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Cozzen v. Municipality of Anchorage (12/8/95), 907 P 2d 473
NOTICE: This is subject to formal correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0607, fax (907) 276-5808.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
JERRY COZZEN, )
) Supreme Court No. S-6250
Appellant, )
) Superior Court No.
v. ) 3AN-91-6633 CI
)
MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, ) O P I N I O N
)
Appellee. ) [No. 4292 - December 8, 1995]
______________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage,
Mark C. Rowland, Judge.
Appearances: Martin A. Farrell, Jr.,
Anchorage, for Appellant. Douglas A. Carson,
Assistant Municipal Attorney, and Ann Waller
Resch, Acting Municipal Attorney, Anchorage,
for Appellee.
Before: Moore, Chief Justice, Rabinowitz,
Matthews, Compton and Eastaugh, Justices.
COMPTON, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
This appeal arises from a grant of summary judgment in
a wrongful constructive discharge suit brought by Jerry Cozzen
against the Municipality of Anchorage, Anchorage Police
Department (APD). The superior court granted APD's motion for
summary judgment, concluding that Cozzen had failed to exhaust
his available contractual remedies under the collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) by which he was bound. The court also
held that he was estopped from asserting his claim because of an
inconsistent position he had taken before the Anchorage Police
and Fire Retirement Board (Board). We affirm the superior
court's grant of summary judgment on the ground that Cozzen did
not exhaust his available contractual remedies. In view of this
conclusion, we need not address the estoppel issue.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Cozzen was employed as a police officer by APD from
1979 through October 4, 1989. He was a member of the Anchorage
Police Department Employees Association (APDEA), the APD's
collective bargaining unit. The terms and conditions of APDEA
members' employment were specified in successive CBAs between APD
and APDEA.1
In July 1989, following a comprehensive physical
examination, Cozzen met with APD Deputy Chief of Police Duane
Udland. Alan Kraft, the APDEA president, attended this meeting
as Cozzen's union representative. At this meeting Deputy Chief
Udland informed Cozzen that the results of his physical
examination revealed that his hearing no longer met the standard
necessary for employment as a police officer, and that therefore
he would have to retire. Cozzen alleged that the standard which
his hearing did not satisfy was inapplicable to him, because it
was the "pre-hire standard."2
Cozzen testified that he insisted that he "did not want
to leave and that [his] hearing had presented no problem with
[his] job performance." He claims that he "was forced to retire,
against [his] persistently stated wish not to."3 Both parties
agree that Cozzen asked Deputy Chief Udland whether he had any
other options. Deputy Chief Udland answered that he did not.
The parties also agree that Cozzen approached Kraft and
inquired whether APDEA could help him. Cozzen contends that he
asked specifically whether APDEA could file a grievance.
However, his deposition does not reveal that he asked
specifically for a union-filed grievance. Cozzen also informally
questioned Jack Larson, the former president of APDEA, whether
the APDEA could assist him in resisting retirement. Again Cozzen
claims that he asked specifically whether APDEA would grieve his
claim.4 It is clear that Cozzen wanted APDEA to do whatever
could be done to keep him from being forced to retire. However,
when APDEA declined to grieve his retirement, Cozzen never filed
a grievance on his own.
In July 1989 Cozzen applied for permanent occupational
disability benefits. In October the Board awarded Cozzen
permanent non-occupational disability benefits. The Board
advised Cozzen that he had 15 days within which to appeal this
decision. Cozzen did not appeal. He retired on October 4, 1989.
In August 1990 the Board contacted Cozzen. It had been
apprised that he was employed in Valdez in a position that
required him to carry a firearm. The Board informed Cozzen that
it was required to review his physical condition, and that if it
determined that he was able to perform duties similar to those
performed upon retirement, he might be considered recovered, and
thus no longer eligible for disability benefits.5 In September
Cozzen's attorney submitted a letter to the Board which stated
that Cozzen had recently undergone a hearing test showing that
his hearing was "as bad, if not worse, today than it was when he
was involuntarily retired."
In August 1991 Cozzen filed the suit from which this
appeal arises. Cozzen claimed that he was medically retired
without just cause, and thereby was wrongfully forced to retire.
He argued that this wrongful termination was a breach of the CBA
which caused him to be damaged in excess of $50,000. APD moved
for summary judgment, which the superior court granted on two
grounds: (1) Cozzen had failed to exhaust contractual remedies
available to him under the CBA; and (2) Cozzen was estopped from
asserting a position which was inconsistent with the one he had
taken before the Board, based upon which he has gained
substantial advantage.6 Cozzen appeals.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
"When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the court
must determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists
and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment on the law
applicable to the established facts." Wright v. State, 824 P.2d
718, 720 (Alaska 1992). We review de novo an order granting
summary judgment. Tongass Sport Fishing Ass'n v. State, 866 P.2d
1314, 1317 n.7 (Alaska 1994) (quoting Gilbert v. State, 803 P.2d
391, 394 (Alaska 1990).
B. Summary Judgment Was Appropriate Because Cozzen
Failed to Exhaust His CBA Remedies
The superior court did not err in granting summary
judgment for APD on the ground that Cozzen failed to exhaust the
contractual remedies available to him under the CBA governing his
employment by APD. Cozzen makes essentially two arguments: (1)
it was futile for him to proceed further under the CBA once the
APDEA officials had denied him assistance; and (2) he was not
required to pursue a grievance on his own under Article 5.2(l) of
the CBA, because the language "terminated for cause" applies only
to terminations following disciplinary proceedings and not to
terminations for medical disabilities. Cozzen is wrong on both
grounds.
Cozzen may not sue APD because he failed to exhaust his
available contractual remedies. This court has consistently held
that employees must first exhaust their contractual or
administrative remedies, or show that they were excused from
doing so, before pursuing a direct action against their employer.
See, e.g., Casey v. City of Fairbanks, 670 P.2d 1133 (Alaska
1983). Cozzen first argues that once APDEA denied him
representation in an APDEA-filed grievance, he had exhausted his
remedies under the CBA, and any further efforts would have been
futile. He erroneously relies on Beard v. Baum, 796 P.2d 1344
(Alaska 1990), and Casey v. City of Fairbanks, 670 P.2d 1133
(Alaska 1983). Beard and Casey hold that where a union refuses
to process a grievance, and under the controlling CBA there is no
other means by which the employee can enforce the arbitration
agreement, the employee may sue his employer directly. Beard,
796 P.2d at 1349; Casey, 670 P.2d at 1138. Beard and Casey do
not support Cozzen's claim because Article 5.2(l) of the APDEA
CBA specifically provides alternative means of enforcement to
employee's denied APDEA representation.7
Our reasoning in Casey directly contradicts Cozzen's
argument. In Casey, we held that the relevant working agreement
did not permit the plaintiff to unilaterally initiate arbitration
proceedings. Since Casey had made a good faith effort to have
the union pursue his claim which the union had refused, it
followed that the only way to satisfy Casey's due process rights
was to allow him to maintain an independent action against his
employer. Casey, 670 P.2d at 1136, 1138. APDEA's agreement
allows employees denied representation to pursue arbitration on
their own. Article 5.2(l) provided Cozzen with a contractual
remedy, not present in the Casey or Beard cases, which he failed
to exhaust.
Cozzen's second argument also fails, because his
retirement is covered by Article 5.2(l). Cozzen asserts that
Article 5.2(l) does not apply to an employee who is discharged
for failure to meet a physical fitness standard. He reasons that
the "terminated for cause" language only applies to employees
terminated on disciplinary grounds. Cozzen offers three
justifications for his argument, two based on the CBA and one
based on the use of "for cause" in the context of police conduct.
First, he bases his interpretation of "termination for
cause" on what he perceives as an inconsistency between two
articles of the collective bargaining agreement. He claims that
there is an inconsistency between (1) Article 5.1(a) and (b)
which guarantees APDEA representation at each and every step of
the Grievance Procedure and (2) Article 5.2(l) which requires
employees to pursue their own termination grievances once APDEA
declines to do so. He concludes that the only time that APDEA
would not be required to represent an employee terminated for
cause would be in any proceedings following the final stages of a
disciplinary hearing.
Cozzen's first argument is insupportable. We construe
his argument as a claim that APDEA had a duty to represent him
pursuant to Article 5.1(a) and (b). Whether or not APDEA
breached any duty under the agreement to represent Cozzen,
Article 5.2(l) clearly provides to employees who are denied APDEA
representation other contractual remedies which they must pursue
before they can sue the employer directly.
Second, Cozzen argues that language in Article 5.2(l)
conclusively demonstrates that Article 5.2(l) applies only to
disciplinary proceedings. The section he refers to provides:
"The arbitrator shall hear and resolve the grievance as provided
under subsections 5.2(f) through 5.2(j) above." He claims that
sections 5.2(f) through (j) are disciplinary hearing provisions,
and thus, 5.2(l) must only apply to disciplinary hearings.
This argument is not meritorious. Sections 5.2(f)
through (j) are not disciplinary hearing provisions; these
subsections lay out the standards for the submission of disputes
to arbitration, the arbitrator's authority over submissions of
disputes, the binding effect of the arbitrator's decision, the
division of arbitration costs, and the ability of the parties to
modify the time limits in the Grievance Procedure.
Third, Cozzen argues that "for cause," when it is used
to explain a police officer's termination, connotes termination
for some misconduct or poor moral character. He bases this
argument on the definition of "for cause" found in AAC
13.85.900(6). Alaska Administrative Code 13.85.900(6) defines
"for cause" as "inefficiency, incompetency, dishonesty,
misconduct or some other reason that adversely affects the
ability and fitness of the officer to perform job duties or that
is detrimental to the reputation, integrity, or discipline of the
department or agency where the officer works."
Cozzen offers no authority that would require or
dispose this court to apply an Administrative Code definition to
interpret the CBA. Neither AAC 13.85.900(6) nor the CBA provide
that the code should be incorporated by reference into the
agreement. Even if we were to seek guidance from AAC 13.85.900(6)
in interpreting the CBA, "for cause" under the AAC 13.85.900(6)
definition would cover a termination for medical reasons.
Although the definition does focus on discharges for misconduct,
the plain language of the code also covers discharges for "some
other reason that adversely affects the ability and fitness of
the officer to perform job duties . . .." AAC 13.85.900(6).
This court has rejected a mechanical application of the plain
meaning rule as an exclusionary rule in interpreting enacted
laws. See State v. Alex, 646 P.2d 203, 208 (Alaska 1982). We
apply a sliding scale in determining the meaning of statutes,
under which "the plainer the language, the more convincing
contrary legislative history must be." Id. at 209 n.4 (quoting
United States v. United States Steel Corp., 482 F.2d 439, 444
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 909 (1973)). Cozzen has
presented no legislative history which supports his
interpretation that "some other reason that adversely affects the
ability and fitness of the officer to perform job duties" should
be limited to moral or disciplinary reasons, rather than "some
other reason." Thus, there is no reason to limit this language
to moral unfitness.
IV. CONCLUSION
The superior court correctly concluded that Cozzen did
not exhaust his available contractual remedies when he failed to
file a grievance after APDEA declined to pursue the grievance for
him. The CBA provided a means by which employees could
unilaterally pursue grievances against APD. Exhaustion of this
remedy was required before Cozzen could directly sue APD. The
judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.
_______________________________
1 The only agreement appearing in the record is one
covering November 1, 1985 through December 31, 1988. The
relevant events of this case take place between July 1989 and
October 1989; however, neither party has suggested that the
agreement applicable to the case in any way differs from the one
appearing in the record.
2 Cozzen also contends that at trial he could have
demonstrated that the APD has no established hearing standard
applicable to senior or long-time police officers. This
contention is central to his primary claim below, which was that
APD had applied an inappropriate hearing standard when they
forced him to retire.
3 The pages of the record cited by Cozzen for these two
quotations do not contain either the quotations or any support
for the allegations.
4 Again the record citation given to substantiate this
claim refers to a document which is unrelated to the claim made.
5 If the Board concludes that Cozzen
is recovered because he has a job
in which he must carry a firearm,
the Board is being disingenuous.
It has placed Cozzen in a "Catch
22." The reason Cozzen was forced
to retire was not because his
"disability" prevented him from
carrying a gun. Rather, he was
compelled to retire because he
could not meet a hearing standard.
Regardless of whether another
employer finds Cozzen capable of
carrying a gun or doing police-like
work, he will never be able to be
an APD officer because he will
never be able to meet the hearing
requirement imposed by APD.
6 We need not address the estoppel issue because we
affirm on the ground that Cozzen failed to exhaust all his
available contractual remedies.
7 Article 5.2(l) of the collective bargaining agreement
for November 1, 1985 through December 31, 1988, provides:
A non-probationary employee who has been
terminated for cause shall immediately notify
the Association if he/she wishes to grieve
that action. The Association will then
notify the Chief, or his designee, and the
employee, in writing, within thirty (30)
calendar days of the termination whether they
will pursue a grievance. If the Association
declines to pursue the termination grievance
and the employee still wishes to do so,
he/she will notify the Chief and the Labor
Relations Office, in writing, within three
(3) working days of receiving notification
from the Association. Upon receipt of the
employee's request, the Labor Relations
Office shall select an arbitrator certified
by the American Arbitration Association. The
arbitrator shall hear and resolve the
grievance as provided under subsections
5.2(f) through 5.2(j) above.
(Emphasis added.)