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Feichtinger v. Municipality of Anchorage (4/28/95), 893 P 2d 1266
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Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0607, fax (907) 276-5808.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
ERIC "FRANK"FEICHTINGER and )
JACQUELINE A. FEICHTINGER, ) Supreme Court Nos. S-5681/5791
individually and as natural )
parents and next best friends )
of M.F. and K.F., minors, ) Superior Court No.
) 3AN-91-10695 CI
Appellants and )
Cross-Appellees, )
) O P I N I O N
v. )
)
EATON CONANT, )
) [No. 4189 - April 28, 1995]
Appellee and )
Cross-Appellant, )
)
and )
)
MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, )
ANCHORAGE POLICE DEPARTMENT, )
KEVIN O'LEARY, JOSEPH AUSTIN, )
THOMAS WALKER, DWAYNE )
MCCONNELL, ANCHORAGE POLICE )
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, and )
the STATE OF ALASKA, )
)
Appellees. )
______________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the
State of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage,
Jonathan H. Link,
Judge.
Appearances: Edgar Paul Boyko, Boyko &
Flansberg, Anchorage, for Appellants and
Cross-Appellees. Julia B. Bockmon,
Robertson, Monagle & Eastaugh, Anchorage, for
Appellees and Cross-Appellant.
Before: Moore, Chief Justice,
Rabinowitz, Matthews and Compton, Justices.
[Eastaugh, Justice, not participating.]
MATTHEWS, Justice.
Frank Feichtinger was fired by the Anchorage Police
Department. Feichtinger filed an administrative grievance,
contending that he was terminated without just cause. Pursuant
to the contract between the Municipality of Anchorage and the
police officers' union, Feichtinger's grievance was heard by an
arbitrator. The arbitrator, Eaton Conant, decided against
Feichtinger.
Feichtinger sued Conant in superior court, alleging
that Conant deprived him of his due process rights during the
arbitration proceeding in violation of the underlying labor
contract.1 The superior court granted Conant summary judgment on
the grounds of arbitral immunity. Feichtinger appeals. We
affirm.
Arbitral immunity gives arbitrators absolute immunity
from liability for damages arising out of quasi-judicial actions
taken by them. See, e.g., International Union, United Auto.,
Aerospace, and Agr. Implement Workers of America and its Locals
656 and 985 v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 701 F.2d 1181, 1185 (6th
Cir. 1983). Arbitral immunity is the rule in virtually all
jurisdictions,2 and we now adopt it. We recognized the doctrine
of judicial immunity, which protects judges from liability for
their judicial acts, in DeNardo v. Michalski, 811 P.2d 315, 316
(Alaska 1991). In Lythgoe v. Guinn, 884 P.2d 1085, 1087-89
(Alaska 1994), we held that a court-appointed independent custody
investigator who performed quasi-judicial functions was protected
from suit by the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity. Like the
investigator in Lythgoe, arbitrators perform quasi-judicial
functions; our recognition of arbitral immunity flows naturally
from our decisions in Lythgoe and DeNardo.3
Feichtinger proposes that arbitral immunity should not
apply (1) where the arbitrator did not act in good faith;4 (2)
where a labor-management arbitrator commits gross negligence,
fraud, corruption, gross error, or misbehavior; (3) where an
arbitrator commits egregious misconduct; and/or (4) where the
arbitrator's behavior is extreme and outrageous. We decline to
adopt any of Feichtinger's proposed limits on arbitral immunity,
as doing so would undermine the policies served by arbitral
immunity.
Arbitral immunity encourages the settlement of disputes
by arbitrators. It protects the integrity of the arbitration
process from reprisals by dissatisfied parties. It enhances the
impartiality and independence of arbitrators. It lends finality
to decisions of arbitrators. And it makes it easier to recruit
arbitrators. See International Union, 701 F.2d at 1186-87;
Tamari v. Conrad, 552 F.2d 778, 781 (7th Cir. 1977); Dennis R.
Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, Arbitral Immunity, 11 Indus. Rel. L.J.
228, 233 (1989). Exposing arbitrators to personal liability
would weaken the effectiveness and attractiveness of arbitration
as an alternative to litigation.
Conant cross-appeals, arguing that the award of
attorney's fees to him was too low. Conant requested
approximately seventy-five percent of his actual fees; the
superior court awarded approximately thirty percent. An award of
attorney's fees will be overturned only upon a showing of abuse
of discretion or a showing that the award is manifestly
unreasonable. De Witt v. Liberty Leasing Co. of Alaska, 499 P.2d
599, 601 (Alaska 1972); Palfy v. Rice, 473 P.2d 606, 613 (Alaska
1970).5 Conant has not made such a showing. Conant's main
argument is that his entitlement to immunity "was clear as a
matter of law"and that a large fee award would discourage suits
against arbitrators and thereby serve the public policies behind
arbitral immunity. However, before this decision, no Alaska case
had addressed the issue of arbitral immunity. If a suit similar
to the one in this case were to be filed after the publication of
this decision, it could be frivolous and justify an award of
actual fees. See State v. University of Alaska, 624 P.2d 807,
817-18 (Alaska 1981). But since this is the first Alaska case
dealing with arbitral immunity, the award of attorney's fees was
well within the discretion allowed to the superior court.
Feichtinger's claims are barred by arbitral immunity.
The superior's court's award of attorney's fees was not an abuse
of discretion. In all respects, the decision of the superior
court is AFFIRMED.
_______________________________
1 Feichtinger alleged that the arbitrator committed
misconduct by (1) denying Feichtinger a fair hearing by refusing
to grant a continuance; (2) improperly excluding Feichtinger from
participating in the hearing; (3) deliberately misleading
Feichtinger by promising to hear his evidence and then
terminating the hearing without doing so; (4) colluding with the
Municipality to deny Feichtinger a fair hearing; (5) being biased
in favor of the Municipality, which was concealed from
Feichtinger; (6) fraudulently rendering a decision based on
evidence submitted only by one side; (7) deliberately trapping
Feichtinger into a situation where his proffered evidence could
be ruled untimely; and (8) conducting the hearing so unfairly
that Feichtinger was deprived of his fundamental due process
rights.
2 See, e.g., Skidmore v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 619
F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 854 (1980);
Tamari v. Conrad, 552 F.2d 778 (7th Cir. 1977); Fong v. American
Airlines, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 1340 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Merchants
Despatch Transp. Corp. v. System Federation No. One Ry. Emp.
Dept. AFL-CIO Carmen, 444 F. Supp. 75 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Jones v.
Brown, 6 N.W. 140 (Iowa 1880).
3 Some courts have held that arbitral immunity does not
apply where the arbitrator breaches his contract by failing to
issue a timely decision. See Baar v. Tigerman, 189 Cal. Rptr.
834, 836-39 (Cal. App. 1983); E. C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan
Const. Co. of Texas, 551 F.2d 1026, 1033-35 (5th Cir. 1977),
modified on other grounds, 559 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1067 (1978). We do not need to decide here
whether to adopt this exception to arbitral immunity, as
Feichtinger does not allege that Conant failed to issue a timely
decision.
4 In support of his argument that arbitral immunity
should not apply where the arbitrator acts in bad faith,
Feichtinger relies on Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104, 117-18
(9th Cir. 1962), and City of Durham v. Reidsville Engineering
Co., 120 S.E.2d 564, 567 (N.C. 1961). These cases are inapposite
because they involved engineers or architects performing quasi-
arbitral functions and employed by one of the parties, not true
arbitrators.
5 At the time Conant filed his motion for attorney's
fees, Alaska Civil Rule 82(a)(1) provided that attorney's fees
could be "fixed by the court in its discretion in a reasonable
amount" where the prevailing party did not win a monetary
judgment.
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