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B. Jones v. V. Jones (6/26/92), 835 P 2d 1173
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Notice: This is subject to formal
correction before publication in the Pacific
Reporter. Readers are requested to bring
typographical or other formal errors to the
attention of the Clerk of the Appellate
Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska
99501, in order that corrections may be made
prior to permanent publication.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
BILLIE G. JONES, )
) Supreme Court File No.
) S-4340
Appellant, ) Superior Court File No.
) 3AN-89-4200 Civil
)
v. ) O P I N I O N
)
VIRGINIA J. JONES, )
) [No. 3856 - June 26, 1992]
Appellee. )
______________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the
State of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, John Reese, Judge.
Appearances: Richard D. Pennington,
Richard D. Pennington & Associates, P.C.,
Anchorage, for Appellant. Kenneth C. Kirk,
Anchorage, for Appellee.
Before: Rabinowitz, Chief Justice,
Burke, Matthews, Compton and Moore, Justices.
MOORE, Justice.
RABINOWITZ, Chief Justice, dissenting in part.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this appeal, Billie Jones challenges the property
division and alimony award ordered by the superior court pursuant
to a divorce decree. Billie also challenges the superior court's
award of attorney's fees.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Billie and Virginia Jones were married in April 1951.
They have four children, all of whom are emancipated. The
couple separated in July 1988 after thirty-eight years of
marriage. At the time of trial, they were both about 57 years
old.
During most of the marriage, Billie worked for Shell
Oil Company. Virginia, who never completed the ninth grade, was
not employed during the marriage. Billie left Shell in 1982 to
work for British Petroleum (BP). At the time of separation, he
was earning about $145,000 per year. Billie was transferred to
BP's Houston office in April 1989 and currently earns
approximately $115,000 per year.
After Billie moved out of the couple's Anchorage home
in July 1988, he and Virginia kept the same joint bank account,
into which he continued to deposit his paychecks. Virginia
usually made the mortgage payments and paid other marital
obligations from this account. This arrangement continued until
May 19, 1989, when Virginia filed a complaint in superior court
requesting an order of separate maintenance. Billie
counterclaimed for divorce and property division. In June 1989,
the superior court ordered Billie to pay Virginia $2,900 per
month in interim spousal support. During the trial,
two experts testified as to Virginia's ability to obtain
employment. Dr. Scott Mackie, an expert in emergency and
internal medicine, testified that he had treated Virginia in 1988
and 1989 for hypertension, post-menopause problems, chronic lower
back pain, chronic leg pain due to a tumor, situational
depression, and chronic anxiety. He said that she would always
have some problems with anxiety and depression. He felt that
Virginia's ability to work was limited by her back problems and
emotional condition.
Richard Stone, an expert in vocational evaluation and
rehabilitation, testified that Dr. Mackie's deposition and
Virginia's medical records indicate that Virginia is capable of
performing sedentary work that does not require her to lift more
than ten pounds. He estimated Virginia's current earning
potential at $1,160 per month, and at $1,498 per month if she
were to obtain six months of formal training. He also testified
that his investigation of the employment market in Bakersfield,
California, where Virginia is presently residing, suggested that
numerous job opportunities existed for Virginia.
In his September 1990 decision, Judge John Reese
concluded that, in view of Mrs. Jones' age and debilitated
status, it is not reasonable to expect her to become economically
employed. The court found that Virginia's "reasonable needs are
somewhat in excess of $2,500.00 per month" and, in light of
Billie's lucrative and secure career, ordered him to pay Virginia
$2,500 per month in alimony until he retires at the age of 65.
The court explained that these payments "will maintain Mrs. Jones
in an appropriate station in life although somewhat less than the
standard of living to which she was accustomed in Alaska." To
satisfy her remaining needs, the court divided the marital
property in a manner which, using the asset values stipulated to
by the parties, allegedly gives Virginia seventy percent of the
assets and Billie thirty percent of the assets. As part of this
division, each party was awarded one-half of Billie's retirement
account benefits. The court stated that it is appropriate for the
parties to be economically separated from one another upon
retirement.
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the
court awarded Virginia $8,000 in attorney's fees. Billie appeals
the superior court's decisions regarding property division,
spousal support and attorney's fees.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Did the court err in dividing the marital assets?
Under Alaska law, a three-step process is used to
divide marital assets. First, the court determines what property
is available for distribution. Wanberg v. Wanberg, 664 P.2d 568,
570 (Alaska 1983). This determination "is reviewed under the
abuse of discretion standard, although it may involve legal
determinations to which this court applies its independent
judgment." Lewis v. Lewis, 785 P.2d 550, 552 (Alaska 1990).
Second, the court values that property. Wanberg, 664 P.2d at
570. This valuation is a factual determination, and will be
reversed only if clearly erroneous. Lewis, 785 P.2d at 552.
Finally, the court equitably allocates the property. Wanberg,
664 P.2d at 570. This court will reverse an allocation decision
only if the trial court abuses its discretion in allocating the
property, and then only if the allocation is clearly unjust.
Lewis, 785 P.2d at 552.
1. Did the court err when dividing the proceeds
from the sale of the motorhome?
The superior court's decision provides that "[t]he wife
is to receive . . . one-half of the 1973 motorhome proceeds at
$3,140.50,"and the "[d]efendant, husband, is awarded . . . one-
half of the 1973 Motorhome proceeds at $31,400.50." Billie
argues that the discrepancy between the stated values of one-half
the motorhome proceeds suggests that the court misvalued the
proceeds and erroneously credited him with receiving more
property than he actually received.1
This argument is without merit. There is a
typographical error in the decision regarding the amount of
Billie's share of the proceeds. This error was harmless. On
page four of the decision is a total of the marital assets being
awarded, $92,438. This is the amount which results if Billie is
credited with the proper amount of the motorhome proceeds.
2. Did the court err in failing to take into
account several transactions which
occurred during the time of separation?
Billie next claims that the superior court failed to
take into account four transactions which allegedly occurred
after the parties' separation.
First, Billie argues that the court failed to consider
Virginia's withdrawal of $26,720 from the couple's joint account
by means of 130 automatic teller machine withdrawals between July
1988 and June 1, 1989. Citing Hartland v. Hartland, 777 P.2d 636
(Alaska 1989), he claims that marital property dissipated after
separation but prior to divorce must be recaptured in calculating
the property available for distribution. In Hartland, we held
that a party's share of marital assets can be reduced if he or
she dissipated substantial amounts of marital assets for his or
her own benefit during the parties' separation. Id. at 642.
Virginia maintains that Billie's assertion that she
made these withdrawals is supported solely by Billie's
recollection that he withdrew money only from the Anchorage
Airport automatic teller machine. She also claims that he
ignores the court's decision to use June 1989, not September
1988, as the date for division of the retirement benefits.
Citing Streb v. Streb, 774 P.2d 798, 802 (Alaska 1989), she notes
this court's holding that until a married couple ceases to
operate as a financial unit, each party has the right to manage
and control marital funds.
The record indicates that the superior court was aware
of Billie's allegations that Virginia withdrew money from the
joint account. As Virginia suggests, the court apparently did
not take these transactions into account because it determined
that the parties continued to operate as a financial unit until
June 1, 1989. That is the date which the court used to value
Billie's retirement funds. The court's decision to value the
marital estate as of June 1, 1989 was reasonable, for the parties
did not initially view the separation as ending their marriage.
Virginia testified that she did not know during the initial
period of separation that the marriage was over, and that Billie
told her that it was not. She did not file a complaint
requesting an order of separate maintenance until May 19, 1989.
Under Streb, the court therefore did not abuse its discretion in
excluding from the marital estate the alleged withdrawals made
prior to June 1, 1989. Hartland is inapposite because the record
contains no evidence that Virginia spent money for her own
separate purposes prior to the date the parties ceased
functioning as an economic unit.
Second, Billie argues that the court did not take into
account Virginia's withdrawal of $3,326 from the parties' joint
account on May 31, 1989. Because this withdrawal occurred prior
to June 1, 1989, the date the court used in determining the
property available for distribution, the court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding the $3,326 from the marital estate.
Third, Billie claims that the parties loaned $7,020 to
their daughter on November 15, 1988, and that the daughter repaid
all $7,020 to Virginia. He argues that the court should have
forced Virginia to account for this repayment. While it is not
entirely clear from the record whether this amount was repaid,
the record suggests that it was repaid between September 1988 and
June 1989, when both parties continued to operate from joint
accounts. Virginia could not recall exactly when the money had
been repaid, but she said she knew "it wasn't very long
afterwards the loan"that her daughter repaid it, suggesting that
the loan was repaid prior to the date the parties ceased
functioning as an economic unit. Again, the court did not abuse
its discretion by including the loan repayments in the marital
estate.
Fourth, Billie claims the court should have considered
the $9,701 which he gave Virginia on November 16, 1989, in "an
effort to balance the amounts received by the parties." While
the court did not consider this money in its decision, it did
consider the money in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, and reduced the amount owed by Billie to Virginia by that
amount. Billie's criticisms are therefore unfounded.
3. Did the court err in failing to take into
account Billie's equity in the Subaru?
Despite the parties' stipulation that Billie retained a
1987 Subaru with an equity of $122, the superior court failed to
discuss this vehicle in its decision. It is unclear why the
court did not discuss this vehicle. On remand, the court should
take the car into account and, if necessary, adjust the
distribution of the property accordingly.
4. Did the court err in failing to take into
account the interim support payments?
Billie submits that the purpose of the court's order
awarding Virginia $2,900 per month in interim support was to
redistribute the parties' property. He claims that the $2,900
payments greatly exceeded Virginia's needs. He also argues that
in cases where the amount of interim support awarded is as large
as in this case,2 the trial court must take the interim support
payments into account when making a division of marital property.
As Virginia points out, Billie's argument is
inconsistent with our holding in Lewis concerning the role of
interim support in the allocation and distribution of marital
property. Lewis, 785 P.2d at 552-54. Citing cases from other
states, we wrote that "[i]n other jurisdictions the distinction
between alimony and the distribution of marital property is very
clear: _[A]limony is in no way a property settlement, but is the
provision made for the support of the wife._ [citations omitted]
We agree with this approach and consider it to be consistent with
our earlier decisions in this area." Id. at 553-54. We reversed
the superior court's decision to treat the interim support as a
distribution of marital property, stating that the court provided
no explanation for treating the interim support as a distribution
of marital property. Id. at 554.
Because Alaska law distinguishes between interim
support payments and marital property, Billie's argument that the
court should have considered these payments when distributing the
marital property is rejected.3
5. Did the court err in its valuation of the
proceeds from the sale of the residence?
Billie claims that the court erred in its valuation of
the proceeds from the sale of the family residence. Billie and
Virginia received $42,739 from the sale of the house. The court
credited each of the parties with one-half of this amount.
Billie alleges that this was a mistake, because he made three
house payments from post-separation income in the amount of
$6,889. He claims that the court should have subtracted $6,889
from the amount it credited Billie as having received from the
sale.
Virginia disagrees, arguing that these payments appear
to have been made from the joint accounts, and the court was
therefore correct in not including them in the marital estate.
The transcript indicates that Billie made these
payments in June, July and August of 1989. Because these
payments were made after the date the court determined the
parties were no longer a financial unit, and because the payments
were made from Billie's own funds, on remand the court should
consider whether he should be given credit for the payments he
made and, if necessary, adjust the distribution of the property
accordingly.
6. Did the court fail to equitably
allocate the marital assets?
Billie claims that the court failed to equitably
allocate the marital assets. Relying upon his arguments that the
court failed to consider many marital assets and failed to
consider his interim support payments, Billie argues that the
court did not achieve its goal of giving thirty percent of the
marital assets to Billie. In reality, Billie argues, he received
less than zero percent of the marital assets.
The court's decision reveals that it
carefully considered the factors for determining
an equitable division of marital assets which were
set forth in Merrill v. Merrill, 368 P.2d 546, 547
n.4 (Alaska 1962).4 As such, we find that the
court did not abuse its discretion in dividing the
property.5 We recognize, however, that the court
may alter its disposition of the marital property
after it takes into account the Subaru and the
mortgage payments made by Billie.
B. Did the court err in awarding alimony?
Billie argues that the superior court's award of
spousal support of $2,500 per month is erroneous for several
reasons. First, he claims that the court erroneously concluded
that it is not reasonable to expect Virginia to be economically
employed. Second, he claims that the alimony award was tainted
by the court's failure to properly analyze the amount of property
in the marital estate. Third, he suggests that the award
represents an impermissible attempt to balance the parties'
income rather than an effort to provide for Virginia's reasonable
needs. Finally, he maintains that Virginia exaggerated her
support needs.
Alaska Statute 25.24.160(a) provides that spousal
support may be awarded to the extent it is "just and necessary."
In Messina v. Messina, 583 P.2d 804, 805 (Alaska 1978), we held
that the standards provided in the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act,6 together with the Merrill factors, supra note 4, must be
considered in determining whether an alimony award is just and
necessary. In 1990, the Alaska Legislature amended AS
25.24.160(a)(2) to reflect this holding.7 An award of alimony
will not be set aside unless the trial court abused its
discretion when determining whether alimony is just and
necessary. Richmond v. Richmond, 779 P.2d 1211, 1215 (Alaska
1989).
We have recognized that awards of "rehabilitative
alimony" are appropriate when the recipient spouse intends to
apply the alimony toward job training designed to lead to
employment. See, e.g., Bussell v. Bussell, 623 P.2d 1221, 1224
(Alaska 1981). We also have upheld "reorientation alimony"
awards designed to "allow the requesting spouse an opportunity to
adjust to the changed financial circumstances accompanying a
divorce." Richmond, 779 P.2d at 1215 n.6 (citing Dixon v. Dixon,
747 P.2d 1169 (Alaska 1987)). The purpose of both rehabilitative
and reorientation alimony is to help a spouse adapt to the
changed financial circumstances following his or her divorce.
Either rehabilitative alimony or reorientation alimony where
appropriate is, in general, to be preferred to permanent alimony
because it is generally undesirable to require one person to
support another on a long-term basis in the absence of an
existing legal relationship.
The trial court apparently did not award Virginia
rehabilitative or reorientation alimony because it found that she
is not employable. We are not persuaded by Billie's arguments
that the judge erred in making this finding. Virginia did not
work outside of the home during her marriage and she failed in
her efforts as a church volunteer after her separation from
Billie. Doctor Mackie testified that she will continue to suffer
from serious physical and mental problems which make future
employment unlikely. While Mr. Stone testified that, based on
Dr. Mackie's deposition and Virginia's medical records, he felt
Virginia could find employment in Bakersfield, Mr. Stone appears
to have ignored Dr. Mackie's medical conclusions regarding
Virginia's disabilities. Because the record contains substantial
evidence in support of the court's finding that Virginia is not
employable, that determination was not clearly erroneous.
We do not address the remainder of Billie's arguments
because we believe the trial court failed to adequately assess
Virginia's needs before it awarded alimony. In determining
whether alimony is just and necessary, a court is obliged to
consider the "circumstances and necessities" of the parties.
Merrill v. Merrill, 368 P.2d at 547 n.4. While the court did
find that Virginia's "reasonable needs are somewhat in excess of
$2,500.00 per month," it did not make specific findings
concerning her financial needs and expenses. Our review of the
record reveals little evidence of Virginia's current
"circumstances and necessities."8 In the absence of specific
findings concerning Virginia's financial needs, we are unable to
evaluate whether $2,500 per month in alimony is just and
necessary. We therefore vacate the alimony award and remand the
issue of spousal support for findings concerning Virginia's
financial needs. In unusual cases like this one, where due to
Virginia's disabilities and lack of work experience the alimony
award is sizable, it is imperative that the trial court inquire
into the specific needs of the recipient spouse before making the
award.
C. Did the court err in awarding attorney's fees?
Billie challenges the superior court's award of
attorney's fees. He argues that the award was excessive since,
as a consequence of the superior court's decision, Virginia's
income will exceed his if she obtains employment.
In actions for divorce, attorney's fees awards are
committed to the discretion of the court. Rostel v. Rostel, 622
P.2d 429, 432 (Alaska 1981), overruled on other grounds, Moffitt
v. Moffitt, 749 P.2d 343, 347 n.3 (Alaska 1988). The "prevailing
party" standard of Rule 82 does not apply in divorce actions.
Siggelkow v. Siggelkow, 643 P.2d 985, 988 (Alaska 1982).
Instead, the court must base an award of fees on the parties'
relative economic situations and earning power. Johnson v.
Johnson, 564 P.2d 71, 76-77 (Alaska 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S.
1048 (1978); Burrell v. Burrell, 537 P.2d 1, 7 (Alaska 1975).
We disagree with Billie's contention that Virginia's
income will exceed his income. Billie has a high-paying job as a
manager in an oil company, and Virginia was found incapable of
working. Because Billie's economic situation is far superior to
Virginia's, the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
Virginia $8,000 in attorney's fees.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
RABINOWITZ, Chief Justice, dissenting.
I dissent from the court's holding vacating the
superior court's award of alimony and remanding the issue for
findings concerning Virginia Jones' financial needs.9 In my view
the court's analysis of this alimony issue overlooks relevant
findings by the superior court as well as explicit statutory
criteria which must be considered by the superior court in making
an alimony determination.
In relevant part AS 25.24.160 provides as follows:
(a) In a judgment in an action for
divorce or action declaring a marriage void
or at any time after judgment, the court may
provide
. . . .
(2) for the recovery by one party
from the other of an amount of money for
maintenance, for a limited or indefinite
period of time, in gross or in installments,
as may be just and necessary without regard
to which of the parties is in fault; an award
of maintenance must fairly allocate the
economic effect of divorce by being based on
a consideration of the following factors:
(A) the length of the marriage and
station in life of the parties during the
marriage;
(B) the age and health of the
parties;
(C) the earning capacity of the
parties, including their educational
backgrounds, training, employment skills,
work experiences, length of absence from the
job market, and custodial responsibilities
for children during the marriage;
(D) the financial condition of the
parties, including the availability and cost
of health insurance;
(E) the conduct of the parties,
including whether there has been unreasonable
depletion of marital assets;
(F) the division of property under
(4) of this subsection; and
(G) other factors the court
determines to be relevant in each individual
case;
In its finding number VII the superior court states:
For the reasons given in the decision of
court, it is just and necessary that husband
pay to wife the amount of $2,500 per month to
begin October 1, 1990 and end upon . . . the
husband reaching age 65. . . .
(Emphasis added.)
Review of the "Decision of Court"indicates that the
superior court followed the mandate of AS 25.24.160(a)(2) in
making its alimony determination. The superior court begins its
analysis of this subject by stating its conclusion:
This court also determines that because
of plaintiff's economic dependency upon
defendant as discussed below, she should be
entitled to spousal maintenance until
defendant's retirement at the age of 65 in
the amount of $2,500.00 per month.10
The superior court then notes that "This is a 38 year
marriage"; that the parties are 57 years of age; that Virginia
has "not worked outside of the home throughout this marriage";
that her education is less than ninth grade; that she has
extensive physical impairments and psychological difficulties;
and "[a]fter 38 years of marriage and at her mature age and
debilitated status, it is not reasonable to expect her to become
economically employed."
Of particular significance is the following portion of
the superior court's decision:
Until the time of retirement, however,
it will be necessary for Mrs. Jones to be
partially supported by Mr. Jones. Evidence
indicates that $2,500.00 per month would be
an appropriate level of alimony for Mr. Jones
to pay during these remaining few years.
This would maintain Mrs. Jones in an
appropriate station in life although somewhat
less than the standard of living to which she
was accustomed in Alaska. It would also
allow Mr. Jones to maintain an appropriate
station in life and an appropriate standard
of living as well.11
(Emphasis added.)
In contrast to the above, the court appears to focus
exclusively upon Virginia Jones' specific financial needs to the
exclusion of all other relevant factors mandated for
consideration by AS 25.24.160(a)(2).
As to the merits of this issue, I would affirm the
superior court's award of alimony. I think it important to
recognize the compelling facts which support the superior court's
resolution of this issue. Here we have a marriage of 38 years'
duration in which it is obvious that the parties mutually
decided that Virginia would remain at home and raise their four
children. At no time during the parties' 38 year marriage was
Virginia employed outside the home (Virginia never completed the
ninth grade). The record is also clear that given Virginia's age
(57 years old), and the debilitated status of her health (both
physical and emotional), the superior court was correct in its
conclusion that it is not reasonable to expect Virginia to work.
On the other hand, the evidence is uncontradicted that Billie
Jones earns at least $115,00 annually.
Given the above, and the record support for the
superior court's conclusion that Virginia's reasonable needs are
in excess of $2,500 per month and that this amount of alimony
will maintain Virginia at an appropriate station in life (for the
eight years in question), I would affirm the superior court's
award of alimony.12
_______________________________
1. The parties stipulated that the motorhome was sold for
$6,281. One-half of this amount is $3,140.50.
2. Billie paid interim support payments of $2,900 per month
for sixteen months. He paid a total of $46,400 in interim
support.
3. Billie's arguments that the interim payments were
excessive and represent an attempt to redistribute the parties'
property are also rejected.
4. In Merrill v. Merrill, 368 P.2d 546, 547 n.4 (Alaska
1962), we wrote:
It has been held that the principal
factors to be considered by the trial court
in determining the question of alimony or
division of property as between the parties
are the respective ages of the parties; their
earning ability; the duration and conduct of
each during the marriage; their station in
life; the circumstances and necessities of
each; their health and physical condition;
their financial circumstances, including the
time and manner of acquisition of the
property in question, its value at the time
and its income producing capacity if any.
5. We reject Billie's arguments that the court erred in
considering Virginia's age when it divided the marital property
and awarded spousal support. See Schoning v. Schoning, 550 P.2d
373, 374 (Alaska 1976) (recognizing that courts are to consider
the ages of the parties in determining questions of spousal
support and division of property).
6. In Messina v. Messina, 583 P.2d 804 (Alaska 1978), we
wrote:
The Uniform Marriage & Divorce Act,
approved by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and
recommended for passage by the states by the
American Bar Association, provides for
alimony only if the spouse seeking
maintenance:
1. lacks
sufficient property to provide
for his reasonable needs; and
2. is unable
to support himself
through appopriate
employment or is the
custodian of a child
whose condition or
circumstances make it
appropriate that the
custodian may not be
required to seek
employment outside the
home. (footnote omitted)
The comment pertaining to these provisions states:
The dual intention of this section and
Section 307 [property division] is to
encourage the court to provide for the
financial needs of the spouses by property
disposition rather than by an award of
maintenance. Only if the available property
is insufficient for the purpose and if the
spouse who seeks maintenance is unable to
secure employment appropriate to his skills
and interests or is occupied with child care
may an award of maintenance be ordered.
Id. at 804-05 (quoting Uniform Marriage & Divorce Act
308(a)(1)).
7. AS 25.24.160(a)(2) provides that courts should make
awards of separate maintenance "as may be just and necessary
without regard to which of the parties is in fault." The 1990
amendments to this statute added a list of factors which courts
must consider in making awards of separate maintenance:
(A) the length of the marriage and
station in life of the parties during the
marriage;
(B) the age and health of the parties;
(C) the earning capacity of the
parties, including their educational
backgrounds, training, employment skills,
work experiences, length of absence from the
job market, and custodial responsibilities
for children during the marriage;
(D) the financial condition of the
parties, including the availability and cost
of health insurance;
(E) the conduct of the parties,
including whether there has been unreasonable
depletion of marital assets;
(F) the division of property under (4)
of this subsection; and
(G) other factors the court determines
to be relevant in each individual case;
The 1990 amendments do not change the outcome of this case. As
we recognized in Bays v. Bays, 807 P.2d 482, 485 n.5 (Alaska
1991) (citing Ch. 130, 1, SLA 1990), "the express purpose of
the 1990 amendments was to _restate the principle factors found
in the case law, not to change them, affect the interpretation
given to them, or preclude changes or additions to them by other
court rulings._"
8. Virginia's financial declaration states that her total
monthly expenses are $4,021, but this figure appears to overstate
her actual needs. For example, Virginia claims that she pays
$150 per month in telephone expenses, $250 per month for gas,
oil, and auto repair, $200 per month for dental expenses, $600
per month for food and household supplies, and $500 per month for
"incidentals."Unfortunately, the record contains no receipts or
canceled checks which verify Virginia's claimed monthly expenses.
In cases where a party requests a large permanent alimony award,
that party must reasonably verify his or her claimed financial
needs.
9. I agree with all of the court's other holdings.
10. The effect of this provision is that Billie G. Jones'
obligation to pay alimony terminates in eight years.
11. See AS 25.24.160(a)(2)(A) note 1, supra.
12. My view that the superior court's award of alimony
should be affirmed is based in part upon a construction of "just
and necessary", and the other factors articulated in AS
25.24.160(a)(2), which leads me to conclude that the legislature
did not intend to limit alimony to subsistence levels for
recipient spouses.
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