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Edward V. Hailstone v. State of Alaska (10/4/2024) ap-2791

Edward V. Hailstone v. State of Alaska (10/4/2024) ap-2791

                                               NOTICE  

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        errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts:  

          

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               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA  



EDWARD V. HAILSTONE,  

                                                              Court of Appeals No. A-14083  

                                Appellant,                  Trial Court No. 2KB- 17-00071 CI  



                        v.  

                                                                        O P I N I O N  

STATE OF ALASKA,  



                                Appellee.                      No. 2791 - October 4, 2024  



                Appeal  from  the  Superior  Court,  Second  Judicial  District,  

                Kotzebue, Romano D. DiBenedetto, Judge.  



                Appearances: Cynthia Strout, Attorney at Law, Anchorage, for  

                the Appellant. Eric A. Ringsmuth, Assistant Attorney General,  

                Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor,  

                Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.  



                Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Harbison and Terrell, Judges.  



                Judge HARBISON.  



                Edward  V.  Hailstone  was  convicted  of  two  counts  of  perjury  and  two  



counts of providing false information with the intent of implicating another person in  

an offense.1 Following the denial of his direct appeal, Hailstone filed an application for  



    1   AS 11.56.200 and AS 11.56.800(a)(1)(A), respectively.  


----------------------- Page 2-----------------------

post-conviction relief, raising various claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The  



superior court denied this application, and Hailstone now appeals one of the claims: that  



his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by permitting Hailstone to dictate  



the defense strategy, even though a more viable defense strategy was available. For the  



reasons explained in this opinion, we conclude that the attorney's performance did not  



fall below the required standard of competence, and we accordingly affirm the superior  



court's order denying post-conviction relief.   



        Factual and procedural background  



                 We begin by  summarizing the events that led to Hailstone's indictment,  



                                                                         2 

as described in our opinion from Hailstone's direct appeal.   



                 Hailstone  was  charged  with  two  counts  of  perjury  and  two  counts  of  



providing false information with the intent of implicating another person in an offense.  



These  charges arose after Alaska State Troopers  responded to a  report of  a fight  in  



Noorvik . A number of people, including Hailstone's stepson and Hailstone's daughter,  



were involved in the fight. The troopers spoke with people who were present at the fight  



and ultimately arrested several, including Hailstone's stepson.  



                 Later that morning, Hailstone, his wife, and his daughter went to the public  



safety building where the troopers were processing the people they had arrested. When  



the Hailstones arrived at the public safety building, they  told  the troopers, in raised  



voices,  that  the fight in  question  started when  Hailstone's daughter  and  Hailstone's  



stepson were confronted by people carrying weapons.   



                 Troopers  Christopher  Bitz  and  Gordon  Young  went  outside  with  the  



Hailstones  to  discuss  their  concerns.  Bitz  told  the  Hailstones  that  other  witnesses  



indicated that Hailstone's daughter and stepson had started the fight. In response, the  



Hailstones  began  yelling  at  Bitz  and  insisting  that  someone  had  pointed  a  rifle  at  



    2   See Hailstone v. State, 2016 WL 853039 (Alaska App. Mar. 2, 2016) (unpublished).  



                                                   - 2 -                                               2791  


----------------------- Page 3-----------------------

Hailstone's daughter. During this interaction, Hailstone's daughter moved her hand in  



a manner that made both Bitz and Young believe that she was going to strike Bitz. In  



response, Bitz moved to prevent this by grabbing the daughter's arm to prevent her from  



striking him.  



               The next  day,  Hailstone  sent  an  email  to  the  Alaska State  Troopers  in  



which he  claimed that  Bitz had physically assaulted his daughter at the public safety  



building,  causing  her  "serious  pain."  According  to  Hailstone's  email,  Young  had  



interceded  to  stop  Bitz  from  inflicting  further  pain  on  his  daughter.  Hailstone  also  



asserted that Bitz had caused him and his wife to fear for their lives by placing his hand  



on his gun "like he was going to draw it." Hailstone stated that Young apologized to  



the Hailstones for Bitz's  actions. This email was the basis for one count of providing  



false information with the intent to implicate another person in an offense.  



               Two days later, Hailstone applied for short-term and long-term protective  



orders against Bitz. In support of his request for a short-term protective order, Hailstone  



testified under oath before a magistrate judge. In this testimony, Hailstone stated that,  



during the encounter at the public safety building, Bitz had attacked his daughter and  



did not stop until Young physically intervened. Hailstone  also testified that Bitz had  



threatened  Hailstone  and  his  wife  with  a  gun.  Hailstone  claimed  that  Young  had  



apologized  to  him  for  Bitz's  actions,  and  that  a  restraining  order  was  necessary  to  



protect his family from Bitz. After hearing this testimony, the magistrate judge granted  



Hailstone's request for a short-term protective order. Hailstone's testimony before the  



magistrate formed the basis for one count of perjury.  



               As a result of Hailstone's allegations, the Alaska Bureau of Investigation  



opened an investigation into what had occurred. Hailstone told the trooper conducting  



the investigation that Bitz had grabbed his daughter's arm and put her into a wrist lock.  



Hailstone  claimed  that  Bitz  was  "going  for  his  gun,"  when  Young  intervened  by  



physically removing Bitz's hands from his daughter and moving Bitz away from her.  



The investigator ultimately determined that no charges against Bitz were warranted.  



                                              - 3 -                                          2791  


----------------------- Page 4-----------------------

Hailstone's  statements  to  the  investigator  formed  the  basis  of  the  second  count  of  



providing false information with the intent to implicate another person in an offense.  



                 Two weeks later, Hailstone testified  under oath  before a superior court  



judge in support of his petition for a long -term protective order against Bitz. In this  



testimony, Hailstone repeated most of the allegations he had previously made regarding  



Bitz's behavior. Following this hearing, the superior court judge denied the request for  



a long-term order.  Hailstone's testimony at this hearing was the basis for the  second  



count of perjury.  



                 Hailstone was charged with the perjury and false information counts, and  



his case proceeded to a jury trial. While Hailstone did not personally testify at trial, the  



defense  attorney  called  several  eyewitnesses  who  observed  the  interaction  between  



Trooper  Bitz,  Trooper  Young,  and  the  Hailstones.  Hailstone's  wife  and  daughter  



testified that Bitz had exhibited unwarranted aggression towards Hailstone's daughter.  



During  closing  arguments,  the  defense  attorney  told  the  jury  that  it  should  acquit  



Hailstone for two reasons: (1) "all the witnesses except the troopers saw things exactly  



the  way  that  [Hailstone]  did,"  and  (2)  the  State  "didn't  present  any  evidence  that  



 [Hailstone] didn't absolutely believe what he said."   



                 The jury convicted Hailstone of all charged counts - i.e., two counts of  



perjury and two counts of providing false information.   



                 Hailstone  then  filed  a  direct  appeal.  When  Hailstone's  trial  attorney  



transferred the  case to an appellate attorney, he prepared a transfer memo  stating that  



Hailstone was "one of [his] most difficult clients of all time" and that Hailstone "very  



strongly directed litigation strategy." This Court affirmed Hailstone's convictions on  



                 3 

direct appeal.   



                 Hailstone  subsequently  filed  an  application  for  post-conviction  relief,  



alleging ineffective assistance of his trial attorney. Among the claims raised was that  



     3   Id. at *10.  



                                                    - 4 -                                                2791  


----------------------- Page 5-----------------------

Hailstone's  trial  attorney  erred  by  implementing  the  trial  strategy  that  Hailstone  



advocated  for,  rather than  the  strategy  that  the  attorney  believed  would  most  likely  



succeed. The superior court dismissed some of Hailstone's claims for failure to state a  



p rima  facie  case  for  relief,  but  conducted  an  evidentiary  hearing  on  the  remaining  



claims,  including  the  claims  related  to  the  attorney's  decision  to  adopt  Hailstone's  



desired trial strategy.   



               During  the  evidentiary  hearing,  Hailstone's  trial  attorney  testified  that  



while he and Hailstone had  substantial communication about the case, Hailstone was  



difficult to communicate with because he dominated the conversation and did not listen  



to  him.  According  to  the  trial  attorney,  Hailstone  maintained  that  his  previous  



descriptions  of  the  events  were  accurate,  and  that  he  was  not  guilty  of  perjury  or  



providing false information because he was telling the truth.  Hailstone made  it  clear  



that he wanted his attorney to pursue this defense at trial.   



               Hailstone's  attorney  testified  that  a  better  defense,  in  his  view, was  to  



argue that  Hailstone  did not have the mens rea necessary to support a conviction for  



perjury or providing false information because  Hailstone believed  that his version of  



the  events was accurate. The attorney wanted to argue that different people can have  



different  understandings  of  the  same  event,  and  that  in  Hailstone's  case,  both  the  



troopers and the Hailstones were "being honest from their perspective . . . and that it  



 [was] not necessary for one side or the other to be lying."   



               Hailstone's attorney  testified that he  repeatedly  explained  his proposed  



strategy  (and  why  he  believed  it  was  the  better  strategy)  to  Hailstone.  The  defense  



attorney also testified that there was a way to  combine the two defenses, but  that he  



ultimately adopted Hailstone's defense.  



               Hailstone,  by  contrast,  testified  that  his  attorney  did  not  explain  the  



elements of the charges  against him  and did not explain why the attorney's strategy  



would have been better.   



                                               - 5 -                                          2791  


----------------------- Page 6-----------------------

                After  the   evidentiary  hearing  concluded,  the   superior   court  denied  



Hailstone's  application  for  post-conviction  relief.  Relevant  to  this  appeal,  the  court  



found that the defense attorney had informed Hailstone of "several legal defenses" and  



"urged the better of the legal arguments." The court further found that, "congruent with  



the Rules of Professional Conduct," the attorney ultimately defended the case using the  



argument preferred by Hailstone. These factual findings are not challenged on appeal.  



Based on these findings, the  superior court held that there was "no reasonable doubt"  



that the attorney provided effective assistance of counsel.   



                This appeal followed.  



            y we conclude that  Hailstone failed to show that his defense attorney  

        Wh 

        provide d ineffective assistance of counsel   



                Under the test established in Risher v. State, in order to show ineffective  



assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove that their attorney failed to "perform at  



least as well as a lawyer with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law," and that  



                                                                                                      4 

there is a reasonable possibility that the attorney's incompetence affected the outcome.   



On  appeal,  Hailstone  asserts  that  his  defense  attorney  incompetently  acquiesced  in  



adopting  Hailstone's  preferred  trial strategy. Hailstone argues that this acquiescence  



amounts   to   a   structural   error,   requiring   automatic   reversal   of   his   conviction.  



Alternatively, Hailstone argues that his attorney's incompetent performance  met the  



prejudice prong under Risher .   



                Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(a) states that "[i]n a criminal  



case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer,  



as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial, whether the client will testify, and  



    4   Risher v. State, 523 P.2d 421, 424-25 (Alaska 1974); Burton v. State, 180 P.3d 964,  



968 (Alaska App. 2008).   



                                                 - 6 -                                             2791  


----------------------- Page 7-----------------------

                                  5 

whether to take an appeal."  But the Commentary to this rule clarifies that the client has  



                                                                                                            6 

"the ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal representation,"   



and that because of the "varied nature" of potential disagreements between lawyers and  



clients, the Rules  of Professional Conduct  do not prescribe how disagreements are to  



                                                           7 

be resolved when a conflict over tactics arises.   



                 In  Simeon  v.  State,  we  explained  that  the  client's  decision-making  



authority  is  limited  to  the  four  decisions  enumerated  in  Rule  1.2(a),  and  that  all  

decisions concerning trial strategy are left to the attorney.8  For this reason, we have  



held that an attorney did not act improperly when they chose to proceed with a defense  



                                                                         9 

strategy that was different from what the client requested.    



                 But in this case, unlike in Simeon, Hailstone's trial attorney did not pursue  



his own preferred strategy over his client's objections. Rather, according to Hailstone,  



his attorney did the exact opposite: he adopted the strategy that Hailstone - the client  



- requested, even though the attorney's preferred defense was available and was more  



likely to be successful. Hailstone contends that this decision was incompetent.   



                 To  establish  that  an  attorney's  tactical  decision  was  incompetent,  the  



defendant  must  establish  that  the  attorney's  actions  were  ones  that  no  reasonably  

competent attorney would take.10 Furthermore, as the United States Supreme Court has  



    5   Alaska R. Prof. Conduct 1.2(a).  



    6   Alaska R. Prof. Conduct 1.2 cmt. para. 1.  



    7   Alaska R. Prof. Conduct 1.2 cmt. para. 2.  



    8   Simeon v. State, 90 P.3d 181, 184 (Alaska App. 2004). The four decisions entrusted  

to the client are: (1) what plea to enter, (2) whether to waive jury trial, (3) whether to testify,  

and (4) whether to take an appeal. Id.; Alaska R. Prof. Conduct 1.2(a).   



    9   Simeon, 90 P.3d at 184-85.  



    10  State v. Jones, 759 P.2d 558, 568-70 (Alaska App. 1988).  



                                                    - 7 -                                                2791  


----------------------- Page 8-----------------------

explained,   "[t]he   reasonableness   of   counsel's   actions   may   be   determined   or  

substantially  influenced  by  the  defendant's  own  statements  or  actions."11  Thus,  an  



attorney's  actions may properly be based on "informed strategic choices made by the  

defendant and on information supplied by the defendant."12 And the Alaska Rules of  



Professional Conduct similarly require an attorney to abide by their client's decisions  



concerning the objectives of the representation and to "consult with the client as to the  



                                                    13 

means by which they are to be pursued."                



                 In keeping with these principles, a majority of jurisdictions have held that  



when an attorney presents the defense favored by their client, rather than the defense  



that  the  attorney  personally  favors,  this  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  the  defense  



                                      14 

attorney acted incompetently.              



                 We  have  previously  agreed  with  this  majority  position,  noting  that  



although counsel must give competent advice and is ultimately responsible for tactical  



and  strategic  decisions  under  their  control,  an  attorney  does  not  provide  ineffective  



assistance of counsel when, after advising the client of what the attorney believes is the  



best legal tactic, the attorney acquiesces in the client's desire to proceed in a different  



    11  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984).  



    12   Id.  Indeed,  the  Eleventh  Circuit  has  held  that  "when  a  defendant  preempts  his  



attorney's  strategy  by  insisting  that  a  different  defense  be  followed,  no  claim  of  

ineffectiveness can be made." Mitchell v. Kemp , 762 F.2d 886, 889 (11th Cir. 1985).  



    13  Alaska R. Prof. Conduct 1.2(a).  



    14   See Jeffries v. Blodgett , 5 F.3d 1180, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 1993); Zagorski v. State, 983  



S.W.2d  654,  658-59  (Tenn.  1998);  Commonwealth  v.  Sam,  635  A.2d  603,  611- 12  (Pa.  

1993); In re Trombly , 627 A.2d 855, 856-57 (Vt. 1993); State v. Ali, 407 S.E.2d 183, 189  

(N.C. 1991); State v. Thomas, 625 S.W.2d 115, 123-24 (Mo. 1981); People v. Gadson, 24  

Cal. Rptr. 2d 219, 226-27 (Cal. App. 1993); State v. Rubenstein, 531 N.E.2d 732, 740 (Ohio  

App. 1987). But see State v. Lee, 689 P.2d 153, 159-60 (Ariz. 1984) (holding that a defense  

attorney  falls  below  minimal  standards  of  providing  effective  assistance  when  they  

acquiesce in a defendant's demand to  call witnesses whose veracity and credibility  the  

attorney strongly doubts).  



                                                    - 8 -                                                2791  


----------------------- Page 9-----------------------

manner.15  As the Missouri Supreme Court has explained,  "It would be absurd to say  



that a defendant may waive the assistance of counsel entirely  [but] may not waive the  



benefit of counsel 's advice with respect to a particular decision, such as whether or not  

to  assert  a  particular  defense."16  Thus,  even  if  the  defendant's  choice  to  pursue  a  



particular defense was unwise, "this does not impeach the competency of counsel who  



advised against it. The failure of a strategy knowingly and voluntarily pursued by  [a]  



defendant does not entitle him to another try under the guise of ineffective assistance of  



            17 

counsel."       



                 In  Hailstone's  case,  the  superior  court  found  that  Hailstone's  attorney  



informed him  "of the several legal defenses that could be made in his case" and the  



attorney "urged the better of the legal arguments, but ultimately accepted the wishes of  

his client and defended his client using the argument preferred by his client." 18 Given  



that Hailstone's attorney explained the various legal arguments available and why the  



attorney's  own  defense  was  the  better  choice,  we  conclude  that  the  attorney  could  



reasonably choose to adopt Hailstone's chosen defense and that such a choice was not  



incompetent.   



                 There is a second reason why the defense attorney's performance was not  



incompetent.  Here,  although  the  defense  attorney  presented  Hailstone's  preferred  



    15   Valcarcel  v.  State,  2003  WL  22351613,  at  *3  (Alaska  App.  Oct.  15,  2003)  



(unpublished).  



    16   Thomas, 625 S.W.2d at 124.  



    17  Id.  



    18   A trial court's factual findings about whether an attorney's performance fell below  

the  minimal  level  of  competence  are  reviewed  for  clear  error.  See  Rausch  v.  Devine,  

80 P.3d 733, 737 (Alaska 2003) ("The factual findings of the trial court are reviewed for  

clear error, a standard that is met if, after a thorough review of the record, we come to a  

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."). We have reviewed the record  

and find no clear error.  



                                                    - 9 -                                                2791  


----------------------- Page 10-----------------------

defense theory to the jury, the attorney also presented  a second defense theory - the  



defense theory that Hailstone's attorney favored.   



                 To convict Hailstone of perjury, the State had to prove,  inter alia, that  



Hailstone's sworn statements were false and that Hailstone did not believe his sworn  

statements to be true. 19  Similarly, to convict Hailstone of providing false information,  



the State had to prove, inter alia, that Hailstone provided false information to a peace  



                                                                                                  20 

officer and that he knew that the information was false at the time it was given.                      



                 In closing arguments, the defense  attorney argued that Hailstone  should  



be acquitted  for two separate reasons: first,  because  Hailstone  did  not  provide false  



sworn statements or false information to a peace officer (because Trooper Bitz was, in  



fact,  assaultive  toward  Hailstone's  daughter outside the public safety building), and  



second, because regardless of whether Hailstone's assertions were actually true or false,  



the  State  failed  to  prove  at  trial  that  Hailstone  knew  his  sworn  statements  and  



information furnished to the police were false at the time he uttered or provided them  



(because Hailstone actually believed that his statements were true).    



                 These  two  defense  theories  were  not  inconsistent.  Rather,  they  could  



logically be presented together because they attacked different elements of perjury and  



providing false  information  to  a  peace officer.  Therefore,  the  attorney's decision  to  



simultaneously present  Hailstone's preferred defense and his  own  preferred  defense  



was not incompetent. For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in  



determining that the defense attorney's performance met at least the minimum standard  



of competence.  



    19  See AS 11.56.200(a).  



    20  See AS 11.56.800(a)(1)(A).  



                                                  - 10 -                                               2791  


----------------------- Page 11-----------------------

Conclusion  



       The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.  



                                  - 11 -                                    2791  

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