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NOTICE
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Pacific Reporter. Readers are encouraged to bring typographical or other formal
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303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501
Fax: (907) 264-0878
E-mail: corrections@akcourts.gov
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
CLAYTON ANDREW CHARLIE,
Court of Appeals No. A-13962
Appellant, Trial Court No. 3AN- 18-10952 CR
v.
O P I N I O N
STATE OF ALASKA,
Appellee. No. 2793 - December 27, 2024
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Andrew Peterson, Judge.
Appearances: Claire De Witte, Assistant Public Defender, and
Terrence Haas, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Seneca Theno Freitag, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney
General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Harbison,
Judges.
Judge ALLARD.
Clayton Andrew Charlie, who has schizophrenia, repeatedly stabbed an
Alaska Zoo employee and then ran him over with a car, killing him in a random attack.
Charlie was initially found incompetent to stand trial, but was later restored to
competency. Charlie then pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced
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1
to 75 years with 20 years suspended (55 years to serve) and 10 years' probation.
Among the probation conditions imposed was a condition requiring Charlie to take
prescribed antipsychotic medication and providing for judicial review of that
requirement if Charlie refused to take the medication.
Charlie now challenges the condition on various grounds that he failed to
raise at sentencing. For the reasons explained here, we conclude that the condition is
adequate and survives plain error review with one small modification to ensure that the
State, and not Charlie, is responsible for scheduling the prerelease hearing.
Factual background and prior proceedings
Since June 2012, Charlie has been admitted to the Alaska Psychiatric
Institute on thirteen separate occasions. Charlie's diagnoses include schizoaffective
disorder and he has been prescribed several antipsychotic medications over the years to
manage this condition. Charlie has a history of increasingly violent behavior, and he
has accrued a significant history of police contacts, criminal convictions, and
institutional violations.
In November 2018, Charlie randomly attacked Michael Greco, an
employee of the Alaska Zoo, who was working as the night watchman. Greco's body
was not discovered until the next morning. Greco had been stabbed multiple times in
the chest, head, back, and legs. He had multiple rib fractures that perforated his lung,
and had what appeared to be defensive injuries on his hands. Bloody tire marks in the
snow indicated that Greco had also been run over by a vehicle and then dragged to the
location where his body was found. Greco's wallet and cell phone were missing.
Charlie was apprehended in his stepfather's car, which had been reported
stolen. Charlie initially refused to stop and engaged the police in a high-speed chase
1 AS 11.41.110(a)(2).
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that only ended after two of his tires were deflated by a police device. Charlie was later
determined to have used Greco's debit card, which was found in the stepfather's car.
Charlie was charged with one count of first-degree murder, two counts of
second-degree murder, one count of first-degree burglary, one count of second-degree
theft, one count of third-degree assault, one count of first-degree vehicle theft, one count
of failure to stop at the direction of an officer, three counts of violation of a protective
order, seven counts of fraudulent use of an access device, and one count of reckless
2
driving.
Charlie was initially found to be incompetent to stand trial because of his
mental illness. But after he received restoration treatment in South Carolina, Charlie
was found to be competent to stand trial.
Charlie pleaded guilty to second-degree murder pursuant to a plea
agreement.3 Under the terms of the agreement, Charlie agreed to admit the facts set
forth in the complaint, receive a sentence with an active term of imprisonment between
35 and 55 years, and pay restitution. All other aspects of the sentence were left open, to
be determined by the court.
A presentence report was submitted prior to sentencing. The probation
officer recommended that the court impose Special Probation Condition No. 6. This
condition, as initially worded by the probation officer, would require Charlie to "ingest,
take or inject medications as prescribed by a licensed practitioner who has been
2 AS 11.41.100(a)(1)(A), AS 11.41.110(a)(1) and (a)(2), AS 11.46.300(a)(1),
AS 11.46.130(a)(7), AS 11.41.220(a)(5), AS 11.46.360(a)(1), AS 28.35.182(a)(1),
AS 11.56.740(a)(1), AS 11.46.285(b)(3), and AS 28.35.400, respectively.
3 AS 11.41.110(a)(2).
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4
approved by a Probation Officer or by the IDP+ Program" and "totally abstain from
use and possession of any drugs not prescribed by a licensed practitioner."
In his sentencing memorandum, the prosecutor proposed amending
Special Probation Condition No. 6 to ensure that certain procedural safeguards were
complied with. The prosecutor proposed adding the following requirements: (1) that a
hearing be held before Charlie's release to determine whether he should be required to
take medications; (2) that Charlie's medical provider be approved by a probation officer
or by the IDP+ program; (3) that Charlie authorize the release of his mental health
records to the Department of Corrections prior to his release from custody on probation;
(4) that Charlie provide notification before he discontinues any prescribed medication
he is required to take once he is released; and (5) that Charlie abstain from possessing
and using any drugs not prescribed by a licensed practitioner.
In his sentencing memorandum and at sentencing, Charlie agreed that the
prosecutor's suggestions remedied "most of the constitutional concerns" with the
probation condition, with one exception: the requirement that Charlie's medical
provider be approved by a probation officer or the IDP+ program. Charlie argued that
requiring the Department of Corrections to approve his medical provider infringed on
his constitutional right to privacy in making independent medical decisions.
In response, the prosecutor argued that the challenged provision was
narrowly tailored and survived special scrutiny because it did not prevent Charlie from
selecting his own practitioner. Rather, it simply created an approval process to prevent
Charlie from picking an inappropriate or unqualified practitioner.
The superior court agreed that the probation officer might have a valid
concern with Charlie's selection of a practitioner. The court therefore suggested adding
4 The Institutional Discharge Program Plus ("IDP+") is a Department of Corrections
program for probationers with severe mental illness. The program includes release
planning and medication management.
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a sentence that allowed for a hearing if the State disagreed with Charlie's selection. The
court explained that "both parties can present their evidence and he can have a hearing,"
and "if there's a determination made by a court at that time that the medical provider
isn't qualified or for some reason isn't appropriate, then Mr. Charlie can select
somebody else."
The prosecutor agreed that such a modification would resolve the issue.
Charlie agreed that the proposed modification was consistent with caselaw, but he
maintained his objection to the approval requirement. The court ultimately approved
the following version of Special Probation Condition No. 6:
Prior to release from custody on probation, the defendant
shall request a hearing to determine if he should be required
to ingest, take or inject medications as prescribed by a
licensed practitioner who has been selected by Mr. Charlie
and approved of by the Probation Officer, or the IDP[+]
Program. If the Probation Officer or the IDP[+] Program
does not agree with Mr. Charlie's selection of a medi[c]al
practitioner, they may file a request for a hearing. Also,
60 days prior to release from custody on probation, the
defendant shall sign a Release of Information allowing the
Department of Law District [A]ttorney's Office access to
any mental health treatment records contained at the
Department of Corrections to include medication history. If
[the] defendant is out on probation and receiving mental
health medi[c]ation under this condition and wishes to
terminate taking any medication prescribed by his treatment
providers, he shall provide his probation officer with written
notice at least 30 days prior to ceasing his medication to
allow for a hearing to be held and a judge to decide the issue.
The defendant shall totally abstain from the use and
possession of any drugs not prescribed by a licensed
practitioner.
This appeal followed.
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Charlie's current challenges to Special Probation Condition No. 6
On appeal, Charlie raises six challenges to Special Probation Condition
No. 6 . Because Charlie failed to raise all but one of these challenges before the superior
court, he must establish plain error as to those claims.5 Plain error is error that "(1) was
not the result of intelligent waiver or a tactical decision not to object; (2) was obvious;
(3) affected substantial rights; and (4) was prejudicial."6
1. Did the superior court apply the correct level of scrutiny to the
probation condition?
Charlie argues first that Special Probation Condition No. 6 is invalid in its
entirety because the superior court allegedly failed to apply special scrutiny. The State
argues that the record shows that the court did apply special scrutiny to the condition.
We agree with the State.
As a general matter, probation conditions must be "reasonably related to
the rehabilitation of the offender and the protection of the public" (or another
recognized objective of criminal administration) and "must not be unduly restrictive of
liberty."7 However, when a probation condition infringes on a probationer's
constitutional rights, the condition is subject to "special scrutiny."8 In applying special
scrutiny, the sentencing court "must ensure that the condition is narrowly tailored to
avoid unnecessary interference with the constitutional right at issue, and the court must
5 State v. Ranstead, 421 P.3d 15, 23 (Alaska 2018).
6 Id. (quoting Adams v. State , 261 P.3d 758, 764 (Alaska 2011)).
7 Id. at 19 (quoting Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235, 1240 (Alaska 1977)); see also id.
at 20 (clarifying that probation conditions may be based on any of the objectives of criminal
administration recognized in the Alaska Const. art. I, § 12).
8 Glasgow v. State, 355 P.3d 597, 600 (Alaska App. 2015).
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----------------------- Page 7-----------------------
affirmatively consider, and have good reason for rejecting, any less restrictive
9
alternatives."
As the parties recognized at the sentencing hearing, Special Probation
Condition No. 6 is subject to special scrutiny because it potentially infringes on
Charlie's constitutional rights. The United States Supreme Court has recognized a
"significant constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted
administration of antipsychotic drugs."10 "The Alaska Supreme Court has gone further
and has held that given Alaska's more protective constitutional guarantees of liberty
and privacy, the right to refuse to take antipsychotic drugs is 'fundamental.'"11 In
addition to protecting the right to reject unwanted antipsychotic medication, the Alaska
Constitution's guarantees of liberty and privacy also protect a person's "right to make
independent medical choices in consultation with a physician" 12 and a person's right to
privacy in sensitive personal information related to their physical and/or mental health
13
care.
9 Id.
10 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 178 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990)).
11 R.A. v. State, 550 P.3d 594, 597 (Alaska App. 2024) (quoting Myers v. Alaska
Psychiatric Inst., 138 P.3d 238, 248 (Alaska 2006)).
12 Glasgow, 355 P.3d at 600; see also Huffman v. State, 204 P.3d 339, 346 (Alaska
2009) ("We now hold that the right to make decisions about medical treatments for oneself
. . . is a fundamental liberty and privacy right in Alaska.").
13 See Rollins v. Ulmer, 15 P.3d 749, 752 (Alaska 2001) (recognizing that Alaska's
constitutional right to privacy includes "the right to avoid public disclosure of personal
matters and the right to privacy in consulting with a physician and making medical
treatment choices") (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977)); Falcon v.
Alaska Pub. Offs. Comm'n , 570 P.2d 469, 478 (Alaska 1977) (recognizing that "certain
types of information communicated in the context of the physician-patient relationship fall
within a constitutionally-protected zone of privacy").
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Here, both parties alerted the superior court that it needed to apply special
scrutiny to the provisions of Special Probation Condition No. 6. On appeal, Charlie
acknowledges that the court addressed his objection to the provision that requires him
to obtain approval of his chosen medical practitioner. Charlie faults the court, however,
for failing to make similar express findings with regard to all of the provisions of the
probation condition, including those that Charlie did not challenge.
But the caselaw is clear that, absent a specific objection, a court does not
need to make express findings on the record to support imposition of a probation
condition.14 As the Alaska Supreme Court explained in State v. Ranstead, it is the
sentencing court's obligation to ensure that probation conditions are constitutionally
imposed and the court "may not delegate this responsibility to the presentence report
even if the defense does not object."15 But the fact that a sentencing court is required to
comply with these requirements "does not mean . . . that a sentencing court must make
express findings for or otherwise justify each condition on the record."16 "Nor does it
furnish an exception to the well-established principle that 'a defendant must raise an
17
objection in the trial court in order to preserve that argument for appeal.'"
Here, the record shows that the superior court was well aware that the
probation condition required special scrutiny. The superior court made extensive
findings that support the need for the probation condition, detailing Charlie's significant
mental health and criminal history, as well as numerous instances of his violent
behavior, especially when unmedicated. The superior court also made findings about
14 State v. Ranstead, 421 P.3d 15, 20-21 (Alaska 2018). Best practices, however,
would be to make express findings on the record, particularly when addressing probation
conditions that directly infringe on important constitutional rights.
15 Id. at 20 (quoting Beasley v. State, 364 P.3d 1130, 1133 (Alaska App. 2015)).
16 Id.
17 Id. (quoting Johnson v. State , 328 P.3d 77, 82 (Alaska 2014)).
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Charlie's general resistance to taking medication and following treatment
recommendations, even though there were some instances of voluntary compliance.
The superior court found that "when [Charlie] is not medicated, he presents a clear and
present danger to society" and that "there's clear evidence in this case of an
unwillingness to take medication while both in and out of custody."
Given this record, we reject Charlie's contention on appeal that the
superior court failed to apply special scrutiny to the probation condition as a whole.
2. Did the superior court plainly err in requiring Charlie to request a
prerelease medication hearing?
Special Probation Condition No. 6 requires, inter alia, that "[p]rior to
release from custody on probation, the defendant shall request a hearing to determine if
he should be required to ingest, take or inject medications as prescribed by a licensed
practitioner." As both parties recognize on appeal, this provision was intended to ensure
that the State complied with this Court's requirement that a judicial hearing be held
18
prior to the administration of compelled medication.
In Kozevnikoff v. State, we vacated a medication-related probation
condition because it did not provide for an independent judicial hearing until after the
defendant was forced to comply with the probation officer's order to take psychotropic
drugs or face revocation of his probation for failing to do so. 19 We concluded that
providing for a hearing that precedes the administration of psychotropic medication
18 See Love v. State, 436 P.3d 1058, 1061 (Alaska App. 2018) (remanding to provide
for an independent judicial hearing on the medication probation condition before defendant
is required to either take the medication or face revocation for refusing to do so);
Kozevnikoff v. State, 433 P.3d 546, 548 (Alaska App. 2018) (holding that an independent
judicial hearing must occur prior to the administration of compelled psychotropic
medication); Huff v. State, 2019 WL 2451009, at *3 (Alaska App. June 12, 2019)
(unpublished) (same).
19 Kozevnikoff, 433 P.3d at 548.
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gives the defendant "the opportunity to present his own expert testimony, and to argue
for alternatives to any medication at all, or to a particular medication."20 Moreover,
because a sentencing court cannot know what medication, if any, will be appropriate
when a defendant is released on probation, we directed the court to provide for a
"hearing near the date of the defendant's release if the circumstances at that time
21
appeared to justify compelled medication."
Unlike in Kozevnikoff, Special Probation Condition No. 6 affords Charlie
the opportunity to request a hearing to determine if he should be required to take
medication before he is actually required to do so. Therefore, the primary concern that
we noted in Kozevnikoff - that Kozevnikoff was only afforded an independent judicial
hearing after he had actually started taking psychotropic drugs22 - is not present in
Charlie's case. Additionally, Special Probation Condition No. 6 ensures Charlie
receives a prerelease judicial hearing that is near in time to his release on probation and
therefore alleviates our concern in Kozevnikoff that "the trial court could not know at
the time of sentencing what medication might be appropriate when the defendant was
ultimately released on probation."23 This is especially true here, since Charlie was
sentenced to 55 years to serve and it will be decades before he is eligible for release on
probation.
On appeal, Charlie acknowledges that the probation condition properly
provides for a prerelease judicial hearing, but he argues that the condition is flawed
because it requires Charlie to request the hearing. Charlie argues that the State should
20 Id. ; see also Huff, 2019 WL 2451009, at *3.
21 Kozevnikoff, 433 P.3d at 548 (citing Kobuk v. State, 1987 WL 1357149, at *2
(Alaska App. June 3, 1987 (unpublished)).
22 Id. at 548.
23 Id. (citing Kobuk, 1987 WL 1357149, at *2).
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be required to request the hearing because it is the State who bears the burden at that
hearing of establishing that compelled medication is necessary to achieve the goals of
24
probation.
We agree that it is appropriate for the State to be responsible for
scheduling the hearing, especially given Charlie's well-established mental health
issues. Charlie's institutional probation officer will be in the best position to know the
date of his projected release, and thus when the hearing should take place, and may
inform the State if a hearing should be requested.
We accordingly remand this case to the superior court and direct the court
to replace the phrase, "the defendant shall request a hearing," with the phrase, "the
defendant shall be afforded a hearing," with the understanding that the State will be
responsible for requesting the hearing. The court shall also ensure that Charlie has
representation for the hearing.
3. Did the superior court err in requiring the Department of Corrections'
approval of Charlie's selection of a medical practitioner given the
availability of judicial review if there is a disagreement as to Charlie's
selection ?
Special Probation Condition No. 6 assigns the decision of selecting an
appropriate medical practitioner to Charlie, but subjects his selection to approval by his
probation officer or the IDP+ program. The condition further provides that "if the
Probation Officer or the IDP[+] Program does not agree with Mr. Charlie's selection of
a medical practitioner, they may file a request for a hearing."
Charlie objected to this approval requirement at sentencing and now
renews his objection on appeal. Charlie argues that this requirement infringes on his
24 See Huff, 2019 WL 2451009, at *3 (explaining that the State has the burden at the
hearing of establishing "not only that the proposed psychotropic medication is appropriate,
but also that this medication is the least intrusive method for achieving the goals of
probation").
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constitutional right "to make independent medical choices in consultation with a
physician." But a probation condition can infringe on a defendant's fundamental
constitutional rights if it is "narrowly tailored" and the court "affirmatively consider[s]"
25
and has "good reason for rejecting any less restrictive alternatives."
Here, the superior court affirmatively considered deleting the approval
requirement as Charlie requested, but determined that some protection against Charlie
selecting an inappropriate or unqualified practitioner was necessary. Charlie argues that
such a fear is speculative because there is nothing in the record to suggest that he will
select an inappropriate medical practitioner. But there is equally nothing in the record
to suggest that the Department of Corrections will unreasonably withhold approval of
an appropriate medical practitioner.26 Moreover, should Charlie select an inappropriate
practitioner or should the probation officer unreasonably withhold approval of an
27
appropriate practitioner, the issue will go to the superior court judge to decide.
Given the availability of judicial review, we conclude that the superior
28
court acted within its discretion when it imposed the modified approval provision.
25 Glasgow v. State, 355 P.3d 597, 600 (Alaska App. 2015).
26 Cf. Diorec v. State, 295 P.3d 409, 418 (Alaska App. 2013) (finding the sentencing
court's conclusion that defendant's probation officer will exercise appropriate discretion
reasonable).
27 Charlie argues that, given the current wording of the probation condition, it is not
clear that the judge would make the final decision. We agree that the probation condition
could be worded more artfully, but we conclude that the court's intent to have the judge
resolve any dispute over Charlie's selection of a practitioner is sufficiently clear.
28 Allen v. Municipality of Anchorage , 168 P.3d 890, 895 (Alaska App. 2007) (citing
Parks v. State, 571 P.2d 1003, 1005 (Alaska 1977)).
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4. Did the superior court plainly err in requiring Charlie to sign a
p rehearing release of information of his mental health treatment
records and medication history?
Special Probation Condition No. 6 provides, in relevant part:
60 days prior to release from custody on probation, the
defendant shall sign a Release of Information allowing the
Department of Law District [A]ttorney's Office access to
any mental health treatment records contained at the
Department of Corrections to include medication history.
Charlie did not object to this provision at sentencing and is therefore
required to establish plain error.29 On appeal, Charlie cites to two unpublished cases in
which this Court invalidated a probation condition that required the defendant to sign a
release of information releasing his medical records to the crime victim 's medical
providers.30 He argues that requiring him to sign a prehearing release of information to
the District Attorney's Office is a similar invasion of his right to privacy. We disagree.
As the State points out, the apparent purpose of this provision is to ensure
that the State is adequately prepared for the prerelease hearing on compelled medication
31
- a hearing that is mandated by our caselaw and at which the State bears the burden.
The State also notes that the release is limited to Charlie's mental health treatment
29 State v. Ranstead, 421 P.3d 15, 23 (Alaska 2018).
30 See Sanchez Rosario v. State, 2021 WL 386939, at *3 (Alaska App. Feb. 3, 2021)
(unpublished) (vacating condition that required defendant to sign a release of medical
information to the victim's medical providers but upholding the release of information to
defendant's medical providers and probation officer); Giddings v. State, 2018
WL 3301624, at *5 (Alaska App. July 5, 2018) (unpublished) (same).
31 Kozevnikoff v. State, 433 P.3d 546, 547-48 (Alaska App. 2018); Huff v. State, 2019
WL 2451009, at *3 (Alaska App. June 12, 2019) (unpublished) ("At this hearing, the State
has the burden of presenting expert medical testimony to establish, not only that the
proposed psychotropic medication is appropriate, but also that this medication is the least
intrusive method of achieving the goals of probation[.]").
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----------------------- Page 14-----------------------
records and medication history, both of which are relevant to the prerelease hearing.
Given these limitations and the apparent purpose, we find no plain error.
We note, however, that a defendant should not be required to provide a
release of information to the District Attorney's Office in cases where the defendant is
willing to take their prescribed medication and to be subject to a medication probation
condition and where the defendant (with the assistance of counsel) knowingly and
intelligently waives their right to a full judicial hearing.
5. Did the superior court plainly err in requiring Charlie to give at least
thirty days' notice before stopping medication that he has been
ordered to take?
Special Probation Condition No. 6 also provides, in relevant part:
If defendant is out on probation and receiving mental health
medi[c]ation under this condition and wishes to terminate
taking any medication prescribed by his treatment providers,
he shall provide his probation officer with written notice at
least 30 days prior to ceasing his medication to allow for a
hearing to be held and a judge to decide the issue.
On appeal, Charlie concedes that it is reasonable for the probation
condition to include a notice requirement so that a judicial hearing can be scheduled if
he decides to stop taking the medication as ordered, but he contends that requiring thirty
days' notice is "unduly restrictive."
Charlie argues specifically that, given the nature of psychotropic
medication, there could be circumstances when a thirty-day delay before stopping his
medication could cause long-term health problems. But Charlie ignores the context in
which the thirty-day notice will be required. If Charlie's long-term health is actually
endangered by a delay of thirty days, presumably, the medical professionals in charge
of his care would agree to stop the medication or prescribe alternative medications. In
such circumstances, Charlie would indeed not be in violation of the terms of his
probation because he would be continuing to take his medication as prescribed. In other
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----------------------- Page 15-----------------------
words, the thirty-day delay applies only in circumstances where the treatment has
already been determined to be the least restrictive alternative necessary to ensure
protection of the public and/or Charlie's rehabilitation and only where Charlie is
unilaterally deciding - against the advice of his medical practitioner - that he no
longer wants to take the prescribed medication.
Given that the thirty-day notice only comes into play when Charlie
unilaterally decides, against medical advice, to stop taking his medication, we do not
find plain error. We also expect that the hearing will be held as expeditiously as
possible.
6. Did the superior court plainly err in requiring Charlie to abstain from
drugs that were not prescribed?
The final sentence of Special Probation Condition No. 6 states: "The
defendant shall totally abstain from the use and possession of any drugs not prescribed
by a licensed practitioner." Charlie objects to this provision, interpreting the term
"drugs" broadly to include "common over-the-counter medications such as cold, cough
and allergy medications; analgesics; anti-acids; laxatives; and diarrhea medication."
But we agree with the State that the more natural reading of the condition in context is
that "drugs" means prescription drugs. Accordingly, we find no plain error.
Additional guidance to trial courts regarding forced medication probation
conditions
By affirming the probation condition in this case as not plainly erroneous,
we do not intend to suggest that this somewhat complicated probation condition should
become the template for all future forced medication probation conditions. The most
important part of the condition is its provision for an independent judicial review prior
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----------------------- Page 16-----------------------
to the administration of any forced medication.32 As long as the probation condition
allows for an independent judicial review prior to the administration of any forced
medication (and prior to any revocation for failing to comply with the forced medication
condition), it will generally pass constitutional muster, even if the condition does not
33
spell out all of the intricacies of how and when the judicial review should occur.
Conclusion
This case is remanded to the superior court so that Special Probation
Condition No. 6 can be modified to ensure that the State, not Charlie, is responsible for
scheduling any prerelease judicial hearing. The judgment of the superior court is
otherwise AFFIRMED.
32 See, e.g., Love v. State , 436 P.3d 1058, 1061 (Alaska App. 2018) ("If . . . the superior
court concludes that the facts justify a probation condition that could potentially require
Love to take psychotropic medication against her will, this probation condition must be
written in such a way that Love can seek judicial review before she is required to take the
medication, and before she faces revocation of her probation for refusing to take the
medication.").
33 Id.
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