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Marvin Joe Kelila v. State of Alaska (8/23/2024) ap-2789

Marvin Joe Kelila v. State of Alaska (8/23/2024) ap-2789

                                                           NOTICE  

          The text of this opinion can be corrected before the opinion is published in the  

          Pacific Reporter. Readers are encouraged to bring typographical or other formal  

          errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts:  

            

                                       303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501  

                                                   Fax: (907) 264-0878  

                                          E-mail: corrections@akcourts.gov  

                                                                   

                                                                   

                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA  

  

  

MARVIN JOE KELILA,                                                       

                                                                              Court of Appeals No. A-14230  

                                        Appellant,                         Trial Court No. 3AN-20-08530 CR  

                                                                         

  

                              v.                                         

                                                                                           O P I N I O N  

STATE OF ALASKA,                                                         

  

                                                                         

                                        Appellee.                              No. 2789 - August 23, 2024  

  

                                                                         

  

                    Appeal  from  the   Superior  Court,   Third  Judicial  District,  

                    Anchorage, Jack R. McKenna, Judge.  

                      

                    Appearances:  Lindsey  Bray,  Assistant  Public  Defender,  and  

                    Terrence Haas, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.  

                    Ann B. Black, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal  

                    Appeals,  Anchorage,  and  Treg  R.  Taylor,  Attorney  General,  

                    Juneau, for the Appellee.  

                      

                    Before:  Allard,  Chief  Judge,  and  Wollenberg  and  Harbison,  

                    Judges.  

                      

                    Judge ALLARD.  

                      



                    Under Alaska law, a criminal defendant who spends time on electronic  



monitoring prior to trial may, under certain circumstances, receive credit against their  


----------------------- Page 2-----------------------

                               1 

sentence for that time.  But this credit does not apply to sentences for certain crimes,  



                                                       2 

including felony crimes against a person.   



                  Marvin Joe Kelila pleaded guilty to one count of third-degree assault, a  

felony  crime  against  a  person.3  Prior  to  his  plea,  Kelila  spent  time  on  electronic  



monitoring.  Kelila  later  requested  that  he  receive  credit  against  his  felony  assault  



sentence for the time he  spent on electronic monitoring. Kelila acknowledged that he  



was not entitled to such credit under AS 12.55.027(g), but he argued that this law, by  



granting credit for time spent on electronic monitoring to defendants convicted of some  



types  of  crimes  but  not  others,  violates  the  equal  protection  clause  of  the  Alaska  



Constitution.  



                  The superior court rejected this argument, and Kelila now appeals. For the  



reasons explained in this decision, we affirm the judgment of the superior court.   



                    



         The history of AS 12.55.027 and Kelila's crime  



                  In Nygren v. State, this Court held that a defendant who spent time, prior  



to trial, in a residential treatment facility under restrictions approximating incarceration  



                                                                            4 

was entitled to credit for that time against their sentence.   



                  Later, in Matthew v. State , we held  that a defendant who spent time on  



electronic  monitoring  prior  to  trial  was  not  entitled  to  credit  against  their  sentence  



                                      

     1   AS 12.55.027(a).  



     2   AS 12.55.027(g).  



     3   AS 11.41.220(a)(1)(A).  



    4    Nygren v. State, 658 P.2d 141, 142 & n.1, 146 (Alaska App. 1983) (granting credit  



under AS 12.55.025(c)).   



                                                       - 2 -                                                    2789  


----------------------- Page 3-----------------------

because  unlike residential treatment,  electronic monitoring does  not approximate the  



                                                                          5 

restrictions experienced by a person who is incarcerated.   



                 In  2007,  the  legislature  partially  codified  our  holding  in  Nygren  in  

AS  12.55.027.6 In 2015, the legislature amended AS 12.55.027 to authorize credit for  



time served on electronic monitoring, at least when the person had not committed a  



criminal  offense  while  on  electronic  monitoring  and  when  certain  restrictions  were  

placed on the person's freedom of movement and behavior.7  The sponsor of the bill,  



Representative Tammie Wilson, stated that the purpose of the bill was to "substantially  



save money while increasing . . . access to community-based treatments [and the] ability  



                                                                      8 

to maintain employment, and reduc[ing] recidivism."    



                  The following year, in 2016, the legislature expanded eligibility for credit  



for time spent in a treatment program but imposed additional restrictions on the ability  

to qualify for credit for time spent on electronic monitoring.9 Of relevance to the current  



case, the legislature enacted AS 12.55.027(g), which placed a cap of 360 days of credit  



against any sentence imposed for certain listed crimes, including felony crimes against  

a person.10 In other words, defendants convicted only of the listed crimes could receive  



some credit for their time spent on electronic monitoring, but only up to a maximum of  



360 days.   



                                     

    5    Matthew v. State , 152 P.3d 469, 472-73 (Alaska App. 2007).   



    6    SLA 2007, ch. 24, § 20.   



    7    SLA 2015, ch. 20, § 2.  



     8   Sponsor Statement from Representative Tammie Wilson, regarding House Bill 15  



(Feb. 20, 2015), at 1.   



    9    See SLA 2016, ch. 36, §§ 69-71.   



     10   SLA 2016, ch. 36, § 71.   



                                                      - 3 -                                                  2789  


----------------------- Page 4-----------------------

                 Then, in 2019, the legislature amended AS 12.55.027(g)  so that it flatly  



prohibits granting any credit for time spent on electronic monitoring against a sentence  

of imprisonment imposed for any of the listed crimes.11  Alaska Statute 12.55.027(g)  



now states as follows:   



                  (g)   Unless   the   defendant   participated   in   a   residential  

                 treatment  program  under  (c)  and  (f)  of  this  section  while  

                 under  electronic  monitoring,  a  court  may  not  grant  credit  

                  against a sentence of imprisonment under (d) of this section  

                 if the sentence is for   



                          (1) a felony crime against a person under AS 11.41;  



                          (2) a crime involving domestic violence as defined in  

                          AS 18.66.990;  



                          (3) an offense under AS 11.71 involving the delivery  

                          of a controlled substance to a person under 19 years  

                          of age;   



                          (4) burglary in the first degree under AS 11.46.300;  

                          or   



                                                                                          [12] 

                          (5) arson in the first degree under AS 11.46.400.                     



                 In October 2020, Kelila was arrested after an altercation with his  then- 



girlfriend, and he ultimately  pleaded guilty, in May 2023, to a single count of third- 



degree assault, which is a felony crime against a person and thus ineligible for electronic  

monitoring  credit  under  AS  12.55.027(g).13  Between  October  2020  and  May  2023,  



Kelila spent approximately 23 months on electronic monitoring. It is undisputed that,  



                                     

     11   SLA 2019, ch. 11, § 6. We note that the statutory language prohibits granting credit  



against a sentence of imprisonment if the sentence is for certain crimes, and that a defendant  

may be convicted of multiple crimes and have multiple sentences, not all of which would  

necessarily be subject to the prohibition.   



     12   AS 12.55.027(g), as amended by SLA 2019, ch. 11, § 6.   



     13   AS 11.41.220(a)(1)(A).   



                                                      - 4 -                                                  2789  


----------------------- Page 5-----------------------

except for the nature of his crime, Kelila otherwise satisfied the criteria for electronic  



monitoring credit under AS 12.55.027(d).  



                  Prior  to  sentencing,  Kelila  requested  credit  for  the  time  he  spent  on  



electronic monitoring. Kelila argued that AS 12.55.027(g) violates the equal protection  



clause of the Alaska Constitution by treating people convicted of the enumerated crimes  



differently from people  convicted of  other crimes for purposes  of determining  their  



eligibility for credit for time served on electronic monitoring.  



                  The superior court rejected Kelila's argument, and Kelila now appeals.   



                    



         Why  we  conclude  that  AS  12.55.027(g)  does  not  violate  the  equal  

        protection clause of the Alaska Constitution   



                  The equal protection guarantee of the Alaska Constitution requires "equal  

treatment of those similarly situated." 14 "When equal protection claims are raised, the  



question  is  whether  two  groups  of  people  who  are  treated  differently  are  similarly  



                                                                                                      15 

situated and therefore are entitled to equal treatment under the constitution."                            



                  Alaska's  core  equal  protection  analysis  applies  a  flexible  three-step  

sliding scale test.16 However, the Alaska Supreme Court has held that "there are some  



occasions when a full equal protection analysis may not be necessary because it is so  

exceedingly clear that the two classes in question are not similarly situated."17 A court  



may "summarily conclude that two classes are not similarly situated only in clear cases  



                                     

     14   Planned Parenthood of The Great Nw. v. State, 375 P.3d 1122, 1135 (Alaska 2016)  

(quoting  State,  Dep't  of  Health  &  Soc.  Servs.  v.  Planned  Parenthood  of  Alaska,  Inc.,  

28 P.3d 904, 909 (Alaska 2001)).   



     15   Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Gallant, 153 P.3d 346, 349 (Alaska 2007).  



     16   Planned Parenthood of The Great Nw., 375 P.3d at 1137.  



     17   Id. at 1136.  



                                                       - 5 -                                                   2789  


----------------------- Page 6-----------------------

because '[s]uch a conclusion reflects in shorthand the analysis traditionally used in [the  



                                                                   18 

supreme court's] equal protection jurisprudence.'"                     



                  The  superior  court  resolved  this  case  by  applying  the  shorthand  test,  



concluding that  a defendant who commits one of the enumerated crimes  (like  third- 



degree assault) is not similarly situated to a defendant who does not commit one of the  



enumerated crimes for purposes of their sentences' eligibility for credit for time served  



on  electronic  monitoring.  The  superior  court  reasoned  that,  as  this  Court  stated  in  



Maeckle v. State , a defendant "shares common traits only with other offenders who have  



                                              19 

committed the same misconduct."                  



                  There is considerable support for this conclusion in our case law. In Alex  



v.  State,  for  example,  a  defendant  challenged  on  equal  protection  grounds  a  statute  



providing that "it is a felony for a felon to escape [prison], while it is a misdemeanor  

for  a  misdemeanant  to  escape."20  The  supreme  court  rejected  this  equal  protection  



challenge, explaining that "[i]t is elementary that the power to define crimes and fix  



punishments rests in the legislature," and that power may "not be confined by narrow  

or unduly restrictive limits."21  The supreme court explained that the legislature could  



reasonably have believed that persons convicted of felonies present a greater threat to  



the public, or that people convicted of felonies had greater motivation to escape,  and  



                                                                                      22 

that this required a greater penalty to deter felons from escaping.                        



                                     

     18   Id.  at 1136 n.81 (quoting Shepherd v. State, Dep't of Fish & Game, 897 P.2d 33,  



44 n.12 (Alaska 1995)).  



     19   Maeckle v. State , 792 P.2d 686, 689 (Alaska App. 1990).   



     20   Alex v. State , 484 P.2d 677, 684 (Alaska 1971).   



     21   Id.  



     22   Id. at 685.  



                                                       - 6 -                                                   2789  


----------------------- Page 7-----------------------

                  In Hemphill v. State, this Court applied the same reasoning to conclude  



that the classification of forgery as a misdemeanor or felony depending on the type of  

instrument forged did not violate equal protection.23 And in Maeckle v. State , cited by  



the superior court in this case, this Court reached the same conclusion with respect to a  



statute that made it a felony for hunting guides to guide without a valid license, but did  



not make it a felony for other professionals to practice without a license when a license  

was  legally required.24 As we  explained, "Because Maeckle was subject to the same  



penalties  as  any  other  person  committing  the  same  misconduct  -  that  is,  guiding  



without a license  -  his right to equal protection was not violated by the provision  



                                                                    25 

subjecting him to felony sanctions for the offense."                    



                  Finally, in Brown v. State, this Court held that a statute  did not violate  



equal protection by treating prisoners who received a presumptive term differently from  



prisoners  who  received  a  mandatory  minimum  term  for  purposes  of  eligibility  for  

discretionary  parole.26  We  explained  that  the  mandatory  minimum  and  presumptive  



sentencing provisions at issue "deal[t] with different classes of offenders and serve[d]  



differing purposes" - specifically, the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions only  



applied to a limited number of unclassified felonies, which are the most serious crimes  

in  Alaska.27  We  therefore  concluded,  citing  to  Maeckle ,  that  these  two  classes  of  



offenders "cannot be deemed similarly situated for purposes of considering an equal  



                                                                28 

protection claim based on disparate sentencing."                    



                                     

    23   Hemphill v. State, 673 P.2d 888, 891-92 (Alaska App. 1983).   



    24   Maeckle , 792 P.2d at 689.  



    25   Id.  



    26   Brown v. State, 926 P.2d 1195, 1198 (Alaska App. 1996).  



    27   Id. at 1198 & n.2.  



    28   Id. at 1198 (citing Maeckle , 792 P.2d at 689).  



                                                      - 7 -                                                   2789  


----------------------- Page 8-----------------------

               Given this case law, we agree with the superior court that a defendant who  



commits one of the crimes enumerated in AS 12.55.027(g) is not similarly situated, for  



purposes  of  determining  eligibility  to  receive  credit  for  time  spent  on  electronic  



monitoring,  to a defendant who does not commit one of the enumerated crimes. We  



note  that  the  crimes  listed  in  AS  12.55.027(g)  are,  generally  speaking,  crimes  of  



violence (like crimes against a person) or crimes that  are otherwise highly dangerous  



(like arson, or delivering a controlled substance to a person under nineteen  years of  



age). The legislature could reasonably conclude that the goals of sentencing, including  



protecting the public, community condemnation, and deterrence, would be best served  



by requiring defendants who commit these crimes to serve their full sentence in prison,  



rather than being permitted to serve a portion of their sentence on electronic monitoring.  



               On appeal, Kelila contends that the superior court erred when it failed to  



apply the full three-prong equal protection test. But applying that test leads to the same  



results, and for the same reasons.   



               In order to conduct the full equal protection test, we apply the following  



three-step process:   



                       First, it must be determined at the outset what weight  

               should be afforded the constitutional interest impaired by the  

               challenged enactment.  .  .  . Depending upon the primacy of  

               the interest involved, the state will have a greater or lesser  

               burden in justifying its legislation.  



                       Second,  an  examination  must  be  undertaken  of  the  

               purposes served by a challenged statute. Depending on the  

               level  of  review  determined,  the  state  may  be  required  to  

               show only that its objectives were legitimate, at the low end  

               of the continuum, or, at the high end of the scale, that the  

               legislation was motivated by a compelling state interest.  



                       Third,  an  evaluation  of  the  state's  interest  in  the  

               particular  means  employed  to  further  its  goals  must  be  

               undertaken.  Once  again,  the  state's  burden  will  differ  in  

               accordance with the determination of the level of scrutiny  

               under the first stage of analysis. At the low end of the sliding  



                                               - 8 -                                          2789  


----------------------- Page 9-----------------------

                  scale, we have held that a substantial relationship between  

                  means and ends is constitutionally adequate. At the higher  

                  end of the scale, the fit between means and ends must be  

                  much closer. If the purpose can be accomplished by a less  

                  restrictive      alternative,       the      classification        will     be  

                  invalidated.[29]  



                  Under the first prong of the test, the court evaluates "the importance of the  



personal  right  infringed  upon  to  determine  the  State's  burden  in  justifying  its  

differential infringement."30 On appeal, Kelila argues that AS 12.55.027(g) implicates  



his fundamental rights to liberty, reasonable bail, and rehabilitation. But the statute does  



not restrict a defendant's access to bail or rehabilitative opportunities, and it therefore  



has no meaningful impact on a defendant's right to bail or to rehabilitation.   



                  Instead,  the practical effect of  AS 12.55.027(g)  is that defendants who  



have spent time on electronic monitoring prior to trial  and did not  commit  one of the  



enumerated  crimes  will  potentially  be  required  to  serve  less  time  in  prison  than  



defendants who spent time on electronic monitoring  prior to trial  and  are unable to  



obtain  credit  against  their  sentence  for  one  of  the  enumerated  crimes.  Thus,  "the  



individual interest affected by the challenged statute is the relatively narrow interest of  

a convicted offender in minimizing the punishment for an offense."31 As this Court has  



previously  noted,  "[t]his  interest,  though  certainly  not  negligible,  is  not  sufficiently  



                                                                                                32 

significant to trigger strict scrutiny of the statute's legislative purposes."                      



                                     

    29   Planned Parenthood of The Great Nw. v. State , 375 P.3d 1122, 1137 (Alaska 2016)  



(quoting Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Brown , 687 P.2d 264, 269-70 (Alaska 1984)).  



     30   Id.  



     31   See Maeckle , 792 P.2d at 689.  



     32   Id.  



                                                       - 9 -                                                   2789  


----------------------- Page 10-----------------------

                 Under the second prong, the court examines the "purposes served by  a  

challenged statute."33 Here, the government has the legitimate purpose of reducing the  



amount  of  time  served  in  prison  by  individuals  convicted  of  only  certain  offenses  



                                                                                               34 

(i.e., the non-listed offenses) and who spend time on electronic monitoring.                       



                 Finally,  the court  evaluates  "the state's interest in the particular means  

employed to further its goals"35 - i.e., "the closeness of the fit between the challenged  



statute  and  the  state's  asserted  regulatory  interest."36  Here,  we  "find  no  marked  



deficiency  in  the  challenged  statute's  approach  to  fulfilling  the  state's  legitimate  



interest" in reducing the amount of time individuals convicted of certain offenses serve  

in prison.37 The legislature could reasonably conclude that individuals convicted of less  



serious or less dangerous crimes should be permitted to receive credit for their time  



served on electronic monitoring, while at the same time concluding that individuals  



convicted of more serious or more dangerous crimes should be required to serve their  



full  term  of  imprisonment  and  should  not  receive  a  reduction  for  time  served  on  



                            38 

electronic monitoring.          



    33   Planned  Parenthood  of  The  Great  Nw.,  375  P.3d  at  1137  (quoting  Alaska  Pac.  



Assurance Co. , 687 P.2d at 269).  



    34   Cf. Brown v. State, 926 P.2d 1195, 1198 (Alaska App. 1996) ("[T]he state has a  



strong and direct interest in establishing penalties for criminal offenders and in determining  

how those penalties should be applied to various classes of convicted felons. In this arena,  

the legislature has traditionally been accorded broad authority." (quoting Dancer v. State,  

715 P.2d 1174, 1180-81 (Alaska App.1986))).  



    35   Planned  Parenthood  of  The  Great  Nw.,  375  P.3d  at  1137  (quoting  Alaska  Pac.  



Assurance Co., 687 P.2d at 269).  



    36   Brown, 926 P.2d at 1198.   



    37   See id. at 1199 (quoting Anderson v. State , 904 P.2d 433, 436 (Alaska App. 1995)).  



    38   See Gray v. State, 267 P.3d 667, 673 (Alaska App. 2011) ("A sentencing system  



that  specifies  progressively  harsher  penalties  for  more  progressively  serious  classes  of  



                                                   - 10 -                                                2789  


----------------------- Page 11-----------------------

                    For all these reasons, we agree with the superior court that the legislative  



classification adopted in AS 12.55.027(g) does not violate equal protection.  



                      



          Conclusion  



                    The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.  



                      



                                          

offenses  is  neither  novel  nor  impermissible.  This  is  a  form  of  classification  that  has  

traditionally been recognized and upheld as rational." (quoting Brown, 926 P.2d at 1199)).  



                                                             -  11 -                                                           2789  

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