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Compton v. Compton (9/8/95), 902 P 2d 805
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, telephone (907) 264-0607, fax (907) 276-
5808.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
WILLIAM C. COMPTON, )
) Supreme Court No. S-5891/5941
Appellant/ )
Cross-Appellee, ) Superior Court No.
) 3AN-92-0425 CI
v. )
)
GAIL F. COMPTON, ) O P I N I O N
)
Appellee/ ) [No. 4247 - September 8, 1995]
Cross-Appellant. )
______________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage,
Elaine M. Andrews, Judge.
Appearances: R. Scott Taylor and Philip R.
Volland, Rice, Volland and Gleason, P.C.,
Anchorage, for Appellant. Joan M. Clover,
Max F. Gruenberg, Jr., and Jennifer L.
Holland, Gruenberg and Clover, Anchorage, for
Appellee.
Before: Moore, Chief Justice, Rabinowitz,
Matthews, Compton and Eastaugh, Justices.
EASTAUGH, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
William (Bill) Compton appeals the trial court's
finding that he is not entitled to reimbursement for marital
expenditures that he claims benefited property of his former
spouse, Gail Stover. Bill argues that the couple's prenuptial
agreement requires reimbursement. We affirm the trial court's
finding that reimbursement is not required. We also affirm the
trial court's distribution of the parties' vehicle and disputed
bank account and its finding that an award of attorney's fees is
not appropriate in this case. We remand regarding distribution
of the couple's marital residence.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
On the day they married in 1988, Gail and Bill signed a
prenuptial agreement which provided that the parties would keep
all premarital property, including any increase in value of the
property or property acquired in exchange for premarital
property, as their "sole and separate property." When their
marriage began Bill and Gail each had a substantial amount of
separate property, including several separate bank accounts.
Gail had approximately $750,000 in premarital assets, while Bill
had about $1.4 million in premarital assets.
Shortly after they married, Bill added Gail's name to
one of his separate bank accounts (the 571 account). Bill placed
his marital income into this account and transferred funds from
his separate accounts into this account during the marriage.
Gail placed some of her marital income into this account as well.
Both parties wrote checks on this account throughout the
marriage. During the marriage, and unknown to Gail, Bill opened
a separate account (the Wedbush account) and began depositing his
marital income in that account.
Bill and Gail expended a considerable amount of money
during the marriage. They sold Bill's house and spent over
$230,000 remodeling the Barry Street house which Gail brought
into the marriage. They bought an airplane and a Suburban
vehicle, and spent approximately $114,000 on Bill's two children
and approximately $90,000 on travel, jewelry and clothes. In the
course of the marriage, over $630,000 of Bill's income earned on
premarital assets was placed into the joint 571 account. Bill
and Gail separated in 1991, and Bill filed for divorce in 1992.
Their marriage lasted three years and eleven months.
During the divorce proceedings, Bill alleged that
$620,000 of the amount spent during the marriage was from his
separate assets and that approximately $315,000-$340,000 of this
amount was spent to enhance Gail's separate assets, including
payments for remodeling her premarital home on Barry Street, the
mortgage, and taxes on Gail's separate real estate. Bill argued
that the parties' premarital agreement entitles him to
reimbursement of his separate assets which he transferred to Gail
by spending them on her property and debts. He testified that he
cannot remember if he was ever advised to keep separate property
segregated, but that the prenuptial agreement precludes any
conclusion that his separate property, including his separate
property which he placed into the couple's joint checking
account, became marital. Bill's expert witness, an accountant,
determined that the marriage had "overspent" itself by
approximately $29,000.1 Bill also estimates that his net worth
decreased by $331,000 during the marriage. Bill claimed at trial
that Gail had to repay him the nearly $340,000 he spent on her
separate property.
At trial Gail disputed Bill's assertion that he is
entitled to reimbursement of his separate funds that he spent
during the marriage. Gail asserted that she and Bill were
advised by their respective attorneys to keep their separate
property segregated and were warned that if they did not they
should consider themselves as having donated it to the marital
unit. Gail argued that because Bill had chosen to "supplement[]
the marital coffers" with his separate income by placing it into
the joint 571 checking account, Bill could not argue that this
money somehow remained separate property which had to be
reimbursed by Gail. Gail also asserted that before she married
Bill she had lived a lifestyle within her economic limitations
and that her personal income during the marriage would have been
greater had she not reduced her work hours at Bill's suggestion.
Both sides agree that Bill never gave Gail any reason to believe
during the marriage that the money placed into the joint checking
account remained separate and would have to be reimbursed at a
later date. Gail asserted that if Bill had indicated that he was
"lending" her the money for remodeling the Barry Street residence
or for tax payments, jewelry, and the like, it would have
affected her decisions to work part time, maintain two private
airplanes, remodel her home, and spend $114,778 on Bill's two
children. She testified that she believed that if she mixed her
separate assets with marital assets she would be contributing
them to the "marital pot."
The trial court distributed the parties' assets
according to established principles under Alaska law. See
Wanberg v. Wanberg, 664 P.2d 568, 570 (Alaska 1983) (requiring
the court to undertake a three-step analysis to determine
division of property); Merrill v. Merrill, 368 P.2d 546, 548 n.4
(Alaska 1962) (articulating factors relevant to determining
equitable division of property). The court found the Barry
Street house, where Bill and Gail had resided during most of
their marriage, to be marital property and divided the net
marital equity in half. The court thus awarded Bill the increase
in value of the house due to the remodeling, but not one-half of
the actual costs of the remodeling. The court also divided
equally each party's retirement plan, the depreciated value of
the Suburban vehicle, and the Wedbush bank account.
The court refused to credit Bill for his expenditures
on Gail's separate real estate, investments, or tax liabilities.
The court found that if Bill had told Gail "or even given
significant hints" that she would need to reimburse Bill, the
"extravagant spending patterns engaged in by both parties would
not have occurred." The court also found it impossible to
determine whether the funds that backed the payments Bill made to
Gail's separate property were in fact separate funds. The court
stated that implicit in its conclusion was the determination that
the court was not required to enforce a prenuptial agreement
where the parties' actions and expressed intent are contrary to
the agreement. The court cited In re Marriage of Fox, 795 P.2d
1170 (Wash. App. 1990), as support for this conclusion.
On appeal Bill argues that the superior court erred by
refusing to enforce the prenuptial agreement, and thus failed to
order the required reimbursement. Bill also argues that the
court divided three specific items of property incorrectly: (1)
the Barry Street residence; (2) the Suburban; and (3) the Wedbush
account. Gail cross-appeals, asking for attorney's fees under AS
25.24.140(a)(1) and Alaska Civil Rule 82.
III. DISCUSSION
Bill argues that under the terms of the prenuptial
agreement, he is entitled to reimbursement for the portion of his
separate funds that benefited Gail's separate property;
furthermore, because there is insufficient marital income with
which to reimburse him, the reimbursement must come from Gail's
separate property. Gail responds that reimbursement is not
required under the terms of the prenuptial agreement, nor is it
permissible under principles of equity and fundamental fairness.
Rather, Gail argues, Bill's contributions should be viewed as
gifts to Gail and to the marital unit, as permitted under
paragraph five of the prenuptial agreement. Gail thus argues
that the agreement does not preclude transmutation of separate
property into marital property.2
Although the lower court stated that implicit in its
conclusion that Bill was not entitled to reimbursement was its
determination that a court need not enforce a prenuptial
agreement where the parties act contrary to the agreement, this
determination is only dispositive if reimbursement is otherwise
required under the prenuptial agreement. Thus, we must first
decide whether the prenuptial agreement requires reimbursement.
Because we find that the agreement does not prohibit
transmutation of separate property into marital property, we
conclude that reimbursement is not required.
A. Effect of Prenuptial Agreement on the Claim that
Separate Property Was Transmuted into Marital Property
When a party uses separate property to acquire property
during a marriage, the acquired property is treated as marital
property if the trial court determines that the owner of the
separate property intends that the newly acquired property be
marital or if circumstances indicate that the other spouse has
made significant contributions with respect to the property.
Lewis v. Lewis, 785 P.2d 550, 555 (Alaska 1990) (citing Wanberg,
664 P.2d at 571-72). Under paragraph one of the parties'
prenuptial agreement, each party was to keep as "sole and
separate property" all of the party's premarital property,
"including any increase of value of such property referred to in
this paragraph or any property acquired in exchange for such
property." Bill argues that because of this provision, Gail had
notice that any of Bill's separate property used to benefit
Gail's separate property could not later be deemed marital
regardless of how the parties treated the property during the
marriage.3 Bill's reading of the paragraph would prohibit a
court from invading separate or premarital property, regardless
of either the parties' intentions after signing the agreement or
the requirements of equity. This interpretation of the agreement
is not in accord with past precedent or sound policy.
We hold that a provision such as paragraph one should
be considered persuasive evidence that the parties meant to
maintain premarital property as separate. However, this evidence
is not conclusive. While trial courts must consider a premarital
agreement as probative evidence of the parties' intent, courts
are not prohibited by the existence of a prenuptial agreement
from inquiring into the parties' treatment of property during
marriage and treating specific assets as marital if it finds the
parties so intended. Under this analysis, unlike rescission or
unenforceability due to unfairness, the agreement remains valid,
but controls distribution of only those assets which the parties
handled in accordance with the prenuptial agreement.4 Cf. Keffer
v. Keffer, 852 P.2d 394, 397 (Alaska 1993) (goal in interpreting
a contract is to give effect to the reasonable expectations of
the parties, requiring review of language of contract, case law,
and relevant extrinsic evidence).
This approach follows from our decision in Brooks v.
Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044, 1048-51 (Alaska 1987), where we upheld the
validity of prenuptial agreements made in contemplation of
divorce. The agreement in that case provided in part that
it is the desire of the parties that said
separate property shall retain its status
free and clear of any claims by either party
or their heirs against the property of the
other . . . and [property] shall be subject
to his or her disposition as his or her
separate property in the same manner as if
said proposed marriage had never been
celebrated.
Id. at 1046-47. After determining that the Brooks' agreement was
valid and enforceable, we addressed the question of whether
Ms. Brooks was entitled to one-half of the postmarital
appreciation of one of Mr. Brooks' premarital assets. Rather
than relying on the provisions of the prenuptial agreement as
conclusive, we determined whether invasion was necessary
considering all the circumstances of the case. We held that
invasion of the postmarital appreciation of the premarital
property was not appropriate because the parties did not
demonstrate their intent to treat the property as joint property
by taking an active interest in control or management of the
property; nor did Ms. Brooks make a contribution to the marital
community which benefited Mr. Brooks' premarital property. We
found that the parties exhibited the exact opposite intention:
The record shows that [Vern Brooks] purchased
the apartment complex over two years before
the Brooks' marriage and that throughout the
marriage, title to the property remained
solely in his name. Vern also made all the
mortgage payments and the Brooks never
resided at the complex. The evidence further
shows that the Brooks tried, as much as
possible, to keep their respective assets and
funds separate. Moreover, the parties'
prenuptial agreement unambiguously denotes an
intention to hold their prenuptial assets
separately, "as if said . . . marriage had
never been celebrated."
Id. at 1053-54. Thus, we considered the prenuptial agreement to
be extremely probative, but not conclusive, of the parties'
intent to keep their premarital property separate. See also
Chotiner v. Chotiner, 829 P.2d 829, 833 (Alaska 1992) (citing
Brooks for the proposition that written agreements may
demonstrate an owner's intent to convert separate property to
marital property).
Other jurisdictions have also adopted a view of
prenuptial agreements which recognizes that such agreements
should be construed in accordance with the parties' intentions
throughout the marriage rather than adhered to formalistically.
See, e.g., Estate of Gillilan v. Estate of Gillilan, 406 N.E.2d
981, 988 (Ind. App. 1980) (holding that prenuptial contracts are
given liberal rather than strict construction in order to
effectuate the intent of the parties); In re Marriage of Pillard,
448 N.W.2d 714, 715 (Iowa App. 1989) (same, citing In re Parish's
Estate, 20 N.W.2d 32, 36 (Iowa 1945)). See also Pillard, 448
N.W.2d at 717 ("[T]he end result in any dissolution action is not
an interpretation of a prenuptial agreement but an assessment of
all factors, including the agreement, to see if there is in fact
an equitable result.") (Sackett, J., concurring).
In this case, the trial court found that the
commingling of the parties' separate and marital assets was
"extensive, and only traceable with heroic and tenacious effort
on the part of Bill Compton and [his accountant]." The court
elaborated, "Bill simply wrote out the checks from the 571
account, paid on his separate property, paid [on] her separate
property and paid on marital bills without regard to whose pot
the money came from and whose asset the payment improved." Bill
testified that he never indicated to Gail that he considered the
money spent on her separate tax liabilities, the Barry Street
remodeling, or the Suburban, a loan. Bill's testimony at trial
clearly indicates that he did not think of the money placed in
the 571 account as separate, even though it came from his
separate funds.5 There was also evidence that the couple
originally planned to jointly borrow the money for the Barry
Street remodeling but decided to use funds from one of Bill's
separate accounts after being advised by Bill's financial advisor
that it would be less expensive and easier than obtaining a loan.
In this case, unlike Brooks, the prenuptial agreement
is the only evidence that the parties intended to keep the assets
in question separate. Bill's testimony and handling of the
parties' finances during the marriage support the court's finding
that when Bill mixed his separate property with marital money and
used his income from separate assets to support marital and
Gail's separate property, his intention was to make a gift to the
marital unit, despite the existence of paragraph one of the
prenuptial agreement.
Bill argues that interpreting the prenuptial agreement
to allow for transmutation renders the premarital agreement
"meaningless." We disagree. As the trial court noted, the
parties did not dispute that most of their significant premarital
property was protected by the prenuptial agreement. Thus, the
agreement provided meaningful protection to most of the parties'
property. To the extent paragraph one of the agreement is
ineffective, the parties themselves rendered it so by not
segregating their separate assets.
B. Distribution of the Barry Street Residence, the
Suburban, and the Wedbush Account
In addition to disputing the court's overall theory of
distribution, Bill argues on appeal that the court erred with
respect to three specific assets: the Barry Street residence,
the Suburban, and the Wedbush account. We affirm the court's
distribution of the Suburban and the Wedbush account and reverse
the trial court's distribution of the Barry Street residence.
1. The Barry Street residence
Both parties agree that the Barry Street home was
transmuted into joint property during the marriage. Bill argues
that, in accordance with his general reimbursement theory under
the prenuptial agreement, he should be reimbursed the entire
amount he contributed to remodeling the residence, approximately
$190,000. Alternatively, Bill argues that the house should be
treated as a joint economic enterprise, and, since the parties
contributed roughly equal amounts to the enterprise, the value of
the house at the time of divorce should be divided between the
parties.
During the marriage, the equity in the home increased
from $48,000 to $123,000. Thus, the net equity accruing during
the marriage was $75,000. The court, citing to Wanberg, 664 P.2d
568, determined that the home was marital property and that the
$75,000 equity accruing during marriage should be divided equally
between the parties.
Bill has not established what amount of money he
contributed from his separate funds, since these funds came from
the parties' joint 571 account. Furthermore, it is undisputed
that the parties were prepared to take out a loan together to
remodel the home and that it was on the advice of their financial
advisor that they decided to use liquid assets. It was not an
abuse of discretion for the superior court to find that the
parties intended to treat the money used to remodel the house as
"their" money. Moreover, Bill's reimbursement analysis, as
stated in section A, supra, is rejected under the prenuptial
agreement and under Alaska law.6 Bill's argument that the value
of the property rather than merely the equity should be divided
equally also ignores the fact that Gail owes a mortgage debt of
approximately $142,000 on the property.7
However, Bill is correct in asserting that the court
erred in awarding him only the amount of equity that accrued
during marriage. In Wanberg we held that it was an abuse of
discretion for the trial court to allocate only the equity
actively accrued during marriage where the parties had
demonstrated an intent to treat premarital property as joint
property. 664 P.2d at 572. The court reasoned that the property
had, for the purposes of division, become marital through the
combined efforts of the parties. Id.
Thus, the court had to allocate the entire equity in the
property. Id. at n.16.
We have affirmed on numerous occasions the principle
that the entire equity in a piece of joint property should be
allocated. See, e.g., Chotiner, 829 P.2d at 832 n.4 (citing
Burgess v. Burgess, 710 P.2d 417, 420 n.3 (Alaska 1985)) (while
it may invade separate property, the court must take into account
marital property in its property division); McDaniel v. McDaniel,
829 P.2d 303, 306 (Alaska 1992) (recognizing that Wanberg
requires the entire equitable value of property to be divided
where the parties have demonstrated an intent to treat property
as jointly held); Moffitt v. Moffitt, 749 P.2d 343, 347 (Alaska
1988) (upholding decision to divide entire property as marital
asset where parties treated property as a joint holding).8 In
this case, both parties admit that the property is joint
property. Consequently, the entire value of the equity,
$123,000, is subject to allocation. Gail concedes in her brief
that the entire equitable value of the Barry Street residence was
before the court, but argues that the court may have had
equitable reasons for granting Bill only one-half of the marital
equity. However, in the court's own words, it found "no
substantial basis to do other than divide this net marital equity
in half." We hold that Bill should be awarded $61,500, one-half
of the equity in the Barry Street residence.
2. The Suburban vehicle
The court did not abuse its discretion in determining
that the Suburban was marital property. Although the vehicle was
purchased with funds from Bill's separate account, it was titled
in Gail's name alone, purchased to replace Gail's car, and used
as a family car. Both parties testified that the vehicle was
paid for out of the separate account because there was
insufficient money in the joint 571 account at the time of the
purchase. The parties exhibited an intent to treat the Suburban
as marital property. The court was thus permitted to allocate it
equitably under the Wanberg line of cases. We affirm the court's
decision to divide the present value of the Suburban equally
between Bill and Gail.9
3. The Wedbush account
We affirm the trial court's determination that the
Wedbush account was subject to division and hold that Bill waived
any argument that the account was incorrectly valued. Bill
argues that even though the Wedbush account included deposits
from his marital salary, it should not be divided because the
marriage overspent itself. This argument, which is founded on
Bill's reimbursement theory, is likewise rejected.
Bill further contends that the court erred in valuing
the portion of the account that was deposited from marital income
(1) by failing to segregate separate income, including a $25,000
premarital balance in the 571 account which had been rolled into
the Wedbush account; and (2) by valuing the account as of August
30, 1991, rather than as of a date closer to trial.
Bill never advised the court of any dispute regarding
the valuation of the Wedbush account. The parties conferred with
the court after the court issued its proposed decision, and the
court stated that the only dispute regarding the Wedbush account
was whether it was subject to division. Bill's attorney never
indicated during the conference, nor during trial, that the court
had valued the Wedbush account incorrectly. Thus, Bill waived
any argument that the trial court valued the Wedbush account
incorrectly. See Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d 1361, 1365 n.4
(Alaska 1993) ("A party generally may not present new issues or
advance new theories to secure a reversal of a lower court
decision.") (quoting Zeman v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 699 P.2d
1274, 1250 (Alaska 1985)).
C. Attorney's Fees
The trial court ordered the parties to bear their own
costs and attorney's fees. On cross-appeal Gail argues that the
trial court erred in failing to grant Gail attorney's fees in
light of amendments to AS 25.24.140(a)(1) and Civil Rule
82(b)(3).
Except in circumstances not present here, Rule 82 does
not apply to divorce cases. Cooper v. State, 638 P.2d 174, 180
(Alaska 1981); Burrell v. Burrell, 537 P.2d 1, 6 (Alaska 1975).
Further, the 1990 amendment to AS 25.24.140(a)(1) did not change
the analysis relevant to Gail's attorney's fees claim. We
consequently affirm the trial court's decision regarding
attorney's fees.
IV. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the trial court's conclusions that Bill
transmuted some of his separate property into marital property
and gave other property to Gail, and is thus not entitled to
reimbursement. We also AFFIRM the trial court's distribution of
the Suburban and the Wedbush account and its determination that
attorney's fees should not be awarded to either party. We
REVERSE the trial court's finding that Bill is entitled to one-
half of the marital equity of the Barry Street residence and
instead hold that Bill is entitled to one-half of the entire
equity of the residence since both sides agree that the home is
joint property.
_______________________________
1 The accountant originally testified that marital
income was $843,000 and that the couple spent $920,858 during the
marriage. Thus, the marriage overspent itself by approximately
$77,000. After corrections made during trial, the accountant
revised these numbers. According to the new assessment, the
marriage overspent itself by about $29,000. The court adopted
this new estimate.
2 We review a trial court's allocation of property in a
divorce proceeding under the abuse of discretion standard.
Wanberg, 664 P.2d at 570. We will reverse the trial court's
determination only if the allocation is clearly unjust. Jones v.
Jones, 835 P.2d 1173, 1175 (Alaska 1992). Whether the trial
court applied the correct legal standard in exercising its broad
distributive discretion is a separate legal issue which we review
de novo while considering the rule of law most persuasive in
light of precedent, reason and policy. Cox v. Cox, 882 P.2d 909,
913 (Alaska 1994); Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1284 n.6 (Alaska
1979).
3 The prenuptial agreement provided:
1. Sole and Separate Property. The
parties agree that each party will keep, as
that party's sole and separate property, all
of that party's premarital property (see
exhibits A&B) and any property subsequently
acquired by inheritance or by gift from a
third party, including any increase of value
of such property referred to in this
paragraph or any property acquired in
exchange for such property.
2. Marital Property. The parties
intend that all assets accumulated by them
during the marriage, (and other than those
assets which are excluded under paragraph 1,
above), shall be considered marital property,
and therefore subject to division between the
parties upon dissolution of the marriage.
4 We will not enforce a prenuptial agreement if the
facts and circumstances have changed since the agreement was
executed so as to make enforcement unfair and unreasonable.
Brooks v. Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044, 1049 (Alaska 1987). If the
parties' prenuptial agreement required reimbursement to Bill, we
would be required to decide whether enforcement of the agreement
would be fair and reasonable given the parties' actions after
signing the agreement. However, because we hold that the
prenuptial agreement does not preclude transmutation, and thus
does not require reimbursement to Bill, we need not decide
whether the agreement would be unenforceable if it required
reimbursement.
Paragraph seven of the prenuptial agreement requires
that all modifications or amendments of the agreement be in
writing. This provision does not obviate our holding that the
agreement does not preclude transmutation. While the agreement
indicates that the parties intended that separate property remain
separate, the parties' actions indicate otherwise with respect to
certain assets. Thus, we do not hold that the agreement was
modified or waived by the parties' actions, but rather that the
agreement is not the only evidence the court should consider in
determining whether the parties intend to transmute particular
items of separate property into marital property.
5 Although Bill testified that he believed the
premarital agreement meant that if he put money from his separate
income into the joint account the character of the money would
remain unchanged, he also stated that he came to this conclusion
"to some degree" after he met with his attorney during divorce
proceedings. More importantly, the great majority of Bill's
testimony at trial was inconsistent with this assertion.
6 Bill argues that the prenuptial agreement entitles him
to reimbursement. Alaska case law also provides for
reimbursement in a marriage of short duration where there has
been no significant commingling. Rose v. Rose, 755 P.2d 1121
(Alaska 1988). The trial court rejected an application of Rose
to this case. Bill does not appeal that decision.
7 Bill's argument that such a division is allowed under
the prenuptial agreement because "Gail clearly acknowledged that
the entire mortgage liability remained her separate debt," is
without merit. First, Bill cannot simultaneously argue that the
house is joint through transmutation, allowing him the benefit of
one-half of all the equity, yet separate under the prenuptial
agreement. Second, Gail does not dispute that she is liable for
the debt and is not asking that Bill pay any part of future
mortgage payments.
8 In Burgess v. Burgess, 710 P.2d 417 (Alaska 1985), we
concluded that the factors which caused the Wanberg court to
determine that the disputed property was marital property -- use
of the property as joint personal residence and active interest
taken by both parties in the management and maintenance of the
property -- were also present in Burgess. However, after
concluding that the property was not separate, we ordered that
the value of the equity accumulated during the marriage was a
marital asset and should have been allocated. 710 P.2d at 420-
21. This deviation from Wanberg was not explained, nor was any
other case cited. The cases cited above indicate that Wanberg is
correctly read as requiring allocation of the entire equity of
joint property.
9 Bill's argument that the court should have valued the
Suburban at its purchase price of $24,000 is without merit.
Property should be valued at the time of trial to avoid
inequitable results. Moffitt, 813 P.2d at 678. See also Bell v.
Bell, 794 P.2d 97, 102 (Alaska 1990) (expressing doubt about
propriety of reimbursing where value of assets has drastically
changed).