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S. Anchorage Concerned Coalition et al v. Coffey et al (11/12/93), 862 P 2d 168
<![CDATA[
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal correction
before publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers
are requested to bring typographical or other formal
errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate
Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, in order
that corrections may be made prior to permanent
publication.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
SOUTH ANCHORAGE CONCERNED )
COALITION, INC., DEANNA M. )
ESSERT, DON MARTIN McGEE, )
STEPHEN GERVEL AND KENNETH )
BANZHOF, ) ) Supreme Court
Appellants, ) File No. S-5197
)
v. ) Superior Court
) File No. 3AN-91-2830 CI
DAN COFFEY AND G.F. KALMBACH, )
and MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, )
) O P I N I O N
Appellees. )
________________________________) [No. 4024 - November 12, 1993]
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Karl S. Johnstone, Judge.
Appearances: Joyce E. Bamberger, Anchorage,
for Appellants. Kenneth D. Jensen, Jensen,
Harris & Roth, Anchorage, for Appellees.
Before: Moore, Chief Justice, Rabinowitz,
Burke and Compton, Justices. [Matthews,
Justice, not participating.]
BURKE, Justice.
The South Anchorage Concerned Coalition (SACC) appeals
the superior court's reversal of the Anchorage Planning and
Zoning Commission's (the Commission's) decision to deny a
conditional use permit to Dan Coffey and G.F. Kalmbach (Coffey).
The superior court ruled that the findings supporting the permit
denial were legally deficient and were not supported by
substantial evidence. The court ordered the Commission to grant
the permit. We reverse.
I. FACTS & PROCEEDINGS
The property involved in this appeal is a 58-acre
parcel of land known as the Kalmbach gravel pit. The property
was once operated as a commercial gravel pit but now lies idle.
It is located near Kincaid Park in Anchorage and abuts the south
side of Kincaid Road and the east side of Lucy Street. A sizable
housing development currently exists on the east side of Lucy
Street, but few other houses stand in close proximity to the
property. The property is zoned R-2A SL, a classification
designed primarily for noncommercial residential uses, but which
also permits "natural resource extraction"as a conditional use.
AMC 21.40.040(A), (D)(7).
Starting in August 1989, Coffey sought city approval
for a three-phase, residential subdivision development plan for
the property. The first phase of the plan called for the
completion of "grading"which entailed the extraction and removal
of 1.6 million cubic yards of marketable gravel from the property
over a period of three to five years. The final project phases
called for the completion of a residential subdivision conforming
to R-2A zoning. It was the proposed gravel extraction of phase
one which created the controversy giving rise to this appeal.
When Coffey's plan went to the Board of Adjustment1
(Board) for final approval, the Board determined that the
proposed gravel excavation was so extensive that a conditional
use permit was required. In March 1990, Coffey applied to the
Commission for a "natural resource extraction"conditional use
permit. With the application, Coffey submitted an extensive
"Conditional Use Narrative"which provided, among other things, a
grading plan, a staging plan, a truck haul plan, and a "Materials
Extraction/Restoration Study." The most significant features of
the proposed operation follow.
The grading operation envisioned the removal of 1.6
million cubic yards of gravel material from the site for
commercial sale. The gravel would be moved offsite in 80,000
truck trips over a three to five year period. Ten to twenty
trucks would leave the site per hour from 7 a.m. to 6 p.m.,
Monday through Saturday, five months out of the year. Trucks
would carry signs with the name of the subdivision development
company and a phone number for the public to call if the trucks
caused safety hazards or property damage. The truck drivers would
be registered and proof of insurance would be documented. The
trucks would enter and leave the site at Snead Street, the point
on the property farthest away from existing homes.
Silts and fine sands, called overburden, would first
have to be removed to access the marketable gravel. The
overburden would then be compacted back into the excavation pit
to attain the final subdivision grades. Coffey's engineering
geologist acknowledged that overburden is difficult to compact
when wet and concluded that engineering control would be
necessary to assure that structures built on the compacted
overburden would not be subjected to unstable ground conditions.
He nonetheless concluded that with proper engineering
supervision, the pit in question could be regraded to permit a
variety of future uses.2
Noise levels at the site would also occasionally exceed
the standard limitation of noise levels for residential property
set by the Municipality of Anchorage, but generally, activities
would remain below acceptable noise levels. The gravel
excavation would proceed to a maximum depth of 25 feet above mean
sea level, taking it to within 10-15 feet of the area's water
table.3 The final grade and contours of the proposed subdivision
would be fairly severe. Although the final contours would be an
improvement over the existing contours, the subdivision would
still be located in a depression with steep sloping sides (a two
foot horizontal to one foot vertical rise) fifty feet high.
According to the geologist's report, this 2:1 slope represented
the maximum slope allowable for hillside stability.
The Commission planning staff reviewed the Coffey plan
and recommended approval of the conditional use permit subject to
thirty-three operating conditions previously imposed by the
Platting Board and twenty-one additional conditions proposed by
the Commission staff.4 The staff apparently concluded that if
the final plan satisfied the fifty-four conditions of approval,
it would comply with municipal code standards.5 See AMC
21.50.020 and 21.50.070(B) (providing standards for the issuance
of a "natural resource extraction"conditional use permit).
On April 16, 1990, the Commission held a public hearing
on the use permit. The Commission heard from its planning staff,
Coffey and his representative, Mr. Sawhill, SACC representatives,
and many Sand Lake residents who opposed the permit application.6
The opposition's statements were primarily anecdotal accounts of
past negative experiences with the pits while they were operating
or assertions from residents that they had relied on the Sand
Lake Redevelopment Plan ("SLRP") when buying property and
believed that further gravel extraction would not be permitted in
the area. A few people giving statements had experience either
in land use planning, construction, or real estate, but no one
actually purported to provide "expert testimony."
The residents cited: (1) danger from gravel on the
road and dust and noise from the excavation operation; (2)
concern over water contamination if the excavation goes too deep
and hits the water table; (3) the dangers posed by heavy gravel
trucks on the road; (4) concern that the many permit conditions
could not be effectively enforced; (5) concern that project
guarantees would be insufficient to ensure that Coffey would go
forward with residential development once the gravel extraction
phase was complete; and (6) concern that the subdivision would
not be marketable given the glut of available housing and its
poor location in a former gravel pit.
At the end of the hearing, the commissioners voted
unanimously to deny the permit for the following reasons: (1) the
adverse impact of open pit mining on both the property values and
the quality of life of the residential neighborhoods near the
property;7 (2) concern that the depth of the proposed excavation,
particularly excavating "below grade,"was inconsistent with the
purpose and assumptions of the SLRP; (3) the Sand Lake pit
operators' understanding that no new, large-scale commercial
gravel operations would be allowed following adoption of the SLRP
by the Commission; (4) the fact that fifty-four conditions were
added to the plan indicated that it was an "inherently
incompatible use"with the surrounding area; (5) the belief that
the final contours of the subdivision were undesirable and
potentially unstable; (6) the plan was not "redevelopment" but
was actually commercial mining contrary to the SLRP and R-2A
zoning;8 (7) the desirability of a "master plan" for
redevelopment in which several gravel pit owners work together to
design a subdivision with less extreme grading; and (8) the
concern that gravel trucks leaving a residential area would pose
a safety hazard. Only one commissioner expressly concluded that
the plan actually satisfied the standards of AMC 21.50.020 and
.070. However, she voted to deny the permit because she believed
that the strong public sentiment against the project indicated
that there was "something wrong with the project."
After the vote, the planning staff drew up Resolution
No. 88-019A from the substance of the hearing minutes. The
findings of fact parallel the commissioners' above-stated reasons
for denying the permit. The resolution contained no separate
conclusions of law section.
As provided for in AMC 21.30.010, Coffey appealed the
permit denial to the Assembly sitting as the Board of Adjustment.
The Board concluded that Resolution 88-019A did not provide
sufficient findings to support the permit denial and remanded the
case back to the Commission for further findings. The Board did
not require the Commission to reopen the record or take
additional testimony. The Board members did not suggest that the
denial itself was improper, but they were concerned that the
Commission's findings might be insufficient to allow for judicial
review in an anticipated court challenge.
On remand, the Commission met to review proposed new
findings and conclusions which the planning staff had prepared
prior to the meeting. The commissioners reviewed the findings
section-by-section, making admendments as necessary. They then
adopted a new resolution which added a separate section for
"conclusions of law and fact."9 Among its findings, the
resolution states that the subdivision "requires a massive
commercial natural resource extraction"and notes that the plan
fails to conform to the SLRP in various ways. It further
provides: "The interim use . . . will have negative impacts to
the adjacent surrounding neighborhood, as well as traffic impacts
to the surrounding neighborhood." The "conclusions of law and
fact" rely heavily on the policies and goals of the SLRP to
justify denying the permit. Coffey again appealed to the
Board, but this time the Board affirmed the permit denial. The
Board recognized that the SLRP had not been adopted by the
Assembly but concluded that it was valid as a Commission guide to
future development of the Sand Lake Gravel pit area. The Board
noted that the commercial gravel industry and local residents
made substantial investments based on the SLRP which contemplated
the "projected closure of the Sand Lake area to gravel
extraction."10 The Board concluded that the evidence and the
Commission's findings adequately supported the permit denial.
Coffey appealed this decision to the superior court in
April 1991. Superior Court Judge Karl Johnstone reviewed the
Commission's findings and the administrative record and reversed
the permit denial. He determined that the Commission and the
Assembly had improperly relied on the SLRP as a standard and as
evidence to support its findings. He also held that the gravel
extraction operation could not be considered a permanent negative
impact to the area within the meaning of AMC 21.50.020. Judge
Johnstone further concluded from his review of the record that
the Commission had rejected Coffey's permit application based on
"community sentiment rather than objective and proper criteria."11
Instead of remanding the case to the planning agency for further
action, Judge Johnstone simply directed the city to issue the
permit. The city chose not to appeal this mandate and granted
the conditional use permit subject to the fifty-four conditions
which have been mentioned above. Judge Johnstone then stayed
action on this permit pending the outcome of SACC's appeal to
this court.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under AS 29.40.060 and AMC 21.30.180(A) and .190, the
superior court hears appeals from the Commission and Board of
Adjustment denials of conditional use permits. The appeal "shall
be heard solely on the record established before the municipal
bodies"and the zoning body's decision "shall not be reversed if,
in the light of the whole record, they are supported by
substantial evidence."AMC 21.30.190; see also Galt v. Stanton,
591 P.2d 960, 965 (Alaska 1979) (Rabinowitz J., concurring);
Keiner v. City of Anchorage, 378 P.2d 406, 411 (Alaska 1963).
The majority rule, and the one we adopt, is that judicial review
of zoning board decisions is narrow and that a presumption of
validity is accorded those decisions.12 See 3 Edward Ziegler,
Rathkoph's The Law of Zoning and Planning, 42.07 at 42-65
(1992). We will give no weight to the superior court's decision
but will independently review the record because the superior
court was acting as an intermediate appellate court with respect
to the Commission's decision. Cook Inlet Pipe Line Co. v. Alaska
Pub. Util. Comm'n, 836 P.2d 343, 348 (Alaska 1992).
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Commission correctly applied AMC
21.50.020 and 21.50.070 to deny the permit
application.
Anchorage Municipal Code 21.50.020 and 21.50.070(B)
provide the standards for determining whether the Commission may
issue a natural resource extraction conditional use permit.
The authority hearing a conditional use
application may approve[13] the application
only if it finds that the conditional use:
A. Furthers the goals and policies of
the Comprehensive Development Plan and
conforms to the Comprehensive Development
Plan in the manner required by Chapter 21.05;
B. Conforms to the standards for that
use in this title and regulations promulgated
under this title;
C. Will be compatible with existing and
planned uses in the surrounding neighborhood
and with the intent of its use district; and
D. Will not have a permanent negative
impact on the items listed below
substantially greater than that anticipated
from permitted development;
1. pedestrian and vehicular
traffic circulation and safety;
2. the demand for and availability
of public services and facilities;
3. noise, air, water or other
forms of environmental pollution;
4. the maintenance of compatible
and efficient development patterns and land
use intensities.
AMC 21.50.020.
In addition to these requirements, "natural resource
extraction" conditional use applications must also satisfy the
procedural requirements of AMC 21.50.070(A) and meet the
substantive standards of AMC 21.50.070(B). Subsection (B)
requires that (1) access to the operation "minimize the use of
residential streets"and that suitable dust and traffic controls
be adopted; (2) "the extraction operations will not pose a hazard
to the public health and safety;"(3) "the extraction operations
will not generate noise, dust, surface water runoff or traffic
that will unduly interface with surrounding land uses;"(4) "the
restoration plan . . . assures that after extraction operations
cease, the site will be left in a safe, stable and aesthetically
acceptable condition;" and 5) the use meets all additional
standards imposed by regulation.
SACC argues that the evidence and the Commission's
factual findings demonstrated that Coffey's proposed gravel
extraction operation failed to meet at least one, if not several,
of the substantive standards imposed by these ordinances. SACC
further argues that the Commission properly referred to and
relied on the SLRP in making its decision to deny the conditional
use permit.
1. The Status of the SLRP.
The Commission denied Coffey's permit application
based, in part, on the project's failure to conform to the
planning goals of the SLRP. Coffey argued successfully to the
superior court that reference to this document was improper
because it essentially added a new standard to the exclusive list
provided by AMC 21.50.020 and .070. We disagree.
We see no reason why the Commission should not be
allowed to consider the SLRP in ruling on the appropriateness of
a proposed conditional use in the Sand Lake area. Although the
Commission and the Board recognized that the SLRP did not have
the status of a zoning ordinance, the SLRP is a detailed,
thoroughly researched planning document which the Commission
adopted by resolution and has repeatedly used to guide its
decision-making in the Sand Lake area.14
In reviewing zoning decisions, courts generally try to
guard against prejudice, arbitrary decision-making, and improper
motives. See Ziegler, supra note 11, 41.06 at 41-29 and
41.14(3)(b) at 41-93. Reliance on comprehensive planning
documents actually helps combat these problems so long as the
Commission refers to them in a uniform fashion. The record does
not indicate that the Commission acted arbitrarily or with
prejudice when it judged Coffey's plan with reference to the
goals of the SLRP.15 Coffey provides no explanation why the
Commission should not consider the SLRP other than the fact that
it was not passed as an ordinance by the Assembly. We consider
Coffey's argument too restrictive.
As the Utah Supreme Court has explained:
[Z]oning authorities are bound by the
terms and standards of the applicable zoning
ordinance, and are not at liberty to either
grant or deny conditional use permits in
derogation of legislative standards. Within
the boundaries of such standards, however,
the zoning authority is afforded a broad
latitude of discretion.
Thurston v. Cache County, 626 P.2d 440, 444-45 (Utah 1981)
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Nothing in AMC 21.50.020
and .070 suggests that the planning goals of the SLRP are in
derogation of the conditional use standards. Because AMC
21.50.020(C) requires the Commission to determine if the use
"will be compatible with existing and planned uses in the
surrounding neighborhood,"it is reasonable for the Commission to
refer to studies explaining what the "existing and planned uses"
are. We, therefore, conclude that the Commission properly
referred to the SLRP as a planning document in reviewing the
permit application.
2. The Commission's Findings are
Sufficient to Support the Permit Denial.
Although no ordinance requires the Commission to make
specific findings of fact to support its conditional use
decisions, we have held that zoning boards and other agencies
making adjudicative decisions must articulate the reasons for
their decisions. See Kenai Peninsula Borough v. Ryherd, 628 P.2d
557, 562 (Alaska 1981). We have explained:
Such findings facilitate judicial
review, insure careful administrative
deliberation, assist the parties in preparing
for review, and restrain agencies within the
bounds of their jurisdiction.
City of Nome v. Catholic Bishop of N. Alaska, 707 P.2d 870, 875
(Alaska 1985). The test of sufficiency is thus a functional one:
do the Commission's findings facilitate this court's review,
assist the parties and restrain the agency within proper bounds?
The second set of factual findings issued by the
Commission is certainly not a model of clarity. However, when we
supplement the findings with the comments which the commissioners
made on the record while they considered the permit application,
their reasoning and conclusions become clear.
From the findings, we are able to conclude that the
Commission determined that the proposed conditional use failed to
comply with the standard set forth in AMC 21.50.020(C).
Subsection (C) requires that the conditional use "will be
compatible with existing and planned uses in the surrounding
neighborhood and with the intent of its use district."16 The
findings indicate that Coffey proposed a "massive commercial
natural resource extraction"which was in "inherent conflict"
with the "adjoining residential land uses." When these
statements are taken in conjunction with the commissioners
comments at the public hearing, they suffice to explain the basis
for the Commission's denial of the permit.
3. The Findings are Supported by
Substantial Evidence.
The clearest evidence of the incompatibility of uses
comes from the details of the gravel extraction plan itself. The
project envisions 80,000 truck loads of gravel, one truck leaving
every three minutes, six days a week, five months a year. It
establishes five years of heavy industry next to a residential
subdivision. The potential for dust, noise, cracked windshields,
water contamination, and serious traffic accidents is easily
established by the record.
The two uses are not made compatible simply by the fact
that Coffey's plan calls for dust mitigation and provides the
best possible truck routes with a number to call if the trucks
pose a danger. As one commissioner noted, the many conditions
imposed on the plan actually evidence its incompatibility with
the surrounding area. Simply because "natural resource
extraction" is permitted as a conditional use in R-2A areas
doesn't mean that large-scale commercial mining must be permitted
anywhere in the area so long as the mine operator takes every
reasonable precaution to conduct the operation carefully. See,
e.g., Byrum v. Board of Supervisors, 225 S.E.2d 369, 373 (Va.
1976) ("No matter how reasonably a hog farm is administered, its
very nature is going to make it incompatible with many other
uses.").
Therefore, we hold that the Commission's decision was
supported by substantial evidence. The superior court's decision
is REVERSED.
_______________________________
1. Under AMC 21.10.030, the Anchorage Assembly sits as the
Board of Adjustment to hear appeals from decisions of the
Platting Board and the Commission.
2. The geologist's report acknowledged that standard
Municipality specifications require that "backfill should be
placed in maximum 12 inch lifts and compacted to 95% maximum
density." However, the report concluded that this requirement
was "unduly restrictive"and that 95% density would "be difficult
or impossible to achieve due to the high natural moisture
contents in the silty overburden."
3. This feature of the plan caused considerable concern
among area residents about contamination of their well water
supply. However, Coffey's geologist concluded that past pit
operations had not adversely affected water quality.
4. Although Coffey attempts to bolster his argument by
relying on the planning staff's "approval"of his plan, the
transcript from the public hearing indicates that a planning
staff recommendation of "approval with conditions" is not as
significant as Coffey suggests. After one commissioner stated
that the planning staff should not have recommended the plan,
another commissioner explained that it was beneficial to the
process for the staff to lay out all the conditions which could
make the plan acceptable even if the overall plan was not
satisfactory. The planning staff representative also stated that
"99% of the time, we're going to give you conditions of
approval."
5. Given the fact that the most controversial aspect of the
Coffey Plan was the removal and sale of large quantities of
gravel, the planning staff recommendation surprisingly never
clearly explained how, or even if, this feature of the plan
conformed to the conditional use ordinances or the Sand Lake
Redevelopment Plan. At one point, the recommendation states that
the staff's original view was that material could not leave the
site for regrading purposes. The recommendation never clearly
explains why, or even if, this opinion has changed.
6. An overriding point of contention was the need to remove
such a large quantity of gravel from the site. SACC personnel and
Commissioners repeatedly argued that the property could reach the
proposed final grade of the subdivision without extracting the
marketable gravel below grade. They felt that the land could
simply be held until market conditions made a straightforward
subdivision development economically feasible or until more
gravel pit owners came together with a "masterplan" for
redevelopment of the area. On the other hand, Coffey, through
his representative Mr. Sawhill, maintained that the commercial
gravel operation was essential to development of the subdivision
because the profits from the gravel sales would fund the rest of
the development.
7. One commissioner stated: "Primarily, it comes down very
simple for me. If I knew that . . . I was buying into an area
where open pit mining was going to be going on, I wouldn't buy a
home there."
8. One commissioner stated that the "finished grades of the
subdivision look to me like the finished grades of a gravel pit."
9. The parties dispute whether both resolutions or only the
second one forms the basis for the denial. Coffey argues that
because 88-019A was never formally rescinded, both documents are
still in effect and should be considered the ratio decidendi of
the Commission's decision. Coffey's position actually hurts his
case because the two findings together provide stronger support
for the permit denial than the second resolution alone. However,
based on our reading on the transcript, it appears that the
Commission intended only the second resolution to have continuing
force.
10. In fact, the SLRP does not contemplate the closure of
the Sand Lake pits to all further gravel excavation. However, as
a general planning document, the SLRP does contemplate that all
future extraction plans be of a limited duration and always with
the primary goal of the residential development of the area. In
its conclusion, the SLRP also states that
strong consideration should be given to
permitting such extraction only for use in
filling unserviceable areas located in nearby
pits. . . . [C]onsideration should [also] be
given to filling in on-site unserviceable
areas first prior to export. Finally, in no
case shall extraction extend below those
contours established for a gravel-fed
sewerage system.
The SLRP proposed that the gravel pit owners join together to
work out a "master plan"for redevelopment of the area. It did
not endorse piecemeal development by individual pit owners. The
SLRP stated, "the primary goal is to establish a residential
community in this area. This has been determined to be in the
public's best interest; therefore, future action should follow in
this direction. Any plans that steer us farther from this goal
should be put to rest."
11. Although we agree with Judge Johnstone that a permit
denial based on negative community sentiment alone is improper,
we disagree with his reading of the record. As noted above, only
one commissioner expressly based her vote on "community
sentiment." The recognized rule is that a planning board may
always take evidence and testimony from community members into
account in making its permitting decisions, but that it may not
rely on neighborhood opposition alone as a reason to deny a
permit:
Zoning should not be allowed or
disallowed on the basis of a plebiscite of
the neighborhood, although evidence submitted
by persons living in the neighborhood who
would be most familiar with it and the
conditions therein may be considered.
3 Edward Ziegler, Rathkoph's The Law of Zoning and Planning
41.14 at 41-91 (1992); see also Thurston v. Cache County, 626
P.2d 440, 445 (Utah 1981) ("While it is true that the consent of
neighboring landowners may not be made a criterion for the
issuance or denial of a conditional use permit, there is no
impropriety in the solicitation of, or reliance upon, information
which may be furnished by other landowners in the vicinity of the
subject property at a public hearing.") (footnotes omitted).
12. The great weight of authority also suggests that zoning
board interpretations of zoning ordinances and planning documents
"should be given great weight and should be accepted whenever
there is a reasonable basis for the meaning given by the board."
Ziegler, supra note 11, 42.07 at 42-65; Seattle Shorelines
Coalition v. Justen, 609 P.2d 1371, 1373 (Wash. 1980).
On the construction of zoning ordinances, we have
previously held that the "appropriate standard of review is
substitution of judgment."Bocek Brothers v. Anchorage, 750 P.2d
335, 336 (Alaska 1988). However, Bocek involved a condemnation
proceeding rather than an administrative appeal of a planning
agency decision. Id. Because the case did not require it, the
superior court did not consider planning agency interpretations
of the ordinance in question. Likewise, we did not consider
whether zoning agency expertise came into play in interpreting
the ordinance. When a planning agency does, in fact, provide its
interpretation of an ordinance within its area of expertise, we
will give that interpretation considerable deference.
13. By its plain language, the ordinance requires that the
Commission deny permit applications if it finds that any standard
is not met. However, the use of the terms "may approve"
indicates that the Commission also has discretion to deny the
permit even if it finds that the standards are met.
14. Although SACC makes a cogent argument that the SLRP
could be considered an implementing "plan" or "policy tool"
within the hierarchy of documents that make up Anchorage's
Comprehensive Development Plan, we need not resolve this issue at
this time. See AMC 21.05.020-.025; AS 29.40.030 (the plan "may
include, but is not limited to, . . . statements of policies,
goals and standards"etc.).
15. In his opening remarks, Coffey's representative, Mr.
Sawhill, accepted the Commission's authority to refer to the SLRP
in making its decision. He stated that "The three sets of
standards we are to meet are the general standards for
conditional use in 21.50.020, the specific standards for natural
resource extraction in 21.50.0709(A)-(C), and then the standards
contained in Commission resolution 16-83 which adopts the [SLRP]
with the attached standards of operations which were items 1-10."
(Emphasis added.)
16. Coffey argues that because the Commission found that the
goal of residential development was compatible with the
surrounding neighborhood, his plan satisfied the standard in AMC
21.50.020(C). However, the ordinance plainly requires the
"conditional use"(i.e the gravel excavation) to be "compatible
with existing and planned land uses."AMC 21.50.020(C).
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