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NOTICE
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Pacific Reporter. Readers are encouraged to bring typographical or other formal
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303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501
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E-mail: corrections@akcourts.gov
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
SETH ALBERT LOOKHART,
Court of Appeals No. A-13752
Appellant, Trial Court No. 3AN- 17-02990 CR
v.
O P I N I O N
STATE OF ALASKA,
Appellee. No. 2805 - May 9, 2025
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Michael L. Wolverton, Judge.
Appearances: Michael L. Horowitz, Law Office of Michael
Horowitz, Kingsley, Michigan, under contract with the Public
Defender Agency, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender,
Anchorage, for the Appellant. Donald Soderstrom, Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and
Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Wollenberg, Harbison, and Terrell, Judges.
Judge HARBISON.
Seth Albert Lookhart was convicted, following a bench trial, of eighteen
counts of various criminal charges related to the operation of his dental business. The
State began investigating Lookhart after a whistleblower accused him and his co-
defendants - Lookhart Dental LLC d/b/a Clear Creek Dental (his dental business) and
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Shauna Cranford (his business manager) - of engaging in an insurance fraud scheme
that jeopardized the health and safety of their patients.
Following a monthslong investigation, the State obtained a warrant to
search Lookhart, Cranford, and the dental business premises. The warrant authorized
officers to seize dental and healthcare records, computers, and any "removable or loose
computer storage media such as . . . cell phones." Although the warrant application
listed "cell phones" as one of the many items the officers could seize, it did not contain
any information about whether or why Lookhart's or Cranford's cell phones would
contain dental or healthcare records. Nevertheless, the court granted the warrant, and
the ensuing forensic examination of the cell phone data uncovered incriminating
messages, videos, and photos.
Prior to trial, Lookhart and Cranford jointly moved to suppress evidence
obtained from their respective cell phones, arguing that the search warrant did not
satisfy the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Alaska Constitution. After the superior
court denied this motion, Lookhart filed a second motion to suppress evidence from the
cell phone search. In this motion, Lookhart expanded on his argument that the search
warrant lacked probable cause, and he additionally argued that the warrant lacked
particularity.
While Lookhart's second motion to suppress the cell phone evidence was
pending, Cranford entered into a plea agreement, resolving all outstanding charges
against her. The superior court ultimately denied Lookhart's motion, and Lookhart's
case then proceeded to a bench trial.
During Lookhart's trial, the State introduced videos, photos, and text
messages obtained from the search of Lookhart's and Cranford's cell phones. Following
trial, Lookhart was convicted of eighteen criminal offenses, including eight counts of
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1 2
felony medical assistance fraud, three counts of scheme to defraud, and seven
3
additional misdemeanors.
Lookhart appeals his convictions, raising two related claims. First,
Lookhart challenges the superior court's ruling that the warrant authorizing the search
of his and Cranford's cell phones was supported by probable cause. Second, Lookhart
challenges the superior court's ruling that the search warrant was sufficiently particular.
In response, the State contends that (1) the warrant satisfied the probable cause and
particularity requirements; (2) even if the warrant was constitutionally infirm, the
evidence was admissible under the independent source doctrine; and (3) Lookhart did
not have standing to challenge the search of Cranford's cell phone.
As we explain in this opinion, we agree with Lookhart that the warrant
authorizing the search of his cell phone lacked probable cause and particularity, and
thus violated Article I, Section 14 of the Alaska Constitution and the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. We also conclude that the evidence from
Lookhart's phone was not admissible under the independent source doctrine. We
therefore reverse the superior court's denial of Lookhart's motion to suppress the
evidence obtained from his cell phone. However, as we explain in this opinion, we
remand this case to the superior court so that it may determine whether the evidence
from Cranford's phone should also have been suppressed. Following this determination,
the superior court must reassess its verdicts to determine whether they are supported by
sufficient admissible evidence.
1 AS 47.05.210(a)(1).
2 AS 11.46.600(a)(2).
3 AS 47.05.210(a)(5) (misdemeanor medical assistance fraud), AS 08.36.315(6)(b)
(practicing dentistry without a license), and AS 11.41.250 (reckless endangerment),
respectively.
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Background facts and procedures
After the Alaska Medicaid Fraud Control Unit received information
indicating that Clear Creek Dental routinely sedated Medicaid patients longer than
medically necessary to maximize billing, Investigator Lance Anderson began looking
into these claims. Anderson interviewed current and former employees, spoke with
experts in the field of dentistry, and worked with an undercover FBI agent who posed
as a Medicaid patient at Clear Creek Dental. Through this investigation, Anderson
discovered evidence that Lookhart (the dentist) and Cranford (the business manager)
were providing unnecessary procedures to Medicaid patients, often without their
knowledge, and then submitting false claims to Medicaid.
Anderson obtained a search warrant (3AN-17-00529 SW) authorizing him
to search Lookhart, Cranford, and "the premises known as Clear Creek Dental"4 for
"[m]edical/[d]ental and business records . . . for Clear Creek Dental" and to seize,
inter alia, "removable or loose computer storage media such as, but not limited to, cell
phones." In his affidavit, Anderson alleged that Clear Creek Dental, its owners, and its
employees, committed "Medical Assistance Fraud," and he detailed his monthslong
investigation into Clear Creek Dental's business practices.5 The affidavit did not assert
that there was data on Lookhart's or Cranford's cell phones that would be evidence of
a crime, nor did it specify which parts of the cell phones the officers wanted to search.
In fact, Anderson's affidavit did not mention cell phones whatsoever in its description
of the investigation.
The district court granted the search warrant under the parameters
requested in the warrant application - e.g., it authorized the police to seize and search
4 The search warrant application also noted that Clear Creek Dental was "doing
business" under the name Lookhart Dental LLC.
5 AS 47.05.210(a)(1)-(2), (a)(5) (setting out the elements of "medical assistance
fraud").
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"computers" and "cell phones." The police then executed the warrant, seized Lookhart's
and Cranford's cell phones, forensically examined them, and found incriminating text
messages, videos, and photos on both phones.
Following this search, the State charged Lookhart, Cranford, and Lookhart
Dental LLC with medical assistance fraud, scheme to defraud, first-degree theft, and
over twenty misdemeanors. Lookhart's and Cranford's cases were joined for trial.
Prior to trial, Cranford moved to suppress the evidence obtained from her
cell phone, arguing that the warrant application did not provide probable cause that
evidence of medical assistance fraud was located on the phone. Cranford noted that
Anderson's affidavit did not discuss "cell phones" and did not indicate that she and
Lookhart used cell phones to communicate about work matters. Lookhart filed a notice
that he was "joining " Cranford's motion and adopting her legal arguments.
The superior court denied the motion to suppress. The court held that
because there was probable cause to search the dental business's computers, there was
also probable cause to search Cranford's and Lookhart's cell phones because "modern
day cellphones are computer devices." Additionally, the court found that Cranford and
Lookhart were alleged to be "co-conspirators," and accordingly, that it was reasonable
to infer that they had communicated about their conspiracy using cell phones.
Approximately ten months later, Lookhart filed a second motion to
suppress evidence from the search of "cell phones." In this motion, Lookhart provided
additional support for his argument that the search warrant lacked probable cause, and
he also argued that the warrant was insufficiently particular.
The State opposed this motion on strictly procedural grounds, arguing that
it was untimely and successive. The superior court denied the motion on the merits,
again finding that the search warrant was supported by probable cause, and finding in
the first instance that the warrant was sufficiently particular.
While Lookhart's second motion to suppress was pending, Cranford
entered into a plea agreement to resolve all of the charges against her. As required by
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this agreement, Cranford and her attorney signed a document that the State prepared,
which was titled "Consent to Search Phone." This document stated that "both Cranford
and her counsel assert and agree that Cranford is knowingly and voluntarily waiving
any objections and giving consent to search the contents of her cell phone."
One week after Cranford's plea agreement was executed, Investigator
Quinten Warren prepared an unsworn addendum to the original search warrant (3AN-
17-00529 SW). The addendum described evidence that had been discovered when the
warrant was executed, including evidence taken from Cranford's phone. It then stated
that Cranford had subsequently "consented to an unfettered search of all the contents of
her iPhone," and that text messages, videos, and photos previously found on Cranford's
phone implicated Lookhart in criminal activity. The addendum stated that Warren was
"seeking additional permission to further search the contents of Lookhart's iPhone for
additional evidence regarding the aforementioned crimes."
Warren apparently submitted the addendum to a district court judge. The
judge 's signature and initials appear on the addendum near the handwritten words,
"This request is granted."
Accompanying the addendum was a document entitled "Cruse/Starkey
Notice." This document was signed by an assistant attorney general, and it explained
that it was a "Cruse and Starkey notice related to the pending addendum to [search
warrant] 3AN-17-00529SW." The notice asserted that the original warrant had
authorized the State to search Lookhart's phone and that the search "has already
occurred." The Cruse/Starkey Notice indicated that the addendum had two purposes.
First, the State "wishe[d] to more fully search [Lookhart's] phone." Second, the State
explained that because Lookhart had challenged the validity of the warrant, the
addendum was obtained "with an eye to the Court of Appeals . . . to potentially cure a
hypothetical appeal point."
At the time the Cruse/Starkey Notice and the addendum were submitted
to the district court, Lookhart's cell phone was still in the custody of the police, and the
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superior court had not yet ruled on Lookhart's second motion to suppress. However,
there is no indication in the record that either Lookhart or the superior court judge were
contemporaneously notified of the proceedings involving the addendum and the
Cruse/Starkey Notice. There likewise is no indication in the record that an additional
search of Lookhart's phone was ever conducted.
After the superior court denied Lookhart's second motion to suppress, his
case and Lookhart Dental LLC's case proceeded to a bench trial. At trial, the State
introduced into evidence hundreds of text messages and videos that were obtained from
Lookhart's and Cranford's cell phones. In some of the admitted text messages, Lookhart
and Cranford were messaging each other, whereas in other admitted messages,
Lookhart was messaging with third parties.
The superior court found Lookhart, and Lookhart Dental LLC, guilty of
all charged offenses. After the trial was over, but prior to Lookhart's sentencing, the
State filed in the superior court a "Notice of Filing," which stated:
The State of Alaska, Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, hereby
notices the court and parties of the filing of a complete and
accurate copy of search warrant number 3AN-17-00529 SW
attached hereto. The State is filing a copy of the search
warrant in an effort to ensure a complete record in case of
appeal.
The Cruse/Starkey Notice and the addendum were attached to this "Notice of Filing."
The superior court ultimately entered convictions for eighteen offenses
and sentenced Lookhart to a composite sentence of 28 years with 8 years suspended (20
years to serve). This appeal followed.
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The warrant authorizing the cell phone search did not comply with the
probable cause and particularity requirements of Article I, Section 14 of
the Alaska Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution
The Alaska Constitution protects the "right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses and other property, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
6 7
searches and seizures." The United States Constitution sets out a similar right. To
protect this right, both the federal and state constitutions require a search warrant to be
supported by probable cause and to "particularly describ[e] the place to be searched,
8
and the persons or things to be seized."
On appeal, Lookhart argues that the warrant authorizing the search of his
and Cranford's iPhones violated these constitutional provisions. Lookhart first contends
that the warrant did not establish probable cause that evidence of medical assistance
fraud was located on the cell phones. Second, he contends that the warrant's description
of the items targeted ("cell phones") was insufficiently particular.
When we evaluate the constitutionality of a search warrant, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the warrant.9 We accordingly must
6 Alaska Const. art. I, § 14. We have stated that Article I, Section 22 of the Alaska
Constitution - i.e., "[t]he right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be
infringed" - provides greater protections against unreasonable searches and seizures than
does the Fourth Amendment. State v. Gibson, 267 P.3d 645, 659 (Alaska 2012) ("Alaska
courts have used section 22's right to privacy to give section 14's protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures 'a liberal interpretation.'" (quoting Municipality of
Anchorage v. Ray , 854 P.2d 740, 750 (Alaska App. 1993))).
7 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]"
8 U.S. Const. amend. IV; Alaska Const. art. I, § 14.
9 State v. Chapman, 783 P.2d 771, 772 (Alaska App. 1989).
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describe the contested search warrant and the trial court litigation relating to the warrant
in more detail.
On February 24, 2017, Investigator Anderson applied for a warrant to
search Lookhart, Cranford, and "the premises known as Clear Creek Dental" for
"concealed property." He then provided the following description of the "concealed
property" that officers would search for:
Medical/Dental, personal care and business records (paper
or electronic) for Clear Creek Dental, including, but not
limited to on site imaging and/or seizure of internal
computer hard drives, mainframe server and seizure of
separate removable or loose computer storage media such as,
but not limited to, cell phones, personal data assistants
(PDA's), equipment having data storage capacity, floppy
disks, Bernoulli disks Iomega Zip or Jaz disks, floptical or
other removable storage media such as CD-ROM disks, data
cartridges, storage devices or tape storage devices for audio,
video or electronic. Documentation and/or other material
describing the operation of any computer, software and/or
computer peripherals found at the premises, including
instruction manuals, passwords, file name lists, readme
and/or help files.
Additionally, Anderson's affidavit provided the following description of
the items that officers sought to seize:
The seizure of electronic information by subsequent forensic
examination of all electronic data at an off-site location. The
seizure of any documents, electronic, handwritten or printed,
related to the providing of dental related services, billing
procedures, employment of staff, policies and procedures,
accounting information, payroll, void or denied claims,
and/or any documentation pertaining to the provision of
healthcare services, policies and or procedures for providing
such services including, but not limited to all Medicaid files,
x-rays, photos, monitor strips, narcotic logs, medication
inventory documentation and purchase invoices,
prescription logs, patient treatment plans, CPR training
documents, office policy and procedure material, articles,
journals, publications, protocols reference books or other
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written or electronic records regarding Medicaid procedures,
patient and employee schedules, notes or documentation for
medical necessity of services for all patients and/or
employees.
The affidavit asserted that the "concealed property" was evidence of the crime of
medical assistance fraud (in violation of AS 47.05.210) and tended to show that Clear
Creek Dental, its owners, and its employees committed this crime.
Anderson's affidavit then summarized five conversations with former
employees detailing business practices and explaining the nature of Lookhart and
Cranford's relationship. According to the affidavit, one former employee overheard
Lookhart and Cranford "discussing how to introduce much more IV sedation than was
medically necessary [in order] to bill more." A different former employee had explained
that Clear Creek Dental talked "every patient" into using IV sedation for their dental
procedures, and that Lookhart "did a lot of drilling on healthy teeth." The affidavit
described Cranford as the "mastermind" of making fraudulent billing look legitimate,
and Lookhart as an unethical medical professional motivated by money.
The affidavit noted that Clear Creek Dental had installed a software
program, "Dentrix," on a computer and used the program for billing and to organize
patient information. It also described a close personal relationship - including an affair
- between Lookhart and Cranford. However, other than identifying cell phones as a
type of "separate removable or loose computer storage media" that Anderson sought to
seize, the phrase "cell phone" did not appear anywhere in the affidavit.
The district court issued the warrant as requested. The warrant authorized
law enforcement to search for the property that was identified in the affidavit's
description of "concealed property," which included "loose computer storage media
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such as, but not limited to, cell phones."10 Notably, the warrant did not authorize the
police to search for or seize text messages, videos, or photos.
On March 1, 2017, Anderson executed the warrant and seized numerous
items, including cell phones belonging to Lookhart and Cranford. Anderson then
prepared an inventory of the property that was seized, which he filed with the court.
The inventory of seized items included two iPhones, computer servers, desktop
computers, USB drives, paper records, a laptop computer, and a tablet.
Following the seizure of Lookhart's and Cranford's cell phones,
technicians extracted the digital data from the phones and prepared reports analyzing
the data. The reports indicated that the technicians had discovered incriminating text
messages, videos, and photos in the data extracted from the cell phones.
After Lookhart and Cranford were indicted, Cranford moved to suppress
evidence obtained from her cell phone. She argued that the search warrant was
unconstitutionally overbroad because it lacked "probable cause to believe that evidence
of any crimes would be found on the cell phone." Cranford noted that Anderson's
affidavit did not state that Cranford or Lookhart owned cell phones, or that they used
cell phones to communicate about substantive work matters. Lookhart filed a notice
that he was "joining" Cranford's motion and adopting her legal arguments.
The State opposed the motion to suppress, asserting that Anderson's
affidavit established probable cause to search both cell phones. The State's opposition
was focused entirely on its argument that the search warrant was valid; the State did not
argue that an exception to the warrant requirement separately justified the search.
On October 3, 2018, the superior court ruled that the State had probable
cause to search the cell phones, and denied the motion to suppress. The court held that
Anderson's affidavit established probable cause to search Clear Creek Dental's
10 The only change was that the description in the warrant did not include the term
"personal care" in the first line.
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computers, and that because "modern day cellphones are computer devices," this
probable cause extended to the search of Cranford's and Lookhart's cell phones. The
court additionally held that, while Anderson's affidavit did not indicate that Lookhart
and Cranford communicated via cell phones, such communication could be inferred
because Lookhart and Cranford were "co-conspirators."
On August 5, 2019, Lookhart filed a second motion to suppress evidence
which cited Pohland v. State, a case issued subsequent to the issuance of the order on
his first motion to suppress. 11 In this second motion to suppress, Lookhart claimed that,
by authorizing a search of the entire contents of the cell phones without any limitations
or restrictions, the scope of the search warrant exceeded the probable cause on which it
was based and amounted to "the sort of general warrant that the Fourth Amendment
was designed to guard against." Lookhart also claimed that the search warrant was
insufficiently particular.
In its opposition, the State did not address the merits of Lookhart's motion.
Rather, it opposed the motion on procedural grounds, arguing that the motion was
untimely filed and was barred by res judicata.
The superior court denied Lookhart's motion on the merits. The court
reaffirmed its previous ruling that the warrant was supported by probable cause and also
ruled that the warrant was sufficiently particular, distinguishing the facts of Lookhart's
12
case from Pohland . We review the superior court's legal conclusions de novo.
11 Pohland v. State, 436 P.3d 1093, 1100-01 (Alaska App. 2019) (holding that a
"comprehensive examination" of the defendant's laptop violated the United States and
Alaska Constitutions because it "exceeded the boundaries of any search that the warrant
might reasonably have authorized" for "business and finance documents").
12 Crawford v. State, 138 P.3d 254, 258 (Alaska 2006).
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1. The search warrant application did not establish
probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime would
be found on Cranford 's or Lookhart's cell phones
Lookhart's first claim is that the search warrant application did not
establish probable cause to search his and Cranford's cell phones. Lookhart does not
challenge the superior court's finding that the application established probable cause
that he committed medical assistance fraud. Instead, he asserts that the search warrant
application failed to establish probable cause that evidence of this offense would be
found on his and Cranford's cell phones.
Lookhart notes that the search warrant affidavit did not state that he and
Cranford used cell phones to communicate about work matters, and in fact did not
discuss cell phones at all. Additionally, Lookhart challenges the superior court's
findings that "modern day cellphones are computer devices" and that probable cause to
search his cell phone existed as long as he and Cranford were "co-conspirators."
The State defends the superior court's findings as reasonable inferences
from the evidence. Citing to Pohland, the State argues that in the modern world, "over
90 percent of Americans own a cell phone," and it is "common knowledge" that "many
people conduct business on their personal phones." 13 The State also asserts that the
court could infer that, because Lookhart and Cranford were co-conspirators in a scheme
to commit medical assistance fraud, their cell phones "would contain programs or
communications relating to dental services, billing, employment, policies, accounting,
payroll, claims, or other matters."
As an initial matter, the State's argument misapprehends our decision in
Pohland . In discussing the ubiquity of cell phones, we did not endorse the inference
that probable cause to search a cell phone may be derived from assumptions about how
common these devices are in modern life. Rather, we mentioned the ubiquity of portable
13 See Pohland, 436 P.3d at 1098.
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computing devices to emphasize the importance of affording them strong Fourth
14
Amendment protections.
To satisfy the probable cause requirement of the United States and Alaska
Constitutions, a search warrant must provide "a 'nexus' between the place to be
searched, criminal activity, and the items sought."15 Thus, in order to establish probable
cause to search Lookhart's cell phone, the warrant application was required to explain
not only why Lookhart was suspected of committing medical assistance fraud, but also
why law enforcement expected to find evidence of that crime in Lookhart's cell phone.
The warrant application in this case did not provide any factual
information about why Lookhart's and Cranford's phones would contain programs or
communications relating to Clear Creek Dental's services, billing, employment,
policies, accounting, payroll, or insurance claims. It did not discuss text messages,
videos, or photographs, and did not provide any explanation for why Lookhart or
Cranford would be storing dental or insurance records, or other business documents, in
their phones' memory. And although the court could reasonably infer that Lookhart and
Cranford (like most adult Americans) owned cell phones, the warrant application did
not discuss Lookhart's and Cranford's use of their cell phones, nor did it assert that the
officers believed that they had used their cell phones to discuss their medical assistance
fraud scheme.
Under these circumstances, it was unreasonable for the court to assume
that Lookhart and Cranford used their phones to communicate about their insurance
14 See id. at 1098, 1100.
15 Stuart v. State, 698 P.2d 1218, 1221 (Alaska App. 1985) (quoting Snyder v. State,
661 P.2d 638, 645 (Alaska App. 1983)).
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billing practices or that their status as "co-conspirators" meant that they would have
16
used cell phones to communicate about the alleged conspiracy.
As we have explained, when the superior court denied the motion to
suppress, it based its decision in part on its finding that "modern day cellphones are
computer devices." But even if we accept that cell phones are a type of small portable
computer,17 this does not mean that whenever a search warrant application establishes
probable cause to search a desktop or laptop computer for evidence of fraudulent
billing, such probable cause will automatically extend to the business owner's or office
manager's cell phones. Indeed, although we have characterized cell phones as "portable
computing devices,"18 cell phones often serve different functions and contain different
kinds of information than laptop and desktop computers. Thus, even though the warrant
application established probable cause to search Clear Creek Dental's office computers
for evidence of medical assistance fraud, the court was still required to separately
determine whether the application established probable cause to believe that such
evidence would be found on Lookhart's and Cranford's cell phones.
The affidavit in this case did not provide any explanation for why
Lookhart's phone would contain programs or communications relating to dental
services, billing, employment, policies, accounting, payroll, or insurance claims. In fact,
as we have mentioned, it did not discuss cell phones at all. Given that the application
16 See Commonwealth v. Morin, 85 N.E.3d 949, 960 (Mass. 2017) (holding that police
"may not rely on the general ubiquitous presence of cellular telephones in daily life, or an
inference that friends or associates most often communicate by cellular telephone, as a
substitute for particularized information that a specific device contains evidence of a
crime").
17 "Computer," Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/computer (last updated Jan. 24, 2025) (defining a computer as "a
programmable usually electronic device that can store, retrieve, and process data").
18 Pohland, 436 P.3d at 1098.
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did not contain any non-speculative indication that Lookhart's or Cranford's cell phones
would contain the dental records, healthcare records, or other documents that were
mentioned in the affidavit, we conclude that the affidavit did not establish probable
cause to search Lookhart's and Cranford's cell phones.
2. The search warrant did not particularly describe the
place to be searched
Lookhart advances a second reason why the search warrant was infirm: he
contends that it lacked particularity, giving the police unconstitutionally broad
discretion to search his entire cell phone for any type of electronic data that they deemed
to be evidence of a crime.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 14 of the Alaska Constitution state that a warrant must "particularly describ[e]
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."19 This particularity
requirement "serves to protect against the possibility of a general, exploratory search,
to assure that articles of property outside the legitimate scope of the warrant are not
subject to mistaken seizure, and to reinforce the fundamental rule that seizure of
property cannot be permitted in the absence of probable cause."20 While all warrants
must be "reasonably specific," the degree of particularity required of a specific warrant
21
is determined by the totality of the circumstances.
We have previously join ed the appellate courts of several other states in
concluding that it is unlawful for a warrant to authorize an unfettered search of an entire
19 U.S. Const. amend. IV; Alaska Const. art. I, § 14.
20 Namen v. State, 665 P.2d 557, 560 (Alaska App. 1983).
21 Id. at 560-61.
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cell phone, or all "app data" contained on a cell phone.22 We have also explained that
warrants authorizing the search of cell phones usually should contain some temporal
limit - e.g., they should restrict the search for data that was generated within a specific
time.23 The State nevertheless contends that the warrant in this case was sufficiently
particular because it identified the types of records sought, which the State describes as
"programs or communications relating to dental services, billing, employment, policies,
accounting, payroll, claims, or other matters."
22 Macasaet v. State , __ P.3d __, 2025 WL 499893, at *7-10 (Alaska App.
Feb. 14, 2025) (holding that the warrant provision authorizing the search of "app data" on
Macasaet's phone was insufficiently particular); Ridenour v. State, 539 P.3d 530, 539-40
(Alaska App. 2023) (holding that a warrant authorizing a search of any cell phone "for text
messages, e-mails, phone calls, and 'any other electronic evidence relevant to this
investigation'" was insufficiently particular); see, e.g., People v. Carson, __ N.W.3d __,
2024 WL 647964, at *8-9 (Mich. App. Feb. 15, 2024) (holding that a warrant authorizing
a search of the entire contents of a cell phone was insufficiently particular); State v. Wilson,
884 S.E.2d 298, 300-01 (Ga. 2023) (holding that a warrant that provided a "limitless
authorization to search for and seize any and all data that c[ould] be found on [the
defendant's] cell phones" was insufficiently particular); State v. Smith, 278 A.3d 481, 497
(Conn. 2022) (holding that a warrant to search the entire contents of a cell phone violated
the Fourth Amendment because it did not limit the search by describing the areas within
the phone to be searched, or by a time frame reasonably related to the crimes); Richardson
v. State, 282 A.3d 98, 124 (Md. App. 2022) (holding that a warrant authorizing a search of
everything on a cell phone is not sufficiently particular); State v. Bock, 485 P.3d 931, 936
(Or. App. 2021) (holding that a warrant authorizing seizure of any item on a cell phone that
might later serve to establish the device owner or user 's identity is tantamount to a general
warrant); People v. Coke, 461 P.3d 508, 516 (Colo. 2020) (holding that a warrant
authorizing a search of "all texts, videos, pictures, contact lists, phone records, and any
data that showed ownership or possession" violated the Fourth Amendment's particularity
requirement).
23 Macasaet , 2025 WL 499893, at *16; see also Commonwealth v. Snow, 160 N.E.3d
277, 288 (Mass. 2021) (holding that "to be sufficiently particular, a warrant for a cell phone
search presumptively must contain some temporal limit"). Temporal limits also help ensure
that the scope of the search authorized by a warrant is constrained by the scope of probable
cause.
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But even if the warrant particularly described the items that law
enforcement could seize, it did not particularly describe the "place" to be searched.
Instead, the warrant in this case authorized a "forensic examination of all electronic
data at an off-site location,"24 and it did not limit the search to only particularly
described areas within the phones - for example, to particular types of data, to data
acquired during a particular timeframe, or to data found within particular applications.
Because the warrant seemingly authorized a generalized search of all of
the cell phone's electronic data, i.e., it did not comply with the particularity
requirement, we conclude that the search warrant in this case was an unlawful general
warrant. Thus, the search of Lookhart's cell phone - and the seizure of the text
messages, photos, and videos located within the phone - was unconstitutional.
The evidence was not admissible based on the independent source
exception to the exclusionary rule
"[T]he exclusionary rule renders inadmissible evidence obtained
indirectly as a result of an unlawful search or seizure as well as evidence directly
obtained thereby."25 Given our holding that the search warrant was constitutionally
infirm, evidence directly or indirectly obtained from the unlawful search of Lookhart's
and Cranford's cell phones must be suppressed, unless an exception to the exclusionary
26
rule applies.
On appeal, the State argues for the first time that an exception to the
exclusionary rule applies with regard to the search of Lookhart's phone: the
24 Emphasis added.
25 Smith v. State, 948 P.2d 473, 477 (Alaska 1997) (citing Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963)).
26 Id. Later in this opinion, we separately address the State's argument that Lookhart
does not have standing to challenge the evidence obtained from Cranford's cell phone.
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----------------------- Page 19-----------------------
independent source doctrine. Under this doctrine, when evidence is obtained pursuant
to an unlawful search, the exclusionary rule ordinarily will prohibit the use of that
evidence, but it will not prohibit the use of evidence that was obtained from an
independent source or by means that are "so attenuated as to dissipate the taint [of the
unlawful search]."27 Thus, if the challenged evidence was obtained "by exploitation of
[the prior] illegality" rather than "by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of
the primary taint," the evidence must be suppressed, along with the primary evidence
yielded by the initial illegal search.28 But when "the disputed evidence stems from an
independent and lawful source, even though it could have emerged from the prior
29
unlawful search as well, the evidence is admissible."
The State points out that, even if the original cell phone search was
unlawful, Cranford later filed a document stating that she "knowingly and voluntarily
waiv[ed] any objections and g[ave] consent to search the contents of her cell phone."
After this, a state investigator submitted an addendum to the original warrant to the
district court. The addendum cited Cranford's consent and stated that evidence found
on Cranford's phone "showed Lookhart used his iPhone during the commission [of the
crimes], and to facilitate the said crimes." The court granted the State's request to
30
conduct a second search of Lookhart's phone.
27 Kalmakoff v. State, 257 P.3d 108, 125 (Alaska 2011) (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S.
at 417).
28 Cruse v. State, 584 P.2d 1141, 1145 (Alaska 1978) (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at
488).
29 Id.
30 The State did not file this addendum in the superior court until several months after
the jury returned its verdicts. When it filed the addendum, it also filed a "Cruse/Starkey
Notice."
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The State asserts that this addendum established an independent source
for the evidence obtained from searching Lookhart's phone because it "cured any
deficiencies" in the original warrant, even if the search that had previously been
conducted pursuant to that warrant was unlawful. As support for its argument, the State
relies on the Alaska Supreme Court's opinion in Cruse v. State31 and on this Court's
32
opinion in Starkey v. State.
In Cruse v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court held that an unlawful
warrantless search of a vehicle's trunk did not taint a subsequent warrant to search the
vehicle because the warrant was based on probable cause that was entirely independent
of the prior illegality.33 Similarly, in Starkey v. State, after the police entered the
defendant's house without his consent, they obtained a search warrant and then seized
evidence from the house as authorized by the warrant.34 This Court held that, as long as
the warrant was not tainted by the prior entry into Starkey's house, it was an
"independent source" that justified the subsequent seizure of the evidence from
35
Starkey's residence.
But these cases do not stand for the proposition that the State may "cure"
an unlawful search by submitting new information in an addendum to an invalid search
warrant. Instead, these cases demonstrate that when the police first conduct an illegal
search and they then conduct a second search pursuant to a search warrant that is free
of any taint from the prior illegality, the evidence obtained from the second search need
31 Cruse, 584 P.2d at 1145.
32 Starkey v. State, 272 P.3d 347, 348-52 (Alaska App. 2012).
33 Cruse, 584 P.2d at 1145.
34 Starkey, 272 P.3d at 348.
35 Id. at 351-52.
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----------------------- Page 21-----------------------
not be excluded.36 As explained by Alaska Supreme Court, the question is whether the
disputed evidence was obtained from an independent and lawful source, even if it may
37
also have emerged from the prior unlawful search.
As we have explained, the State claims that the text messages were
lawfully obtained not only from the initial unlawful searches, but also from the
addendum and the related district court order granting the State's request to conduct a
second search of Lookhart's phone, which it claims was a valid, independent source.
But when the State sought the district court's permission to conduct the second search,
it did so in an addendum that was attached to the original, invalid search warrant. And
the addendum specifically referred to the text messages which were seized when the
police conducted the previous unlawful searches. It is therefore difficult to imagine how
the addendum could be viewed as free from the taint of the prior illegality.
Furthermore, even if the addendum authorized a second independent
search, the addendum itself did not satisfy the search and seizure provisions of the
United States and Alaska Constitutions. In order to pass muster under these
constitutional provisions, the police must have obtained a search warrant (1) based
"upon probable cause," (2) "supported by Oath or affirmation," and (3) "particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized."38 Here, the
court granted the State's request to conduct an additional search based on an unsworn
statement, without making a finding of probable cause. Additionally, the search
36 Cruse, 584 P.2d at 1145; Starkey, 272 P.3d at 348-52.
37 Cruse, 584 P.2d at 1145.
38 U.S. Const. amend. IV; Alaska Const. art. I, § 14; see Dalia v. United States, 441
U.S. 238, 255 (1979) (explaining that warrants must (1) "be issued by neutral, disinterested
magistrates," (2) "demonstrate to the magistrate their probable cause to believe that the
evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction for a particular offense,"
and (3) "particularly describe the things to be seized, as well as the place to be searched"
(internal quotations and citations omitted)).
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----------------------- Page 22-----------------------
authorized by the court did not set out the specific items the police could search for or
the parts of Lookhart's phone that could be searched.
Thus, even if we accept the State's argument that Cranford's consent
provided a valid basis to issue a second search warrant, the court order that the State
obtained by submitting the addendum did not otherwise comport with basic
requirements of the search and seizure provisions of the United States and Alaska
Constitutions and accordingly could not have been a "lawful" independent source.
Finally, we note that the record contains no indication that the police
actually conducted a second search of Lookhart's cell phone after the addendum was
signed by the district court judge. Instead, the record before us indicates that the sole
search of Lookhart's cell phone was the forensic analysis that was conducted shortly
after the original warrant was executed, prior to the filing of the motions to suppress. In
other words, the record does not show that Lookhart's text messages were obtained both
from the original unlawful search, and independently, from a lawful search authorized
by the addendum.39 Thus, unlike the situations in Cruse and Starkey, the challenged
evidence in this case was not obtained from a second search based on an independent
source; instead, the evidence was only obtained from the original, unlawful search.
For these reasons, we reject the State's argument that Cranford's consent,
and the issuance of the addendum, provided a lawful basis for the admission of the
disputed evidence.
39 Indeed, even if the addendum provided a lawful independent source, the addendum
and the Cruse/Starkey Notice were not filed with the court until after Lookhart's trial,
depriving Lookhart of the opportunity to challenge the admissibility of evidence obtained
as a result of these documents. See Alaska R. Crim. P. 37(e)(2) ("The prosecutor shall file
notice of subsequent warrants issued in relation to the case once executed.").
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----------------------- Page 23-----------------------
This case must be remanded for further proceedings regarding whether
Lookhart had standing to challenge the search of Cranford 's cell phone
As we just explained, the original search warrant (3AN-17-00529SW),
through which the police obtained evidence from Lookhart's and Cranford's phones,
and the search warrant addendum, violated the United States and Alaska Constitutions.
On appeal, Lookhart argues that under the exclusionary rule, the superior court
accordingly should have suppressed all evidence obtained from Lookhart's and
Cranford's phones.
The State, by contrast, argues that Lookhart is only entitled to the
suppression of the evidence that the police obtained from his phone in violation of his
constitutional rights. In other words, the State argues that Lookhart is not entitled to
suppression of evidence from Cranford's phone because he lacks standing to challenge
the search of Cranford's phone - i.e., because he had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the contents of Cranford's phone. The State points out that, "Fourth
40
Amendment rights are personal rights which . . . may not be vicariously asserted."
In response, Lookhart argues that the State waived the right to contest
standing on appeal because it did not raise the issue of standing in the trial court. In
support of this waiver argument, Lookhart cites to the general rule, as articulated by
40 See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969) (explaining that "Fourth
Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not
be vicariously asserted"); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978) (holding that a
defendant generally may not move to suppress evidence based on a claim that the evidence
was obtained in violation of someone else's property rights); Newcomb v. State, 779 P.2d
1240, 1244 (Alaska App. 1989) (holding that a defendant did not have standing to assert a
violation of a codefendant's Fourth Amendment rights because the defendant did not show
either "(1) that a police officer obtained the evidence as a result of gross or shocking
misconduct, or (2) that the officer deliberately violated a codefendant's rights" (quoting
Waring v. State, 670 P.2d 357, 363 (Alaska 1983))).
- 23 - 2805
----------------------- Page 24-----------------------
this Court, "that the [S]tate cannot argue that a defendant does not have standing to raise
41
a suppression issue when the [S]tate has not contested this issue in the court below."
The trial court record suggests that Lookhart may have been seeking to
suppress evidence from both his phone and Cranford's phone. However, Lookhart never
asserted that he had a possessory or privacy interest in Cranford's phone, and no factual
42
record was developed regarding this claim.
Lookhart filed two motions to suppress in superior court. In the first
motion, Lookhart joined Cranford's motion to suppress by filing a notice stating that
Cranford's arguments "are exactly those that [he] could file separately." This statement
implied that Lookhart was asking the court to suppress evidence obtained from his cell
phone, just as Cranford was seeking suppression of evidence obtained from her cell
phone.
In the second motion, however, Lookhart repeatedly used the plural term
"cell phones" when he identified the evidence that he wanted the court to suppress. At
the same time, Lookhart did not provide any basis for asserting a privacy interest in
Cranford's phone, and it appears that the superior court itself did not interpret
41 D'Antorio v. State, 837 P.2d 727, 730 (Alaska App. 1992).
42 The Ninth Circuit has provided this explanation of what "standing" means in the
context of Fourth Amendment claims:
The term "standing" is often used to describe an inquiry into
who may assert a particular fourth amendment claim. Fourth
amendment standing is quite different, however, from "case or
controversy" determinations of article III standing. Rather, it is
a matter of substantive fourth amendment law; to say that a
party lacks fourth amendment standing is to say that his
reasonable expectation of privacy has not been infringed. It is
with this understanding that we use "standing" as a shorthand
term.
United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 669-70 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at
139-40).
- 24 - 2805
----------------------- Page 25-----------------------
Lookhart's motion as requesting suppression of the evidence from both phones, instead
limiting its order to evidence taken from Lookhart's phone:
Viewing the affidavit in its entirety and in a commonsense
manner, it is clear that the district court judge was within his
discretion to find probable cause to search and seize
Lookhart's cellphone in connection with his alleged
conspiracy with Cranford. (Emphasis added.)
We have previously held that the State cannot argue for the first time on
appeal that a defendant lacks standing to raise a Fourth Amendment claim when the
State did not contest this issue in the trial court.43 But we have also recognized that there
could potentially be situations in which the State is permitted to raise standing for the
first time on appeal.44 We conclude that this is such a situation.
In three of our prior cases - Murdock v. State , Kvasnikoff v. State, and
D'Antorio v. State - we determined that the defendant had sufficiently asserted, during
the trial court proceedings, an interest in the location or object that was searched,
triggering the State's duty to contest standing in order to preserve the argument for
appeal.45 For example, in Murdock , the defendant "clearly asserted that he had standing
in his suppression memorandum filed in the trial court," but the State waited until the
appeal to object to Murdock's standing.46 Similarly, in D'Antorio , the defendant
43 See Murdock v. State , 664 P.2d 589, 595 (Alaska App. 1983); Kvasnikoff v. State,
804 P.2d 1302, 1306 n.1 (Alaska App. 1991); D'Antorio, 837 P.2d at 730; see also Steagald
v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 209 (1981) (recognizing that the government may lose the
right to argue standing on appeal "when it has made contrary assertions in the courts below,
when it has acquiesced in contrary findings by those courts, or when it has failed to raise
such questions in a timely fashion during the litigation").
44 Kvasnikoff , 804 P.2d at 1306 n.1.
45 See Murdock , 664 P.2d at 595; Kvasnikoff, 804 P.2d at 1306 n.1; D'Antorio, 837
P.2d at 730.
46 Murdock , 664 P.2d at 595.
- 25 - 2805
----------------------- Page 26-----------------------
consistently asserted his possessory interest in the car that was searched, and although
the trial court had ordered the State to produce evidence to dispute this claim, the State
never did.47 And in Kvasnikoff, the State did not object to consideration of the
defendant's claim on the merits in the trial court and as a result, "the [trial] court did
48
not inquire into the factual circumstances relating to the issue of standing."
In each of these cases, we determined that the State could not claim on
appeal that the defendant lacked standing to raise a suppression issue when the State
had not contested this issue in the trial court. But notably, in each of these cases, we
reviewed the record and concluded that the record was clear that the State received
adequate notice that the defendants were asserting a third party's possessory or privacy
49
interest.
By contrast, in the present case, it is not clear from the record that the State
received adequate notice that Lookhart sought suppression of evidence from his and
Cranford's cell phones. As we noted earlier, while Lookhart's second motion to
suppress did reference the fact that he sought to suppress evidence from both "cell
phones," Lookhart did not assert a possessory or privacy interest in Cranford's phone,
and it appears from the superior court's order that the court itself did not interpret
50
Lookhart's motion as requesting suppression of the evidence from both phones.
47 D'Antorio, 837 P.2d at 730.
48 Kvasnikoff , 804 P.2d at 1306 n.1.
49 See Murdock , 664 P.2d at 595; Kvasnikoff, 804 P.2d at 1306 n.1; D'Antorio, 837
P.2d at 730.
50 Unlike the prior cases we cited above, where there was a single search - in
Murdock , the search of a third party's apartment; in Kvasnikoff, the search of the co-
defendant's home; and in D'Antorio, the search of the defendant's rental car - there were
two searches at issue here (the search of Lookhart's phone and the search of Cranford's
phone). Thus, the filing of the suppression motion alone would not necessarily have put
the State on notice of Lookhart's assertion of standing in both places searched. While
- 26 - 2805
----------------------- Page 27-----------------------
On this record - where it is unclear the State received adequate notice to
raise standing in the trial court - we conclude that the State may raise standing for the
first time on appeal. We therefore remand this matter to the trial court so that the parties
51
may develop a sufficient record to resolve the standing issue.
Additional issues that the superior court must decide on remand
At Lookhart's trial, the State introduced evidence that was discovered on
Lookhart's phone and also introduced evidence that was discovered on Cranford's
phone. In light of our holding that the original search warrant and the warrant addendum
violate the search and seizure provisions of the United States and Alaska Constitutions,
the superior court erred by not suppressing evidence that the State solely obtained from
Lookhart's phone. But because it is unclear from the appellate record whether Lookhart
had standing to challenge the search of Cranford's phone, we cannot determine at this
ju ncture whether evidence from Cranford's phone must also be suppressed.
On remand, the superior court should first decide whether Lookhart has
standing to challenge the search of Cranford's phone. If the court determines that
Lookhart does not have standing to vicariously assert Cranford's Fourth Amendment
rights, then the exclusionary rule would not apply to evidence obtained from Cranford's
phone and the court should reassess its verdicts without consideration of the evidence
derived from the search of Lookhart's cell phone.
Lookhart repeatedly cited to "cell phones" in his second motion to suppress, his focus was
on the deficiencies in the warrant itself.
51 See Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224, 227-28 (1972) (holding that the
intermediate appellate court erred in holding that Combs lacked standing when the
government raised the standing issue for the first time on appeal, and determining that
remand was appropriate since the record was "virtually barren of the facts necessary to
determine whether petitioner had an interest in connection with the searched premises that
gave rise to 'a reasonable expectation (on his part) of freedom from governmental
intrusion' upon those premises").
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----------------------- Page 28-----------------------
On the other hand, if Lookhart does have standing to challenge the search
of Cranford's phone, then the court must next address an argument raised by the State:
whether evidence that was obtained from searching Cranford's phone was nevertheless
admissible based on the consent she provided in connection with her plea agreement.
Lookhart challenges this contention, arguing that Cranford's consent was given in order
to resolve charges against her that (according to Lookhart) were the direct result of the
prior unlawful searches of their cell phones. He therefore contends that Cranford's
consent was tainted by the unlawful searches. On remand, the superior court should
allow the parties to litigate this question, including allowing them to further develop the
factual record if needed.
Once the trial court has determined whether any of the evidence obtained
from Cranford's cell phone was properly admitted at trial, the court should next
determine what effect its ruling has on Lookhart's conviction. Because Lookhart
received a bench trial, we direct the superior court to reconsider its verdicts in light of
(1) our directive to suppress the evidence obtained from Lookhart's phone, and (2) the
findings it makes on remand about the admissibility of the evidence obtained from
Cranford's phone.
Conclusion
We accordingly REVERSE the superior court's order denying Lookhart's
motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his own phone. However,
we REMAND this case to the superior court for further proceedings as to the
admissibility of the evidence obtained from Cranford's cell phone. The court should
then reconsider its verdicts, excising the evidence from Lookhart's phone and any
inadmissible evidence from Cranford's phone. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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