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Bromley v. Mitchel Marine Service (9/8/95), 902 P 2d 797
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal correction
before publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers
are requested to bring errors to the attention of the
Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, telephone (907) 264-0607, fax (907) 276-
5808.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
RAYMOND E. BROMLEY and )
CAROLYN J. BROMLEY, ) Supreme Court Nos. S-6399/6449
)
Appellants and ) Superior Court No.
Cross-Appellees, ) 3AN-92-11304 Civil
)
v. ) O P I N I O N
)
JOHN D. MITCHELL d/b/a ) [No. 4250 - September 8, 1995]
MITCHELL MARINE SERVICE; )
JOHN D. MITCHELL d/b/a )
YACHT DOC; and JIM HENSON )
d/b/a YACHT DOC, )
)
Appellees and )
Cross-Appellants. )
______________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage,
Joan M. Woodward, Judge.
Appearances: John S. Hedland, Eric J. Brown
and Amy L. Vaudreuil, Hedland, Fleischer,
Friedman, Brennan & Cooke, Anchorage, for
Appellants and Cross-Appellees. John D.
Mitchell, Seattle, Washington, pro se. Jim
Henson, Kirkland, Washington, pro se.
Before: Moore, Chief Justice, Rabinowitz,
Matthews, Compton and Eastaugh, Justices.
MOORE, Chief Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Alaska resident Raymond Bromley entered into an
agreement with Yacht Doc, a Washington company, to purchase a
sport fishing vessel. Bromley also entered into an agreement
with Mitchell Marine Service, another Washington company, to make
repairs to the boat. Alleging that both the sales and the repair
agreements were breached, Raymond and his wife Carolyn sued John
Mitchell, d/b/a Mitchell Marine Service and Yacht Doc, and Jim
Henson, d/b/a Yacht Doc.
The superior court ordered the claims against Mitchell
and Henson dismissed on grounds of forum non conveniens, and
awarded attorney's fees to Mitchell. The Bromleys appeal these
rulings. We affirm the lower court's dismissal of the claims
against Mitchell and its award of attorney's fees. We reverse
the court's dismissal of Henson.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Intent on purchasing a sport fishing vessel, Raymond
Bromley responded by telephone to an ad in the "Northwest Boat
Trader." John Mitchell returned Bromley's call, identifying
himself as a representative of Mitchell Marine Service and of
Yacht Doc, a brokerage firm in the business of locating and
buying boats. Communication between the two men led to an
agreement by which Yacht Doc agreed to procure a vessel for
Bromley. Bromley and Mitchell entered into a separate,
apparently oral, contract which provided that Mitchell Marine
Service would repair the boat.
Yacht Doc located a boat and transported it to Seattle,
where Mitchell Marine Service performed the repair work. Bromley
retained a third party to sail the vessel from Seattle to
Anchorage. The voyage north ended in Sitka, however. The
Bromleys claim that because of inadequate fuel tanks and other
problems, the boat could be sailed no farther.
Mitchell sued Raymond Bromley in the superior court of
King County, Washington, for unpaid repairs to the boat. Before
Bromley answered Mitchell's complaint, Raymond and Carolyn
Bromley sued Mitchell d/b/a Mitchell Marine Service and Yacht
Doc, in Anchorage, alleging that the vessel did not comport with
the brokerage agreement and that the repair work had been
improperly performed.
Mitchell filed a motion to dismiss the Alaska case,
arguing lack of personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens.
The superior court dismissed the suit for lack of personal
jurisdiction. We reversed the personal jurisdiction dismissal
and remanded for a determination of Mitchell's forum non
conveniens claim. Bromley v. Mitchell, Mem. Op. & J. No. 0675
(Alaska, July 28, 1993). After remand, the Bromleys amended
their complaint to allege that Jim Henson, who Mitchell asserted
was the owner of Yacht Doc, had also violated the brokerage
agreement.1
While the forum non conveniens issue was pending in the
superior court, the Washington case was resolved in Mitchell's
favor. The judgment provided that "[a]ll of the claims of the
parties, or potential claims between the parties, arising from
the facts referred to [in] the Plaintiff's complaint, were
adjudicated and resolved." This prompted Mitchell to seek
summary judgment in the Alaska case; he argued that the Bromleys'
claims were compulsory counterclaims in the Washington case, and
therefore were barred under the doctrine of res judicata.
In an order applicable to both Mitchell and Henson, the
superior court granted Mitchell's motion to dismiss on grounds of
forum non conveniens.2 The Bromleys then filed a motion for
reconsideration. The court denied the Bromleys' motion for
reconsideration and directed the Bromleys to respond to
Mitchell's motion for summary judgment. The court subsequently
granted the summary judgment motion in part, holding that "[t]o
the extent this court's decision on forum non conveniens grounds
may be reversed, those portions of the amended complaint [which
consisted of repair claims against Mitchell d/b/a Mitchell Marine
Service] are dismissed." After awarding Mitchell attorney's
fees, the court entered final judgment.
The Bromleys appeal the forum non conveniens dismissal
and the award of attorney's fees.3
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Forum Non Conveniens Dismissal
1. Standard of review
The prevailing rule regarding review of a forum non
conveniens dismissal is that such a determination is
committed to the sound discretion of the
trial court. It may be reversed only when
there has been a clear abuse of discretion;
where the court has considered all relevant
public and private interest factors, and
where its balancing of these factors is
reasonable, its decision deserves substantial
deference.
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981). See also
Marks v. LaBerge, 703 P.2d 559, 563 (Ariz. App. 1985) (holding
that a forum non conveniens decision is "left to the sound
discretion of the trial court"); Stangvik v. Shiley, Inc., 819
P.2d 14, 18 (Cal. 1991) (according trial court's decision
"substantial deference"); Werner v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 861
P.2d 270, 274 (N.M. App. 1993) (leaving decision "largely to the
discretion of the trial court"); West Tex. Utils. Co. v. Exxon
Coal USA, Inc., 807 P.2d 932, 935 (Wyo. 1991) (applying abuse of
discretion standard).
The Bromleys raise three objections to the forum non
conveniens dismissal, however, that pose questions of law: (1)
is the doctrine applicable where, as here, the plaintiff is a
resident and domiciliary of the chosen forum; (2) was Mitchell
estopped from pursuing a forum non conveniens dismissal after he
filed a motion for summary judgment; and (3) was the court
correct to apply the forum non conveniens dismissal to defendant
Henson, even though Henson did not join in the motion? This
court considers questions of law de novo, adopting a rule that is
most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy. Guin
v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1284 n.4 (Alaska 1979).
2. The doctrine of forum non conveniens
applies where the plaintiff is a domiciliary of
the forum state
In Crowson v. Sealaska Corp., 705 P.2d 905 (Alaska
1985), we discussed five factors relevant to a forum non
conveniens determination: ease of access to proof, availability
and cost of witnesses, the possibility that the forum was chosen
to harass, the enforceability of the judgment, and the burden on
the community of litigating matters not of local concern. Id. at
908 (citing Goodwine v. Superior Court, 407 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1965)
(noting general desirability of litigating local matters in local
courts)). The Bromleys argue that these factors are relevant
only if the action is between non-domiciliaries of the forum
state. They contend that "if one [party] is a domiciliary, forum
non conveniens does not apply regardless of the other factors."
Based on this assertion and their Alaska domiciliary status, the
Bromleys insist that the forum non conveniens dismissal must be
reversed.
The Bromleys' legal premise is incorrect. Both Crowson
and cases from other jurisdictions demonstrate that, while forum
non conveniens motions will be granted only in exceptional cases
where the plaintiff is a domiciliary of the chosen forum, the
doctrine remains applicable in such circumstances. Crowson
recognizes this principle when it notes that "[w]here . . .
plaintiff is a bona fide resident of the forum state, the
doctrine of forum non conveniens has only an extremely limited
application." Crowson, 705 P.2d at 908 (affirming lower court's
refusal to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds where
plaintiff was Alaska corporation with principal place of business
in Juneau). Thus, under Alaska law, the doctrine of forum non
conveniens can apply to cases brought in Alaska by Alaskan
plaintiffs. Crowson's treatment of this issue is in keeping with
the vast majority of states. While the Bromleys' proposed rule
was once the law in a number of jurisdictions, "Florida is
apparently the only state that still holds as a matter of law
that there can be no dismissal of an action if one of the parties
is a resident." 15 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure ' 3828 n.42 (1986). Crowson's rule is
also in accord with federal law, where courts follow the
principle that "[a forum non conveniens] dismissal should not be
automatically barred when a plaintiff has filed suit in his home
forum. As always, if the balance of conveniences suggests that
trial in the chosen forum would be unnecessarily burdensome for
the defendant or the court, dismissal is proper." Piper Aircraft
Co., 454 U.S. at 256 n.23.
In short, the doctrine of forum non conveniens is
applicable. Consequently, to obtain a reversal of the dismissal
of their case, the Bromleys must demonstrate that the trial court
abused its discretion in dismissing the case to a more convenient
forum.
3. The superior court's forum non
conveniens dismissal of Mitchell was not an abuse
of discretion
The Bromleys offer two additional arguments that the
lower court improperly granted Mitchell's forum non conveniens
motion. First, they contend that the trial court was wrong to
override "the weighty presumption in favor of a party's right to
have access to courts of that party's residence" because this
case fails to exhibit "any of the vices" which prompt courts to
grant forum non conveniens dismissals against a domiciliary
plaintiff. Second, the Bromleys argue that Mitchell's forum non
conveniens objection should have been barred by estoppel after he
filed a motion for summary judgment. We find neither of these
arguments convincing.
a. The court's forum non conveniens
determination was not based on an unreasonable
weighing of the Crowson criteria
As noted above, a court presented with a motion for
forum non conveniens dismissal should consider (1) ease of access
to proof, (2) availability and cost of witnesses, (3) the
possibility that the forum was chosen to harass, (4) the
enforceability of the judgment, and (5) the burden on the
community of litigating matters not of local concern. Crowson,
705 P.2d at 908. It is true that "[u]nless the balance of these
factors is strongly in favor of defendants, plaintiff's choice of
forum should rarely be disturbed." Id. It is also the case,
however, that we review the lower court's decision under an abuse
of discretion standard, and that such an abuse exists only where
the trial court's determination is "manifestly unreasonable."
See Malvo v. J.C. Penney Co., 512 P.2d 575, 586-87 (Alaska
1973). The facts of this case convince us that this is one of
the limited instances in which a domiciliary plaintiff's choice
of forum may in the trial court's discretion be disallowed.
The trial court found that the first two Crowson
factors favored dismissal. It noted that except for the
plaintiffs, all of the witnesses live "in Washington state or
points further south." Similarly, the boat that is the subject
of this dispute is in Washington. The ease of access to proof
and availability of witnesses therefore indicate that this case
would be more conveniently litigated in Washington.
Examining the third factor, the court concluded that
the "plaintiff is motivated by, or at the very least must
acknowledge the reality of, harassment of the defendant."4 This
conclusion was based on the court's observation that rather than
trying the case in Washington, the Bromleys had embarked on a
more expensive course which would involve sending their Alaska
lawyer out-of-state to depose witnesses and paying for witnesses'
travel to an Alaska trial.5
Moving to the fourth factor, the court remarked that
"[t]here is . . . no evidence that any judgment obtained by
plaintiff could be enforced in Alaska." With regard to the final
Crowson factor, the court found that Washington "does have an
interest . . . [in] insur[ing] consistency of decisions between
this case and the previously commenced Washington suit, and [in]
conduct[ing] judicial oversight of Washington business
operations." A domiciliary plaintiff's choice of
forum should be considered presumptively correct unless the
defendant can demonstrate that the plaintiff's right to choose is
outweighed by other factors. See Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas.
Co., 330 U.S. 518, 525 (1947) (holding that a plaintiff "should
not be deprived of the presumed advantages of his home
jurisdiction except upon a clear showing" that another forum is
appropriate). On the facts of this case, we cannot say that the
superior court's decision to dismiss the case against Mitchell
was an abuse of discretion. The United States Supreme Court has
noted that "[i]n any balancing of conveniences, a real showing of
convenience by a plaintiff who has sued in his home forum will
normally outweigh the inconvenience the defendant may have
shown." Koster, 330 U.S. at 525. While this standard heavily
favors the plaintiff, it also assumes that the plaintiff can make
some initial showing of convenience. In the instant case, the
trial court found that the "plaintiff cannot articulate a good
faith rationale for bringing suit where he resides." This
finding is unchallenged by the Bromleys.6
As we have discussed, Alaska law and the law of
virtually all other jurisdictions supports the lower court's
holding that "a plaintiff is generally entitled to litigate in
his or her state of residence . . . . However . . . the
plaintiff's residence is not so dispositive as to nullify the
import of the other factors." While a domiciliary plaintiff's
choice of forum will be honored when she makes a "real showing of
convenience," the Bromleys have failed to provide even a minimal
showing that it is more convenient for them to sue in Alaska than
in Washington, and the facts of this case indicate otherwise. On
these facts, we find no abuse of discretion in the lower court's
decision to dismiss this case.
b. Mitchell was not estopped from pursuing
a forum non conveniens dismissal
The Bromleys also argue that, because Mitchell filed a
summary judgment motion, he should have been estopped from
pursuing his forum non conveniens objection. The Bromleys
contend that theories of equitable and quasi-estoppel support
this conclusion.7 We find these equitable doctrines inapplicable
to the facts of this case.
Initially, we note that a forum non conveniens motion
need not be raised in the answer or in a preliminary motion to
dismiss. Rather, "there is no time limit on when a motion to
dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens can be made.
However, if the litigation has progressed significantly . . . a
defendant's belated assertion that the forum is not a convenient
one is likely to be dimly viewed by the court." 15 Wright &
Miller, supra, at ' 3828, at 291 (1986) (citing Jenkins v. Smith,
535 A.2d 1367, 1369 n.5 (D.C. App. 1987); Snam Progetti S.p.A. v.
Lauro Lines, 387 F. Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)).
Turning to the Bromleys' estoppel arguments, we find
that the equitable estoppel claim fails because, contrary to the
Bromleys' assertion, they did not detrimentally rely on any
position asserted in Mitchell's summary judgment motion. While
it is correct to say that the Bromleys were forced to respond to
Mitchell's motion, and thereby incurred some expense, this
stemmed from the trial court's decision to rule on the summary
judgment issue before entering judgment. Any detriment incurred
by the Bromleys resulted from the court's procedural decision,
and not from reliance on the representations contained in
Mitchell's filing. Because they did not rely on the positions
asserted in Mitchell's summary judgment motion, the Bromleys'
equitable estoppel argument fails.
The Bromleys' quasi-estoppel charge also fails, because
the summary judgment motion filed by Mitchell constituted neither
a changed nor an inconsistent position in relation to the motion
for forum non conveniens dismissal. Mitchell's forum non
conveniens motion argued that it would be highly inconvenient to
litigate a case in Alaska when nearly all the evidence -- the
boat itself and all witnesses, save the Bromleys -- were in
Washington or elsewhere. The summary judgment motion in no way
contradicted this position. It did not, for example, introduce
evidence in an attempt to obtain a judgment "on the merits."
Rather, Mitchell's request for summary judgment raised a purely
legal argument independent of any evidentiary issue: it simply
claimed that the Bromleys' claims were barred because they should
have been filed as compulsory counterclaims in the Washington
case. Finding no changed or inconsistent position in Mitchell's
summary judgment motion, we reject the Bromleys' quasi-estoppel
argument.
4. The lower court failed to ensure that
the Bromleys would be able to bring this case in
Washington
The Bromleys have failed to show that the superior
court abused its discretion in dismissing the case against
Mitchell under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. We
therefore affirm that holding. However, the lower court erred by
failing to ensure that this suit will be allowed to proceed in
Washington.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens presupposes the
existence of a preferable forum in which the dispute can be
resolved. 15 Wright & Miller, supra, at ' 3828, at 288 & n.32.
Accordingly, in dismissing the Bromleys' claims against Mitchell,
the Alaska courts are bound to ensure that the Bromleys have the
opportunity to bring those claims in Washington. We therefore
direct the superior court to modify Mitchell's forum non
conveniens dismissal by adding Mitchell's stipulation that he
will waive any statute of limitations defense.8 See 15 Wright &
Miller, supra, at ' 3828 n.34 ("Generally, the conditions a
defendant [seeking forum non conveniens dismissal] must follow
are . . . (4) waiver of statute of limitations") (quotation
omitted)); see also Shewbrooks v. A.C. & S., Inc., 529 So. 2d
557, 562 (Miss. 1988) (explaining that "the overwhelming
authority in this country requires a defendant to waive the
statute of limitations" before a forum non conveniens dismissal
will issue). The Bromleys will thus be assured of the ability to
bring their remaining claims against Mitchell in Washington.9
5. The court erred in applying the forum
non conveniens dismissal to Henson
Although the forum non conveniens motion was filed by
Mitchell alone, the trial court dismissed the case as to both
defendants. When the Bromleys objected to the dismissal of
Henson in their motion for reconsideration, the court explained
that it could "decide the forum non conveniens issue without
receiving specific input from defendant Henson," and that
Henson's non-participation was construed as "non-opposition" to
the motion for dismissal. On appeal, the Bromleys ask that their
claim against Henson be reinstated.
We agree that the lower court erred in dismissing the
claims against Henson. It is not enough for Henson to insist on
appeal that the reasons that support Mitchell's forum non
conveniens dismissal apply equally to him. Henson must present
his arguments in a motion to the trial court. See Alaska R. Civ.
P. 77. Since Henson filed no such motion, we do not consider his
arguments, and our discussion and affirmance of the lower court's
forum non conveniens dismissal applies solely to Mitchell. We
reverse the dismissal of Henson and remand the claims against him
to the trial court.
B. Attorney's Fees
1. Standard of review
In reviewing an award of attorney's fees, we apply an
abuse of discretion standard; such an abuse is "established only
where it appears that the court's determination is manifestly
unreasonable." Adoption of V.M.C., 528 P.2d 788, 795 (Alaska
1974). This standard applies to the trial court's determination
of who is the prevailing party, as well as to the court's
determination of the fee. First Nat'l Bank v. Enzler, 537 P.2d
517, 526 (Alaska 1975).
2. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in awarding Mitchell attorney's fees
The court awarded Mitchell approximately $3,700 in
attorney's fees, explaining that "since the case was dismissed
with prejudice insofar as any adjudication in this court is
concerned, the dismissal was on the merits for purposes of
awarding attorney's fees." The Bromleys appeal the fee award.
They argue that the forum non conveniens dismissal was not an
adjudication on the merits, and that consequently Mitchell is not
a prevailing party eligible for attorney's fees.10
The Bromleys' argument ignores the fact that we have
previously allowed attorney's fees in cases that were dismissed
without prejudice. See Miller v. Wilkes, 496 P.2d 176, 178 & n.7
(Alaska 1972), overruled on other grounds, R.A. Davenny &
Assocs., Inc. v. Shinjin Motor Sales Co., 533 P.2d 1112, 1114
(Alaska 1975) (affirming Civil Rule 82 fee award after voluntary
dismissal without prejudice); Hart v. Wolff, 489 P.2d 114, 119
(Alaska 1971) (affirming Civil Rule 82 fee award where discovery
violation led to dismissal without prejudice).
Moreover, while a forum non conveniens dismissal is not
a judgment on the merits, the trial court was correct to state
that it did operate as a dismissal with prejudice "insofar as any
adjudication in this court is concerned," because it finally
resolved the rights of the parties in the Alaska courts. See
Pastewka v. Texaco, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 641 (D. Del. 1976), aff'd,
565 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1977) (forum non conveniens ruling has
preclusive effect, in that all other courts of equal jurisdiction
in that forum are bound to abide by the conclusion that the case
should be tried elsewhere); Torreblanca de Aguilar v. Boeing Co.,
806 F. Supp. 139, 141 (E.D. Tex. 1992) (citing Pastewka).
In sum, the trial court's award is legally supported by
our precedents and logically supported by the fact that Mitchell
has obtained a judgment, binding on all Alaska courts, that the
claims against him must be resolved in another forum. Under
these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the court abused its
discretion in determining that Mitchell was the prevailing party.
We therefore affirm the award of attorney's fees.
IV. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the trial court's decision to dismiss the
claims against Mitchell under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. We instruct the trial court, however, to modify that
dismissal by adding Mitchell's stipulation that he will waive any
statute of limitations defense in the event of a future lawsuit.
We also AFFIRM the trial court's decision to award Mitchell
attorney's fees. We REVERSE the dismissal of the Bromleys'
claims against Henson, who has not filed a motion for forum non
conveniens dismissal, and REMAND for further proceedings.
_______________________________
1 Mitchell made this assertion in his motion to dismiss on
grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction and forum non
conveniens.
2 Henson did not join in the motion to dismiss on grounds
of forum non conveniens, however. Until he filed a brief on
appeal, Henson's participation in the case was apparently limited
to a letter to the superior court which "object[ed] to this court
having jurisdiction" and "den[ied] all the allegations and
charges made by the plaintiff." The superior court considered
the letter a non-conforming answer to the Bromleys' amended
complaint.
3 Mitchell also cross-appeals the superior court's failure
to grant him full summary judgment. But as mentioned above, the
summary judgment order was composed so as to become effective
only "[t]o the extent [that the superior] court's decision on
forum non conveniens grounds may be reversed." Since we affirm
the forum non conveniens decision as to Mitchell, see part
III.A., infra, the superior court's grant of partial summary
judgment has no effect and will not be reviewed.
4 When the court subsequently awarded attorney's fees,
however, it refused to find that the Bromleys had engaged in
harassing litigation.
5 This conclusion was also based partly on the fact that
the Washington case was in progress at that time. The court
noted that "[i]t cannot be more economical for plaintiff to
pursue dual causes of action in two locales."
6 While the Bromleys argue that "nothing in the record"
indicates that they are engaged in harassment, they do not
dispute the court's observation that they have failed to provide
even a minimal showing that it is more convenient for them to sue
in Alaska than in Washington.
7 The elements of equitable estoppel are "the assertion
of a position by conduct or word, reasonable reliance thereon by
another party, and resulting prejudice." Wright v. State, 824
P.2d 718, 721 (Alaska 1992). Quasi-estoppel does not require
reliance, but applies when "the existence of facts and
circumstances mak[es] the assertion of an inconsistent position
unconscionable." Id.
8 According to defendant Henson, the statute of
limitations on the Bromleys' claims expired in May of this year.
We do not decide whether this is the case, but simply direct the
trial court to follow the accepted practice in a forum non
conveniens dismissal.
9 The Bromleys concede that their repair claims against
Mitchell d/b/a Mitchell Marine Service were resolved in the
Washington litigation. Their remaining claims against Mitchell
assert that Mitchell d/b/a Yacht Doc breached the brokerage
agreement and engaged in unfair trade practices. Although
Mitchell argues that these claims are also barred by the
Washington judgment, we have no occasion to consider that
argument here. See note 3, supra.
10 The Bromleys also argue that they were the prevailing
parties on the only issue of substance which the lower court
resolved -- Mitchell's summary judgment claim. The lower court
clearly indicated, however, that the fee award was based on the
forum non conveniens dismissal. As we described above, the
superior court's summary judgment order was contingent on this
court's reversal of the forum non conveniens dismissal of the
claims against Mitchell. Since we affirm the forum non
conveniens dismissal of the claims against Mitchell, the summary
judgment order is ineffectual and there is no reason to discuss
it here.