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Chawn D. Summerall v. State of Alaska (8/16/2024) ap-2788

Chawn D. Summerall v. State of Alaska (8/16/2024) ap-2788

                                               NOTICE  

        The text of this opinion can be corrected before the opinion is published in the  

        Pacific Reporter. Readers are encouraged to bring typographical or other formal  

        errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts:  

                               303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501  

                                        Fax: (907) 264-0878  

                                 E-mail: corrections@akcourts.gov  



              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA  



CHAWN D. SUMMERALL,  

                                                              Court of Appeals No. A-14055  

                                Appellant,                 Trial Court No. 3KO-10-00279 CR  



                        v.  

                                                                       O P I N I O N  

STATE OF ALASKA,  



                                Appellee.                     No. 2788 - August 16, 2024  



                Appeal from the Superior Court, First Judicial District, Juneau,  

                Daniel Schally, Judge.  



                Appearances:  Renee  McFarland,  Assistant  Public  Defender,  

                and  Terrence  Haas,  Public  Defender,  Anchorage,  for  the  

                Appellant.  Ann B. Black,  Assistant Attorney General, Office  

                of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney  

                General, Juneau, for the Appellee.  



                Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Harbison and Terrell, Judges.  



                Judge HARBISON.  



                In 2010, Chawn D. Summerall was convicted, following a jury trial, of  



                                                                                                 1 

first-degree  assault  for  beating  up  a  person  who  later  died  from  his  injuries.   The  



    1   Former AS 11.41.200(a) (pre-October 2019 version).  


----------------------- Page 2-----------------------

evidence  indicated  that  Summerall  was  intoxicated  when  the  assault  occurred.  The  



superior court sentenced  Summerall to 20 years with 9 years suspended (11 years to  



serve) and 5 years of probation and imposed special conditions of probation to address  



Summerall's  substance use. Under these original conditions,  Summerall was required  



to  obtain  a  substance  abuse  evaluation  and  spend  up  to  6  months  in  a  residential  



substance abuse treatment program if recommended by the evaluation.  



               Between   2020   and   2022,  the   superior   court   revoked   Summerall's  



probation  five  separate times  for conduct relating to substance abuse.  As part of  the  



disposition of the State's fifth petition to revoke probation, the court added a condition  



requiring   him   to   obtain   a   new   substance   abuse   assessment   and   to   follow   its  



recommendations,  including  "up  to  1  year  of  in-patient  treatment."  In  this  appeal,  



Summerall argues that this condition violated double jeopardy because it increased his  



punishment by requiring him to complete up to  1  year in residential treatment rather  



than the six-month period that his original judgment required.  



               The State raises two arguments in response. First, the State argues that this  



Court  should  decline  to  hear  Summerall's  claim  because   Summerall's  attorney  



requested the very probation  condition he now appeals. Second, the State argues that  



Summerall's  double  jeopardy  claim  fails  on  the  merits  because  the  court  did  not  



increase  his overall punishment; rather, it  specified  the manner  in which Summerall  



had to serve a portion of his outstanding suspended sentence.   



               For the reasons explained, we need not reach the State's waiver argument  



because  we  agree  that  Summerall's  double  jeopardy  claim  fails  on  the  merits.  The  



superior court did not increase Summerall's punishment  in a manner that implicates  



double  jeopardy.  Rather,  it  exercised  its  discretion  to  modify  his  probation  by  



specifying the manner in which Summerall may have to spend 1 year of his outstanding  



suspended sentence.  



                                               - 2 -                                           2788  


----------------------- Page 3-----------------------

        Background facts and proceedings  



                 In 2008, Summerall and his co-defendant assaulted Darrell Cavaness, who  



later  died  from  the  injuries  he  sustained.  Following  a  jury  trial,  Summerall  was  



                                                                                          2 

convicted of first-degree assault but acquitted of second-degree murder.  The evidence  



                                                                                     3 

indicated that Summerall was intoxicated when the assault occurred.    



                 In 2010, the superior court sentenced Summerall to 20 years with 9 years  



suspended (11 years to serve) and a 5-year term of probation.  Summerall was thirty- 



one  years  old  at  the  time  of  sentencing  and  had  previously  been  convicted  of  nine  



misdemeanors, many of which involved alcohol or controlled substances.  The court  



accordingly  imposed  several  special  probation  conditions  to  address  Summerall's  



substance use.   



                 Special Condition No. 2 ordered that Summerall obtain a substance abuse  



evaluation within  60  days from his release from prison  and  "make the results of the  



evaluation       available     to    the    Probation/Parole        Officer."      Special      Condition  



No. 3 authorized his probation officer to order Summerall to spend up to 6 months in a  



"residential treatment program":   



                 [Special  Condition  No.  3:]  The  defendant  shall  actively  

                 participate   in   and   successfully   complete   an   approved  

                 substance abuse program if recommended by the evaluation,  

                 which may include a residential treatment program of up to  

                 six  (6)  months,  at  the  direction  of  the  Probation/Parole  

                 Officer.   The   defendant   shall   not   discontinue   treatment  

                 without  the  prior  written  approval  of  his  Probation/Parole  

                 Officer.  



    2   AS 11.41.200(a) and AS 11.41.110(a), respectively.  



    3    Several witnesses testified that Summerall was "highly intoxicated" before and after  



the incident.   



                                                   - 3 -                                                2788  


----------------------- Page 4-----------------------

                 After serving the active portion of his sentence, Summerall was released  



                                                                                                           4 

from  incarceration  and  placed  on  concurrent  parole  and  probation  supervision.   



Between May 2020 and April 2022, the superior court revoked Summerall's probation  



five separate times. The fourth and fifth petitions are relevant to this appeal.  



                 In December  2021, the State filed a fourth petition to revoke probation  



alleging that Summerall consumed  drugs  and that his urinalysis test  was positive for  



methamphetamine  and  marijuana.  Summerall  admitted  this  conduct.  Following  a  



contested disposition, the court revoked Summerall's probation, requiring him to serve  



6 months of his suspended time and extending his probation by  1 year. The court also  



added a condition authorizing  Summerall's probation officer to require  Summerall to  



                                                                                                      5 

spend 6 months at a community residential center (CRC) - i.e., a halfway house.    



                 In April 2022, the State filed a fifth petition alleging that Summerall failed  



to report to his probation officer and failed to submit to drug and alcohol testing as  



           6 

directed.   Summerall  admitted  to  these  allegations,  and  his  case  proceeded  to  a  



contested disposition hearing.  



                 At  this  hearing,  the  State  expressed  concern  about  Summerall's  recent  



substance use given his history of assaulting people while intoxicated (including the  



fatal assault in this case). The State noted that, after the fourth petition was adjudicated,  



the court added a condition that Summerall reside in a CRC, but that Summerall "didn't  



follow through."   



    4   Summerall was initially released and placed on parole and probation supervision in  

December 2016. Between December 2016 and December 2017, Summerall violated his  

parole  six  separate  times  by  consuming  either  controlled  substances  or  alcohol.  On  

December  8,  2017,  the  Parole  Board  revoked  his  parole  and  required  him  to  serve  all  

remaining good time. Summerall was released on probation in March 2020.  



    5   See Summerall v. State, __ P.3d __, 2024 WL 3309436 (Alaska App. July 5, 2024)  



(affirming the disposition of Summerall's fourth petition to revoke probation).  



    6   The petition alleged that Summerall violated General Condition No. 5 and Special  

Condition No. 5.   



                                                   - 4 -                                                2788  


----------------------- Page 5-----------------------

               Probation  Officer Ian Petershoare next addressed the court. Petershoare  



explained  that  despite  Summerall's  poor  history  on  supervised  release,  Petershoare  



believed that Summerall could succeed this time if he received treatment for substance  



use.  Petershoare  also  corrected  the  State's  remark  that  Summerall  "didn't  follow  



through" with residing in a CRC, noting that because the CRC did not previously have  



bed space for him, Summerall was "release[d] . . . to the street." Petershoare requested  



that the court again order Summerall to reside in a CRC, and assured the court that the  



CRC would have bed space for Summerall.   



               The defense attorney agreed with Petershoare that release to a  CRC was  



advisable; accordingly, the  attorney  requested  a  time-served  sentence and asked the  



court   to   "structure   a   judgment   that   would   allow   a   bed-to-bed   transfer   [from  



incarceration directly into  a  CRC]." Additionally, the defense attorney requested that  



the court order  Summerall to perform  community service  and that Summerall receive  



"an updated drug assessment in order to get into inpatient treatment if that's what's  



recommended."   



               The superior court revoked Summerall's probation, imposed 14 months of  



suspended  time,  and returned Summerall  to probation under  modified  conditions  of  



probation. The conditions included:  



               Defendant to get a new substance use assessment. Defendant  

               to  follow  all  treatment  recommendations  including  up  to  

               1 year of in-patient treatment, and sign all necessary ROIs.  

               Defendant to spend up to 6 months at CRC.   



In its sentencing remarks, the court explained that it had been inclined to "pull the plug"  



on  Summerall's probation altogether, but that because various stakeholders believed  



that returning Summerall to probation would be beneficial,  it would not  "stand in the  



way of that."   



               This appeal followed.  



                                              - 5 -                                           2788  


----------------------- Page 6-----------------------

         Why  the superior  court  did  not  violate  the  prohibition  against  double  

        jeopardy when it modified Summerall's probation    



                 Summerall argues that the superior court's disposition order resolving the  



fifth  petition  to  revoke  his  probation  violated  the  constitutional  prohibition  against  



double  jeopardy.  According  to  Summerall,  the  court  impermissibly  increased  his  



punishment  beyond  what  was  ordered  by  the  original  judgment  when  it  added  the  



condition that he obtain a new substance abuse evaluation and "follow all treatment  



recommendations including up to 1 year of in-patient treatment."  As support for his  



position, Summerall relies on this Court's decision in Dodge v. Anchorage , holding that  



"[c]ustodial confinement in a residential alcohol treatment program is the functional  



                                                                                                      7 

equivalent  of  jail  time  and  therefore  constitutes  a  sentence  of  imprisonment."   He  



asserts that the new condition requiring up to  1 year of in-patient treatment imposes a  



more severe punishment than the original sentence (but he concedes that, if he has not  



yet  participated  in  residential  treatment,  he  may  still  be  required  to  participate  in  



residential treatment of up to 6 months as ordered in his original judgment) .   



                 The State disputes Summerall's assertion that the new probation condition  



increased his overall punishment. The State notes that  Summerall had over 7 years of  



outstanding suspended time when the condition authorizing "up to 1 year of in-patient  



treatment"  was  ordered.  The  State  also  notes  that  when  a  court  modifies  probation  



conditions to the defendant's detriment, the modification does not necessarily violate  



double jeopardy. The State posits that the contested probation condition in this case did  



not "increase" Summerall's sentence, but  instead merely  imposed up to  1 year of his  



outstanding suspended time and required  Summerall to  serve that time in an inpatient  



                        8 

treatment program.    



    7   Dodge v. Anchorage , 877 P.2d 270, 272 (Alaska App. 1994).  



    8   The State also argues that  Summerall may not raise his double jeopardy claim on  

appeal under principles of waiver and invited error.  The State identifies that before the  

court entered its disposition order  on Summerall's fifth petition to revoke probation, his  



                                                   - 6 -                                                2788  


----------------------- Page 7-----------------------

                 Courts have broad discretion to place defendants on probation and to order  



                                                       9 

that they abide by  conditions  of probation,   as long as the  conditions are "reasonably  



related to at least one of the[] constitutional principles" of criminal administration set  

out  in  Article  I,  Section  12  of  the  Alaska  Constitution.10  Courts  also  have  broad  



discretion  to  "revoke  or  modify  any  condition  of  probation,  change  the  period  of  

probation,  or  terminate  probation  and  discharge  the  defendant  from  probation." 11  



However, there are circumstances under which the court's discretion over probation is  



circumscribed by the double jeopardy clause.   



                 The  Alaska  Constitution  provides  that  "[n]o  person  shall  be  put  in  

jeopardy twice for the same offense." 12 The double jeopardy clause protects defendants  



from  receiving  multiple  punishments  for  the  same  offense.  As  the  Alaska  Supreme  



Court has explained, "once a sentence has been meaningfully imposed, it may not, at a  

later time, be increased."13 Thus, courts are forbidden from "imposing a new sentence  



defense attorney requested "an updated drug assessment in order to get  [Summerall] into  

inpatient  treatment  if  that's  what's  recommended."  In  Johnson  v.  State ,  the  Alaska  

Supreme Court explained that, while double jeopardy claims ordinarily may be raised for  

the  first  time  on  appeal,  a  defendant  may  waive  such  a  claim  if  they  knowingly  and  

willingly relinquish their right to double jeopardy protection. Johnson v. State , 328 P.3d  

77, 82-85, 82 n.20 (Alaska 2014). Under this principle, we question whether Summerall  

waived  his  double  jeopardy  claim.  However,  we  decline  to  reach  this  procedural  issue  

because we agree that Summerall's double jeopardy claim fails on the merits.  



     9   AS 12.55.090-.100.  



     10  State v. Ranstead, 421 P.3d 15, 19-20 (Alaska 2018).  



     11   AS 12.55.090(b); Reyes v. State, 978 P.2d 635, 639 (Alaska App. 1999) (explaining  



that "the legislature intended probation to be modifiable").  



     12   Alaska Const. art. I, § 9. See also U.S. Const. amend. V (" [N]or shall any person be 



subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.").  



     13  Sonnier v. State, 483 P.2d 1003, 1005 (Alaska 1971); see also Reyes, 978 P.2d at  



637-38. 



                                                    - 7 -                                                2788  


----------------------- Page 8-----------------------

more severe than the one the defendant originally received." 14 In other words, when a  



trial court exercises its discretion to modify a defendant's probation, it may not impose  



a condition that causes the defendant's sentence to be more severe than the sentence the  



court originally imposed without violating principles of double jeopardy.   



                We   have   applied   this   principle   in   previous   cases,   holding   that   a  



modification  to  a  defendant's  probation  violates  double  jeopardy  if  the  modified  

condition   increases   a   defendant's   overall   jail   time,15   increases   the   defendant's  



restitution  or  fine,16  or  if  the  modified  condition  is  not  authorized  by  Alaska's  



sentencing statutes.17   



                For example, in Dodge v. Anchorage , we held that the trial court violated  

double jeopardy by imposing  the challenged  probation  condition.18  Dodge  had been  



convicted of  driving while  intoxicated  and  sentenced to a term of  1 year flat.19  The  



district  court  later  amended  Dodge's  judgment,  imposing  a  probation  condition  



requiring him to  spend up to  90  days in a residential alcohol treatment program  (in  

addition to serving the  1 year in prison).20 Dodge appealed, arguing that the probation  



condition violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy by increasing  

his sentence.21  This  Court  agreed, holding that because "confinement in a residential  



    14  Reyes, 978 P.2d at 637-38; see also Sonnier, 483 P.2d at  1005.  



    15  See Dodge v. Anchorage , 877 P.2d 270, 272 (Alaska App. 1994).  



    16  See Reyes, 978 P.2d at 641.  



    17  Galindo v. State, 481 P.3d 686, 690 (Alaska App. 2021).  



    18  Dodge, 877 P.2d at 272.  



    19  Id. at 271.  



    20  Id. at 271-72.  



    21  Id. at 272.  



                                                - 8 -                                            2788  


----------------------- Page 9-----------------------

alcohol  treatment  program  is  the  functional  equivalent  of  jail  time,"  the  trial  court  



unconstitutionally  increased  Dodge's  total jail  time  (or  equivalent)   from  1  year,  to  

 1 year and 90 days.22   



                 In the present matter, Summerall argues that the trial court violated double  



jeopardy by  imposing an additional probation  condition requiring him to  spend up to  



 1 year in an inpatient treatment program. Citing Dodge , Summerall argues that because  



inpatient treatment is akin to jail time, the court violated the double jeopardy  clause  



when  it  added  this  requirement  because  it  exceeded  the  6  months  of  residential  



treatment originally authorized.  



                 Summerall  is  mistaken.  As  the  State  points  out,  when  Summerall  was  



sentenced on his fifth petition to revoke probation, he had over 7 years of suspended  



time remaining on his sentence. Accordingly, when the court revoked his probation, it  



could have ordered Summerall to spend all of his remaining suspended time in prison  



without violating double jeopardy. Instead, the court sentenced Summerall to 14 months  



to serve  in the custody of the Department of Corrections,  an additional  6 months  to  



serve in a CRC, i.e. a halfway house, and up to 1 additional year of in-patient treatment.  



In other words, the court ordered Summerall confined to jail or the functional equivalent  



of  jail  for  up  to  2 years  and 8 months  -  i.e., just  over  one-third of  the  7  years of  



suspended time remaining on his sentence.   



                 This disposition did not violate Summerall's double jeopardy rights. It is  



established law that courts may modify probation or impose suspended time in a manner  



that is detrimental to the defendant without violating the double jeopardy clause as long  

as the defendant's sentence is not increased.23 Unlike in Dodge, where the court's action  



increased the original sentence from 1 year to 1 year and 90 days, in Summerall's case,  



    22  Id.  



    23  See Reyes v. State, 978 P.2d 635, 639-40 (Alaska App. 1999).  



                                                   - 9 -                                               2788  


----------------------- Page 10-----------------------

the total jail time imposed (up to 2 years and 8 months) was less than the time remaining  

on Summerall's original sentence (over 7 years).24   



              For these reasons, we reject Summerall's double jeopardy claim.  



       Conclusion  



              We AFFIRM the judgment of the superior court.  



   24  Dodge, 877 P.2d at 272.  



                                          - 10 -                                      2788  

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