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Neilson v. Neilson (4/19/96), 914 P 2d 1268
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal correction
before publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers
are requested to bring errors to the attention of the
Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501; (907) 264-0607.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
ROBERT D. NEILSON, )
) Supreme Court No. S-6209
) Superior Court No.
v. ) 3AN-87-4292 CI
JUDITH NEILSON, ) O P I N I O N
Appellee. ) [No. 4337 - April 19, 1996]
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Elaine Andrews, Judge.
Appearances: Robert D. Neilson, New Zealand,
pro se. Judith Imlach, Anchorage, pro se.
Before: Rabinowitz, Matthews and Eastaugh,
Justices. [Moore, Chief Justice, and
Compton, Justice, not participating.]
This appeal raises two issues, both relating to child
support: (1) whether the superior court erred in denying a non-
custodial parent's Civil Rule 60(b) motion for relief from a
child support order; and (2) whether the superior court erred in
modifying the non-custodial parent's child support obligation
under Civil Rule 90.3.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Robert Neilson and Judith Imlach, formerly Judith
Neilson, were married in Anchorage in 1983. They had two
Zachary David Neilson, born April 17, 1984, and Aislinn Bridget
Neilson, born April 14, 1986. Robert filed for divorce in May
1987, and in April 1988, the superior court granted custody of
the children to Judith and ordered Robert to pay child support.
Robert moved to California after filing for divorce and resided
there through the time that he filed this appeal. Judith and the
children have remained in Alaska.
The parties' original divorce decree provided that
Robert's child support obligation would be the greater of $40 per
month per child or 27% of his average monthly income. The Child
Support Enforcement Division (CSED) calculated Robert's child
support obligation to be $227 per month based on his monthly
income. Under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
(URESA), Robert was also subject to a concurrent California child
support order in the amount of $234 per month.
In October 1989, after Robert contacted the CSED
inquiring about child support arrearages and the effect of the
two child support orders, the CSED responded to Robert stating:
Because of the complications involved in
keeping two separate orders, one based on
90.3 in Alaska and the other one in
California set by the California courts, our
client [Judith] requested that we accept
whatever the California courts decided
regarding child support amounts. Effective
March 1, 1989, this is what we have done.
Thereafter, on July 24, 1990, the CSED filed a motion in the
superior court of Alaska to modify child support. Specifically,
the motion, supported by an affidavit and memorandum of law,
requested that Robert's support obligation be increased to $368
per month. Robert received notice of Judith's motion and hired
counsel to represent him. On September 29, 1990, the superior
court granted Judith's motion and ordered Robert to pay $368 per
Robert then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, an
Opposition to Motion for Modification of Child Support, and a
Motion for Evidentiary Hearing, which Judith joined. Robert's
principal contention was that the CSED improperly denied some of
his business expenses when it calculated his Rule 90.3 support
obligation. The superior court granted both of Robert's motions.
Robert's attorney had filed a Motion to Withdraw with Cause,
which the superior court granted. Before withdrawing, Robert's
counsel sent him a letter stating that the "signed Order for
Evidentiary Hearing . . . will need to be calendared by your new
attorney." Though the record indicates that Robert hired a new
attorney, Robert notes that his new attorney "left the United
States promptly after his name appeared on the Substitution of
Counsel, and never did anything on Robert's behalf."
Consequently, since neither Robert nor his counsel followed up on
his previously granted motions, the superior court's September
29, 1990 order stood undisturbed.
In May 1993, after more than a two year hiatus in
proceedings, Robert, appearing pro se, filed a Civil Rule 60(b)
motion for relief from the superior court's 1990 order requiring
him to pay $368 per month. Judith filed a response to Robert's
motion and a cross motion to modify child support. The superior
court ordered both parties to file updated child support
affidavits, recent tax returns, and pay stubs, and set the case
for hearing before a Master.
After hearing evidence, the Master issued a report
recommending that Robert's Civil Rule 60(b) motion for relief be
denied and Judith's motion to modify child support be granted.
After he was granted an extension of time, Robert filed his
objections to the Master's Report, and Judith replied to his
objections. By order dated January 4, 1994, the superior court
approved the Master's report, denied Robert's motion, and ordered
Robert to pay modified child support in the amount of $535.01 per
On January 7, 1994, apparently before receiving notice
of the superior court's order, Robert filed motions for leave to
File Erratum, to Reject Master's Report, and to Grant a Hearing.
The superior court denied these motions. Robert appeals the
superior court's denial of his Civil Rule 60(b) motion, and his
January 7, 1994 motions, and its grant of Judith's motion to
modify child support.
A. The superior court did not err in denying Robert's
Civil Rule 60(b) motion.2
Robert's motion for relief from the order modifying his
child support obligation from $227 per month to $368 per month
was not filed until May 1993, over two years after Robert
received notice of it. Accordingly, his motion is limited to
grounds (4),(5) and (6) of Rule 60(b).3
Under Rule 60(b)(4), Robert seems to argue that the
Alaska Superior Court order permanently raising support to $368
is void because the California URESA order supersedes the pre-
existing Alaska order. In this respect, he observes that "[h]e
cannot reasonably be expected to serve or satisfy two masters
giving different instructions." To properly address this claim,
a short discussion of the URESA is helpful.
The original version of URESA, as adopted in Alaska in
1953, contained a provision which explicitly permitted the
concurrent existence of more than one valid, binding order of
support. The passage was found in section 30 of the 1950 version
of the uniform act, and it remains in force today in Alaska in
substantially the same form. It now reads:
An order of support issued by a court of this
state, when acting as a responding state,
does not supersede a previous order of
support issued in a divorce or separate
maintenance action, but the amounts for a
particular period paid under either order
shall be credited against amounts accruing or
accrued for the same period under both.
AS 25.25.240 (emphasis added); see also URESA ' 30, 9B U.L.A.
553, 600 (1987).
When URESA was amended in 1968 by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, a similar,
even more explicit provision replaced section 30 -- section 31 of
the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
(RURESA). Although RURESA was never adopted in Alaska,
California enacted it in 1970. 1970 Cal. Stat. 1126. Section 31
as adopted in California reads:
A support order made by a court of this state
pursuant to this chapter does not nullify and
is not nullified by a support order made by a
court of this state pursuant to any other law
or by a support order made by a court of any
other state pursuant to a substantially
similar provision of law, regardless of
priority of issuance, unless otherwise
specifically provided by the court. Amounts
paid for a particular period pursuant to a
support order made by the court of another
state shall be credited against the amounts
accruing or accrued for the same period under
a support order made by the court of this
Cal. Fam. Code ' 4840 (emphasis added).
Given that the California URESA order in this case did
not explicitly modify, nullify, or supersede the pre-existing
Alaska support order, we conclude that Civil Rule 60(b)(4) is
inapplicable since the September 29, 1990 Alaska order of support
was not superseded and thus was not void.
Under Rule 60(b)(5), Robert apparently argues that the
order "has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
[order] upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the [order] should
have prospective application." Alaska R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). To
this effect, Robert states:
By breaching her October 16, 1989 agreement
nine months after it was made, and by
continuing to have California determine and
collect child support from Robert, Judith is
estopped to deny that the September 29, 1990
Order is void.
The "October 16, 1989 agreement"referred to is the
letter the CSED sent to Robert stating that Judith "accept[s]
whatever the California courts decided regarding child support
amounts." Judith argues that the intention of the letter was to
relieve Robert of the necessity of providing income information
every six months. In a May 17, 1993 letter to the CSED, Judith
also explained her motivations as follows:
In June 22, 1989, a URESA order was entered
in California ordering support of $234.00 per
month . . . . I was informed by CSED that
they would no longer be making the
adjustments to the ongoing support every six
months as the Divorce Decree ordered. I
would have to request a modification through
the courts to have the amount changed. At the
time, I felt that the Alaskan and the
California URESA orders were close enough in
amounts that it would be easiser [sic] to go
with the California amount. I later realized
that there was a considerable difference
between the Alaskan and Californian Child
Support Guidelines, so in mid 1990, I
requested a modification of my Alaskan order.
Whether the parties had an agreement is not
determinative. What is determinative is the fact that the
parties never precluded future modifications. Therefore, we hold
that Robert failed to meet the requirements of Rule 60(b)(5) in
that the letter of October 1989 did not constitute a release,
satisfaction, or discharge of the superior court's support order
of September 29, 1990.
Robert also argues that he is entitled to relief under
Rule 60(b)(6). As we stated in O'Link v. O'Link, 632 P.2d 225,
229 (Alaska 1981), "Clause (6) is reserved for extraordinary
circumstances not covered by the preceding clauses." Robert
notes several personal factors -- bankruptcy, poverty, medical
conditions, and his attorneys' performance -- to support his
claim for relief under Rule 60(b)(6). However, these factors,
and especially any neglect on his attorneys' part, fall under the
first clause of the Rule 60(b) umbrella: mistake, inadvertence,
surprise or excusable neglect. However, since Robert made his
motion for relief more than one year after the order was entered,
he is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(1). Accordingly,
we conclude that the superior court did not abuse its discretion
in denying Robert's motion for relief under Rule 60(b)(6).
B. The superior court erred in accepting the Master's
clearly erroneous child support calculation.4
After hearing testimony and receiving evidence, the
Master concluded that Robert's modified support obligation should
be $535.01 per month. In arriving at this figure, the Master
disallowed approximately $7,020 worth of claimed expenses
submitted by Robert. Robert argues that the Master, as well as
the superior court by virtue of its adoption of the Master's
report, erred in two ways: (1) as a matter of law, it was
improper for the Master to disallow business expenses that are
otherwise allowable under the Internal Revenue Code; and (2) in
any event, the Master's factual findings were clearly erroneous.
In considering Robert's claim that the Master
improperly disallowed over two-thirds of his claimed business
expenses, the commentary to Civil Rule 90.3 is instructive:
Self-Employment Income. Income from self-
employment . . . includes the gross receipts
minus the ordinary and necessary expenses
required to produce the income. Ordinary and
necessary expenses do not include amounts
allowable by the IRS for the accelerated
component of depreciation expenses,
investment tax credits, or other business
expenses determined by the court to be
Civil Rule 90.3 Commentary, III(B).5 Robert argues that lacking
any guidelines for what constitutes an "ordinary and necessary"
expense, or for what constitutes an "inappropriate"expense, the
superior court should accept those deductions which the IRS
allows self-employed persons pursuant to the Internal Revenue
Code, provided there is no evidence of fraud. In this vein,
Robert argues that there should be a rebuttable presumption that
business expenses reported to the IRS are ordinary and necessary
for the production of income for purposes of child support
We have addressed the question of whether it is proper
for a parent to deduct business expenses in the context of
determining income for purposes of Rule 90.3. In Ogard v. Ogard,
808 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1991), this court, while recognizing that
total deference to a parent's tax returns may pose problems,
nonetheless held that straightline depreciation is an allowable
deduction under Civil Rule 90.3:
Furthermore, while we acknowledge the court's
concerns regarding the accuracy of an income
tax return as a reflection of true income,
the technique the court employed did not
allow sufficient recognition of appropriate
business expenses. . . . Depreciation is a
means of reflecting on an annual basis the
costs of capital equipment. Such costs are
real and should not be disregarded unless it
appears that equipment was acquired in order
to avoid or reduce the obligor's child
Id. at 819. See also Eagley, 849 P.2d at 781 ("We therefore hold
that in the context of a Civil Rule 90.3 adjusted income
determination, the superior court should allow, as ordinary and
necessary business expenses, a deduction for straightline
depreciation of the parent's business' real estate.").
This court also addressed the issue of claimed business
expenses in Coghill v. Coghill, 836 P.2d 921 (Alaska 1992):
[T]he [superior] court disallowed deductions
for certain expenses relating to use of an
automobile, work clothing, meals, a home
office, and imputed taxes. . . . In our view
[appellant] misunderstands the superior
court's denial of his various deductions.
The court was not implying that his expenses
. . . were not legitimate business expenses.
Rather, the court recognized that such
expenses reduced [appellant's] living
expenses. Here, where the meals were
consumed by [appellant] and where the type of
clothing purchased by [appellant] was not
significantly different from the clothing
purchased by most Alaskans, the superior
court properly disallowed deductions for
these and other expenses for the purposes of
computing Civil Rule 90.3 income.
Id. at 926. Though Judith takes this to mean that Rule 90.3
"limits business expenses beyond what is allowed by the IRS," a
closer reading of Coghill reveals that the holding was fact
specific. Id. at 926 n.6.
The distinguishing factor in Coghill, as illustrated
above in reference to clothing, was that the disallowed
"business"expenses would have been otherwise incurred. Id. That
is, in Rule 90.3 parlance, the expenses were not "ordinary and
necessary expenses required to produce . . . income." Rule 90.3
Commentary, III(B). In Coghill, the superior court made specific
findings that the claimed expenses were in fact personal, a
distinction lacking in the case at bar. Id.
In Zimin, 837 P.2d at 118, this court held that a
parent's contribution to a "Capital Construction Fund"was not an
allowable deduction for Rule 90.3 purposes. Id. at 122-23.
Significantly, the $25,000 contribution at issue, unlike
accelerated depreciation, is not the type of expense that the
commentary expressly disallows. Furthermore, under federal law,
the contribution was deductible from the parent's reportable
income. Id. at 120 & n.2. Nonetheless, we held that "[s]ince
the goal of the Rule 90.3 guidelines is to obtain a realistic
estimate of an obligor's adjusted annual income, these funds
should be included in [the obligor's] 1990 income for the
purposes of calculating child support. To hold otherwise would
severely understate [appellant's] most current income figures."
Id. at 123.
Two propositions can be gleaned from these decisions:
(1) this court, in contrast to Robert's suggestion, has refrained
from adopting a bright line test that all expenses recognized by
the IRS are similarly recognized under Rule 90.3;6 and (2)
instead of a hard and fast rule, the determinative factor as to
whether a claimed expense is deductible under Rule 90.3 is
whether it is an "ordinary and necessary expense required to
produce the income"and whether the allowance of such an expense
would defeat the goals of Civil Rule 90.3.
Thus, insofar as Robert's claimed expenses are
necessary for producing his income, they are deductible under
Rule 90.3. In this light, a parent's tax return serves two
functions. First, as evidence, it indicates whether a claimed
expense was in fact incurred. Second, it may support a parent's
claim that a given expense is ordinary and necessary. It does
not, however, serve as a proxy for the necessary determination of
whether a claimed expense was ordinary and necessary, though
there will be significant overlap.
In the case at bar, as we previously noted, the Master
disallowed over two-thirds of Robert's claimed business expenses.
In so doing, the Master deferred to Judith's testimony at hearing
and accepted her objections in toto. As the Master stated in his
Then [Judith] took his claimed business
expenses for that eight month period and did
her own review of their applicability. Her
testimony went through each of his claimed
expenses. Her testimony was convincing that
his claim of $10,334.98 in business expenses
for the eight month period was excessive.
She was persuasive that only $3,315.62 of his
claimed business expenses would be applicable
to the child support computation.
Judith's "review" of Robert's claimed expenses
consisted of an analysis of Robert's banking records as well as
the underlying components of each expense item. Some of her
assertions were supported. She noted that Robert claimed $179
for dues and publications expenses, which included a subscription
to "Surfer Magazine,"and that Robert claimed hundreds of dollars
for "professional"expenses that actually consisted of a debt for
legal services stemming from his personal bankruptcy. However,
most of Judith's assertions amounted to little more than her
unsubstantiated opinion as to what constituted a valid expense.
For instance, she testified that Robert's claimed rental expense
of $3,552.50 should not be allowed "because that is not an
allowable expense for self-employed people who work out of their
home."7 Judith "disallowed" Robert's claimed expenses for
repairs and maintenance as well as his utility expenses on the
same grounds. As for expenses related to Robert's vehicle, the
Master endorsed Judith's seemingly arbitrary claim that only one-
half of such expenses should be allowed since Robert also uses
his vehicle for personal use.8
On this record, it is clear that the Master erred. For
reasons discussed above, Robert's expenses, insofar as they were
ordinary and necessary, should be allowed under Rule 90.3.
Though deductions for a "home office" should be subject to
scrutiny,9 they should not be categorically disallowed.
Accordingly, to disallow all deductions for rent, utilities, and
repairs, when the record clearly indicates that such expenses
occurred and were necessary, is error.
Unlike Coghill, there is no evidence here that Robert's
claimed rental and vehicle related expenses would have been
incurred in any event. In fact, the only evidence presented
indicates that these expenses would have been avoided but for
Robert's income producing activities. The basis for holding that
Robert is entitled to a rental deduction for his "home office"is
not that the IRS recognizes such a deduction. Instead, the basis
is that the record clearly demonstrates that his allocated rental
expense is ordinary, necessary, and reasonably calculated.10
Similarly, the Master's adoption of Judith's arbitrary allotment
of 50% of Robert's vehicle expenses, in light of the evidence to
the contrary, is in error. Accordingly, Robert's rent and
vehicle related expenses should be held to be deductible.11
In addition to erroneously determining Robert's allowed
business expenses, the Master erred in his allocation of taxes
under Rule 90.3(a)(1)(A), which states:
(1) Adjusted annual income as used in this
rule means the parent's total income from all
(A) mandatory deductions such as
federal income tax, social security
tax, mandatory retirement
deductions and mandatory union
In short, the Master made two additional errors: (1) he computed
Robert's social security tax at 7.65%, though the rate for self-
employed persons is 15.3%; (2) he failed to consider Robert's
State of California income taxes, an expense no less mandatory
than the others listed in Rule 90.3(a)(1)(A).
Finally, Robert also claims that the Master erred in
computing the income side of his support calculation.
Specifically, he argues that it was error for the Master to
project his income for eight months of 1993 for the whole year,
since he earns less money from September to December. Though
Robert did present some evidence that the basis for the Master's
projection was flawed, we conclude that the Master's proration of
Robert's income was not clearly erroneous and it does not reflect
an abuse of discretion.12 See, e.g., Coghill, 836 P.2d at 926
("the superior court properly exercised its discretion and, on
the basis of the most complete evidence before it, chose the best
indicator of [appellant's] future earning capacity"); Renfro v.
Renfro, 848 P.2d 830, 833 (Alaska 1993)("This court has approved
of an averaging approach when a parent's future earnings are
The superior court properly denied Robert's Civil Rule
60(b) motion for relief from the superior court's order dated
September 29, 1990. However, in granting Judith's cross motion
for modification of child support under Civil Rule 90.3, the
superior court erred in adopting the Master's report since the
Master's underlying factual findings concerning Robert's business
and tax deductions are clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the
superior court is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part. The
superior court's modification order dated January 7, 1994 is
VACATED and REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this
2 We review the superior court's denial of Robert's
motion for Rule 60(b) relief for an abuse of discretion, which
exists if we are "left with the definite and firm conviction on
the whole record that the trial judge has made a mistake."
Gregor v. Hodges, 612 P.2d 1008, 1010 (Alaska 1980) (citation
3 Alaska Civil Rule 60(b) provides in part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court may relieve a party . . . from a[n]
. . . order . . . for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due
diligence could not have been discovered in
time to move for a new trial under Rule
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation,
or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied,
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment
upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or
(6) any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment.
The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time, and for reasons (1),(2) and
(3) not more than one year after the date of
notice of the judgment or orders as defined
in Civil Rule 58.1(c).
4 Civil Rule 53(d)(2) provides that the superior court
"shall accept the master's [factual] findings unless clearly
erroneous." However, the master's conclusions of law and
recommendations are not controlling, and the superior court is
free to disregard them. Headlough v. Headlough, 639 P.2d 1010,
1012 (Alaska 1982). Also, "[c]hild support determinations are
within the broad discretion of the trial court and will only be
reversed when we are left with a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made." Zimin v. Zimin, 837 P.2d 118, 123
n.8 (Alaska 1992)(citation omitted).
5 "While this court has not officially adopted or
approved the commentary, [it has] relied on it for guidance in
determining adjusted annual income for self-employed parents."
Eagley v. Eagley, 849 P.2d 777, 779 (Alaska 1993).
6 As one commentator has stated, "when determining which
business deductions to allow for the purposes of determining
child support, a court is not bound by the tax laws." 2 Jeff
Atkinson, Modern Child Custody Practice ' 10.23, at 525 (1986).
Similarly, as the Delaware Supreme Court held:
[S]ome aspects of the tax laws are designed
to encourage the growth in business
enterprises, whereas the child support laws
are necessarily concerned with the welfare of
the children. When the two approaches to net
income conflict, the Family Court is free to
depart from tax law accounting, but in doing
so the court must show that the departure is
reasonable and fair and practical under all
R.T. v. R.T., 494 A.2d 150, 154-55 (Del. 1985); see also Otte v.
Otte, 368 N.W.2d 293, 297 (Minn. App. 1985).
7 Concerning his work at home, Robert testified:
I do all my work out of the home. . . . I've
been in three locations to work . . . and
every one of them, the reason I moved into
them to begin with was so that I had room to
set up an office. My office is exclusively
used for work. My customers come here. The
place I just moved into, I had extensive
remodeling work done so that I have a place
where my clients can come and visit. It is
based on the square footage of the office
compared to the total square footage of the
house. Otherwise, I would be paying rent
somewhere else to have an office. I wouldn't
be able to work without a separate area to
work. I wouldn't be able to earn income.
8 Again, Robert's testimony is telling:
The truck was based on my actual business
mileage, and I took 69% of all vehicle
expenses, including the interest. Prior to
owning the truck, I took the standard
deduction based on the mileage.
9 As one commentator has stated:
The deduction of depreciation and other
business expenses is a common issue when a
parent owns a closely held company. Like
salary, business expenses can be manipulated
to affect net income, and some business
deductions may have a minimal effect on the
business owner's cash flow.
2 Atkinson, ' 10.23, at 525.
10 In Nass v. Seaton, 904 P.2d 412 (Alaska 1995), we said:
In Eagley we rejected the commentary's
categorical disallowance of all depreciation
of real estate, and held that straightline
depreciation of business real estate was
appropriate. Eagley thus requires reversal
of the superior court's disallowance of
straightline depreciation for that portion of
the residence which Fred used in his
machinery business. This aspect of the
appeal is therefore reversed and remanded
with instructions to calculate straightline
depreciation limited to the areas of the
residence that are in fact used in the
conduct of Fred's machinery business.
Id. at 417. Robert's disallowed rent and vehicle expenses were
calculated in conformity with this court's directive in Nass.
11 Specifically, Robert's rent ($3,553), insurance ($87),
repair ($144), utility ($205), and vehicle ($502) expenses were
improperly disallowed. Also improperly disallowed is $50 in
professional dues that Judith acknowledged at hearing as being
legitimate, but nonetheless were disallowed by the Master. Thus,
Robert's improperly disallowed deductions total $4,541. As for
his other disallowed expenses (totaling $2,529), Judith did
present evidence which arguably supports the Master's otherwise
cursory findings; that is, the Master's findings regarding these
expenses are not clearly erroneous.
12 In his motion to file an Erratum and Addendum, Robert
The "addendum" part is added to show the
factual errors made by the master in
calculating Mr. Neilson's gross income, and
while those errors did not use his incorrect
analysis of Mr. Neilson's gross income
directly in recommending an increased child
support obligation, Mr. Neilson believes that
incorrect analysis and resulting repeated
suggestions that Mr. Neilson was less than
credible affected the master's blind
acceptance of the former Mrs. Neilson's
disallowance of deductions from Mr. Neilson's
gross income [sic].
Thus, Robert's principal concern was not that the Master erred in
analyzing his proffered income information, but rather that the
Master's errors led it to conclude that Robert was not credible,
and thus served as the basis for disallowing his claimed
expenses. However, any concerns on Robert's part have been
addressed since, as discussed above, it has been shown that the
Master improperly disallowed some of his expenses.
13 Given this disposition, Robert's contention that the
superior court improperly denied his Motion to File Erratum and
Addendum to Objections to Master's Report, and for Order
Rejecting Master's Report and Granting Evidentiary Hearing is
rendered moot. Similarly, Robert's other listed points on appeal
are either moot, meritless, or have been expressly waived.