/17/96), 915 P 2d 1210
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Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in
the Pacific Reporter. Readers are requested to bring errors to the
attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street,
Anchorage, Alaska, 99501, telephone (907) 264-0607, fax (907) 276-
5808.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
MICHAEL HAMILTON and ROBYN L. )
WILLETT, individually and as ) Supreme Court No. S-6010
next friends of MIKKI )
HAMILTON and RANDI WILLETT, ) Superior Court No.
) 4FA-93-1051 CI
Appellants, )
)
v. ) O P I N I O N
)
WILLIAM E. BLACKMAN, ) [No. 4352 - May 17, 1996]
(Deceased), )
)
Appellee. )
______________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of
Alaska, Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks,
Jay Hodges, Judge.
Appearances: D. Randall Ensminger, Law Office
of D. Randall Ensminger, Fairbanks, for
Appellants. David S. Carter, Hughes,
Thorsness, Gantz, Powell & Brundin, Anchorage,
for Appellee.
Before: Rabinowitz, Matthews, Compton and
Eastaugh, Justices. [Moore, Chief Justice,
not participating.]
EASTAUGH, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly twenty-six months after they and their children
were injured in a two-vehicle collision, Michael Hamilton and Robyn
Willett brought a tort action against a deceased person, William
Blackmon. (EN1) Blackmon, the driver of the second vehicle,
suffered fatal injuries. The superior court dismissed the
complaint. This appeal raises questions about how to enforce
claims against the estates of deceased persons, the time in which
to do so, and the potential application of the relation back
doctrine when the original complaint directly names a deceased
person. We remand to the superior court to determine whether
Hamilton and Willett should be permitted to amend their complaint
in this case.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
On April 19, 1991, a vehicle driven by William E.
Blackmon collided head-on with a vehicle driven by Michael
Hamilton; Robyn Willett and two young minors, Mikki Hamilton and
Randi Willett, were passengers in the vehicle driven by Hamilton.
Blackmon received fatal injuries; Hamilton, Willett, and the two
minors (hereafter collectively "Hamilton and Willett") were
injured.
In April 1991 Hamilton and Willett submitted their claim
to State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm),
which provided liability insurance for Blackmon and medical
coverage for Hamilton and Willett at the time of the accident. On
May 21 Blackmon's wife, Linda Blackmon (now Stiffler) filed an
application in probate court to receive decedent's personal
property. She represented that the value of the estate did not
exceed $15,000 and that no application for appointment of a
personal representative was pending or had been granted. On May 28
the superior court ordered that Linda Blackmon was entitled to
receive decedent's personal property. The court closed the probate
file the same day.
In early 1992 Hamilton and Willett retained counsel and
began settlement correspondence with State Farm. On June 3, 1993,
State Farm notified the attorney for Hamilton and Willett that the
statute of limitations appeared to have run on any claims by the
adults and inquired whether counsel wanted to meet and settle the
minors' claims.
Hamilton and Willett filed suit five days later. They
apparently served Linda Stiffler with the complaint and summons on
June 16. The complaint named and referred to the defendant as
"William E. Blackman, (Deceased)." The summons referred to the
Defendant as "Personal Representative of the Estate of William
Blackman, deceased, Linda Blackman, Personal Representative."
Counsel filed an answer on behalf of "the defendant, William E.
Blackman (deceased)"on June 28.
The defendant, through counsel, moved to dismiss the suit
on the ground that no personal representative had been appointed
for the estate, and thus Hamilton and Willett had "filed suit
against a deceased person and attempted service upon the widow"in
violation of AS 13.16.020. (EN2) Hamilton and Willett argued that
they should not be required to obtain the appointment of a personal
representative since they were not suing an estate, but rather were
willing to restrict damages to Blackmon's liability insurance
policy limits. Acknowledging the apparent misspelling, they argued
that if the court would not let them proceed against "William
Blackmon, deceased,"they should be permitted either to amend their
complaint to assert a claim against State Farm as the real party in
interest, or to file a probate action to obtain the appointment of
a personal representative for Blackmon's estate and to amend their
complaint to substitute the personal representative as defendant.
Hamilton and Willett requested a hearing on the motion to dismiss.
Denying the request for a hearing, the court granted Blackmon's
motion to dismiss in August 1993. Hamilton and Willett filed a
motion for reconsideration and a motion to amend their complaint,
again arguing that they should be allowed to denominate the proper
defendant and that the amendment should be allowed to relate back
to the original complaint. The court denied the motion for
reconsideration in September 1993 and did not rule on the motion to
amend. This appeal followed. (EN3)
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The parties agree that the material facts of this case
are not at issue. The issues on appeal involve matters of law and
statutory interpretation. Thus, this court will use its
independent judgment in reviewing the superior court's
interpretations of the law. Croft v. Pan Alaska Trucking, Inc.,
820 P.2d 1064, 1066 (Alaska 1991).
Whether relation back is legally permitted where the
original pleading was brought against a deceased person is a
question of law requiring this court to exercise its independent
judgment. Cf. Ford v. Municipality of Anchorage, 813 P.2d 654, 655
(Alaska 1991) (exercising independent judgment in interpreting a
civil rule).
IV. DISCUSSION
Hamilton and Willett argue that it was error to prevent
them from filing suit directly against decedent William Blackmon
since their recovery will be limited to Blackmon's insurance
coverage. They note that under Alaska law there is no direct
action against a tortfeasor's insurer and that Blackmon's widow
waived probate and would have no real interest in defending a suit
seeking only insurance proceeds. If their suit requires
appointment of a personal representative for Blackmon's estate,
however, they argue that they should have been allowed to amend
their complaint, and that the amendments would have related back to
the date they filed their original complaint. Blackmon argues that
the superior court correctly held that claims against a decedent's
insurance policy cannot be brought directly against the decedent
and that the relation back doctrine does not apply in this case.
A. Timeliness of Adult Claimants' Original Complaint
The issues of whether the court should have allowed
amendment of the complaint and whether such amendment would relate
back are moot regarding the adult plaintiffs, Michael Hamilton and
Robyn Willett, unless their original complaint complied with the
statute of limitations. Thus we must first determine whether their
original complaint was timely filed. (EN4)
The accident occurred on April 19, 1991. Hamilton and
Willett filed suit on June 8, 1993 -- almost twenty-six months
later. They concede that under Alaska law, a plaintiff generally
must bring a personal injury suit within two years. AS 09.10.070.
Nonetheless, they argue that because Blackmon died after the
personal injury statute of limitations began to run, AS 13.16.455
suspended the running of the statute of limitations during the four
months following Blackmon's death. (EN5) Thus, they argue the
statute did not run until twenty-eight months after the accident,
or more than two months after they filed suit.
Blackmon, citing AS 13.16.460, Alaska's nonclaim statute,
first argues that Hamilton and Willett had only four months after
Blackmon's death to present claims to the estate. Blackmon
alternatively argues that even if the two-year personal injury
statute of limitations applies, the close proximity of Blackmon's
death to the accident giving rise to the cause of action renders AS
13.16.455's four-month extension inapplicable.
1. Alaska Statute 13.16.460
We reject Blackmon's argument that AS 13.16.460 required
Hamilton and Willett to present their claims to the estate's
personal representative within four months of Blackmon's death.
Alaska Statute 13.16.460 is Alaska's nonclaim statute. It provides
that all claims which arose before a decedent's death, including
tort claims, if not barred earlier by statutes of limitations, are
barred against the decedent's estate, personal representative, and
heirs and devisees unless presented within four months after proper
notice to creditors is first published, or if no notice is given,
within three years after decedent's death. (EN6)
This statute explicitly excepts proceedings to establish
liability not exceeding the limits of insurance. AS
13.16.460(c)(2). (EN7)
We have never directly addressed AS 13.16.460(c)(2);
however, other courts have reasoned that the corresponding
provision of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) reflects the fact that,
unlike estate assets, the proceeds of a liability insurance policy
may only be claimed by plaintiffs who are
entitled to be indemnified in accordance with
the terms of the policy. Thus, the proceeds
are not available to the general creditors or
beneficiaries of the estate. Moreover, the
claims of the plaintiffs to be satisfied by
the insurance proceeds do not affect the
interests of the beneficiaries under the
estate and thus present no obstacle to an
orderly and exact administration of the
estate.
Sommermeyer v. Price, 603 P.2d 135, 138 (Colo. 1979) (citing In re
Estate of McDonald, 239 N.E.2d 277 (Ohio 1966); Belancsik v.
Overlake Memorial Hosp., 492 P.2d 219 (Wash. 1971)) (holding that
period to apply for administration of estate was tolled for
minority age claimants). See also Corlett v. Smith, 763 P.2d 1172,
1175 (N.M. App.) ("A failure to file within the statutory
[nonclaim] period bars only the right to enforce any liability of
the estate beyond the limits of the insurance policy. The action
itself is not barred."), cert. denied, 762 P.2d 897 (N.M. 1988);
Tank v. Peterson, 332 N.W.2d 669, 671 (Neb. 1983) (holding the
nonclaim statute did not bar plaintiffs from maintaining an action
against the decedent's insurer to the extent of coverage); Uniform
Probate Code  3-803(c) (1994); 1 Uniform Probate Code Practice
Manual 326 cmt. (Richard V. Wellman ed., 1977) ("Tort claims will
normally involve the decedent's or the personal representative's
casualty insurance and so will fall within [this] exception.").
Alaska Statute 13.16.460 did not require Hamilton and
Willett to present their liability claim to the estate within four
months after publication of notice to creditors, because they are
not claiming liability for an amount exceeding Blackmon's liability
insurance limits.
Further, Blackmon has not demonstrated that notice to
creditors was ever published. Therefore the four-month limitation
expressed in AS 13.16.460 never began to run.
2. Alaska Statute 13.16.455
Hamilton and Willett next argue that AS 13.16.455
suspended the two-year personal injury limitations statute for four
months following Blackmon's death. We hold that Hamilton and
Willett are correct.
Alaska Statute 13.16.455 reads in pertinent part:
The running of any statute of limitations
measured from some other event than death and
advertisement for claims against a decedent is
suspended during the four months following the
decedent's death but resumes thereafter as to
claims not barred pursuant to the sections
which follow.[ (EN8)]
The quoted language ensures that the running of any
applicable statute of limitations is suspended for four months. As
AS 13.16.455 states, any statute of limitations (e.g., AS
09.10.070, which measures the limitation period by the occurrence
of "some other event") is tolled for four months following the
decedent's death. See Uniform Probate Code  3-802; 1 Uniform
Probate Code Practice Manual 325 cmt ("This section means that four
months is added to the normal period of limitations by reason of a
debtor's death before a debt is barred."). One court has held that
 3-802 "mandates that the claimant look to the applicable statute
of limitations as well as the nonclaim provisions in  3-803"and
that "[t]he clear purpose [of  3-802] is to give the claimant an
opportunity to seek satisfaction from the estate's personal
representative before bringing suit." Martel v. Stafford, 603 A.2d
345, 348 (Vt. 1991) (citation omitted).
Thus, AS 13.16.455 extends by four months the two-year
limit set by AS 09.10.070. The original complaint, filed within
twenty-eight months of the accident, was consequently timely.
B. Requirement of Appointment of Personal Representative for
Decedent's Estate
Hamilton and Willett argue that because they are not
attempting to enforce a claim against Blackmon's estate, AS
13.16.020 -- which requires the appointment of a personal
representative before commencing a claim against a decedent's
estate -- does not apply. They assert that AS 13.16.460(c)(2)
gives them the option of filing suit against either the decedent's
personal representative or the decedent. They argue that because
State Farm insured Blackmon, an action against him "whether he is
deceased or not"provides a basis for prosecuting their case.
Blackmon argues that "William E. Blackman, [sic]
deceased"is not a legal entity over which a court has personal
jurisdiction, and that Hamilton and Willett were consequently
required to begin a probate proceeding and obtain the appointment
of a personal representative to give the court personal and subject
matter jurisdiction.
A plaintiff seeking an award within the limits of a
deceased tortfeasor's liability insurance policy must nevertheless
obtain court appointment of a personal representative and bring
suit against the personal representative. Although other courts
have held that claims against a decedent's insurance policy are not
claims against the decedent's estate for purposes of a nonclaim
statute, courts nevertheless have held that the existence of a
liability insurance policy warrants the opening of an estate and
the appointment of a personal representative. Compare Corlett, 763
P.2d at 1174 (citing Sommermeyer v. Price, 603 P.2d 135 (Colo.
1979)) (holding that claims that will be paid by insurance are not
considered claims against the estate for purposes of that state's
statutory equivalent of UPC  3-803) with Price v. Sommermeyer, 577
P.2d 752, 755 (Colo. 1978) (adopting the "general rule"that a
right of indemnity under a liability insurance policy constitutes
a sufficient asset for the appointment of an administrator and the
probate of an estate).
Although no case explicitly states that a plaintiff
bringing a claim covered by liability insurance is required (as
opposed to permitted) to have an estate opened and a personal
representative appointed, at least under Alaska law, these
procedures are required even where the damages are limited to
insurance coverage. Alaska Statute 09.05.015(a)(11) does not
create jurisdiction over a deceased person, but instead provides
that an Alaska court has personal jurisdiction "in an action
against a personal representative to enforce a claim against the
deceased person represented"if the court would otherwise have
jurisdiction over the decedent if still living. Furthermore, under
Alaska law a plaintiff may not sue a tortfeasor's insurance company
directly. Evron v. Gilo, 777 P.2d 182, 187-88 (Alaska 1988);
Severson v. Estate of Severson, 627 P.2d 649, 651 (Alaska 1981).
See also William L. Prosser & W. Page Keeton, The Law of Torts 
82, at 586 (5th ed. 1984) ("[T]he injured plaintiff . . . had at
common law no direct remedy against the insurance company.").
Thus, by necessity, a plaintiff must open an estate and
obtain appointment of a personal representative to give a trial
court personal jurisdiction over the estate whether or not the
decedent was covered by liability insurance. (EN9) Consequently,
to pursue their claim, Hamilton and Willett were required to open
an estate and have the court appoint a personal representative for
Blackmon's estate.
C. Relation Back Doctrine
Under Alaska Civil Rule 15(c), an amendment changing the
party against whom the same claim is asserted relates back if,
within the statute of limitations, the party being brought in (1)
has received such notice of the institution of the action that the
party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the
merits; and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake
concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have
been brought against the party. (EN10)
Hamilton and Willett argue that if the superior court
determined that they were required to treat their claim as a claim
against Blackmon's estate, it should have given them an opportunity
to open an estate, obtain the appointment of a personal
representative, and amend their complaint so they could bring their
claim against the proper defendant. (EN11) Blackmon argues that a
complaint filed against a deceased person is void ab initio, and
that consequently there is no valid complaint to which an amendment
can relate back.
While we have never directly addressed the issue of
whether an amendment to substitute a personal representative for a
deceased person should be allowed to relate back, federal courts
and other state courts have. Under Federal Civil Rule 15(c),
amendments adding the representatives of the estates of deceased
persons as defendants have been permitted and held to relate back
to the date of the original proceedings. In such cases, the
appointed representatives were shown to have had actual notice and
knowledge of the action against the deceased person. Loudenslager
v. Teeple, 466 F.2d 249, 250-51 (3d Cir. 1972); Brennan v. Estate
of Smith, 301 F. Supp. 307, 309 (M.D. Pa. 1969). See also Davis v.
Cadwell, 94 F.R.D. 306, 308 (D. Del. 1982) (distinguishing
Loudenslager and Brennan because the appointed representative of an
estate did not possess actual knowledge and notice of the action
against her within the statutory period); Santana v. Holiday Inns,
Inc., 686 F.2d 736, 739 (9th Cir. 1982) (allowing relation back
where the original claim was barred by statute of limitations and
noting that the lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction for
the original pleading does not preclude relation back).
State courts have split on this issue. Some courts hold
that a complaint filed against a deceased person does not invoke
the jurisdiction of the court. These courts consequently hold that
where an original complaint is filed against a dead person before
the applicable statute of limitations has run, but the decedent's
representative is substituted by amendment after the statute of
limitations runs, the statute of limitations is a valid defense to
the action. McCue v. Colantoni, 400 N.E.2d 683, 687 (Ill. App.
1980) (citing Wells v. Lueber, 358 N.E.2d 293 (Ill. App. 1976)).
See also Bricker v. Borah, 469 N.E.2d 241, 242-43 (Ill. App. 1984)
(holding a complaint filed against a deceased person is void ab
initio and does not invoke the jurisdiction of the court,
precluding the possibility of substitution of parties).
Other state courts have rejected the argument that a
complaint brought against a person not within the court's
jurisdiction is a nullity ab initio and have allowed for
substitution of parties in such situations. Burcl v. North
Carolina Baptist Hosp., Inc., 293 S.E.2d 85, 94-95 (N.C. 1982)
(allowing relation back of amendment changing capacity in which
plaintiff sued, and noting that defendants had full notice of
wrongful death claim and were not prejudiced by change). See also
Thomas v. Grayson, 456 S.E.2d 377, 380-81 (S.C. 1995) (applying
relation back doctrine to allow assertion of qualification of
personal representative appointed subsequent to statute of
limitations). In Thomas the court noted that "[a] number of courts
have applied Rule 15(c) to allow relation back of amendments in
wrongful death actions where the personal representative was not
properly appointed." Thomas, 456 S.E.2d at 380 (citing Davis v.
Piper Aircraft Corp., 615 F.2d 606 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 448
U.S. 911 (1980); Slaughter v. Southern Talc Co., 949 F.2d 167 (5th
Cir. 1991); Santana v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 686 F.2d 736 (9th Cir.
1982); Burcl v. North Carolina Baptist Hosp., Inc., 293 S.E.2d 85
(N.C. 1982)).
Although we have never considered the precise question at
issue here, we have considered Civil Rule 15(c) on many occasions.
We have observed that the "touchstone"of the relation back
doctrine is fairness; that is, whether the substituted party has
fair notice of the cause of action and whether its rights will be
prejudiced if the delay is allowed. Farmer v. State, 788 P.2d 43,
47 (Alaska 1990). The rules should be liberally construed to
ensure that no plaintiff is deprived of a hearing on the merits
solely because of the intricacies and technical limitations of
pleading. Id. Although we have stated in dictum that Civil Rule
15(c) should be strictly construed, we have subsequently retreated
somewhat from that position. Id. at 48 & n.15. But see Siemion v.
Rumfelt, 825 P.2d 896, 899 n.3 (Alaska 1992) (taking "conservative
approach"of requiring a party to fulfill all the requirements of
Civil Rule 15(c) for the amended complaint to relate back).
In this case, State Farm does not argue that it did not
have actual notice and knowledge of the lawsuit; it instead appears
that State Farm had actual notice. (EN12) Blackmon states that
"plaintiffs' assertion . . . that Linda Stiffler received notice of
the suit and arranged for an attorney to defend it is absolutely
inaccurate. Counsel herein contacted Ms. Stiffler, not the other
way around." Hamilton and Willett assert that the law firm
defending Blackmon was retained by State Farm, and filed an entry
of appearance on June 28, 1993. Blackmon does not argue to the
contrary on appeal.
Nor does Blackmon argue that any potential defendant will
be prejudiced by allowing a substitution of parties. These factors
militate strongly in favor of permitting relation back. The
fundamental purpose of Civil Rule 15(c) -- fairness to the incoming
defendant -- appears to have been met. Farmer, 788 P.2d at 47; 6A
Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure  1498, at
106 (allowing amendments changing parties to relate back prevents
claim from being defeated on a "technical basis"when it should
have been decided on its merits). We thus agree with the federal
courts and those state courts holding similarly that amendments
adding the representatives of the estates of deceased persons as
defendants may relate back to the date of the original pleadings,
even if the original pleading erroneously named only the decedent
as the defendant.
In this case, however, Hamilton and Willett not only
failed to name the proper defendant, they also failed to follow the
procedures necessary to "create"the proper defendant by having an
estate opened and a personal representative appointed. Thus, an
amendment would require more than just serving the new defendant
and adding the name of the new defendant to the pleadings.
Hamilton and Willett would have to have the proper defendant
appointed before the pleadings could be amended. Blackmon argues
that this distinction precludes relation back. This argument
appears to rest on Blackmon's assertion that because plaintiffs did
not follow the proper procedures, the trial court was never vested
with jurisdiction. Just as we hold that a plaintiff can amend a
complaint brought against a deceased person after the statute of
limitations has run, we likewise hold that the plaintiff may have
a personal representative appointed. Thus, relation back may be
permitted even where substituting a new defendant first requires
that an appropriate defendant be appointed, provided that the
requirements of Civil Rule 15(c) are met.
Although we hold that the superior court is legally
permitted to apply the doctrine of relation back in cases where the
original complaint named a deceased person as the defendant, the
superior court never ruled on Hamilton and Willett's motion to
amend. We consequently must remand so the superior court can
decide whether they should be allowed to amend their complaint
under Civil Rule 15(a). Siemion, 825 P.2d at 898 n.2.
V. CONCLUSION
We adopt the rule articulated by the federal courts and
followed by some state courts that amendments adding the
representatives of the estates of deceased persons as defendants
may relate back to the date of the original proceedings. We thus
VACATE the dismissal of the complaint. We REMAND to the superior
court with instructions to consider plaintiffs' motion to amend.
ENDNOTES:
1. Both parties have referred to the defendant as "Blackman"
during this litigation. According to the record, the decedent's
name is properly spelled "Blackmon."
2. AS 13.16.020 provides:
A proceeding to enforce a claim against the
estate of a decedent or the decedent's
successors may not be revived or commenced
before the appointment of a personal
representative. After the appointment and
until distribution, all proceedings and
actions to enforce a claim against the estate
are governed by the procedure prescribed by
this chapter. After distribution a creditor
whose claim has not been barred may recover
from the distributees as provided in AS
13.16.635 or from a former personal
representative individually liable as provided
in AS 13.16.640. This section has no
application to a proceeding by a secured
creditor of the decedent to enforce a right to
the security except as to any deficiency
judgment which might be sought in the
proceeding.
3. Hamilton and Willett attached to their opening appellate brief
nineteen "exhibits,"only one of which is in the appellate record
designated by the parties. Prior to amendments to the Alaska Rules
of Appellate Procedure effective July 15, 1994, the appellate
record consisted of only those documents and things in the trial
court file expressly designated by the parties. Alaska R. App. P.
210(a)(1) (1994). That rule governs the appellate record in this
case. Apart from a return of service contained in the designated
appellate record, and a summons which was probably part of the
trial court's file, it does not appear from the record properly
before us that the other exhibits were available to the trial court
when it entered the rulings now on appeal. As a result, they could
not properly be added to the record by motion to supplement.
Alaska R. App. P. 210(h) (1994). The appellee has not, however,
objected that any of the exhibits is not properly before us;
instead the appellee's brief refers to two of the non-record
exhibits. Appellee has therefore waived any objection to our
consideration of the non-record exhibits.
4. If the original complaint was not timely filed, the issues of
relation back and proper personal jurisdiction are moot with regard
to the claims asserted by Michael Hamilton and Robyn Willett as
amendments must relate back to the date of a timely filed original
pleading. Siemion v. Rumfelt, 825 P.2d 896, 898-99 (Alaska 1992).
The issues would not be moot with regard to the minors since their
disability as minors continues to toll the statute of limitations.
AS 09.10.140. Truesdell v. Halliburton Co., Inc., 754 P.2d 236,
238 (Alaska 1988).
5. AS 13.16.455 provides:
Unless an estate is insolvent the
personal representative, with the consent of
all successors whose interests would be
affected, may waive any defense of limitations
available to the estate. If the defense is
not waived, no claim which was barred by any
statute of limitations at the time of the
decedent's death shall be allowed or paid.
The running of any statute of limitations
measured from some other event than death and
advertisement for claims against a decedent is
suspended during the four months following the
decedent's death but resumes thereafter as to
claims not barred pursuant to the sections
which follow. For purposes of any statute of
limitations, the proper presentation of a
claim under AS 13.16.465 is equivalent to
commencement of a proceeding on the claim.
6. AS 13.16.460(a) provides:
All claims against a decedent's estate
which arose before the death of the decedent,
including claims of the state and any
subdivision of it, whether due or to become
due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or
unliquidated, founded on contract, tort or
other legal basis, if not barred earlier by
other statute of limitations, are barred
against the estate, the personal
representative, and the heirs and devisees of
the decedent, unless presented as follows:
(1) within four months after the
date of the first publication of notice to
creditors if notice is given in compliance
with AS 13.16.450; however, claims barred by
the nonclaim statute at the decedent's
domicile before the first publication for
claims in this state are also barred in this
state;
(2) within three years after the
decedent's death, if notice to creditors has
not been published.
7. AS 13.16.460(c)(2) provides:
(c) Nothing in this section affects or
prevents:
. . . .
(2) to the limits of the insurance
protection only, any proceeding to establish
liability of the decedent or the personal
representative for which there is protection
through liability insurance.
The Uniform Probate Code (UPC) has been adopted by
Alaska. See AS 13.06.-13.36. AS 13.16.460 is materially identical
to UPC  3-803. See Uniform Probate Code  3-803 (1994); 1 Uniform
Probate Code Practice Manual 325-26 (Richard V. Wellman ed., 1977).
8. AS 13.16.455 is materially identical to  3-802 of the UPC.
See Uniform Probate Code  3-802; 1 Uniform Probate Code Practice
Manual 324.
9. As noted above, see supra part B, numerous courts have held
the appointment of an administrator and the probate of an estate is
permissible in this situation. Price, 577 P.2d at 755 n.3
(collecting cases). It is established that courts have subject
matter and personal jurisdiction over cases in which the "estate"
is comprised only of the decedent's liability insurance coverage.
Nothing in Alaska's probate code -- which is modelled after the
UPC, see AS 13.06.005-.010 -- indicates that courts in this state
should deviate from this rule. The extensive provisions in
Alaska's probate code regarding creditor's claims against the
estate offer adequate guidance to plaintiffs whose claims are
covered by the decedent's insurance policy. See AS 13.16.450-.525.
10. Alaska Civil Rule 15(c) provides:
Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the
claim or defense asserted in the amended
pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction
or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set
forth in the original pleading, the amendment
relates back to the date of the original
pleading. An amendment changing the party
against whom a claim is asserted relates back
if the foregoing provision is satisfied and,
within the period provided by law for
commencing the action against the party to be
brought in by amendment, that party (1) has
received such notice of the institution of the
action that the party will not be prejudiced
in maintaining a defense on the merits, and
(2) knew or should have known that, but for a
mistake concerning the identity of the proper
party, the action would have been brought
against the party.
11. Hamilton and Willett also argue that the superior court should
have permitted them to amend their complaint under the
misnomer doctrine. However, the misnomer doctrine is relevant
where,
the correct party was served so that the party
before the court is the one plaintiff intended
to sue, but the name or description of the
party in the complaint is deficient in some
respect. Under those circumstances, an
amendment merely correcting that description
does not entail the actual "changing"of the
parties and it should be allowed as a matter
of course as long as it satisfies the standard
in the first sentence of Rule 15(c).
6A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary K. Kane, Federal
Practice and Procedure  1498, at 130 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
The misnomer doctrine is not applicable here because the amendment
required in this case would be more substantive than merely
correcting the spelling of the decedent's name or restyling a party
to reflect its correct name.
12. It is the Estate of William Blackmon, not State Farm,
that Hamilton and Willett will seek to bring into the case when
they sue the estate's personal representative. As the estate has
not yet been opened it could not have notice of the claim against
it; it would therefore be impossible to satisfy the literal terms
of Civil Rule 15(c). However, State Farm is the only entity with
exposure for damages liability as a result of Hamilton and
Willett's action. Under these circumstances, actual notice to
State Farm suffices to meet the notice requirement of Civil Rule
15(c).
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