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Reandeau v. State (10/28/2011) ap-2331

Reandeau v. State (10/28/2011) ap-2331

                                               NOTICE
 
        The text of this opinion can be corrected before the opinion is published in the 
        Pacific Reporter.    Readers are encouraged to bring typographical or other formal 
        errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts: 

                               303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska  99501
 
                                        Fax:   (907) 264-0878
 
                         E-mail:  corrections @ appellate.courts.state.ak.us
 

               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 

JASON EDWARD REANDEAU, 
                                                             Court of Appeals No. A-10469 
                                Appellant,                  Trial Court No. 3KO-08-002 Cr 

                        v. 
                                                                    O    P  I  N  I  O  N 
STATE OF ALASKA, 

                                Appellee.                   No. 2331    -    October 28, 2011 

                Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Kodiak,
 
                Peter G. Ashman and John Suddock, Judges.
 

                Appearances:      G.   Blair   McCune,   Wasilla,   for   the   Appellant.
 
                Kenneth M. Rosenstein, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
 
                Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Daniel S.
 
                Sullivan, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee. 
 

                Before:  Coats, Chief Judge, Mannheimer, Judge, and Andrews,
 
                Senior Superior Court Judge. *
 

                [Bolger, Judge, not participating.] 
 

                MANNHEIMER, Judge.
 

                Jason Edward Reandeau was convicted of second-degree sexual abuse of 

a minor, two related acts of fourth-degree assault, and first-degree "failure to register" 

    *   Sitting   by  assignment     made   pursuant    to  Article  IV,  Section   11  of  the  Alaska 

Constitution and Administrative Rule 23(a). 

----------------------- Page 2-----------------------

as   a   sex   offender.  (Actually,   Reandeau   was   convicted   of   failing   to   timely   file   the 

required quarterly verification that his address had not changed.) 

                 A portion of the State's evidence against Reandeau was physical evidence 

(body samples and swabs) collected under the authority of a search warrant.  Reandeau 

argues   that   this   search   warrant   was   not   supported   by   probable   cause,   and   that   the 

physical evidence must therefore be suppressed. 

                 Another   portion   of   the   State's   evidence   against   Reandeau   consisted   of 

statements that Reandeau made to a state trooper during an interview at Reandeau's 

home - an interview that immediately preceded Reandeau's formal arrest.  Reandeau 

contends that, even though he had not been formally arrested, he was in custody for 
Miranda purposes during this interview. 2             Because Reandeau did not receive Miranda 

warnings, he argues that his statements to the trooper must be suppressed. 

                 In a third claim of error, Reandeau argues that his conviction for failure to 

register as a sex offender must be reversed because, in the jury instructions relating to 

this offense, the jurors were asked to determine whether Reandeau failed to register as 

a   sex   offender    -    when,   in   fact,   the  State  conceded     that   Reandeau  had   properly 

registered with the Department of Public Safety as a sex offender, and the charge against 

Reandeau       was    based   on   the   allegation   that   he  failed   to  timely   file  the   quarterly 

verification of his address that was due by the end of December 2007. 

                 Finally, Reandeau argues that he received an excessive composite sentence 

for his four offenses (second-degree sexual abuse of a minor, two counts of fourth-degree 

assault, and failure to register as a sex offender). 

                 For   the   reasons   explained   in   this   opinion,   we   conclude   that   the   search 

warrant was supported by probable cause, that Reandeau was not in custody for Miranda 

    2   Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 

                                                    - 2 -                                                2331 

----------------------- Page 3-----------------------

purposes when the state troopers interviewed him in his home, and that the error in the 

jury instruction was harmless. 

               We further conclude that we have no jurisdiction to decide Reandeau's 

sentence appeal, because Reandeau's composite active term of imprisonment (i.e., his 

composite time to serve) is within the applicable presumptive sentencing range for his 

most serious offense, second-degree sexual abuse of a minor. 

        Underlying facts of the case 

               Reandeau and his girlfriend of several years, Florence D., lived in a trailer 

in Kodiak. Florence's 15-year-old daughter, L.S., lived with them. Florence had another 

daughter, Jessica S., who lived nearby. 

               On December 31, 2007, there was a New Year's Eve party in the trailer. 

Reandeau,     Florence,   and  L.S.  were   all  drinking,  as  was  L.S.'s  boyfriend,   Ben 

Chichenoff.  Florence got drunk during this party and she went to bed soon after the new 

year arrived - sometime between 12:30 and 1:00 a.m.. 

               When Florence awoke the next morning, Reandeau was not in bed with her. 

Florence got out of bed and started looking around the trailer.      She found Reandeau in 

bed with her daughter L.S..    When Florence pulled back the covers, she saw that both 

Reandeau and L.S. were naked, and that Reandeau was "spooned" against L.S.'s back. 

(In other words, Reandeau and L.S. were lying on their side, with L.S. facing away from 

Reandeau, but cradled in his arms and lap.) 

               Florence became angry: she started yelling, and she pushed a television off 

a dresser.   Reandeau got up, grabbed Florence by the hair, and pulled her down the hall. 

As he pulled Florence, he told her, "I'm sick of your shit, you stupid bitch!"  Reandeau 

                                            - 3 -                                        2331
 

----------------------- Page 4-----------------------

then opened the front door of the trailer, pushed Florence outside, and then threw her 

down the stairs. 

               Florence sought assistance at the home of her next-door neighbor.  One of 

Florence's friends, Stacey Bushell, answered the door. When Florence told Bushell what 

had happened, Bushell called 911. 

               Later, when Florence came out of her neighbor's home to see if the police 

had arrived, Reandeau emerged from their trailer.  Reandeau told Florence to run - and 

that he was going to kill her if he caught her. 

               Florence ran down the street, with Reandeau in pursuit.          When Reandeau 

caught up with Florence, he grabbed her and started hitting her head up against a truck. 

One of Florence's male neighbors and another man came to Florence's aid, and they 

wrestled Reandeau to the ground. 

               While these men were attempting to subdue Reandeau, Florence's friend, 

Bushell, pulled up in her car.      Florence climbed in, and then Bushell drove Florence to 

the residence of Florence's other daughter, Jessica S..         Florence told Jessica what had 

happened, and she asked Jessica to go back to the trailer and get L.S. out.  Jessica armed 

herself with a small frying pan, and then Bushell drove Jessica back to Reandeau's and 

Florence's trailer. 

               When Jessica entered the trailer and told Reandeau that she wanted to get 

her sister (L.S.), Reandeau attacked her:         he knocked the frying pan out of her hand, 

grabbed her by the throat, and slammed her against the trailer wall.           Reandeau also hit 

Jessica in the face, bloodying her lip.     Reandeau then released Jessica, and she left the 

trailer without L.S.. 

               Alaska   State   Trooper   Nicholas   Zito   and   Kodiak   Police   Officer   Frank 

Peterson responded to the 911 call. They arrived at the residence at approximately 10:20 

a.m..  Zito's contact with Reandeau, and his interviews with several other people on the 

                                               - 4 -                                          2331
 

----------------------- Page 5-----------------------

scene, are described in the next section of this opinion.  Based on what he learned, Zito 

placed Reandeau under arrest - not for any sexual misconduct with L.S., but rather for 

his assaults on Florence. 

                Later that same day, L.S. began to feel discomfort in her anal cavity.  She 

did not tell Zito about this.     But several days later, L.S. told Kodiak Police Detective 

Rhonda Hosier that she remembered a dream in which it was dark, and she was lying on 

her stomach, and "there was pressure or something" going into her rectum. 

                Apparently prompted by this new information, Zito applied for a search 

warrant to seize body samples from Reandeau - primarily, DNA swabs of Reandeau's 

outer body (his penis and his hands) and the lining of his mouth, as well as pubic hairs. 

Analysis of the ephethelial cells (i.e., skin cells) obtained from the swab of Reandeau's 

penis revealed that some of these cells had DNA different from Reandeau's.  This DNA 

was consistent with L.S.'s DNA at 12 of 13 testing locations.  Also, Reandeau could not 

be excluded as the source of DNA found on L.S.'s pajama pants. 

        Reandeau's attack on the search warrant 

                As we have explained, Trooper Zito obtained a search warrant authorizing 

him to take swabs of Reandeau's outer body and mouth lining, as well as a number of 

Reandeau's   pubic   hairs.    Reandeau   argues   that   all   of   this   evidence   was   unlawfully 

obtained because the affidavit supporting the search warrant does not establish probable 

cause for the search. 

                To   analyze    this  claim  of  error,  we   must   summarize     the  information 

contained in Trooper Zito's affidavit supporting the search warrant application. 

                In his affidavit, Zito told the magistrate that the Kodiak police received a 

report that an older man (Reandeau) was found naked in bed with L.S..  Zito and Officer 

                                                - 5 -                                           2331
 

----------------------- Page 6-----------------------

Peterson arrived at the residence and found Reandeau intoxicated.                    Reandeau told Zito 

that   he   had   been   sleeping   in   L.S.'s   bed,   that   he   had   been   naked,   and   that   he   was 

awakened by L.S.'s mother (i.e., Florence), who was screaming and yelling.  Reandeau 

said that he and Florence had been together since April 2005 (i.e., for about two and a 

half years). 

                 Reandeau told Zito that he did not remember going to bed, and that he did 

not know why he was sleeping in L.S.'s bed.   However, he declared that nothing sexual 

had taken place between them. Reandeau admitted that he grabbed Florence by the hair. 

                 Zito   also   spoke   to  Florence.     According       to  Zito,  Florence    was    both 

intoxicated and visibly upset during this interview; she cried uncontrollably at times. 

Florence told Zito that she had awakened and found that Reandeau was not in bed with 

her.    She then went to L.S.'s bed, and she found Reandeau there.                    Florence tore the 

blanket off the bed, and she saw that both Reandeau and her daughter were totally naked, 

and that Reandeau was "snuggling" with her daughter. 

                 According to Florence, she "freaked out", and then Reandeau started calling 

her a "stupid fucking bitch".  Reandeau grabbed her by the hair and dragged her through 

the house to the front door, then threw her down the front steps.                 Florence went to her 

neighbor's house, encountered her friend (Stacey Bushell), and asked Bushell to call the 

authorities.  When Florence went back outside, Reandeau was there.  He told her, "Run, 

you   stupid   bitch,   run!",   and   then   he   started   chasing   her. When   he   caught   her,   he 

slammed her onto the ground, and then onto the hood of a parked truck. 

                 Zito also spoke to L.S.. L.S. told Zito that her mother "started freaking out" 

because Reandeau was in bed with her.                However, L.S. told Zito that she had been 

sleeping   when   Reandeau   came   to   her   bed,   and   that   she   at   first   thought   it   was   her 

boyfriend.  L.S. declared that "no touching" had taken place between her and Reandeau. 

                                                   - 6 -                                              2331
 

----------------------- Page 7-----------------------

                L.S. told Zito that Reandeau had been living with her and her mother for 

2˝ to 3 years, and that Reandeau was "in charge of the household":  he was the one who 

"enforces the rules".   L.S. conceded that Reandeau had forcibly removed Florence from 

the trailer, "possibly" grabbing her by the back of the neck. 

                In Trooper Zito's search warrant application, he asserted that the foregoing 

facts established probable cause to believe that the body samples he was requesting (i.e., 

body samples from Reandeau) would be evidence of the crime of second-degree sexual 

abuse of a minor as defined in AS 11.41.436(a)(5)(A) - i.e., evidence that Reandeau 

engaged in sexual contact with L.S., a child under the age of 16 who lived in the same 

household as Reandeau, and over whom Reandeau exercised authority. 

                The magistrate reached the same conclusion and issued the search warrant. 

                On appeal, Reandeau contends that the information in the search warrant 

application fails to establish probable cause to believe that any crime was committed. 

He notes that it is not illegal,per se , for an adult to sleep in the same bed as an underage 

minor, even if both of them are naked.            Reandeau further notes that both he and L.S. 

denied that any inappropriate touching had occurred. 

                All of this may be true, but the search warrant application   contained a 

description     of  the   surrounding     circumstances      which    considerably     heightened     the 

implication that Reandeau had engaged in sexual contact with L.S.. 

                From the search warrant application, it was fair to infer that Reandeau 

normally slept with Florence, and not with L.S.. Reandeau told Zito that he and Florence 

had been "together" for approximately two and a half years.                 Florence told Zito that, 

when   she awoke and   discovered that Reandeau was not in   bed with   her,   she   began 

searching the trailer for him. Given Florence's angry reaction when she found Reandeau 

in   bed   with   her   daughter,   it   is   fair   to   infer   that   this   discovery   was   unexpected   and 

                                                 - 7 -                                             2331
 

----------------------- Page 8-----------------------

disturbing to Florence. And finally, Reandeau told Zito that he did not know why he was 

sleeping in L.S.'s bed. 

                Thus,   the   search   warrant   application   supports   the   inference   that   it was 

unusual   for   Reandeau   to   sleep   with   L.S.. Moreover,   both   Reandeau   and   L.S.   were 

naked, and Reandeau was "spooning" or cuddling L.S. in a manner that would normally 

bring his genitals in contact with her buttocks. 

                The magistrate's finding of probable cause is also supported by Reandeau's 

reaction when Florence found him and L.S. in bed together.                 Rather than attempting to 

calm    Florence    and   explain   things,   Reandeau     attacked    Florence    both  verbally    and 

physically.    He dragged her from the house, threw her to the ground, and then later 

chased her down the road to continue his assault.   Reandeau's actions could reasonably 

be construed as a manifestation of his consciousness of guilt. 

                Reandeau relies heavily on the fact that L.S. expressly declared that there 

had    been    no  sexual    contact   between     her   and   Reandeau.      But    given    the  other 

circumstances       recited  in  the   search   warrant    application,    L.S.'s  denial   would    not 

necessarily   negate   the   existence   of   probable   cause.    Moreover,   the   search   warrant 

application   suggests   two   reasons   why   L.S.   might   falsely   deny   that   Reandeau   had 

engaged in sexual contact with her. 

                First,   L.S.   told  Trooper     Zito  that  Reandeau      was   "in   charge   of   the 

household", and he was the one who "enforces the rules".  For this reason, out of fear of 

reprisal against her or her mother, L.S. may have been hesitant to accuse Reandeau of 

criminal conduct.  Second, the search warrant application provides at least some reason 

to believe that L.S. may have felt a degree of allegiance toward Reandeau - an inference 

arising from L.S.'s singularly unemotional response to Reandeau's attack on her mother, 

and from the fact that, during and after this attack, L.S. stayed with Reandeau rather than 

aiding or comforting her mother. 

                                                 - 8 -                                             2331
 

----------------------- Page 9-----------------------

                For all of these reasons, we conclude that the search warrant application 

establishes probable cause to believe that Reandeau engaged in sexual contact with L.S., 

a minor living in the same household as Reandeau, and over whom he had authority. 

                Reandeau makes an alternative argument:             that even if the search warrant 

application establishes probable cause to believe that he engaged in sexual contact with 

L.S., the warrant itself was overbroad, in that it authorized the police to seize body 

samples that would not be evidence of this crime. 

                The warrant authorized the troopers to obtain external swabs of Reandeau's 

genitals and hands, and a swab of the inside of his mouth (a "buccal" swab). The warrant 

further authorized the troopers to comb Reandeau's pubic hair and to seize 30 pubic hairs 

from him.     Reandeau argues that these body samples were not relevant to prove sexual 

contact   -   that   their   only   conceivable   relevance   was   to   prove   sexual   penetration,   a 

discrete crime that was not alleged in the search warrant application and was not found 

by the magistrate when he issued the warrant. 

                We   disagree   with   Reandeau's   assertion   that   the   body   samples   had   no 

relevance to proving sexual contact.          The external swabs of Reandeau's genitals and 

hands might yield cells that could be identified as belonging to L.S..                The swab of the 

lining of Reandeau's mouth would provide an identification of Reandeau's DNA profile, 

and this DNA profile could potentially be linked to cells found on L.S.'s body.  The 

combing of Reandeau's pubic area might yield hair or cells that came from L.S., thus 

tending to show that he had genital contact with her.            And the pubic hairs seized from 

Reandeau might conceivably match hairs found on L.S.'s body.   We therefore conclude 

that the scope of the search authorized by the warrant was not overbroad. 

                For all of these reasons, we uphold the search warrant. 

                                                 - 9 -                                             2331
 

----------------------- Page 10-----------------------

        Reandeau's   claim   that   he   was   subjected   to   custodial   interrogation   in 
        violation of Miranda v. Arizona 

                As    we   have   already    explained,    Trooper    Zito   and   Officer   Peterson 

responded to the 911 call about the disturbance at the residence shared by Reandeau and 

Florence.     When   Zito   and   Peterson   arrived,   they   found   Jessica   S.   (Florence's   other 

daughter) and her boyfriend outside the trailer.   After speaking briefly to Jessica S. and 

her boyfriend, Zito and Peterson entered the trailer.  There, they encountered Reandeau, 

Ben Chichenoff (L.S.'s boyfriend), and L.S..   Reandeau and Chichenoff were sitting in 

the front room, while L.S. was in an adjoining room of the trailer. 

                Zito spoke to Reandeau for about three minutes.            At the end of this initial 

interview with Reandeau, Zito asked Reandeau to "sit tight for a sec[ond]" while he went 

outside to speak with the other witnesses to the altercation - Jessica S., Florence's male 

next-door neighbor, and Florence's friend Stacey Bushell.  Before leaving the trailer to 

conduct these interviews, Zito expressly told Reandeau that he was not under arrest. 

                It took Zito about half an hour to conduct these other interviews.             When 

Zito returned to the trailer, he spoke to Reandeau a second time - this time, for about 

fourteen minutes.      Zito asked Reandeau questions about what had happened between 

Reandeau and L.S., between Reandeau and Florence, and between Reandeau and Jessica 

S. (when, in response to her mother's report of being assaulted, Jessica came to the trailer 

armed with a frying pan). 

                During this second interview, Reandeau and Chichenoff were seated on a 

couch in   the   living room.    At the conclusion of this second interview, Zito arrested 

Reandeau - not for sexual abuse of a minor, but rather for his assault upon Florence. 

                Zito did not apprise Reandeau of his Miranda  rights before conducting 

these two interviews.      The superior court found that the first interview fell within the 

                                                -  10 -                                          2331
 

----------------------- Page 11-----------------------

"on-the-scene questioning" exception to Miranda, and Reandeau does not challenge that 

ruling.   However, Reandeau argues that he was in custody for the second interview, and 

that   therefore   his  statements    to  Zito   during   that  second    interview    were   obtained 

unlawfully. 

                Reandeau notes that when Zito left the trailer following the first interview, 

he told Reandeau to "sit tight", and he left Officer Peterson in the trailer with Reandeau. 

Reandeau argues that a reasonable person in his position would have believed that Zito 

had ordered him not to leave the trailer, and that he was in fact in police custody. 

                Although   these   two   factors,   standing   alone,   might   favor   a   finding   of 

custody, these factors do not stand alone. 

                The    superior    court  found    that  Zito  was   "calm    and   non-threatening" 

throughout his interviews with Reandeau, and that his questioning of Reandeau was 

"low-key".      At the conclusion of the first interview, Zito explained that he wanted to 

leave the trailer to interview the other people involved in the altercation, and he expressly 

told Reandeau that he was not under arrest.              Given   Zito's explanation, a reasonable 

person in Reandeau's position would have perceived Zito's request to "sit tight" as just 

that - a request, rather than an order.           A reasonable person in Reandeau's position 

would have understood that Zito, who was responding to a report of domestic violence, 

was trying to keep the situation under control (and the adverse parties separated) while 

he spoke to everyone involved and decided what to do. 

                This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Zito allowed Chichenoff (who 

was not only L.S.'s boyfriend, but also Reandeau's friend) to remain by Reandeau's side 

during both interviews, even though Chichenoff was himself a witness to at least some 

of what happened.        This conclusion is also bolstered by the fact that Zito did not order 

L.S. to leave the trailer. 

                                                -  11 -                                           2331
 

----------------------- Page 12-----------------------

               It is true, as Reandeau notes, that Officer Peterson remained with Reandeau 

(and Chichenoff and L.S.) in the trailer during the half-hour interval between Zito's two 

interviews with Reandeau.        But Peterson testified that his purpose was to "provid[e] 

security", because domestic violence calls are "dynamic", and the police are often unable 

to know "who's going to be a risk [or] a threat".        Peterson also stated that he remained 

in the trailer to prevent the destruction of evidence, and because L.S. was still in the 

trailer with Reandeau. 

               The superior court concluded that, given these circumstances, a person in 

Reandeau's   situation   would   not   have   perceived   Officer   Peterson's   presence   as   an 

indication of custody.  The superior court also concluded that, under the circumstances, 

no reasonable person in Reandeau's position would have expected Officer Zito to leave 

him alone in the trailer with fifteen-year-old L.S..        The record supports both of these 

conclusions. 

               For these reasons, we uphold the superior court's ruling that Reandeau was 

not in custody for Miranda purposes during the second interview with Trooper Zito. 

        Reandeau's claim that it was plain error to ask the jury to decide whether 
        Reandeau "failed to register" as a sex offender 

               Reandeau was charged with sexual abuse of a minor and several counts of 

fourth-degree assault (for his assaults on Florence and Jessica S.). In addition, Reandeau 

was charged with violating AS 11.56.835(a) - the statute that makes it a felony for a 

person to violate their duties as a sex offender (the duties prescribed in AS 11.56.840) 

for a second or subsequent time. 

               AS 11.56.840 defines the duties of sex offenders to register and to keep the 

Department of Public Safety apprised of their address. 

                                              -  12 -                                         2331
 

----------------------- Page 13-----------------------

                 Subsection (a)(3)(A) of AS 11.56.840 makes it a crime for a sex offender 

to fail to register.   (Registration is a one-time duty.) 

                 Subsection (a)(3)(B) makes it a crime for a sex offender to fail to file a 

written notice of any change of residence address, mailing address, or electronic address. 

                 Subsection (a)(3)(C) makes it a crime for a sex offender to fail to file the 

required periodic verification that their address has  not changed since the time they 

registered, or since their last change-of-address notification.             This verification must be 

filed annually or quarterly, depending on the severity of the offender's underlying sexual 

offense.   See AS 12.63.010(d). 

                 The State's theory was that Reandeau violated subsection (a)(3)(C) of this 

statute    by  failing   to  file  the  quarterly   verification    of   his   address   that   was   due  in 

December       2007.     However,       the  charging     document      and   the  jury   instructions    at 

Reandeau's trial repeatedly referred to Reandeau's crime as a failure to "register" as a 

sex offender. 

                 The language of the charging document and the jury instructions tracks the 

title of the statute:   "failure to register as a sex offender".        However, this statutory title 

is mistaken, or at least misleading. 

                 Technically, "registration" is a one-time duty that Reandeau was required 

to perform when   he completed his prison sentence for attempted first-degree sexual 

assault.    See   AS   12.63.010(a)   -   (b).    The   State   never   presented   any   evidence   (or 

otherwise suggested) that Reandeau failed to register as a sex offender.                      Rather, the 

State's case was premised on the assertion that Reandeau failed to file the December 

2007 quarterly verification of his address required under AS 12.63.010(d)(2). 

                 At grand jury, the State presented the testimony of Trooper Zito to support 

this   charge.     Zito's    testimony     shows    that   he   used   the   terms   "registration"     and 

"verification" interchangeably. 

                                                  -  13 -                                             2331
 

----------------------- Page 14-----------------------

                Zito told the grand jurors that Reandeau was under a general obligation "to 

register quarterly" - and that, in particular, Reandeau "was supposed to register by 

December 31st of 2007".         Zito then testified that, according to the official records, the 

State of Alaska "did   not receive the quarterly verification from Mr. Reandeau as of 

December 2007", and thus Reandeau was not in compliance with his obligations as a sex 

offender.     Zito   added   that   Reandeau   himself   "admitted   to   me   that   he   had   failed   to 

register" as of December 2007 - but, in response to a grand juror's question, Zito 

acknowledged that Reandeau had later submitted the proper verification, and that he was 

back in compliance with the law at the time of the grand jury hearing. 

                During Reandeau's trial, both in discussions outside the presence of the jury 

and while   making his presentation to the jury, the prosecutor repeatedly referred to 

Reandeau's failure to "register" when the prosecutor clearly was speaking of Reandeau's 

failure to file the quarterly verification.        For example, during the prosecutor's opening 

statement to the jury, he referred to Reandeau's offense as "[being] out of compliance 

with the requirement that he quarterly register as a sex offender".              The prosecutor told 

the jurors: 

                        Prosecutor :     [I   will   present   the   testimony   of]   Alice 
                Poncho[, who] is with the sex offender registry of the State of 
                Alaska, and works for the Department of Public Safety.  And 
                she'll   be   testifying   before   you   regarding   the   defendant's 
                record for registration, and the fact that he was required to 
                register during the month of December of 2007. He had to 
                register between ... December 1st and December 31st, and he 
                did not file the registration during that period of time[.] 

                Indeed, when Alice Poncho took the stand, she too used the word "register" 

when she was speaking of the required quarterly verification of a sex offender's address: 

                                                 -  14 -                                            2331
 

----------------------- Page 15-----------------------

                            Prosecutor :         How     often   is   [Reandeau]   required   to 
                   register, ma'am? 

                            Poncho :      He's required to register quarterly for life. 
                            .   .  . 

                            Prosecutor : [So,] was [Reandeau] required to register 
                   during the month of December 2007 as part of his quarterly 
                   registration ... ? 

                            Poncho :      Yes.
 
                            .   .  .
 

                            Prosecutor :        And ... is this [a] copy of the letter that 
                   was sent to Mr. Reandeau, advising him of his obligation to 
                   register prior to the end of the month of December 2007? 

                            Poncho :       Yes. 

                   At the close of the trial, when the prosecutor delivered his summation to the 

jury, he again referred to Reandeau's failure to "register" as a sex offender when he 

clearly meant Reandeau's failure to file the quarterly verification of his address: 

                            Prosecutor :        [Mr.   Reandeau   has   a]   predicate   [sex] 
                   offense, which is attempted sexual assault in the first degree, 
                   for   which   he   was   convicted   in   1995.          That   triggered   the 
                   lifetime      registration      requirement.          He     has    to   register 
                   quarterly.       He's   notified   of   this.    [And]   he   ...   knowingly 
                   fail[ed] to register.       In this instance, he was given notice of 
                   the    requirement         to   make     his    quarterly      registration      in 
                   December of 2007, [and] he failed to do so.  [When he spoke 
                   to Trooper Zito] on the morning of January 1st [2008], he 
                   was aware that he was in violation.                And all he has to do, to 
                   do    this,   is  to   sign    papers     and    go    down     to   the   police 
                   department and fill out the registration form. 

                                                        -  15 -                                                   2331
 

----------------------- Page 16-----------------------

                 Like the prosecutor, the trial judge and the defense attorney used the term 

"register"   when   they   spoke   of   Reandeau's   duty   to   file   quarterly   verifications   of   his 

address. 

                 The jury received two instructions on this "failure to register" charge.  The 

first of these instructions, "B-1", described the charge against Reandeau by quoting the 

language of the charging documents.  That is, Instruction B-1 quoted all of the statutory 

requirements, even though most of these requirements had no relevance to the State's 

theory of prosecution. 

                 The second jury instruction, "B-2", again described Reandeau's offense as 

"failure to register" as a sex offender.          According to this instruction, the State had to 

prove that Reandeau was a sex offender, that he was aware of his duty to register, that 

he knowingly failed to register, and that he had previously been convicted of failing to 

register. 

                 Reandeau's trial attorney did not object to this instruction, but Reandeau 

argues on appeal that it was plain error for the trial judge to instruct the jurors on a crime 

that    was   technically     different   from    the   one   the   State   alleged   (although     it  was 

encompassed by the same criminal statute). 

                 An erroneous jury instruction constitutes "plain error" when, given the way 

the case was litigated, there is a clear likelihood that the jury's decision rested on an 

erroneous theory, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.              Khan v. State, 204 P.3d 1036, 

 1040-41 (Alaska App. 2009), citingAviation Associates, Ltd. v. TEMSCO Helicopters, 

Inc., 881 P.2d 1127, 1131 n.7 (Alaska 1994). 

                 Concededly, the initial "registration" required of sex offenders is distinct 

from the "verifications" of their address that sex offenders must file on an annual or 

quarterly basis.  But in Reandeau's case, the attorneys, the witnesses, and even the trial 

judge repeatedly used the phrase "failure to register" when it was clear, from the context, 

                                                  -  16 -                                             2331
 

----------------------- Page 17-----------------------

that they were speaking of the allegation that Reandeau failed to file his December 2007 

quarterly address verification in a timely manner. 

                 Moreover,      the   prosecutor    never    presented    any    evidence,    nor   did  he 

otherwise suggest, that Reandeau failed to initially register as a sex offender. Rather, the 

prosecutor   repeatedly   stated   that   the   charge   against   Reandeau   was   premised   on   the 

assertion that Reandeau failed to file the quarterly address verification that was due by 

the end of December 2007. 

                 In other words, even though the wording of the challenged jury instruction 

was technically erroneous, there is essentially no possibility that the jurors were misled 

as   to   the   charge   against   Reandeau,   or   misled   as   to   the   elements   that   the   State   was 

required to prove in order to justify a guilty verdict.  For this reason, the erroneous jury 

instruction does not constitute plain error. 

        Reandeau's claim that his sentencing judge violated Blakely v. Washington 
        when the judge found that Reandeau engaged in sexual penetration of L.S. 

                 Reandeau's most serious offense is second-degree sexual abuse of a minor 

- sexual contact with a minor who is at least 13 years old but younger than 16 years old. 

This offense is a class B felony.        See AS 11.41.436(b). 

                Normally,       the   maximum       penalty    for  a  class   B  felony    is  10   years' 

imprisonment.       However, the legislature has established a substantially more severe 

penalty range for second-degree sexual abuse of a minor:   the maximum penalty for this 

offense is 99 years' imprisonment.           See AS 12.55.125(i)(3). 

                 Because Reandeau had a prior conviction for attempted first-degree sexual 

assault, he faced a presumptive sentencing range of 15 to 30 years' imprisonment.  See 

AS 12.55.125(i)(3)(C). 

                                                  -  17 -                                             2331
 

----------------------- Page 18-----------------------

                The sentencing judge, Superior Court Judgepro tempore  Peter G. Ashman, 

found that one aggravating factor, AS 12.55.155(c)(7), applied to Reandeau's offense, 

because Reandeau's prior felony (attempted first-degree sexual assault) was of a more 

serious class than his present felony. 

                (Reandeau does not challenge this aggravating factor.   First-degree sexual 

assault is an unclassified felony; see AS 11.41.410(b).  Thus, an attempt to commit this 

crime is a class A felony; see AS 11.31.100(d)(2).  Reandeau's current offense is a class 

B felony.) 

                In addition, Judge Ashman concluded, based on his review of the evidence 

in the present case, that Reandeau had not only engaged in sexual contact with L.S. but 

had also engaged in sexual penetration with her - a more serious offense. 

                Based     on   aggravating    factor   (c)(7),  and    additionally   based    on   his 

conclusion   that   Reandeau   committed   a   higher   degree   of   offense   by   penetrating   the 

victim, Judge Ashman sentenced Reandeau to 50 years with 25 years suspended.  In 

other words, Reandeau received 25 years to serve - a sentence toward the top of the 

presumptive range - with an additional 25 years suspended. 

                Because Reandeau has a prior conviction for a sexual felony, he is not 

eligible for good time credit (which normally reduces a felony sentence by one-third) 

when he serves this sentence of imprisonment.            See AS 33.20.010(a)(3). 

                Judge Ashman imposed a consecutive sentence of 2 years' imprisonment 

for Reandeau's separate felony offense of failing to file his quarterly address verification, 

and    the   judge   imposed     a  consecutive     180   days   (in  total)  for  Reandeau's      two 

misdemeanor assaults on Florence. 

                                                -  18 -                                          2331
 

----------------------- Page 19-----------------------

                 All told, Reandeau's composite sentence is 27˝ years to serve - and, as 
explained above, he is ineligible for good time credit for 25 years of this sentence. 3 

                 Reandeau argues that Judge Ashman violated his Sixth Amendment right 
to   jury   trial,   as   interpreted   in  Blakely   v.   Washington, 4  when   the   judge   found   that 

Reandeau engaged in sexual penetration (not just sexual contact) with L.S..  Reandeau 

notes that the jury found him not guilty of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor (a crime 

requiring proof of sexual penetration) and instead found him guilty of second-degree 

sexual abuse of a minor (a crime requiring proof of sexual contact).  Reandeau argues 

that, under Blakely, a sentencing judge is bound by the jury's view of the facts - so that 

even if the judge believes that the evidence establishes a more serious crime, the judge 

    3   Reandeau argues that, because he is ineligible for good time credit, his sentence for 

the sexual felony is equivalent to a sentence of 33ayears - because he must serve the extra 
third of the sentence that other offenders would not serve, assuming they maintained good 
behavior. 

        Reandeau's underlying premise is correct:   his sentence is not strictly comparable to 
other 25-year sentences.       But his math is wrong.        Because of Reandeau's ineligibility for 
good time credit, his 25-year sentence for second-degree sexual assault is arguably equivalent 
to a sentence of 37˝ years' imprisonment.            Under normal good time credit rules, a person 
sentenced to serve 37˝ years would serve two-thirds of this sentence - 25 years - and then 
be released on parole. 

        On   the   other   hand,   it   is   not   accurate   to   say   that   Reandeau's   good-time-restricted 
sentence of 25 years to serve is completely equivalent to a normal sentence of 37˝ years to 
serve.   It is true that a defendant sentenced to a normal term of 37˝ years would ordinarily 
serve 25 years (assuming that they maintained good behavior), but then the defendant would 
be on parole for another 12˝ years - with the possibility that their good time credit would 
be revoked and they would have to serve some or all of the remaining 12˝ years of their 
sentence.    Reandeau will have to serve 25 years, but then he will be released without parole 
supervision, and with no portion of his sentence remaining. 

    4   542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). 

                                                   -  19 -                                             2331
 

----------------------- Page 20-----------------------

is constitutionally required to set aside any personal views of the evidence and, instead, 

accept the jury's interpretation. 

               This Blakely argument is waived:  it was not presented until Reandeau filed 
his reply brief, and arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived. 5 

               In his reply brief, Reandeau attempts to circumvent this rule by asserting 

that he raised this Blakely argument in his opening brief.        He is mistaken.  Reandeau's 

opening   brief   contains   the   argument   that   Judge   Ashman   may   have   been factually 

mistaken when he concluded that Reandeau sexually penetrated L.S., but Reandeau's 

opening brief does not contain the argument that Judge Ashman was constitutionally 

barred from reaching this conclusion, regardless of the evidence.           In fact, Reandeau's 

opening brief does not even contain a citation to Blakely v. Washington. 

               In addition to being unpreserved, Reandeau's argument is wrong.            Under 
Apprendi v. New Jersey 6                                    7 
                             and Blakely v. Washington,   a defendant's Sixth Amendment 

right to jury trial requires that any fact other than a prior conviction which increases the 

maximum authorized penalty for the defendant's crime must be submitted to a jury and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 8 

               But when a sentencing judge chooses the defendant's sentence from within 

the range of penalties authorized by the jury's verdict, the judge is authorized to rely on 

their own view of the evidence. 

    5   See, e.g., Petersen v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 803 P.2d 406, 411 (Alaska 

1990); Hitt v. J.B. Coghill, Inc., 641 P.2d 211, 213 n. 4 (Alaska 1982). 

    6   530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). 

    7   542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). 

    8   Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301, 124 S.Ct. at 2536 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 

S.Ct. at 2362-63); Forster v. State, 236 P.3d 1157, 1169 (Alaska App. 2010). 

                                             - 20 -                                         2331
 

----------------------- Page 21-----------------------

                 As we explained in        West v. State, 223 P.3d 634 (Alaska App. 2010), a 

defendant's right to jury trial under Apprendi and Blakely hinges on the consequences 

of resolving the contested issue of fact in the government's favor.                 If resolution of the 

issue of fact in the government's favor means that the defendant will face a greater 

maximum sentence, or a higher presumptive range of imprisonment, then the defendant 

has a right to jury trial on that issue.       223 P.3d at 638.      Conversely, if resolution of the 

disputed issue of fact in the government's favor will not alter the defendant's maximum 

sentence, then the defendant has no right to jury trial on that issue. 

                 Here, because Reandeau was convicted of second-degree sexual abuse of 

a   minor,   and   because   he   had   one   prior   sexual   felony,   Reandeau   was   subject   to   a 

presumptive sentencing range of 15 to 30 years' imprisonment.  AS 12.55.125(i)(3)(C). 

The     superior   court   found    one   aggravating      factor:   that   Reandeau's       prior  felony 

(attempted   first-degree   sexual   assault)   was   of   a   more   serious   class   than   his   current 

offense.   See AS 12.55.155(c)(7).         Reandeau does not challenge that aggravator. 

                 Because the State proved this aggravating factor, the superior court was 

authorized   to   sentence   Reandeau   to   any   term   of   imprisonment   up   to   the   statutory 

maximum of 99 years.         See AS 12.55.155(a)(2) and AS 12.55.125(i)(3). 

                 Thus, when Judge Ashman decided what sentence to impose within this 

authorized   range,   he   was   entitled   to   rely   on   the   fact   that,   in   his   view,   the   evidence 

established that Reandeau actually committed a higher degree of offense by engaging in 

sexual penetration with L.S.. 

                 As we held in  Cleveland v. State, 143 P.3d 977 (Alaska App. 2006), a 

defendant's right to jury trial under Blakely is satisfied (under Alaska's presumptive 

sentencing laws) "if there is at least one Blakely-compliant aggravating factor - i.e., at 

least one aggravating factor that flows directly from the jury's verdict, or is admitted by 

the defendant, or is based on the defendant's prior convictions."                 143 P.3d at 984-85. 

                                                  - 21 -                                              2331
 

----------------------- Page 22-----------------------

Thus, when at least one Blakely-compliant aggravator is present, the sentencing judge 

does not violate a defendant's right to jury trial when the judge resolves other disputed 

issues   of   fact   -   even   when   these   disputed   issues   of   fact   constitute   other   statutory 

aggravators.     This is true because "[p]roof of additional aggravating factors [does] not 

alter    the  range    of  sentences     available    to  the  judge    -    although     these   additional 

aggravators [may] obviously be important to the judge's choice of sentence within that 

sentencing range."  Id. at 984. 

        Reandeau's claim that his failure to file a timely verification of his address 
         in  December       2007    was   among      the  least   serious   within   the   statutory 
        definition of the offense 

                 With     respect    to  Reandeau's       conviction     for   failing   to  file  a  timely 

verification of his address for the quarter ending December 2007, Reandeau proposed 

one mitigating factor:        AS 12.55.155(d)(9)   -   that his conduct was among the least 

serious   within   the   statutory   definition   of   the   offense.    Judge   Ashman   rejected   this 

proposed mitigator, and Reandeau now argues that this ruling was erroneous. 

                 In support of this proposed mitigator, Reandeau offered evidence that there 

were     other   previous    instances    where    he   was   tardy   in  filing   his  quarterly    address 

verifications, and the State did not prosecute him for those lapses. Reandeau argues that 

the   State's    past  laxity   led   him   to  believe    that  the  authorities    did   not  consider     it 

particularly important for sex offenders to file their quarterly verifications on time. 

                 Reandeau further suggests that there is a good reason why this statutory 

requirement is not vigorously enforced:   he contends that a sex offender's failure to file 

a quarterly verification that their address has not changed is simply not as important, or 

as harmful to society's interests, as a sex offender's failure to notify the authorities when 

                                                   - 22 -                                               2331
 

----------------------- Page 23-----------------------

their address has changed - conduct that is covered by a separate subsection of the 

statute. 

                 When Judge Ashman rejected Reandeau's proposed mitigator, he gave this 

explanation for his ruling: 

                         The Court:   As to the mitigator, ... I don't believe this 
                 is   among   the   least   serious   conduct.  I   think   "least   serious 
                 conduct" might be something like some misunderstanding 
                 about the [filing] dates, some error in mailing, some effort to 
                 comply but failure to complete the compliance for circum­ 
                 stances that are essentially excusable.         [This] defendant has 
                 two   priors   for   failure   to   register,   [and]   a   long   history   of 
                 registering late.   Under those circumstances, I don't believe 
                 the Court can find by clear and convincing evidence [that 
                 Reandeau's conduct in this case] is [among] the least serious. 
                 In fact, it meets the precise definition of the crime. 

                 In his brief to this Court, Reandeau does not dispute any of Judge Ashman's 

statements      concerning     Reandeau's      history   of  tardy   compliance      with   the   statutory 

requirement,      or  the   fact  that  Reandeau      had   been   previously     prosecuted     for  tardy 

compliance. 

                 (Arguably, it was improper for Judge Ashman to consider one of these two 

prior prosecutions for this purpose.         Reandeau was convicted offirst-degree  failure to 

register, rather than second-degree, precisely because he had previously been convicted 

of this offense.  But Judge Ashman could properly consider the fact that Reandeau was 

a third-time offender.) 

                 As Judge Ashman noted, the facts of Reandeau's current offense are within 

the   main   definition   of   the   offense.   And   even   if   Reandeau's   current   offense   were 

arguably mitigated, Judge Ashman could properly consider Reandeau's history of similar 

                                                  - 23 -                                              2331
 

----------------------- Page 24-----------------------

violations - both prosecuted and unprosecuted - when deciding whether Reandeau 

had proved his proposed mitigator. 

               The    fact  that  the  government     had   turned  a  blind  eye   to  several  of 

Reandeau's past violations of the reporting requirement might support the conclusion 

that   the  government     viewed    Reandeau's  past     violations   as de   minimis,    but  the 

government's failure to prosecute Reandeau for these past transgressions says little about 

whether Reandeau's current violation of the reporting requirement is among the least 

serious. 

               In sum, the facts of Reandeau's case support Judge Ashman's rejection of 

the proposed mitigator. 

        The superior court's written judgement should be amended 

               In addition to finding Reandeau guilty of second-degree sexual abuse of a 

minor, the jury also found Reandeau guilty of third-degree sexual assault, under the 

theory that he engaged in sexual contact with a person who was incapacitated or unaware 

of the sexual conduct. 

               Judge Ashman did not enter a separate conviction and sentence for this 

crime.   Rather, the judge merged the two crimes and sentenced Reandeau as if he had 

been convicted solely of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor.   However, the written 

judgement notes the jury's verdict on the third-degree sexual assault - and it describes 

that charge incorrectly. 

               As Reandeau notes in footnote 15 of his opening brief, the superior court's 

written judgement erroneously describes Reandeau's crime of third-degree sexual assault 

as a violation of AS 11.41.425(a)(1)(A), which prohibits sexual contact with a mentally 

incapable person. Reandeau's offense was actually a violation of AS 11.41.425(a)(1)(B) 

                                              - 24 -                                         2331
 

----------------------- Page 25-----------------------

or (C) - sexual contact with a person who is incapacitated or who is unaware of the 

sexual conduct. 

                Reandeau asks that this clerical error be corrected.            The State does not 

respond   to   Reandeau's   argument;   indeed,   the   State   may   have   missed   the   argument, 

because it is contained in a footnote.   (We ask that, in the future, attorneys refrain from 

raising arguments in footnotes.)        Nevertheless, there appears to be no reason why we 

should not order the superior court to correct the judgement. 

        This Court has no jurisdiction to decide whether Reandeau's composite 
        sentence is excessive 

                Having resolved Reandeau's attacks on the manner in which the superior 

court   imposed   his   sentence,   we   now   turn   to   Reandeau's   claim   that   his   composite 

sentence is excessive.  We conclude that Reandeau has no right to raise this claim in his 

appeal, and that this Court has no jurisdiction to resolve this claim. 

                As we have already explained, Reandeau faced a presumptive sentencing 

range of 15 to 30 years' imprisonment for his most serious offense, second-degree sexual 

abuse of a minor.     Reandeau's composite sentence (his total sentence for all four of his 

offenses) is 27˝ years to serve.  In other words, Reandeau's composite term to serve lies 

within the presumptive range for his most serious offense. 

                AS 12.55.120(a) declares that a felony defendant can ordinarily appeal 

"[any] sentence of imprisonment lawfully imposed by the superior court for a term or for 

aggregate   terms   exceeding   two   years   of   unsuspended   incarceration".       But   AS   12.­ 

55.120(e) limits this right of appeal.      Subsection (e) states that "[a] sentence within an 

applicable presumptive range set out in AS 12.55.125 ... may not be appealed to the court 

of appeals under [AS 12.55.120] or AS 22.07.020 on the ground that the sentence is 

                                                - 25 -                                           2331
 

----------------------- Page 26-----------------------

excessive."     Rather, the defendant only has the right to petition the Alaska Supreme 

Court for discretionary review of the sentence.  Ibid. 

                Here,     AS   12.55.120(e)     appears    to  bar  Reandeau      from   appealing    his 

sentence - because Reandeau's composite term of active imprisonment (i.e., his time 

to serve) falls within the 15- to 30-year presumptive range that he would have faced had 

he been convicted solely of his most serious offense, second-degree sexual abuse of a 
minor. 9   This jurisdictional issue was not raised in the parties' opening round of briefs. 

However,   this   Court   is   obliged   to   take   cognizance   of   a   flaw   in   our   subject-matter 
jurisdiction, even when this problem is not raised by the parties.  10  We accordingly asked 

the parties to file supplemental briefs on this issue. 

                Reandeau suggests that the statute does not bar Reandeau from pursuing a 

sentence     appeal    because,    even   though    Reandeau's     time   to  serve   falls  within   the 

applicable 15- to 30-year presumptive range, Reandeau's  total  sentence includes an 

additional 25 years of suspended imprisonment.               Reandeau argues that since his total 

sentence (52˝ years with 25 years suspended) is greater than the 30-year top of the 

presumptive range, he has the right to pursue this sentence appeal (and this Court has 

jurisdiction to decide the appeal). 

                In particular, Reandeau relies on this Court's decision in Heavyrunner v. 

State, 172 P.3d 819 (Alaska App. 2007).              In Heavyrunner, we held that a defendant 

pursuing a sentence appeal is entitled to challenge not only the time-to-serve component 

of their sentence, but also the amount of suspended imprisonment they received - and 

    9   See Peters v. State, 943 P.2d 418, 421 (Alaska App. 1997), where this Court held that 

when a defendant is sentenced for two or more crimes, the defendant's composite time to 
serve determines whether the defendant has received the statutory minimum sentence that 
triggers the right of sentence appeal. 

    10  Robertson v. Riplett, 194 P.3d 382, 386 (Alaska 2008). 

                                                 - 26 -                                              2331 

----------------------- Page 27-----------------------

that when this Court decides whether a sentence is excessive, "we must consider the 

sentence in its entirety, including all suspended time".          172 P.3d at 821. 

                Heavyrunner stands for the proposition that this Court will consider the 

entirety of a defendant's sentence when we decide the defendant's sentence appeal - 

if the defendant has a right to appeal the sentence.         But Heavyrunner does not address 

the question of whether a defendant's suspended jail time is to be taken into account 

when determining whether the defendant's sentence is severe enough to trigger a right 

of appeal under AS 12.55.120. 

                We have never addressed this issue in the context of AS 12.55.120(e). 

However, in Cragg v. State, 957 P.2d 1365, 1368 (Alaska App. 1998), we addressed the 

issue   of   suspended   imprisonment   in   the   context   of   AS   12.55.120(a).     This   statute 

declares that a defendant has no right to pursue a sentence appeal unless their composite 

time to serve exceeds 2 years for a felony, or 120 days for a misdemeanor.  In Cragg, we 

rejected the argument that a substantial term of suspended imprisonment could trigger 

a right of sentence appeal:        we held that a defendant has no right to pursue a sentence 

appeal if the defendant's time to serve is less than the statutory minimum, even though 

the defendant's total sentence (including suspended time) is greater than the statutory 

minimum. 

                We acknowledge that the wording of AS 12.55.120(e) differs from the 

wording of AS 12.55.120(a), in that subsection (e) does not contain an explicit reference 

to the "time to serve" component of the defendant's sentence.               Instead, subsection (e) 

simply states that "a sentence within [the] applicable presumptive range ... may not be 

appealed   to   the   court   of   appeals   ...   on   the   ground   that   the   sentence   is   excessive." 

Nevertheless, based on the legislative history of subsection (e), we conclude that when 

the legislature used the phrase, "a sentence within [the] applicable presumptive range", 

they meant "an unsuspended sentence" within the applicable presumptive range. 

                                                - 27 -                                            2331
 

----------------------- Page 28-----------------------

                Subsection (e) of AS 12.55.125, as originally proposed in Senate Bill 56 
(24th   Legislature), 11   would   have   eliminated   all   appellate   review   of   a   sentence   for 

excessiveness if the sentence was within the applicable presumptive range set out in 

AS 12.55.125.      Here is the text of the original version of this provision: 

                        (e)  A sentence reviewed by the appellate court under 
                this section and AS 22.07.020, or by the superior court under 
                AS 22.10.020, or a sentence reviewed by petition accepted 
                under court rules, may not be reversed as excessive, and the 
                sentencing court is not required to make specific findings, if 
                the sentence is within an applicable presumptive range set out 
                in AS 12.55.125, or is a consecutive or partially consecutive 
                sentence imposed in accordance with the minimum sentences 
                set out in AS 12.55.127. 

                During committee hearings on this bill, some legislators expressed concern 

that it would be unconstitutional to eliminate all right of sentence review.  This problem 

was addressed in a legislative research report and a memorandum to the House Judiciary 

Committee from the Public Defender Agency. 

                Both the report and the memorandum pointed out that Alaska Appellate 

Rule   215(a)(5)   explicitly   grants   defendants   a   right   of   discretionary   sentence   review 

(by petition to the Alaska Supreme Court) in cases where there was no statutory right of 
sentence appeal. 12    The report and the memorandum also suggested that eliminating all 

right of sentence review would run afoul of this Court's decision in Rozkydal v. State, 

938 P.2d 1091 (Alaska App. 1997). 

    11  The companion bill was House Bill 78. 

    12  Alaska Appellate Rule 215(a)(5) - entitled "Right to Seek Discretionary Review [of 

a sentence] for Excessiveness" - provides that a defendant "may seek discretionary review 
of an unsuspended sentence of imprisonment which is not appealable ... by filing a petition 
for review in the supreme court under Appellate Rule 402." 
                                                - 28 -                                              2331 

----------------------- Page 29-----------------------

                 (In Rozkydal, this Court interpreted subsection (a) of AS 12.55.125, which 

declares that a felony defendant has no right to appeal their sentence unless the sentence 

exceeds two years to serve. To avoid constitutional problems, we held that this limitation 

on the right of sentence appeal did not limit a defendant's right to petition the supreme 

court for discretionary review of their sentence.            938 P.2d at 1094-95.) 

                 Senate Bill 56 was amended in response to these concerns, changing the 

language of AS 12.55.125(e) to its current form: 

                         (e) A sentence within an applicable presumptive range 
                 set   out   in  AS    12.55.125     or   a  consecutive      or  partially 
                 consecutive       sentence    imposed      in   accordance      with    the 
                 minimum   sentences   set   out   in   AS   12.55.127   may   not   be 
                 appealed      to  the  court   of   appeals    under    this  section    or 
                 AS 22.07.020 on the ground that the sentence is excessive. 
                 However, the sentence may be reviewed by an appellate court 
                 on   the   ground   that   it   is   excessive   through   a   petition   filed 
                 under rules adopted by the supreme court. 

(This amended language was adopted by the House Judiciary Committee 13 and was 

subsequently incorporated into the House Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 56. 14 ) 

                 This legislative history shows that the legislature intended for the limitation 

on sentence appeals codified in subsection (e) to work in tandem with the right to petition 

for sentence review granted by Appellate Rule 215(a)(5).                 From this, we conclude that 

AS 12.55.125(e) should be construed to refer to unsuspended sentences of imprisonment. 

Appellate   Rule   215(a)(5)   gives   defendants   the   right   to       ask  the   supreme   court   for 

discretionary review of unsuspended terms of imprisonment that are not appealable to 

    13  Minutes of the House Judiciary Committee, February 4, 2005, regarding C.S.S.B. 56 

(i.e., Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 56), at 1:17:20 - 1:33:28. 

    14  House Committee Substitute (Judiciary) for C.S.S.B. 56, offered on February 9, 2005. 

                                                  - 29 -                                                2331 

----------------------- Page 30-----------------------

this Court.    Accordingly, we should construe AS 12.55.125(e) in a like manner - that 

is,   construe   it   to   eliminate   the   right   of   sentence   appeal   for   defendants   who   receive 

unsuspended terms of imprisonment within the applicable presumptive range. 

                For these reasons, we hold that, under AS 12.55.125(e), a defendant's right 

to pursue a sentence appeal is determined by the defendant's time to serve. 

                Because Reandeau's composite time to serve is 27˝ years, and because this 

is less than the 30-year ceiling of the presumptive range that applies to his most serious 

offense, we conclude that Reandeau has no right to appeal his sentence on the ground of 

excessiveness, and we further conclude that this Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate 

Reandeau's claim that his sentence is excessive.            See AS 22.07.020(b), which declares 

that this Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals of felony sentences that exceed 2 years to 

serve "except as limited by AS 12.55.120". 

                We are mindful of the real-life consequences of our decision, especially for 

defendants convicted of sexual felonies.            The legislature has recently created special 

presumptive       sentencing    ranges    for  sexual    felonies   -    sentencing    ranges    that  are 

substantially more severe than the presumptive ranges that normally apply to defendants 

convicted of the same classes of felony offenses. For example, Reandeau's most serious 

offense is a class B felony. Instead of facing the presumptive range that normally applies 

to   a  second    felony    offender    convicted     of  a  class   B  felony    (i.e.,  4  to  7  years' 
imprisonment 15), Reandeau faced a presumptive range of 15 to 30 years' imprisonment. 

Because Reandeau's composite time to serve falls within this range, he has no right to 

pursue a sentence appeal, even though he faces almost three decades of imprisonment 

- and even though the legislature has declared that defendants in his situation are not 

eligible for the normal credit for good behavior. 

    15  See AS 12.55.125(d)(3). 

                                                 - 30 -                                               2331 

----------------------- Page 31-----------------------

                We express no opinion as to whether there might be good reason to review 

Reandeau's sentence.       We hold only that, regardless of whether Reandeau's sentence 

might merit review, this Court has no jurisdiction to undertake that review. Accordingly, 

we refer Reandeau's excessive sentence claim to the Alaska Supreme Court pursuant to 

Alaska Appellate Rule 215(k). 

        Conclusion 

                The superior court should amend the wording of Reandeau's judgement so 

that   it   lists   Reandeau's   conviction   for   third-degree   sexual   assault   as   a   violation   of 

AS 11.41.425(a)(1)(B) - (C). 

                 Because this Court has no jurisdiction to decide Reandeau's excessive 

sentence claim, we refer that claim to the Alaska Supreme Court for discretionary review 

pursuant to Appellate Rule 215(k). 

                In all other respects, the judgement of the superior court is AFFIRMED. 

                                                - 31 -                                           2331
 
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