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David Middleton II v. State of Alaska (8/2/2024) ap-2787

David Middleton II v. State of Alaska (8/2/2024) ap-2787

                                               NOTICE  

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              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA  



DAVID MIDDLETON II,  

                                                              Court of Appeals No. A-13173  

                                Appellant,                  Trial Court No. 3AN-17-09317 CI  



                        v.  

                                                                       O P I N I O N  

STATE OF ALASKA,  



                                Appellee.                      No. 2787 - August 2, 2024  



                Appeal  from  the   Superior  Court,   Third  Judicial  District,  

                Anchorage, Michael D. Corey and Dani Crosby, Judges.  



                Appearances: Laurence Blakely (opening brief) and Rachel E.  

                Cella   (supplemental      and   reply   briefs),  Assistant    Public  

                Defenders,      and    Samantha       Cherot,    Public     Defender,  

                Anchorage,  for  the  Appellant.  Anna  L.  Marquez,  Assistant  

                Attorney  General,  Anchorage, and Treg  R. Taylor, Attorney  

                General, Juneau, for the Appellee.  



                Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Harbison and Terrell, Judges.  



                Judge TERRELL.  



                David  Middleton  II  appeals  the  denial  of  his  application  for  post- 



conviction  relief,  arguing  that  the  Department  of  Corrections  (DOC)  unlawfully  



extended his maximum release date -  i.e., the date by which defendants must have  



served all of their active term of imprisonment through a combination of incarceration  


----------------------- Page 2-----------------------

                             1 

and parole supervision.  More specifically, Middleton argues that the 2016 amendment  



                                                  2 

to AS 33.16.220(i) applied retroactively,  rendering DOC's 2015 action, which resulted  



in an extension of his maximum release date, unlawful. For the reasons explained here,  



we reject this retroactivity claim and affirm the judgment of the superior court.   



        Relevant background  



                 In 2006, Middleton was sentenced in  two  separate cases  to  a composite  



term of 4,750 days to serve. In accordance with the applicable statutes, DOC calculated  



Middleton's  mandatory  parole  release  date  as  March  23,  2013,  and  his  maximum  



release date as July 23, 2017.  



                 In 2013, Middleton was released on parole. After his initial release, he was  



repeatedly brought back into custody for various parole violations. He also committed  



a new criminal offense for which he received a 1-year sentence in September 2015.   



                 In December 2015, the Alaska Parole Board revoked Middleton's parole  



and imposed a parole revocation sentence of 1,583 days (i.e., one-third of Middleton's  



original  composite  sentence).  DOC  then  conducted  its  time-accounting  analysis,  



combining  this sentence with Middleton's 1-year sentence for the new offense and a  



60-day  sentence  he  received  for  a  probation  violation  (concurrent  to  the  parole  



revocation sentence), yielding a composite sentence of  1,948 days. In accordance with  



the  applicable  statutes,  DOC  recalculated  Middleton's  mandatory  parole  date  as  



March 20, 2018 and his maximum release date as December 29, 2019.  



                 In July 2016, the Alaska legislature  enacted Senate Bill 91, which  inter  



alia, amended AS 33.16.220(i), the provision authorizing the parole board to revoke all  



or a portion of a defendant's remaining parole. This amendment stated that the parole  



    1   Roller v. State, 539 P.3d 518, 522-23 (Alaska App. 2023).  



    2   SLA  2016,  ch.  36,  §  148.  In  2019,  the  legislature  repealed  this  provision.  See  



FSSLA 2019, ch. 4, §  115.  



                                                   - 2 -                                               2787  


----------------------- Page 3-----------------------

board  could  not  "extend  the  period  of  parole  beyond  the  maximum  release  date  



                                                                     3 

calculated by [DOC] on the parolee's original sentence."    



                In September 2017, the  parole board  revoked Middleton's parole  again  



and imposed a parole revocation sentence of 711 days. DOC subsequently recalculated  



Middleton's mandatory parole date as June 13, 2019, but determined that Middleton's  



                                                                             4 

maximum release date of December 29, 2019 had not changed.   



                Following  this  September  2017  disposition,  Middleton  was  under  the  



mistaken   impression   that   DOC   had   recalculated   his   maximum   release   date   to  



December 29, 2019 when it conducted its 2017 time-accounting analysis. Based on this  



mistaken impression, Middleton filed an application for post-conviction relief, arguing  



that the parole board 's 2017 action violated the 2016  amendment to AS 33.16.220(i).  



The State opposed but did not correct Middleton's mistaken impression about when the  



change to his maximum release date occurred. The superior court conducted a statutory  



interpretation analysis of AS 33.16.220(i), rejected Middleton's claim, and denied his  



post-conviction relief application. Middleton then appealed.   



                While Middleton's appeal was pending, the State realized that DOC had  



recalculated Middleton's maximum release date in December 2015 -  i.e., before the  



2016 amendment to AS 33.16.220(i) was enacted and took effect. Middleton's case was  



then remanded to the superior court so that the parties could litigate whether the 2016  



amendment had an impact on the parole board 's December 2015 action.  



                On     remand,      Middleton      argued     that    the    2016     amendment        to  



AS 33.16.220(i) was retroactive and that the December 2015 revocation of Middleton's  



    3   SLA  2016,  ch.  36,  §  148.  In  2019,  the  legislature  repealed  this  provision.  See  



FSSLA 2019, ch. 4, §  115.  



    4   The  notice  accompanying  the  parole  board's  revocation  decision  stated  that  



Middleton would not have parole supervision following his release from prison unless he  

was released prior to December 29, 2019, in which case he would remain on parole until  

that date.  



                                                  - 3 -                                              2787  


----------------------- Page 4-----------------------

parole,  which  resulted  in  an  extension  of  his  maximum  release  date,  was  therefore  



invalid.  The  superior  court  rejected  this  claim,  ruling  that  the  2016  amendment  to  



AS 33.16.220(i)  was  not  retroactive  and  therefore  did  not  affect  the  validity  of  the  



parole  board  action  that  extended  Middleton's  maximum  release  date.  The  court  



dismissed Middleton's post-conviction relief application for the second time.  



                 This appeal followed.  



         Why we reject Middleton's retroactivity claim  



                 On appeal, Middleton recognizes that when the parole board revoked his  



parole  in  December  2015  and  DOC  recalculated  his  maximum  release  date  to  



December 29, 2019, these actions were legal. But he argues that the 2016 amendment  



to AS 33.16.220(i) was retroactive, and that the December 2015 action was invalidated  



by the enactment of this amendment.   



                 Middleton bases his retroactivity claim on the language in the enacting  



session law's applicability clause, which stated that the amended provision applied "to  



                                                                               5 

parole   granted   before,   on,   or   after   [its]   effective   date."    Middleton   relies   on  



Stoneking v. State for the proposition that use of the language "before, on, or after" in  



an applicability clause automatically leads to the conclusion that the statute is fully  



              6 

retroactive.  Middleton is in error.  



                 Stoneking  dealt  with a  1995  legislative  amendment  to  AS  12.55.088,  a  



statute  providing  for  post-judgment  modification  of  criminal  sentences.  The  1995  



                                                                                                      7 

amendment  changed  the  way  defendants  may  obtain  sentence  modifications.   The  



amendment's  applicability  clause  provided  that  it  applied  to  "offenses  committed  



    5    SLA 2016, ch. 36, §  185(p)(7).   



    6   Stoneking v. State, 39 P.3d 522, 523 (Alaska App. 2002).  



    7    SLA 1995, ch. 79, §§ 6, 30.  



                                                    - 4 -                                                2787  


----------------------- Page 5-----------------------

                                                                   8 

before, on, or after" its July 1, 1995,  effective date.   We interpreted this  language as  



                                                                                9 

making  the  statutory  change  in  Stoneking  fully  retroactive.   But  our  decision  in  



Stoneking did not go so far as to hold that every time "before, on, or after" language is  



used,  the  affected  statute  is  fully  retroactive.  That  is  an  over-simplification  of  our  



decision in Stoneking.   



                 As a general matter, in evaluating whether and to what extent a statute is  

retroactive,  we  begin  with  the  presumption  against  retroactive  legislation .10  This  



presumption  is  "deeply  rooted  in  our  jurisprudence,  and  embodies  a  legal  doctrine  

centuries older than our Republic."11  The  presumption is  reflected  in AS 01.10.090,  



which  states:  "No  statute  is  retrospective  unless  expressly  declared  therein."  But  



AS 01.10.090's express declaration requirement is tempered by a companion statute,  



AS 01.10.020,  which  provides  that  "[t]he  provisions  of  AS . . . 01.10.090  shall  be  



observed in the construction of the laws of the state unless the construction would be  



inconsistent  with  the  manifest  intent  of  the  legislature."  Accordingly,  the  Alaska  



Supreme Court has recognized that despite AS 01.10.090, an express declaration is not  



necessary to overcome the presumption against retroactivity when either the legislative  



history or the necessary operation of a statute demonstrate that the legislature intended  

for the statute to apply retroactively.12  



    8    SLA 1995, ch. 79, § 41.  



    9   Stoneking, 39 P.3d at 523.  



    10  See State v. Doe A, 297 P.3d 885, 888-89 (Alaska 2013).  



    11  Id. at 889 (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994)).  



    12  See, e.g., Louie v. BP Exploration (Alaska), Inc. , 327 P.3d 204, 207 (Alaska 2014)  



(examining  whether there was any "indication that the legislation was intended to have  

retroactive  application  in  either  the  statutory   language  or  the  legislative  history");  

Caspersen v. Alaska Workers '  Comp. Bd., 786 P.2d 914, 915 (Alaska 1990) (holding that  

"[n]either the express terms of AS 23.30.225, nor necessary implication, require that the  

statute be given a retrospective  effect"); State, Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd.  v. Odom  



                                                    - 5 -                                                2787  


----------------------- Page 6-----------------------

               Here, the legislative history strongly suggests that the legislature did not  



intend the 2016 amendment to AS 33.16.220(i) to be retroactive. In 2017, the legislature  



enacted legislation  clarifying  that the statutory change was not retroactive. The new  



legislation stated, in relevant part, "Nothing in the provisions of AS 33.16.220(i) may  



be  construed  as  invalidating  a  decision  of  the  Board  of  Parole,  issued  before  



January  1, 2017, that extended the period of supervision beyond the maximum release  

date on the original sentence."13   



               However,  although  a  subsequent  legislature's  declaration  of  a  prior  



legislature's intent is "a factor that the  courts should consider when determining the  

meaning and effect of the pre-existing statute," it is not dispositive.14 We therefore turn  



to the 2016 statutory language to determine if there is anything in that language that  



suggests that the legislature intended the statutory amendment to be retroactive.   



               In 2016, AS 33.16.220(i) was amended to read :  



               If, after the final revocation hearing, the board finds that the  

               parolee  has  violated  a  condition  of  parole  imposed  under  

               AS 33.16.150(a), (b), or (f), or a law or ordinance, the board  

               may revoke all or a portion of the remaining period of parole  

               subject to the limits set out in AS 33.16.215, or change any  

               condition of parole. . . . The board may not extend the period  

               of parole beyond the maximum release date calculated by the  

               department on the parolee's original sentence plus any time  

               that has been tolled as described in this section.[15]  



Corp.,  671  P.2d  375,  377  n.4  (Alaska  1983)  (noting  that  AS 01.10.020  modifies  

AS 01.10.090's express declaration requirement).  



    13  SLA 2017, ch. 13, § 30.  



    14 Mosquito  v.  State ,  504  P.3d  918,  922  (Alaska  App.  2022)  (quotation  marks  and  



citation omitted).  



    15   SLA 2016, ch. 36, §  148.  



                                              - 6 -                                         2787  


----------------------- Page 7-----------------------

               Notably,  the  first  sentence  of  the  statutory  provision  is  phrased  in  the  



conditional, present tense ("If, . . . the board may"), and the last sentence is phrased as  



a mandatory, present-tense command or prohibition ("The board may not . . ."). Courts  



have recognized that clear language is needed to overcome the presumption against  



retroactivity, and that language phrased in the present tense is generally insufficient to  

do so.16  Indeed, courts have recognized that a statute's use of the present tense is a  



strong indicator of its prospective   orientation.17 As one court has noted, "If anything,  



use of the present tense implies an intent that the statute apply to the present, as of its  

effective date, and continuing forward."18  



                Certainly,   it   would   have   been   possible   for   the   legislature   to   use  



prospectively oriented language in a manner that would affect the continued service of  



parole-revocation sentences imposed prior to AS 33.16.220(i)'s amendment. Examples  

of this can be seen in the case law from other jurisdictions.19 But the legislature instead  



used language directed only at the act of extending parole supervision after the statute's  



effective date. And the legislature did not attempt to retroactively vacate parole board  



adjudicative decisions that were rendered prior to the statute's effective date.   



               Moreover,  the  supreme  court  has  recognized  that,  as  a  general  matter,  



statutes  should  be  construed  in  a  way  that  does  not  upset  settled  expectations  and  



    16  See Waddoups v. Noorda, 321 P.3d 1108, 1112 (Utah 2013).  



    17  See  Carr  v.  United  States,  560  U.S.  438,  447-49  (2010);  State  v.  McClendon,  



935 P.2d 1334, 1339 (Wash. 1997).  



    18   Waddoups, 321 P.3d at 1112.  



    19  E.g.,  People  ex  rel.  Griffin  v.  Baxter ,  173  N.Y.S.3d  87,  90  (App.  Div.  2022)  



(discussing  statute  providing  for  recalculation  of  earned  time  credits  for  "all  persons  

serving a sentence subject to community supervision at the time this legislation becomes  

law retroactive to the initial date such person began his or her earliest period of community  

supervision").  



                                               - 7 -                                            2787  


----------------------- Page 8-----------------------

retroactively  change  legal  statuses.20  Many  prohibitions  and  punishments  turn  on  a  



person's status as a parolee, and if we interpret AS 33.16.220(i) as Middleton proposes,  



it would have the effect of retroactively invalidating many criminal, civil, and agency  



actions that were predicated on  a person's status as a parolee. The 2016 legislature's  



silence  in  Senate  Bill  91  as  to  whether  AS 33.16.220(i)  was  meant  to  retroactively  



invalidate parole board  decisions supports  that it was not meant to be applied in that  



fashion.  



                Finally,  grouping  the  2016  amendments  to  AS 33.16.220(i)  with  an  



applicability clause that applies to "parole granted before, on, or after" the statute's  



effective date ensures that parolees are not excluded from the statute's coverage simply  



because they were placed on parole before the statute's effective date . In other words,  



it ensures that all persons who are on parole after the statute's effective date enjoy the  



benefits of its protections. And as noted previously, the use of the phrase "before, on,  



or  after"  in  an  applicability  clause  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  a  statute  is  fully  



retroactive   -   i.e.,   it   does   not   invariably   constitute   an   express   declaration   of  

retroactivity within the meaning of AS 01.10.090, and it does not do so in this case.21   



                Taking all of the above-noted considerations into account, we conclude  



that the 2016 amendment to AS 33.16.220(i) was not fully retroactive  (i.e., it  did not  



invalidate    extensions     of   parole   supervision     ordered    before    the   amendment's  



    20  See, e.g., Doe v. State, Dept. of Pub. Safety, 92 P.3d 398, 409 (Alaska 2004).  



    21  A better example of an express declaration of retroactivity can be seen in Pfeifer v.  



State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Pub. Assistance, 260 P.3d 1072, 1080, 1080  

n.32 (Alaska 2011) (citing the applicability clause stating that the  statutory provision "is  

retroactive  to  October  1,  2006").  But  in  order  to  constitute  an  express  declaration  of  

retroactivity  within  the  meaning  of  AS 01.10.090,  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  terms  

retroactive  or  retrospective  be  used;  the  requisite  clarity  can  be  achieved  with  other  

language. But it is unnecessary for us here to limn out the dividing line between an express  

declaration under AS 01.10.090 versus discerning retroactivity from a statute's history or  

operation pursuant to AS 01.10.020.  



                                                - 8 -                                             2787  


----------------------- Page 9-----------------------

January  1, 2017 effective date). We therefore agree with the superior court that DOC's  



extension of Middleton's maximum release date in December 2015 was not invalidated  



by the 2016 statutory changes to AS 33.16.220(i). Therefore, the superior court did not  

err when it dismissed Middleton's post-conviction relief application.22   



        Conclusion  



               The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.  



    22   Middleton raises two substantive  claims  on appeal regarding the interpretation of  



the 2016 amendment to AS 33.16.220(i). First, he claims that this amendment prevented  

the parole board from requiring him to serve any portion of his remaining good-time credits  

as  a  parole  revocation  sentence  that  would  result  in  incarceration  after  his  original  

maximum release date. Second, he claims that even if the parole board could revoke his  

parole and cause him to be incarcerated after his original maximum release date, that this  

would still violate AS 33.16.220(i) because DOC would award him good-time credits on  

the parole revocation sentence, resulting in an additional period of parole supervision after  

his original maximum release date. In light of our holding that the 2016 amendment is not  

retroactive, these claims are moot. Furthermore, these claims are foreclosed by this Court's  

recent opinion in Roller v. State, 539 P.3d 518, 527-28 & n.41 (Alaska App. 2023).  



        We  also  note  that  it  is  not  clear  whether  Middleton  continues  to  challenge  the  

September 2017 revocation on appeal. On remand, the superior court found that any issues  

with respect to the 2017 revocation were moot because the 711-day parole revocation only  

extended     Middleton's     incarceration     until   June    13,   2019,    well    within    the  

December 29, 2019, maximum release date calculated by DOC after the December 2015  

parole revocation action. We agree with this conclusion.  



                                               - 9 -                                           2787  

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