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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Austin Ahmasuk v. Division of Banking and Securities (1/8/2021) sp-7498

Austin Ahmasuk v. Division of Banking and Securities (1/8/2021) sp-7498, 478 P.3d 665

           Notice:   This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the P                     ACIFIC  REPORTER.  

           Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts,  

                                                                                                                         

           303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email  

                                                                                                                            

           corrections@akcourts.us.  



                       THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA                                       



AUSTIN  AHMASUK,                                                       )  

                                                                       )   Supreme Court No. S-17414  

                                                                                                      

                                                                                                             

                                 Appellant,                            )  

                                                                       )   Superior  Court  No.  3AN-18-06035  CI  

           v.                                                          )  

                                                                                                

                                                                       )   O P I N I O N  

                                        

STATE OF ALASKA, DEPARTMENT                                           )  

                                                                                                                 

                                                           

OF COMMERCE, COMMUNITY &                                               )   No. 7498 - January 8, 2021  

                        

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,                                                  )  

                                              

DIVISION OF BANKING &                                                  )  

SECURITIES,                                                            )  

                                                                       )  

                                Appellee.                              )  

                                                                       )  



                                                                                                               

                                                  

                      Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third  

                                                                                                     

                      Judicial District, Anchorage, Andrew Peterson, Judge.  



                                                                                                              

                      Appearances:               Susan  Orlansky,  Reeves  Amodio  LLC,  

                                                                                                        

                      Anchorage,  for  Appellant.                    Robert  H.  Schmidt,  Assistant  

                                                                                                       

                      Attorney  General,  Anchorage,  and  Kevin  G.  Clarkson,  

                                                                                                                 

                      Attorney   General,   Juneau,   for   Appellee.                                 Jahna   M.  

                                                                                                                   

                      Lindemuth, Holmes Weddle & Barcott, PC, Anchorage, for  

                                                                                                           

                      Amici  Curiae  Bristol  Bay  Native  Corporation;  Calista  

                                                                                                        

                      Corporation; Cook Inlet Region, Inc.; and Doyon Limited.  



                                                                                                                         

                      Before:  Winfree, Stowers, Maassen, and Carney, Justices.  

                                                                  

                      [Bolger, Chief Justice, not participating.]  



                                           

                      WINFREE, Justice.  


----------------------- Page 2-----------------------

I.         INTRODUCTION  



                       The Alaska Division of Banking and Securities civilly fined Sitnasuak  

                                                                                                                         



Native Corporation shareholder Austin Ahmasuk for submitting a newspaper opinion  

                                                                                                                                       



letter about Sitnasuak's shareholder proxy voting procedures without filing that letter  

                                                                                                                                           



with the Division as a shareholder proxy solicitation.  Ahmasuk filed an agency appeal,  

                                                                                                                                        



arguing that the Division wrongly interpreted its proxy solicitation regulation to cover  

                                                                                                                                           



his  letter  and  violated  his  constitutional  due  process  and  free  speech  rights.                                                     An  

                                                                                                                                              



administrative law judge upheld the Division's sanction in an order that became the final  

                                                                                                                                             



agency decision, and the superior court upheld that decision in a subsequent appeal.  

                                                                                                                                                      



Ahmasuk raises his same arguments on appeal to us.   We conclude that Ahmasuk's  

                                                                                                                                



opinion letter is not a proxy solicitation under the Division's controlling regulations, and  

                                                                                                                                              



we thereforereversethesuperior court's decision upholding the Division's civil sanction  

                                                                                                                                       



against Ahmasuk without reaching the constitutional arguments.  

                                                                                            



II.        BACKGROUND  



                                                                                                                            

           A.          State Laws And Regulations Relevant To Alaska Native Corporations  



                                                                                                                                             

                       Corporations  authorized  by  the  Alaska  Native  Claims  Settlement  Act  



                  1                                                                                             2  

(ANCSA)                                                                                                                             

                    are incorporated under the Alaska Corporations Code.                                            ANCSA explicitly  



                                                                                                                                    3  

                                                                                                                                               

exempts ANCSA corporations from federal securities regulation compliance,                                                              and the  



            1          Pub.   L.   No.   92-203,   §§   7-8,   85 Stat.                    688,   691-94   (1971)   (codified as   



amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1606-1607 (2020)) (authorizing creation of Alaska-chartered                                    

regional and village native corporations).         



           2           AS 10.06.960-.961 (providing that corporations organized under ANCSA  

                                                                                                                                      

are subject to corporations code provisions, with specified overriding exceptions).  

                                                                                                                        



           3           43 U.S.C. § 1625.  

                                             



                                                                       -2-                                                                 7498
  


----------------------- Page 3-----------------------

Division thereforeregulatescertain                                                                             activities ofspecified ANCSAcorporations                                                                                                and their  

shareholders and investigates complaints of illegal conduct.                                                                                                                                  4  



                                           The dispute in this appeal - involving ANCSA corporation shareholder  



voting and proxy solicitation - requires an initial consideration of relevant Alaska  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            

corporations  code  statutes,5                                                                  Alaska  securities  regulation  statutes,6                                                                                      and  regulations  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              



promulgated by the Division in its role as regulator of ANCSA corporations' shareholder  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               

election activities.7   We begin with shareholder voting, move next to shareholder voting  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               



by proxy, and then conclude with solicitation of shareholder proxies.  

                                                                                                                                                                                                  



                                           1.                   Shareholder voting  

                                                                                                            



                                           Generally, subject to variation in a corporation's articles of incorporation,  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      



a shareholder has the right to one vote per share owned and to "vote on each matter  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              



                     4                    See, e.g.                   , AS 45.55.139 (limiting coverage to ANCSA corporations with                                                                                                                                   



500 or more shareholders and total assets exceeding $1,000,000); AS 45.55.910(a)(1)                                                                                                                                 

(authorizing Division to conduct investigations to determine whether "any provision of                                                                                                                                                                                       

this chapter or a regulation or order under this chapter" has been or will be violated);                                                                                                                                                                                              

3 Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) 08.307 (2020) (governing ANCSA corporation                                                                                                                                                                 

proxy solicitation filings); 3 AAC 08.360 (detailing filing process);                                                                                                                                                    see also Henrichs   

v.   Chugach Alaska Corp.                                                          , 260 P.3d 1036, 1044 (Alaska 2011) (stating that ANCSA                                                                                                             

corporations are subject to Alaska proxy regulations but not federal proxy regulations).                                                                                                                                                                                              

See generally                               AS 45.55.138-.990 ("Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act Corporations                                                                                                                          

Proxy  Solicitations   and   Stock");   3   AAC   08.305-.365   ("Alaska   Native   Claims   Act  

Corporations:   Solicitation of Proxies").                                                     



                     5                    See generally AS 10.06.005-.995 ("Alaska Corporations Code").  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 



                     6                    See generally AS 45.55.138-.990 ("Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        

Corporations Proxy Solicitations and Stock").  

                                                                                                                        



                     7                    See   generally   3   AAC   08.305-.365   ("Alaska   Native   Claims   Act  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    

Corporations:  Solicitation of Proxies").  

                                                                                               



                                                                                                                                     -3-                                                                                                                            7498
  


----------------------- Page 4-----------------------

                                                                                       8  

submitted to a vote at a meeting of shareholders."                                        And with respect to electing members                



to a board of directors, again unless the articles of incorporation provide otherwise, a                                                                    

                                                                9  i.e., may vote "the number of shares owned by the  

shareholder may "cumulate votes,"                                                                                                                        



shareholder  for  as  many  persons  as  there  are  directors  to  be  elected,"  giving  one  

                                                                                                                                                       



candidate all votes or distributing votes among candidates as the shareholder deems  

                                                                                                                                                  

appropriate.10   For example, a shareholder with 100 shares of stock voting in an election  

                                                                                                                                                



of 4 members to the board of directors would have 400 votes to cast, either all for 1  

                                                                                                                                                            



candidate or divided among the candidates in any way the shareholder chooses.  

                                                                                                                                  



                        2.           Shareholder proxy voting  

                                                                           



                        Generally, a "person entitled to vote shares may authorize another person  

                                                                                                                                                  



                                                                                                 11  

                                                                                                                                            

or persons to act by proxy with respect to the shares."                                               The term "proxy" is statutorily  

                                                                                   



                                                                                                                                                            

defined in simple fashion as "a written authorization . . . signed by a shareholder . . .  



                                                                                                                                                       12  

                                                                                                                               

giving another person power to vote with respect to the shares of the shareholder." 



                        By  statute  the  Division  regulates  certain  ANCSA  corporation  and  

                                                                                                                                                      

shareholder election activities.13  

                                                                                                                                          

                                                           The Division has promulgated two relevant regulations  



            8           AS   10.06.420(a).  



            9           Rude  v.  Cook  Inlet  Region,  Inc.,  322  P.3d  853,  856-57  (Alaska  2014).  



            10          AS   10.06.420(d).  



            11          AS  10.06.418(a);  see  also  AS  10.06.420(c)  (permitting  shareholder  voting  



in  person  or  by  proxy);  AS  10.06.420(d)  (permitting  proxy  voting  in  director  elections).  



            12          AS   10.06.990(34);  see  also  Proxy, BLACK 'S  LAW  DICTIONARY  (11th  ed.  



2019)  ("Someone  who  is  authorized  to  act  as  a  substitute  for  another;  esp.,  in  corporate  

law,  a  person  who  is  authorized  to  vote  another's  stock  shares.").  



            13          See, e.g., AS 45.55.139 (requiring, for certain ANCSA corporations, that  

                                                                                                

copies "of all annual reports, proxies, consents or authorizations, proxy statements, and  

                                                                                                                                                        

                                                                                                                                     (continued...)  



                                                                            -4-                                                                     7498
  


----------------------- Page 5-----------------------

about proxies.                   First, the Division has construed "proxy" more expansively than the                                                                         



corporations code by defining it as "a written authorization which may take the form of                                                                                        



a consent, revocation of authority, or failure to act or dissent, signed by a shareholder . . .                                                                                   



                                                                                                                                                                                14  

and giving another person power to vote with respect to the shares of the shareholder."                                                                                              

Second, the Division has established specific substantive proxy rules.15  For example, the  

                                                                                                                                                                              



relevant regulation provides that one who holds a proxy "shall vote in accordance with  

                                                                                                                                                                          



any choices made by the shareholder or in the manner provided by the proxy when the  

                                                                                                                                                                             

shareholder  has  not  specified  a  choice."16                                                With  respect  to  electing  directors,  that  

                                                                                                                                                                           



regulation also describes how a proxy document must present the shareholder with  

                                                                                                                                                                          



              13            (...continued)  



                                                                                                                                                    

other materials relating to proxy solicitations distributed, published, or made available  

                                                                                                                                                                               

by any person . . . shall be filed with the [Division] concurrently with its distribution to  

                                                                                                                                                                            

shareholders");  AS  45.55.160  ("A  person  may  not,  in  a  document  filed  with  the  

                                                                                                                                                                      

[Division] or in a proceeding under this chapter, make or cause to be made an untrue  

                                                                                                                                                                              

statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the  

                                                                                                                                                                            

statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not  

                                                                                                                                                                               

misleading."); AS 45.55.910(a)(1) (authorizing Division to conduct investigations to  

                                                                                                                                                                            

determine whether "any provision of this chapter or a regulation or order under this  

                                                                                                                                                                      

chapter" has been or will be violated); see generally AS 45.55.138-.990 ("Alaska Native  

                                                                                                                                                                   

Claims Settlement Act Corporations Proxy Solicitations and Stock"); 3 AAC 08.305- 

                                                                                                                                    

.365 ("Alaska Native Claims Act Corporations:  Solicitation of Proxies").  



              14            3 AAC 08.365(12).  

                                            



              15            See 3 AAC 08.335.  

                                                     



              16            3 AAC 08.335(b).  

                                            



                                                                                       -5-                                                                               7498
  


----------------------- Page 6-----------------------

                                   17  

voting choices                          and provides that "if the shareholders have cumulative voting rights, a                                                                                                

proxy may confer discretionary authority to cumulate votes."                                                                                        18  



                                Discretionary  cumulative  proxy  voting  is  the  underlying  issue  of  this  

                                                                                                                                                                                                        



litigation.  As described above, if a corporation allows cumulative voting in director  

                                                                                                                                                                                              



elections, a shareholder will have the same multiple of votes per share as there are  

                                                                                                                                                                                                          



director candidates; the shareholder may, in the shareholder's sole discretion, allocate  

                                                                                                                                                                                               

those votes among the director candidates in any manner.19                                                                                          How does this work with  

                                                                                                                                                                                                       



respect to proxy voting in ANCSA corporations' director elections?  A proxy holder  

                                                                                                                                                                                                  

ultimately must vote the shareholder's shares as directed by the shareholder.20                                                                                                                     But a  

                                                                                                                                                                                                               



proxy  form  may  provide  for  a  shareholder  to  grant  the  proxy  holder  the  same  

                                                                                                                                                                                                    

discretionary cumulative voting authority held by the shareholder.21                                                                                                      The proxy form  

                                                                                                                                                                                                      



must set out options and instructions for the shareholder to direct the proxy holder how  

                                                                                                                                                                                                       

the shares should be voted for individual director candidates.22  And the proxy form must  

                                                                                                                                                                                                      



set out the proxy holder's authority to vote the shareholder's shares in the event the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                          

shareholder fails to designate how the shares are to be voted.23  

                                                                                                                                     



                17               3 AAC 08.335(e).     



                18               3 AAC 08.335(g).     



                19              See  AS 10.06.420(d).   



                20               3 AAC 08.335(b).     



                21               3 AAC 08.335(f)-(g);                                 see also Rude v. Cook Inlet Region, Inc.                                                           , 322 P.3d     



853, 857 (Alaska 2014) ("This regulation implies that a proxy must explicitly 'confer'                                                                                                        

the 'discretionary authority to cumulate votes.' " (quoting 3 AAC 08.335(g))).  

                                                                                                                                                                 



                22               3 AAC 08.335(e).  

                                                    



                23               3 AAC 08.335(d).  

                                                    



                                                                                                      -6-                                                                                             7498
  


----------------------- Page 7-----------------------

                              3.              Proxy solicitation regulation               



                              Particularly relevant                          tothisappeal,theDivisionregulatesshareholder proxy                                                         



solicitations for some ANCSA corporations:                                                                 proxy solicitation materials, including                             



                                                                   24  

proxies and proxy statements,                                          must be filed with the Division and may not contain false                                                           



                                                                                                                                                                                      25  

                                                                                                                                                                                             

material facts (or omit facts necessary to keep a statement from being misleading).                                                                                                         The  



                                                                                                                                                                                                   

Division defines "solicitation" as "a request to execute or not to execute, or to revoke a  



                                                                                                                                                                                                

proxy" and alternatively as the "distributing of a proxy or other communication to  



                                                                                                                                                                      

shareholders under circumstances reasonably calculated to result in the procurement,  



                                                                                          26  

                                                                        

withholding, or revocation of a proxy." 



               24             The Division's definitions regulation provides that a "proxy statement" is                                                                                         



"a letter . . . or other communication of any type which is made available to shareholders                                                                               

under circumstances reasonably calculated to result in the procurement, withholding, or                                                                                                          

revocation of a proxy."                                3 AAC 08.365(14);                              see also Proxy Statement                                   , B   LACK 'S  LAW  

DICTIONARY  (11th ed. 2019) ("An informational document that accompanies a proxy                                                                                                      

solicitation . . . .").         



               25             See AS 45.55.139 (requiring, for certain ANCSA corporations, that copies  

                                                                                                                                                                                       

"of all annual reports, proxies, consents or authorizations, proxy statements, and other  

                                                                                                                                                     

materials relating to proxy solicitations distributed, published, or made available by any  

                                                                                                                                                                                             

person  .  .  .  shall  be  filed  with  the  [Division]  concurrently  with  its  distribution  to  

                                                                                                                                                                                                

shareholders");  AS  45.55.160  ("A  person  may  not,  in  a  document  filed  with  the  

                                                                                                                                                                                             

 [Division] or in a proceeding under this chapter, make or cause to be made an untrue  

                                                                                                                                                                                      

statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the  

                                                                                                                                                                                               

statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not  

                                                                                                                                                                                             

misleading."); 3 AAC 08.307 (regarding filing of proxy solicitation materials); 3 AAC  

                                                                                                                                                                                        

08.315 (prohibiting false or misleading statements in proxy solicitation materials); cf.  

                                                                                                                                                                                               

3 AAC 08.325 (prohibiting certain proxy solicitations); 3 AAC 08.345 (regarding proxy  

                                                                                                                                                                                        

solicitations by board of directors); 3 AAC 08.355 (regarding proxy solicitations other  

                                                                                                                                                                                         

than by board of directors); 3 AAC 08.360 (providing for Division's investigation of  

                                                                                                                                                                                                

complaints alleging proxy solicitation regulation violations).  

                                                                                                                 



               26              3 AAC 08.365(16)(A)-(B).  The second definition for "solicitation" is the  

                                                                                                                                                                                              

                                                                                                                                                                      (continued...)  



                                                                                               -7-                                                                                       7498
  


----------------------- Page 8-----------------------

            B.          Sitnasuak Proxy Voting           



                        Sitnasuak,    headquartered    in    Nome,    is    the    largest    ANCSA    village  



corporation in the Bering Straits region and is subject to Division regulation.                                                          Sitnasuak  



has almost 2,900 shareholders and an 11-member board of directors.                                                          Sitnasuak allows   



cumulative voting - shareholders thus may cast their cumulated votes for one director                                                        



                                                                                                                                  27  

candidate   or  distribute   votes   among   some   or   all   director   candidates                                                                  

                                                                                                                                       -  and  its  



                                                                                                                            28  

                                                                                                                                  

shareholders  may  vote  for  directors  either  in  person  or  by  proxy.                                                       Accordingly,  



                                                                                                          29  

                                                                                                               

Sitnasuak may, and does, allow discretionary proxy voting. 



                                                                                                                                                       

                        Discretionary proxy voting in director elections has been the subject of  



                                                                                                                                              

Sitnasuak shareholder debate for at least the last few years.  Sitnasuak's bylaws provide  



                                                                                                                  

for a special shareholders' meeting when holders of 10% of its voting stock request it,  



                                                                                                                                              

and in 2015  a sufficient number  of Sitnasuak  shareholders  petitioned for  a special  



                                                                                                                                                      

shareholders' meeting to discuss eliminating discretionary proxy voting.  Notice of the  



                                                                                                                                          

special shareholders' meeting was given in December 2015, and the meeting convened  



                                                                                                                                                       

in early January 2016.  A proposal to amend Sitnasuak's articles of incorporation to  



                                                                                                                                                             

eliminate discretionary proxy voting in director elections was explained to the attendees.  



                                                                                                                                                    

But a required voting quorumcould not be established; the remainder of the meeting was  



                                                                                                                                                

considered  informational  only,  and  the  parliamentarian  made  a  presentation  about  



                                                        

cumulative and proxy voting.  



            26          (...continued)
  



same   as   that   for   "proxy   statement."    Compare   3   AAC   08.365(16)(B),   with   3   AAC
  

08.365(14).  



            27          See  supra  notes  9-10  and  accompanying  text.  



            28          See  supra  notes   11-12  and  accompanying  text.  



            29          See  supra  notes   17-18  and  accompanying  text.  



                                                                           -8-                                                                    7498
  


----------------------- Page 9-----------------------

                                                                                                                          

                     Soon  thereafter  Sitnasuak  issued  a  newsletter  discussing  the  special  



                                                                                                          

shareholders'  meeting  and  setting  out  a  written  version  of  the  parliamentarian's  



                                                                                                                                

discussion  of  cumulative  and  proxy  voting.                           Sitnasuak's  newsletter  advocated  for  



                                                                         

discretionary proxy voting, with the following statements:  



                                                                                                   

                               Many shareholders believe that the Board of Directors  

                                                                                                        

                    use discretionary and cumulative voting to keep their power  

                                                                                             

                    by reelecting themselves or others.   While a discretionary  

                                                                                                           

                    proxy can have that result, it is also used by shareholders who  

                                                                                                          

                    believe they are in a minority to elect someone to voice their  

                                                            

                    interests on the board. . . .  



                                                                                                            

                               However, electing a minority member to a board can  

                                                                                                             

                    be difficult.  Most shareholders can only attend a meeting by  

                                                                                                 

                    proxy.  This means that they won't know which candidates  

                                                                                                                  

                    running for a board will have enough votes to be elected.  

                                                                                                      

                    This happens when shareholders . . . vote directed proxies  

                                                                                                              

                    and others vote discretionary proxies. Directed votes can't be  

                                                                                                    

                    changed.   A candidate who does not get enough directed  

                                                                                                             

                    votes  to  win  still  uses  up  the  directed  vote.                      It  can't  be  

                                                       

                    transferred to another candidate.  



                                     

                               . . . .  



                                                                                                              

                               . . . Shareholders who are able to attend a meeting in  

                                                                                                                

                    person have the opportunity to change their votes and help a  

                                                                                                            

                    candidate   who   doesn't   have   enough   proxy   votes   to  

                                                                                                               

                    potentially be elected to a board seat.   That's also what a  

                                                                                                          

                    proxy  holder  can  do  with  a  discretionary  proxy.                            If  four  

                                                                                                           

                    candidates  run  together  on  one  proxy,  and  only  one  has  

                                                                                                               

                    enough directed votes to give them a chance of winning a  

                                                                                                

                    board  seat,  then  a  discretionary  proxy  can  mean   the  

                                                                                                        

                    differencebetween electing aminority candidateto theboard,  

                                                                                                           

                    or  not.         Eliminating  discretionary  voting  removes  the  

                                                      

                    possibility for this to happen.  



                                                                                                    

                               Of course this means that the majority can also use  

                                                                                                             

                    discretion  to  assure  election  of  a  maximum  number  of  



                                                                -9-                                                          7498
  


----------------------- Page 10-----------------------

                                                                                                  

                    majority  directors.              Shareholders  who  support  minority  

                                                                                              

                    candidates don't like this outcome, but it's just fair.  



                                     

                               . . . .  



                                                                                                             

                              While  discretionary  voting  is  controversial,  if  it  is  

                                                                                                 

                    applied fairly, it has benefits for all shareholders.  



                                                                   

          C.        Ahmasuk's Letter And The Complaint  



                                                                                                                

                    In early February 2017 - well before Sitnasuak's annual shareholders'  



                                                                                                                               

meeting and at least two months before any director candidates were announced or any  



                                                                                                                                

election-related materials were distributed to shareholders - Ahmasuk submitted the  



                                                                                        

following opinion letter published in the Nome Nugget:  



                                         

                    Dear Editor,  



                                                                                                 

                               The  Village  Corporation  for  Nome  i.e.  Sitnasuak  

                                                                                                      

                    Native Corporation (SNC) will soon be holding its annual  

                                                                                                      

                    election and shareholders will file for  candidacy.                              SNC's  

                                                                                                            

                    shareholders have voiced time and time again that they do  

                                                                                                      

                    NOT want discretionary proxies used. Discretionary proxies  

                                                                                                           

                    are NOT required by any Alaskan law and there is NO law  

                                                                                                         

                    that prohibits an ANCSA corporation from prohibiting them  

                                                                                                          

                    for  elections.         Hundreds  of  SNC  shareholders  have  said  

                                                                                                           

                    through public letters, social media, or through mailings that  

                                                                                                                  

                    they do NOT want discretionary proxies used for elections.  

                                                                                            

                    I believe SNC shareholders are realizing that discretionary  

                                                                                                   

                    proxies are harmful to our election process and are realizing  

                                                                                                           

                    in greater numbers such practices are disrespectful to our  

                                                                                                        

                    traditions.  In 2015 and 2016 I and others spent many hours  

                                                                                                             

                    collecting signatures for a request for a special meeting to do  

                    away with discretionary proxies.  We collected hundreds of  

                                                                                                            

                    signatures and we met a 10% requirement as required by  

                                                                                                             

                    Alaskan  law  to  petition  the  SNC  Board  of  Directors  to  

                                                                                                            

                    consider  doing  away  with  discretionary  proxies  and  to  

                                                                                                            

                    request a special meeting. You might ask yourself why all  

                                                                                                                  

                    this commotion about discretionary proxies?  Because I and  

                                                                           

                    others have thoroughly researched the issue and recognized  

                                                                                                           

                    there is a dramatic ethical argument about what is right and  



                                                               -10-                                                         7498
  


----------------------- Page 11-----------------------

                         what is wrong with SNC's  elections.  Discretionary proxies  

                         have  allowed  single  persons  to  use  discretionary  proxies  to  

                         dramatically  alter  the  outcome of an election  for  their  singular  

                         goal.     You   know   who  they   are   they   are   members   of   the  

                          SNC 6.   Please  do  NOT  vote  a discretionary  proxy in 2017.   

                         Thank  you[.]   (Emphases  in  original.)   



                         A  Sitnasuak  director  complained  to  the  Division  that  Ahmasuk's  letter   was  

 a  proxy  solicitation  seen  by  more  than  30  people.30                                     The director alleged that Ahmasuk  

                                                                                                                                                 



therefore  had  violated  proxy  solicitation  regulations  by  (1)  not  concurrently  filing  

                                                                                                                                                        

required disclosures with the Division31  and (2) making false and misleading statements  

                                                                                                                                               

 about discretionary proxy use.32  

                                                              

                                                   



             30          See  3 AAC 08.360(a) ("A shareholder, director, or officer of a corporation                                         



 subject to AS 45.55.139, aggrieved by an alleged violation of 3 AAC 08.305 - 3 AAC                                                                

 08.365  may request that the [Division] investigate the alleged violation.").                                        



             31          See  AS  45.55.139  ("A  copy  of  all  .  .  .  materials  relating  to  proxy  

                                                                                                                                                       

 solicitations distributed, published, or made available by any person to at least 30 Alaska  

                                                                                                                                                      

resident shareholders of a corporation organized under . . . [ANCSA] that has total assets  

                                                                                                                                                        

 exceeding $1,000,000 and a class of equity security held of record by 500 or more  

                                                                                                                                                         

persons  shall  be  filed  with  the  [Division]  concurrently  with  its  distribution  to  

                                                                                                                                                              

 shareholders."). Required disclosures include: the name and address of each participant  

                                                                                                                                               

joining in the solicitation; identification and description of the participant's financial  

                                                                                                                                                  

 interests and activities within the corporation; identification of legal proceedings the  

                                                                                                                                                             

participant is involved in adverse to the corporation; and methods used to solicit proxies,  

                                                                                                                                                    

 estimated solicitation expenses, and who would bear the expenses.  3 AAC 08.355.  

                                                                                                                                               



             32          See  AS  45.55.160  ("A  person  may  not,  in  a  document  filed  with  the  

                                                                                                                                                             

 [Division] or in a proceeding under this chapter, make or cause to be made an untrue  

                                                                                                                                                       

 statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the  

                                                                                                                                                              

 statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not  

                                                                                                                                                            

misleading."); 3 AAC 08.315(a) ("A solicitation may not be made . . . that contains a  

                                                                                                                                                                 

material misrepresentation.").  

                  



                                                                              -11-                                                                       7498
  


----------------------- Page 12-----------------------

                                      D.                                    Administrative Proceedings And Division Decision                                                                                                                                                                                                               



                                                                            The Division notified Ahmasuk of the complaint, later asking him whether                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           



he had filed his letter with the Division and whether he could support his substantive                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               



assertions about proxy voting.  Ahmasuk responded that the proxy regulations did not                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 



apply because his letter was published prior to candidate and proxy announcements for                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      



the upcoming election.                                                                                                              Ahmasuk also contended that the regulations are nebulous and                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       



that the investigation violated his First Amendment free speech right.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  Ahmasuk said   



that, based on his personal experience and assessment of past elections, he believed his                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    



 statements, including his contention that discretionary proxies allowed individuals to                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         



alter election outcomes, were factual.                                                                                                                                                                                  



                                                                            In mid-March -stillbeforeany                                                                                                                                                       director candidates wereannounced                                                                                                                                                                          or any   



annual   meeting   election-related   materials   were   distributed   to   shareholders   -   the  



Division issued an order concluding that Ahmasuk's letter was a proxy solicitation                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        



requiring AS 45.55.139 disclosures. The Division's order stated that Ahmasuk thus had                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   



violated 3 AAC 08.307 by failing to file a copy of the letter with the Commissioner and                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                



 3 AAC 08.355 by failing to file required disclosures.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       The Division also concluded that                                                                                                                                          



Ahmasuk had violated 3 AAC 08.315(a) by making the material misrepresentation that                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     



discretionary proxies have allowed individuals to alter election outcomes. The Division                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    



ordered Ahmasuk to pay a $1,500 civil penalty and to comply with Alaska securities                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   



laws and regulations.                                                                                                       



                                                                            Ahmasuk appealed the order, requesting a hearing and that the order be set                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       

                                 33   He listed three grounds for setting aside the decision, arguing that his letter was:  

aside.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         



                                      33                                    See   AS   45.55.920(d)   (providing   that   before   imposing   penalty   "the  



 [Division]    shall    give    reasonable    notice    of    and    an    opportunity    for    a    hearing");  

AS 44.64.030(a)(39) (providing that Office of Administrative Hearings conduct hearing                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  (continued...)  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            -12-                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  7498
  


----------------------- Page 13-----------------------

 (1) protected by the First Amendment as political speech; (2) not a proxy solicitation;                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       



 and (3) not false or misleading.                                                                                                                                                      The parties agreed to address as a threshold matter                                                                                                                                                                                                                  



whether Ahmasuk's letter was a proxy solicitation subject to regulation and to allow                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             



 appellate proceedings to conclude on that issue before later, if necessary, addressing                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            



whether Ahmasuk's letter contained a material misrepresentation.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 



                                                                           Ahmasuk sought summary adjudication on the proxy solicitation question.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  



 The thrust of Ahmasuk's argument was that his letter could not qualify as a proxy                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           



 solicitation because it "was not 'reasonably calculated to result in the procurement,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               



withholding, or revocation of a proxy.' " Ahmasuk contended that a reasonable reading                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  



 of the proxy solicitation regulation "does not alert a shareholder that [it applies] to public                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                



 statements about the election process in general . . . when no candidates have been                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 



 announced, no individuals . . . are asking shareholders to sign proxies . . . , and no                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          



 shareholder vote on a particular matter is scheduled."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     Ahmasuk also contended that if                                                                                                                                              



the proxy solicitation regulation covered his letter, the regulation would violate his                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         



 constitutional due process and free speech rights.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 



                                                                           Following briefingand                                                                                                         oral argument,theAdministrativeLawJudge(ALJ)                                                                                                                                                                                                            



upheld the Division's order.                                                                                                                                  The ALJ's decision noted the following undisputed facts:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              



Ahmasuk's letter was written two months before the identification of candidates and five                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    



months before the election; his letter did not explicitly advocate for or against any                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     



 distinct   outcome   of   the   election;   and   his   letter   urged   shareholders   not   to   vote   by  



 discretionary proxy.                                                                                              The ALJ focused on one sentence from the letter - "Please do                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   



NOT vote a discretionary proxy in 2017" (emphasis in original) - noting the Division's                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 



                                     33                                    (...continued)  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     

required under AS 45.55 relating to ANCSA corporation proxy solicitations).  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      -13-                                                                                                                                                                                                                             7498  


----------------------- Page 14-----------------------

agreement at oral argument "that the letter would not constitute a proxy solicitation if it                                                                                                                                                                                                           



did not include [that] sentence."                                                                                



                                              The ALJ ultimately concluded that the sentence in Ahmasuk's letter fit                                                                                                                                                                              



within the regulatory definition of a proxy solicitation because it was "both a direct                                                                                                                                                                                                



request to not execute a discretionary proxy, as well as a communication reasonably                                                                                                                                                                                 



calculated to result in the withholding of a discretionary proxy."                                                                                                                                                                        The ALJ rejected                    



Ahmasuk's   free   speech   challenge,   noting   that   "Ahmasuk   did   not   stop   at   simply  



communicating his position -he requested                                                                                                             that . . . shareholders not vote a discretionary                                                      



proxy." The ALJ also rejected Ahmasuk's due process challenge, quoting the regulation                                                                                                                                                                                   



and stating that "[i]t seems reasonable that a reader of this regulation would understand                                                                                                                                                                           



that an actual request to withhold a type of vote, as in . . . Ahmasuk's letter, falls within                                                                                                                                                                                        



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      34  

the definition."  The ALJ's decision ultimately became the Division's final decision.                                                                                                                                                                                                                         



                       E.                      Superior Court Proceedings  

                                                                                                         



                                              Ahmasuk appealed to the superior court, reiterating his legal arguments.  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              



The  superior  court  first  rejected  Ahmasuk's  argument  that  the  proxy  solicitation  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  



regulation cannotapply absent identifiablecandidates, proxy forms,and an election. The  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              



court concluded that the "regulatory scheme provides for broad application" and that  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             



Ahmasuk's interpretationwoulddefycommon senseand theregulation's plain language.  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          



                                              The superior court next rejected Ahmasuk's argument that the regulation,  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      



as applied, violated his constitutional right to due process.  The court reasoned that the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                



regulatory  language  defining  solicitation  as  "distributing  .  .  .  communication  to  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 



shareholders under circumstances reasonably calculated to result in the . . . withholding  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           



 . . . of a proxy" offered fair notice that communicating with shareholders and urging  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   



                       34                     See  AS44.64.060(e)-(f)(providing                                                                                      that Divisionretainsdiscretiontoadopt,                                                                            



revise, or reject ALJ decision within certain time limits, otherwise "the [ALJ's] proposed                                                                                                                                                                                 

decision is the final agency decision").                                                        



                                                                                                                                               -14-                                                                                                                                       7498
  


----------------------- Page 15-----------------------

them to withhold proxies could be deemed a proxy solicitation.                                                                                                                                              The court contrasted               



Ahmasuk's concern "that under a broad and inclusive reading of . . . solicitation every                                                                                                                                                                       



disparaging comment by a shareholder will be treated as a proxy statement because it                                                                                                                                                                                       



might   influence   a   shareholder   vote,"   with   his   letter   "specifically   referencing   the  



upcoming election, specifically urging sharehold[ers] to withhold a proxy."                                                                                                                                                                    The court   



concluded that the regulations were clear, instructive, and provided fair notice that a                                                                                                                                                                                    



statement like Ahmasuk's letter could be considered a proxy solicitation and that failure                                                                                                                                                                  



to register merited a fine.                                    



                                          The superior court also rejected Ahmasuk's argument that the Division's       



application of the proxy solicitation regulations violated his freedom of speech.                                                                                                                                                                       Noting  



the government's compelling interest in regulating election integrity and citing case law                                                                                                                                                                           



suggesting proxy solicitation regulations do not violate the constitution's free speech                                                                                                                                                                  

                                 35  the court concluded that even statements not advocating for or against a  

guarantee,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 



particular candidate may be regulated as proxy solicitations.  

                                                                                                                                                                                               



                     F.                   Appeal  



                                          Ahmasuk appeals the superior court's decision. The Division's position is  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           



supported by amici curiae Bristol Bay Native Corporation, Calista Corporation, Cook  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              



Inlet Region, Inc., and Doyon Limited.  Sitnasuak did not participate in the Division  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    



proceedings, the superior court appeal, or this appeal.  

                                                                                                                                                                          



III.                 STANDARD OF REVIEW  

                                                                                



                                          "When the superior court has acted as an intermediate court of appeal, we  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      



review  the merits of the administrative agency's decision  without deference to  the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    



                     35                   Meidinger v. Koniag, Inc., 31 P.3d 77, 84-85 (Alaska 2001).  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                    



                                                                                                                                  -15-                                                                                                                                       7498  


----------------------- Page 16-----------------------

                                                                                                        36  

 superior court's decision."                                                                                    The parties dispute which standard of review should govern                                                                                                                                                   



 our   consideration   of   the   Division's   regulatory   interpretation   and   conclusion   that  



 Ahmasuk's letter was a proxy solicitation. The Division and Amici argue that we should                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       



 employ a deferential standard of reviewforthis                                                                                                                                         threshold question. Ahmasuk                                                                                           argues that  



 we should not defer to the Division's interpretation of the regulations.                                                                                                                                                                                                                 



                                                      We generally employ the following standards of review when considering                                                                                                                                                                              



 an agency action based on its interpretation of its statutory directives and regulations:                                                                                                                                                                                                            



                                                                                We apply the reasonable basis standard to questions of                                                                                                                                                      

                                                      law   involving   "agency   expertise   or   the   determination   of  

                                                      fundamental   policies  within   the   scope   of   the   agency's  

                                                      statutory functions."                                                                When applying the reasonable basis                                                                                                 

                                                      test, we "seek to determine whether the agency's decision is                                                                                                                                                                           

                                                      supported by the facts and has a reasonable basis in law, even                                                                                                                                                             

                                                      if             we                  may                        not                  agree                          with                       the                 agency's                                     ultimate  

                                                      determination."     We   apply   the   substitution   of   judgment  

                                                      standard to questions of law where no agency expertise is                                                                                                                                                                             

                                                      involved.   Under the substitution of judgment standard, we                                                                                                                                                                      

                                                      may "substitute [our] own judgment for that of the agency                                                                                                                                                        

                                                      even if the agency's decision had a reasonable basis in law."                                                                                                                                                            



                                                                                 .    .    .    We    review    an    agency's    interpretation    and  

                                                      application of its own regulations using the reasonable basis                                                                                                                                                             

                                                      standard of review.                                                            "We will defer to the agency unless its                                                                                                              

                                                      'interpretation is plainly erroneous and inconsistent with the                                                                                                                                                                   

                                                      regulation.'   "       "We    give    more    deference    to    agency  

                                                      interpretations that are 'longstanding and continuous.' "                                                                                                                                                                  [37]  



                           36                         Studley v. Alaska Pub. Offices Comm'n                                                                                                                            , 389 P.3d 18, 22 (Alaska 2017)                                                                          



 (quoting  Tolbert v. Alascom, Inc.                                                                                                  , 973 P.2d 603, 606-07 (Alaska 1999)).                                                                                         



                           37                        Davis Wright Tremaine LLP v. State, Dep't of Admin., 324 P.3d 293, 299  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          

 (Alaska2014) (alterationin original) (footnotesomitted) (first quoting Marathon Oil Co.  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

 v. State, Dep't of Nat. Res., 254 P.3d 1078, 1082 (Alaska 2011); then quoting Tesoro  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            

Alaska Petroleum Co. v. Kenai Pipe Line Co. , 746 P.2d 896, 903 (Alaska 1987); then  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    (continued...)  



                                                                                                                                                                     -16-                                                                                                                                                             7498
  


----------------------- Page 17-----------------------

                        Because our conclusion would be the same regardless of the standard of                                                           



review, we express no opinion on the parties' disagreement.                                                    We explain our decision        



using the more deferential standard.             



IV.         DISCUSSION  



                        Thefundamentalquestion beforeus iswhether theDivision'sinterpretation  

                                                                                                                                     



and application of its definition of "solicitation," as it relates to the definition of "proxy,"  

                                                                                                                                              



is reasonable under the facts and circumstances of this case.  Both the statute and the  

                                                                                                                                                       



Division's  regulations  define  "proxy"  as  "a  written  authorization  .  .  .  signed  by  a  

                                                                                                                                                          

shareholder . . . giving another person power to vote" the shareholder's shares.38                                                                   The  

                                                                                                                                                      



regulations also provide that the written document "may take the form of a consent,  

                                                                                                                                             

revocation of authority, or failure to act or dissent."39  

                                                                              



                        For our purposes, then, a proxy is a written authorization or consent, or a  

                                                                                                                                                           



written revocation of an authorization or consent, for someone to vote a shareholder's  

                                                                                                                                    



shares.   This is reinforced by 3 AAC 08.365(16)'s two-pronged definition of proxy  

                                                                                                                                                  



"solicitation":  under (A), "a request to execute or not to execute, or to revoke a proxy";  

                                                                                                                                               



and under (B), a "communication to shareholders . . . reasonably calculated to result in  

                                                                                                                                                          



the procurement, withholding, or revocation  of a proxy" (emphasis added).  We are  

                                                                                                                                                       



concerned  only  with  a  putative  solicitation  of  a  proxy  execution  or  revocation  for  

                                                                                                                                                       

Sitnasuak's 2017 director election.40  

                                                



            37          (...continued)  



quoting  id.;  then  quoting  Kuzmin  v.  State,   Commercial  Fisheries  Entry   Comm'n,  223  

P.3d  86,  89  (Alaska  2009);  and  then  quoting  Marathon  Oil,  254  P.3d  at   1082).  



            38          AS   10.06.990(34);  3  AAC  08.365(12).  



            39          3 AAC 08.365(12).  

                                       



            40          See   3   AAC   08.325(4)-(5)   (prohibiting   proxy   solicitation   conferring  



                                                                                                                                    (continued...)  



                                                                           -17-                                                                    7498
  


----------------------- Page 18-----------------------

                                              With this in mind, to see how a Sitnasuak shareholder would execute and                                                                                                                                                                        



make a designation for directed or discretionary voting on a proxy card solicited by                                                                                                                                                                            



Sitnasuak's   board   of   directors   months   after   Ahmasuk's   opinion   letter,   Sitnasuak's  



official proxy card for the June 2017 annual shareholder meeting's election of four                                                                                                                                                                                                       



directors is reproduced, in relevant part, below.                                                                                                                    



                           40                 (...continued)  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

authority to vote "at more than one shareholders' meeting or . . . at any shareholders'  

                                                                                                                                          

meeting other than the one disclosed").  



                                                                                                                                              -18-                                                                                                                                       7498
  


----------------------- Page 19-----------------------

 OFFICIAL PROXY CARD                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 S I T N A S U A K  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     NATIVE CORPORATION   



     Solicitation by the Board of Directors for                                                                                                       Shareholder Name:                                                                                                                          Voting Shares:                

     the 2017 Annual Meeting of Shareholders                                                                                                         Address:                                                                                                                                       Vote:                 

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     



                                                                  For greater detail on how to vote, see your 2017 Proxy Statement
  

                                                                                        Check the box of your choice.  Check only one box.
  



     �              Directed - If you wish to direct specific numbers of votes to certain nominees, either within the Board of Directors'  

                    slate or among the independent nominees, write the number of votes you wish to give to each nominee next to that  

                    nominee's name.  Vote for no more than a total of four nominees.  

     �              Discretionary - Your votes will be voted for candidates on the Board of Directors' slate.  Do not indicate your votes  

                    below.  The Corporation will distribute your votes among its slate at the discretion of the Proxyholders named below.  

                                                

     �              Quorum Only - If you wish to withhold authority to vote, your proxy will be counted for quorum purposes only.  If  

                   you check this box, no nominee will receive any of your votes, unless you have also checked the discretionary voting  

                    box or cast directed votes for a nominee.  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          

     Vote for Directors: How Many Votes Do You Have?  See the top right of your proxy card for the number of voting shares you  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

     own and the number of votes you have for directors.  For example, 100 shares = 400 votes.  Four board seats are up for election  

                                                                                                                                                                                                   

     this year.  The four nominees with the highest number of votes will be elected.  



     BOARD OF DIRECTORS                                                 '  NOMINEES                                                                                                        INDEPENDENT NOMINEES   

     The Board of Directors endorses the following slate of                                                                                                                                The following nominees are independent candidates.                                                                                             They  

     nominees.   If you checked the "Discretionary" or "Quorum                                                                                                                             are not endorsed by the Board of Directors.                                                                            If you checked     

     Only" box, you should not write in the number of votes.                                                                                                                               the "Discretionary" or "Quorum Only" box, you should not                                                                                          

                                                                                                                                                                                           write in the number of votes.                                 

     Nominee                                                                                                           # of Directed Votes                       

                                                                                                                                                                                            Nominee                                                                                                          # of Directed Votes                       

     [Names Redacted]                                                                                                                               _________  

                                                                                                                                                                                            [Names Redacted]                                                                                                                              _________  



I hereby appoint as my attorneys in fact and proxies . . . . to vote all of my shares of Sitnasuak Native Corporation that I could vote,                                                                                                                                                                                                                      

including discretionary authority to selectively cumulate votes, with all the powers that I would possess if personally present at the meeting.                                                                                                                                                                                                                               

If this proxy is signed and no specific direction is given, this proxy will be counted for quorum purposes only.                                                                                                                                                                                    If I have directed votes to                                       

specific candidates but checked "Discretionary" or "Quorum Only" at the top of this Proxy Card, my directed votes shall prevail.                                                                                                                                                                                                                CAST MY   

VOTES IN THE MANNER INDICATED ABOVE.                                                                           



 [Signature Execution Block and Instructions Redacted]                                                                



                                                                                                                                                                             -19-                                                                                                                                                                           7498
  


----------------------- Page 20-----------------------

                                                         We also note that in May 2017, after the initiation of the enforcement action                                                                                                                                                                                                                  



underlying this appeal, three Sitnasuak shareholders, including the Sitnasuak director                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         



who filed the complaint against Ahmasuk, solicited proxies to vote for themselves as                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   



directors  at  the   2017   annual   meeting.     This   group's   proxy   card   was   designated   a  



"Discretionary Proxy Card" and conferred authority to use discretionary cumulative                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              



voting   to   elect   as   many   of   the   three   shareholders   "as   [a]   proxy   holder   decides   is  



appropriate." But the card instructed that a shareholder could withhold authority to vote                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      



for one or more of the three candidates by striking out the candidate's name, and, of                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       41          This proxy  

course, a shareholder also could have specified how to allocate the votes.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             



card is set out in relevant part below.  

                                                                                                                                



                             41                          See 3 AAC 08.335(b), (e), (g); supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              



                                                                                                                                                                                -20-                                                                                                                                                                                           7498  


----------------------- Page 21-----------------------

                               Independent Shareholder Solicited Discretionary Proxy Card  

                          For the Sitnasuak Native Corporation Annual Meeting of Shareholders  



I appoint [Names Redacted] with full power of substitution, to represent me as my proxy and to  

                                                                                                                                                                                               

vote my shares in accordance with the instructions in this document at the [June 2017] Annual                                                                                               

Meeting of Shareholders of Sitnasuak Native Corporation . . . and at any adjournment thereof.  



INSTRUCTIONS TO PROXY HOLDER  

For the election of directors, my proxy holder is instructed to cumulate and distribute my votes  

among the following people, to elect as many to the Sitnasuak Native Corporation Board of  

                                                                                                       

Directors as my proxy holder decides is appropriate.  



[Names Redacted]  



(You may withhold authority to vote for a nominee by lining  

through or otherwise striking out the name of that nominee).  



For other matters, my proxy holder is given discretionary authority to vote my shares on matters  

                                                                                                                                                                       

incident to the conduct of the meeting and on any other matter, not specifically addressed by this                                                                                                  

proxy, which may properly come before the meeting.  



I have received the Sitnasuak Native Corporation 2016 Annual Report and the Notice of Annual  

    

Meeting & Proxy Statement dated April 7, 2017, and a Supplemental Proxy Statement from the                                                                         

proxy holder named above.  



[Signature Execution Block Redacted]  



[Proxy Submission Instructions Redacted]  



                                                                                                 -21-                                                                                              7498
  


----------------------- Page 22-----------------------

                         As weanalyzetheDivision'sapplication ofitsproxysolicitation                                                             regulation  



to Ahmasuk's opinion letter, context is key.                                         The important contextual backdrop in this                                



case   is   the   longstanding   corporate   governance   debate   about   Sitnasuak's   allowing  



discretionary   cumulative   proxy   voting   for   corporate   director   elections.     How   are  



shareholders supposed to debate the issue without what the Division contends is a                                                                                 



"communication to shareholders . . . reasonably calculated to result in . . . withholding"                                                 

                                     42   For example, how could a group of Sitnasuak shareholders even  

some future proxy?                                                                                                                                          



have  prepared  and  submitted  a  petition  for  a  corporate  charter  change  eliminating  

                                                                                                                                               



discretionary cumulativevotingfor directorswithoutcoming withintheDivision's broad  

                                                                                                                                                           



interpretation  of  its  solicitation  definition?                                      To  avoid  penalties,  must  such  petition  

                                                                                                                                                      



communications  and  related  statements  asking  shareholders  to  use  direct  and  not  

                                                                                                                                                              



discretionary proxy forms be filed with the Division as a proxy solicitation, along with  

                                                                                                                                                             



other burdensome requirements?  Surely not.  

                                                                               



                         For example, compare Ahmasuk's letter with Sitnasuak's newsletter. Both  

                                                                                                                                                             



reference the shareholder debate about discretionary proxy voting.  And both reference  

                                                                                                                                                   



dissatisfied shareholders' efforts to call a special shareholders' meeting for a vote on  

                                                                                                                                                                



eliminating discretionary proxy voting. With respect to the effect of discretionary proxy  

                                                                                                                                                          



voting, Sitnasuak said:  

                                   



                         Directed votes can't be changed. . . .  

                                                                                              



                                      . . . .  

                                             



                                      . . . Shareholders who are able to attend a meeting in  

                                                                                                                                        

                         person have the opportunity to change their votes  and help a  

                                                                                                                                          

                         candidate   who   doesn't   have   enough   proxy   votes   to  

                                                                                                                                      

                         potentially be elected to a board seat.   That's also what a  

                                                                                                                                         

                         proxy holder can do with a discretionary proxy .  (Emphasis  

                                                                                                                        

                         added.)  



             42  

                                         

                         3 AAC 08.365(16)(B).  



                                                                              -22-                                                                               7498  


----------------------- Page 23-----------------------

Consistent with Sitnasuak's statement, but using different terms about discretionary                                                                                                                         



proxy  holders   being   able   to   change   votes   to   get   a   desired   result,   Ahmasuk   said:  



"Discretionary   proxies have allowed                                                                       single persons to                                   use discretionary                                    proxies to   



dramatically alter the outcome of an election for their singular goal."                                                                                                         



                                     UndertheDivision'sregulatory interpretation, Sitnasuak'snewslettercould                                                                                                                       



be   seen   as  reasonably   calculated   to   result   in   the   eventual   procurement   of   a   future  



discretionary proxy card, or at least the eventual box-check for discretionary proxy                                                                                                                                             



voting on the corporate proxy card.                                                                   The record reflects that Sitnasuak did not file its                                                                                  



newsletter with the Division when it was circulated to shareholders and that Sitnasuak                                                                                                         



faced   no   enforcement   action   by   the   Division.     Indeed,   the   ALJ   noted   that   "[t]he  



Division's   interpretation   at   oral   argument   appear[ed]   at   odds   with   other   Division  



decisions   on   the   same   issue,"   lending  credence   to   Ahmasuk's   argument   that   the  



regulation was "subject to inconsistent enforcement."                                                         



                                      The federal Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), when defining                                                                                                                  



solicitation,consideredtheimpact                                                              ofexcessiveproxy solicitation                                                       regulation oncorporate                

                                                      43   Because the Division apparently adopted the SEC's then-existing  

governance debate.                                                                                                                                                                                            

solicitationdefinitionwhenpromulgating theDivision's definitions regulation,44 theSEC  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      



definition's history provides insight. In 1935 the SECfirst defined solicitation to include  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                              



                   43                See    Regulation    of    Communications    Among    Shareholders,    57    Fed.  



Reg. 48,276 (Oct. 22, 1992) (hereinafter 1992 Amendments).                                                                                                                    



                   44                 Compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(l)(1)(iii) (defining solicitation, in part, as  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            

"furnishing  of  a  form  of  proxy  or  other  communication  to  security  holders  under  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 

circumstances  reasonably  calculated  to  result  in  the  procurement,  withholding  or  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          

revocation of a proxy"), with 3 AAC 08.365(16)(B) (defining solicitation, in part, as "the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       

distributing of a proxy or other communication to shareholders under circumstances  

                                                                                                                                                                                                          

reasonably calculated to result in the procurement, withholding,  or  revocation of a  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              

proxy").  



                                                                                                                   -23-                                                                                                             7498
  


----------------------- Page 24-----------------------

any "request for a proxy, consent, or authorization, or the furnishing of any form of                                                        



             45  

proxy."                                                                                                                            

                   In  1938  the  SEC  amended  the  definition  to  include  any  proxy  request,  

                                                                                                                               46   In 1942  

                                                                                                                                        

                                                                                                                   

regardless whether "accompanied by or included in a written form of proxy." 



the SEC revised the definition to include any request "reasonably calculated to" cause  

                                                                             

a shareholder to execute, not to execute, or to revoke, a proxy.47  

                                                                                              



                      Most pertinent to this case, in 1956 the SEC definition expanded to include  

                                                                                                                                     



"furnishing  of  a  form  of  proxy  or  other  communication  to  security  holders  under  

                                                                                                                                      



circumstances  reasonably  calculated  to  result  in  the  procurement,  withholding,  or  

                                                                                                                                            

revocation of a proxy."48                  In adopting what essentially is a parallel provision to 3 AAC  

                                                                                                                                        

08.365(16),49  the SEC primarily was targeting communications by those who intended  

                                                                                                                                  

to solicit or already had solicited proxies before formally beginning solicitation.50                                                    The  

                                                                                                                                          



           45         Exchange  Act  Release  No.  34,378,   1935  WL  29270  (Sept.  24,   1935).   



           46         Exchange  Act  Release  No.  34,1823,   1938  WL  33169  (Aug.   11,   1938).  



           47         See  Exchange  Act  Release  No.  34,3347,  1942  WL  34864  (Dec.  18,  1942).   



           48         See   Adoption   of   Amendments   to   Proxy   Rules,   Exchange   Act   Release  



No.  34,5276,   1956  WL  7757  (Jan.   17,   1956)  (hereinafter   1956  Amendments).  



           49         See  supra  note  44.  



           50         See  1956  Amendments,  supra  note  48,  at  34,5277  ("[S]tatements  made  for  



the   purpose   of   inducing   security   holders   to   give,   revoke,   or   withhold   a   proxy   with  

respect  to a matter to  be  acted upon by security holders of an issuer .  . . by any person  

who has  solicited  or  intends  to  solicit  proxies  .  . .  may involve a solicitation within  the  

meaning  of  the  regulation,  depending  upon  the  particular  facts  and  circumstances.");  see  

also   1992   Amendments,  supra  note   43,   at   48,278  n.22   (explaining   that   SEC's   1956  

definition  amendment  clearly  "was  principally  concerned  with  communications  'by  any  

person  who  has  solicited  or  intends  to  solicit  proxies'  prior  to  the  formal  commencement  

of  the  solicitation").  



                                                                     -24-                                                              7498
  


----------------------- Page 25-----------------------

SEC apparently was seeking "to address abuses by persons who were actually engaging                                                                    

in solicitations of proxy authority in connection with election contests."                                                                  51  



                          But the SEC later acknowledged its "proxy rules ha[d] created unnecessary  

                                                                                                                                                 



regulatory impediments to communication among shareholders and others and to the  

                                                                                                                                                                   

effective  use  of  shareholder  voting  rights."52                                               The  SEC  was  concerned  that  the  

                                                                                                                                                                  



solicitation definition, too broadly construed, could "turn almost every expression of  

                                                                                                                                                                     

opinion . . . into a regulated proxy solicitation."53   It recognized that excessive regulation  

                                                                                                                                                     

had "a chilling effect on discussion of management performance"54   and raised First  

                                                                                                                                                               



Amendment free speech concerns, particularly in regulating persons who are not in fact  

                                                                                                                                                                  

soliciting proxy authority.55                           The SEC clarified that when it adopted the 1956 definition  

                                                                                                                                                      



it did not intend to regulate "persons who did not 'request' a shareholder to grant or to  

                                                                                                                                                                     



revoke or deny a proxy, but whose expressed opinions might be found to have been  

                                                                                                                                                               



reasonably calculated to affect the views of other shareholders positively or negatively  

                                                                                                                                                     

                                                                                                                         56   Thus in 1992, to better  

toward a particular company and its management or directors."                                                                                                 

                                                                                                     



             51           1992  Amendments,  supra  note  43,  at  48,277.  



             52           Id.   



             53           Id.  at  48,278.   



             54           Id.  at  48,279.  



             55           See   id.   ("A   regulatory   scheme   that   inserted   [SEC]   staff   and   corporate  



management  into  every  exchange  and  conversation  among  shareholders,  their  advisors  

and   other  parties   on  matters   subject  to   a  vote   certainly  would  raise   serious   questions  

under   the   free   speech   clause   of   the   First   Amendment,   particularly   where   no   proxy  

authority  is  being  solicited  by  such  persons.").  



             56           Id. at 48,278.  

                                      



                                                                                -25-                                                                           7498
  


----------------------- Page 26-----------------------

 achieve the proxy regulations' purposes, the SEC adopted amendments significantly                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        

narrowing the "excessive regulatory reach of 'solicitation.' "                                                                                                                                                                                                 57*  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         

                                                         Wesharesimilar concerns aboutthis case, namely that the Division's broad  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    

regulatory  interpretation  contravenes  the  proxy  regulations'  purposes  and  stifles  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                

 corporate governance debate.  If the solicitation regulation can cast such a wide net that  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  

 it applies without regard to whether there actually is a pending election with known  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            

 director candidates and proxy cards circulating (or known to be circulating imminently)  



                             57                           1992    Amendments,   supra   note   43.     After   the   U.S.  Supreme   Court  



recognized commercial speech as protected under the First Amendment in                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               Virginia State   

Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.                                                                                                                                                                                                                             , 425 U.S. 748, 762                                                  

 (1976),   some   predicted   a   "collision"   between   the   First   Amendment   and   securities  

regulation.   See, e.g.                                                                  , Frederick Schauer,                                                                     The Boundaries of the First Amendment:                                                                                                                                               A  

Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience                                                                                                                                                                               , 117 H                           ARV. L. R                                  EV. 1765, 1780                             

 (2004) ("Starting in the early 1980s, claims that the entire scheme of securities regulation                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         

needed to be tested against First Amendment standards became more common."); Karl                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            

M.  F. Lockhart, Note,                                                                         A 'Corporate Democracy'?:                                                                                                      Freedom of Speech and the SEC                                                                                                                   ,  

  104 V                    A. L. R                      EV. 1593, 1625 (2018).                                                                               



                                                         Amid debate in the 1980s and early 1990s about the First Amendment's                                                                                                                                                               

 application to securities regulation, some scholars focused on the free speech concerns                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  

 stemming from proxy solicitation regulation.   See, e.g., Aleta G. Estreicher,  Securities  

Regulation and the First Amendment                                                                                                                             , 24 G                    A. L. R                      EV. 223, 314 (1990) (explaining that                                                                                                      

 SEC's "expansive definition" of solicitation overregulates expressive communications                                                                                                                                                                                                                    

that "make no mention of proxies, proxy contests or upcoming shareholder meetings");                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

 Clark A. Remington, Note,                                                                                             A Political Speech Exception to the Regulation of Proxy                                                                                                                                                                        

Solicitations, 86 C                                                               OLUM. L. R                                        EV. 1453, 1468-71, 1474 (1986) (arguing that when a                                                                                                                                                                                   

 "proxy solicitation addresses a matter of public or political concern" it requires greater                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       

 constitutional  protection).     As   previously   discussed,   the   SEC   adopted   the   1992  

 amendments in part to address such First Amendment concerns.                                                                                                                                                                                                                       See  Lockhart,  supra,  

 at 1626.                            And any expected surge in First Amendment challenges to proxy solicitation                                                                                                                                                                                                                 

regulation never occurred.                                                                                          Id . at 1625-27.             



                                                                                                                                                                                -26-                                                                                                                                                                        7498
  


----------------------- Page 27-----------------------

for shareholder signatures, then the regulation may well go beyond valid regulation and                                                                                                                                 

into free speech infringement.                                                58  



                                   And it would be difficult to enforce even-handedly.   For example, the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                         



Division  conceded it has no regulatory interest in whether an ANCSA corporation  

                                                                                                                                                                                                  



shareholder  votes  in  person  or  by  proxy  in  director  elections,  and  presumably  the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                        



Division  has  no  regulatory  interest  in  whether  an  ANCSA  corporation  allows  or  

                                                                                                                                                                                                      



disallows  discretionary  cumulative  voting  in  director  elections.                                                                                                             But  the  Division  

                                                                                                                                                                                                          



responded to our questioning at oral argument by saying that it would be a "technical"  

                                                                                                                                                                                                   



violation  -  apparently  meaning  unlikely  to  be  enforced  -  if  a  shareholder  

                                                                                                                                                                                                



communicated a general desire that all shareholders attend an annual meeting in person  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                



rather  than  give  someone  a  proxy.                                                                 There  are  few  shades  of  gray  between  that  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                      



hypothetical and Ahmasuk's communicated general desire that, if a shareholder grants  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                 

a proxy, it should be a directed rather than discretionary proxy.59  

                                                                                                                                                    



                 58                The Division argues that in                                             Meidinger v. Koniag, Inc.                                           , 31 P.3d 77, 84-85  



(Alaska 2001), we concluded that the Division's proxy solicitation regulations were not                                                                                                                                  

vague or overbroad and therefore did not violate free speech protection under article I,                                                                                                                                      

section   5   of   the   Alaska   Constitution.     But   what   we   said  in  that   case   was   that   the  

challenger - who was actively soliciting proxy votes to oppose an upcoming ballot                                                                                                                                 

proposition - had failed to support his free speech argument with any case law, and we                                                                                                                                    

therefore rejected his argument.                                                      Id.   at 85.                 It is beyond dispute that reasonable state                                                        

regulation of commercial speech is not completely barred by constitutional free speech                                                                                                                          

protection.   See id.                             at 85 n.18.                    That begs the question of the reach, or overreach, of a                                                                                      

specific regulatory application.                   



                 59                If  the  line  between  lawful  proxy  solicitation  regulation  and  unlawful  

                                                                                                                                                                                                         

infringement of free speech regarding corporate governance is left unclear, then the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                         

regulation also fails to give fair notice of what conduct is required and prohibited. "Laws  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                 

should give the ordinary citizen fair notice of what is and what is not prohibited. People  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                

should not be required to guess whether a certain course of conduct is one which is apt  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                         

to subject them to criminal or serious civil penalties."  Alaska Pub. Offices Comm'n v.  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                             

                                                                                                                                                                                               (continued...)  



                                                                                                           -27-                                                                                                     7498
  


----------------------- Page 28-----------------------

                               Consider again the undisputed facts of this case. Ahmasuk wrote his letter                                                                                  



in February; Sitnasuak's annual shareholder meeting was not held until the summer.                                                                                                                      



Althoughin Februaryshareholders knewthat                                                              an annualshareholder meetinganddirector                                        



election   would   take place sometime in                                                     the   future,  no  director   candidates had                                                 been  



announced,   no   required   corporate   or   other   election-related   disclosures   had   been  



circulated, and no proxy cards had been circulated. Because no proxy card was available                                                                                           



- or known to be soon available - for shareholders' execution, nothing concrete                                                                                                   



                                                                                                                                                                                                  60  

existed for Ahmasuk to ask a shareholder to execute, not execute, give, or withhold.                                                                                                                    



And  Ahmasuk  was  neither  running  as  a  director  candidate  nor  asking  to  be  a  

                                                                                                                                                                                                  



proxyholder.  

                                 



                               To the extent the Division viewed Ahmasuk's opinion letter as directed at  

                                                                                                                                                                                                  



a specific proxy card, it could have been only the expected annual Sitnasuak official  

                                                                                                                                                                                     

proxy card.61                    As discussed, the allegedly offending sentence in Ahmasuk's letter was  

                                                                                                                                                                                             



a request that shareholders "NOT vote a discretionary proxy."  (Emphasis in original.)  

                                                                                                                                                                                 



But Sitnasuak's proxy card is no more a "discretionary proxy card" than it is a "directed  

                                                                                                                                                                                



               59              (...continued)  



                                                                                                                                                                                           

Stevens, 205 P.3d 321, 325-26 (Alaska 2009) (quoting VECO Int'l, Inc. v. Alaska Pub.  

                                                                                                        

Offices Comm'n, 753 P.2d 703, 714 (Alaska 1988)).  



               60              See  Estreicher,  supra  note  57,  at  318  ("[W]hen  no  meeting  has  been  

                                                                                                                                                                                          

scheduled, the issues are only beginning to take shape, and the speaker is seeking to  

                                                                                                                                                                              

influenceviews on corporateaffairs rather thaninduceimpending shareholder action, the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                

state  is  shorn  of  the  corporate  suffrage  justification  for  regulating  intracorporate  

                                                                                                                                                                     

communications.").  



               61             Nothing in the record suggests that in February Ahmasuk knew or should  

                                                                                                                                                                                       

have known that a competing proxy card would circulate in May.  And the Division's  

                                                                                                                                                         

enforcement order against Ahmasuk was issued in March, well before the May proxy  

                                                                                                                                                                            

card circulated.  The Division's enforcement could not have been predicated on May's  

                                                                                                                                                                                       

then-unknown proxy card.  

                                                               



                                                                                              -28-                                                                                        7498
  


----------------------- Page 29-----------------------

proxy card"; it allows a shareholder to check a box for either form of voting. The proxy                                                                                                                                                                                  



card must be filled out with a shareholder's instructions and then executed; Ahmasuk did                                                                                                                                                                                           



not ask that the upcoming Sitnasuak proxy card be executed, not executed, given, or                                                                                                                                                                                                  



withheld; he effectively asked only that shareholders not check the discretionary proxy                                                                                                                                                                                   

                                      62  In the context of this case, and at its broadest, the solicitation regulation  

voting box.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                

governs only seeking the execution or non-execution of a proxy.63                                                                                                                                                                          If the Division  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               



predicated its enforcement action on Ahmasuk's statement being directed to the then- 

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           



unissued Sitnasuak official proxy card, the Division's solicitation definition does not  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  



seem to cover his statement.  

                                                            



                                            And the Division's interpretation appears to conflict with its regulations  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        



describing the effect of "withholding a proxy."   Although the term is not expressly  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             



defined,  a  regulation  describing  proxy  requirements  clearly  explains  what  must  be  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    



provided on a proxy form for director elections:  

                                                                                                                               



                                                                  (A) a box opposite the name of each nominee which  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                             

                                            may  be marked  to  indicate that authority  to  vote for  that  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    

                                            nominee is withheld;  

                                                                                  



                      62                      The ALJ noted that "the parties did not offer persuasive authority on                                                                                                                                                                 



whether [advocating against] a                                                                     type  of proxy . . . qualifies as a solicitation."                                                                                                    (Emphasis  

in original.)                              Rather than question whether the Division's interpretation was in fact                                                                                                                                     

reasonable, the ALJ simply assumed that the Division's broad "definition of solicitation                                                                                                                                                                 

 [was] therefore reasonable" based on a lack of contradictory authority.                                                                                                                                                                      The ALJ thus                     

concluded that Ahmasuk's letter was "both a direct request to not execute a discretionary                                                                                                                                                       

proxy" under 3 AAC 08.365(A) and "a communication reasonably calculated to result                                                                                                                                                                                          

in the withholding of a discretionary proxy" under 3 AAC 08.365(B).                                                                                                                                                                                   The ALJ's   

ultimate conclusion, however, relied only on subsection (B)'s "reasonably calculated"   

definition, and the superior court affirmed only on subsection (B).                                                                                                                                          



                      63                    3 AAC 08.365(16).  

                                                                      



                                                                                                                                        -29-                                                                                                                                 7498
  


----------------------- Page 30-----------------------

                                (B)  an instruction that the shareholder may                           withhold  

                     authority   to  vote   for   a   nominee   by   lining   through   or  

                     otherwise striking out the name of that nominee                              ; . . . .        [64]  



The term "proxy" refers to "a written authorization . . . to vote";65 regulatory language  

                                                                                          



describing "withhold[ing] authority to vote" on a physical proxy card thus appears to  

                                                                                                                                        



describe at the voting level what it means to "withhold[] . . . a proxy" under 3 AAC  

                                                                                                                     



08.365(16)(B). And it refers to the act of not voting for a specific candidate by checking  

                                                                                                                             



a box or "striking out the name of that nominee."  Ahmasuk's opinion letter did not ask  

                                                                                                                                      



anyone to make or withhold specific votes in a proxy card.  

                                                                                       



                     This is a logical interpretation when compared to the other acts listed in  

                                                                                                                                        



3 AAC 08.365(16), as striking out a specific nominee's name - i.e., voting against that  

                                                                                                                                      



candidate - would be the direct inverse of "procur[ing]" or "execut[ing]" the authority  

                                                                                                                             



to vote for  a specific candidate.   Any broader reading would lead to absurd results.  

                                                                                                                                             



Again, would Ahmasuk have violated these provisions if, for example, he instead had  

                                                                                                                                      



implored  shareholders  to  simply  vote  in  person?                                    If  not,  why  would  imploring  

                                                                                                                           



shareholders to vote by directed proxy rather than discretionary proxy have a different  

                                                                                                                              



result?       Although  the  ALJ  noted  that  "any  proxy  type  may  significantly  affect  an  

                                                                                                                                       



election," impact alone does not constitute a proxy solicitation.  

                                                                                                       



                     The  Division's  interpretation  and  application  of  its  proxy  solicitation  

                                                                                                                         

regulation  are  unreasonable  on  the  facts  of  this  case.66                                      Without  reaching  the  

                                                                                                                                     



constitutional issues Ahmasuk raises, we reverse the superior court's decision upholding  

                                                                                                                            



the Division's order sanctioning Ahmusuk.  We remand to the superior court to dismiss  

                                                                                                                                



           64        3  AAC  08.335(e)(2)  (emphases  added).  



           65        3  AAC  08.365(12).   



           66        See  supra  note  37  and  accompanying  text.  



                                                                  -30-                                                             7498
  


----------------------- Page 31-----------------------

the Division's complaint against Ahmasuk and to reevaluate prevailing party status for                                                                                                                                                                                                               

purposes of an attorney's fees award.                                                                                              67  



V.                      CONCLUSION  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             

                                               WeREVERSEthesuperior court's decisionupholding theDivision'sorder  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                

sanctioning  Ahmasuk  and  REMAND  for  further  proceedings  consistent  with  this  



opinion.  



                        67                     We reiterate that context and facts are key. Our decision should not be read                                                                                                                                                                     



to automatically extend beyond this context and these facts.  "In every case we decide                                                                                                         

what we decide, and nothing more."                                                                                            Planned Parenthood of the Great Nw. v. State                                                                                                                    , 375   

P.3d 1122, 1135 (Alaska 2016).                                                                                    



                                                                                                                                                 -31-                                                                                                                                         7498
  

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