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I.J., a minor v. State of Alaska (7/19/2024) ap-2785

I.J., a minor v. State of Alaska (7/19/2024) ap-2785

                                                           NOTICE  

          The text of this opinion can be corrected before the opinion is published in the  

          Pacific Reporter. Readers are encouraged to bring typographical or other formal  

          errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts:  

            

                                       303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501  

                                                    Fax: (907) 264-0878  

                                          E-mail: corrections@akcourts.gov  

                                                                    

                                                                    

                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA  

  

  

I.J., a minor,                                                           

                                                                               Court of Appeals No. A-14275  

                                        Appellant,                         Trial Court No. 3AN-20-00125 DL  

                                                                         

  

                              v.                                         

                                                                                           O P I N I O N  

STATE OF ALASKA,                                                         

  

                                                                         

                                        Appellee.                                 No. 2785 - July 19, 2024  

  

                                                                         

  

                    Appeal  from  the   Superior  Court,  Third   Judicial  District,  

                    Anchorage, Kevin M. Saxby, Judge.  

                      

                    Appearances:   Michael  L.   Barber,  Barber   Legal  Services,  

                    Boston,  Massachusetts,  under  contract  with  the  Office  of  

                    Public  Advocacy,  Anchorage,  for  the  Appellant.  Eric  A.  

                    Ringsmuth,  Assistant  Attorney  General,  Office  of  Criminal  

                    Appeals,  Anchorage,  and  Treg  R.  Taylor,  Attorney  General,  

                    Juneau, for the Appellee. Paul F. McDermott, Assistant Public  

                    Advocate,  and  James  Stinson,  Public  Advocate,  Anchorage,  

                    for guardian ad litem.   

                      

                    Before:  Allard,  Chief  Judge,  and  Wollenberg  and  Terrell,  

                    Judges.  

                      

                    Judge ALLARD.  

   


----------------------- Page 2-----------------------

                  I.J. was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for fourth-degree assault after  

he hit another juvenile with a skateboard. 1  During the pendency of his case,  I.J. was  



placed in multiple foster care placements and various residential treatment programs.  



I.J. repeatedly ran away from his placements and was  also  discovered to have used  



drugs.  Adjudication  was  held  in  abeyance  while  the  parties  struggled  to  find  a  



placement from which I.J. would not abscond. After more than nine failed placements  



and  I.J.'s  admissions to  nine  conduct violations, the superior court concluded that a  



disposition  order  under  AS  47.12.120(b)(1)  -   i.e.,  an  order  that  allowed  the  



Department  of  Family  and  Community  Services  to  place  I.J.  at  McLaughlin  Youth  



Center - was the least restrictive alternative available to I.J.   



                  For the reasons explained here, we affirm this order.   



                    



         Relevant facts   



                  In September 2020, thirteen-year-old I.J. was in the custody of the Office  



of  Children's  Services  and  had  been  placed  in  an  emergency  foster  home.  I.J.  and  



another juvenile at the foster home threw eggs at a neighbor's home. After the other  



juvenile admitted what they had done, the two boys got into an altercation , and I.J. hit  



the other juvenile with a skateboard, causing a black eye. When the police were called,  



I.J.  ran  away  to  his  great-grandmother's  house.  I.J.  was  later  charged  in  a juvenile  



delinquency petition with fourth-degree assault.  



                  I.J. was placed at a new foster home, but he ran away from the home and  



was missing for a week. I.J. was subsequently placed at the Covenant House (a shelter  



for youth) and was then held in temporary detention at the McLaughlin Youth Facility.  



I.J. signed a conduct agreement, agreeing to stay at his next placement, obey curfew,  



and "not ingest illegal drugs or alcohol."   



                                     

     1   AS 11.41.230(a)(2).  



                                                      - 2 -                                                  2785  


----------------------- Page 3-----------------------

                 In February 2021, I.J. was released to his great-grandmother and then, in  



April 2021, transferred to a foster home. However, I.J. ran away from the foster home  



less  than  a  month  later.  Because  I.J.'s  act  of  running  away  was  in  violation  of  his  



conduct agreement, the Division of Juvenile Justice filed a petition to modify or revoke  



                              2 

the conduct agreement.    



                 After a brief stay at McLaughlin, I.J. was returned to the foster home and  



was initially reported as doing "fairly well" and being "engaged in services at Denali  



Family Services." However, a week after this good report, I.J. ran away from the foster  



home. The Division filed a second petition to modify or revoke the conduct agreement  



while I.J. was still missing. I.J. was subsequently found sleeping in the back of a car  



with another runaway minor. I.J. was then temporarily detained at McLaughlin as a  



flight risk.   



                 At an August 2021 detention hearing, I.J. was reported to be "doing well  



in detention" as his team (I.J.'s juvenile probation officer, I.J.'s guardian ad litem, and  



I.J.'s attorney) struggled to find him a placement from which he would not run away.  



I.J.'s guardian ad litem stated that I.J. was "in dire need" of mental health services. I.J.  



was detained at McLaughlin for just over seven weeks, and wa s then temporarily placed  



in a foster home before moving to the Pathway Home, a residential treatment program,  



at the end of September.   



                 The parties then reached a plea agreement, whereby I.J. admitted to the  



fourth-degree  assault  and  the  two  prior  conduct  violations  for  running  away  from  



placements. I.J.'s adjudication was held in abeyance pending his successful completion  



of treatment at the Pathway Home. I.J.'s juvenile probation officer's plan was to dismiss  



the charges once I.J. stabilized and progressed in treatment. I.J. signed a new conduct  



agreement, agreeing to stay at the Pathway Home, not take "illegal drugs or alcohol,"  



                                    

    2    The  Division  of  Juvenile  Justice  is  a  division  of  the  Department  of  Family  and  



Community Services.  



                                                     - 3 -                                                 2785  


----------------------- Page 4-----------------------

and  "participate  in  and  successfully  complete  residential  treatment  at  The  Pathway  



Home."   



               In February 2022, I.J. ran away from the Pathway Home, approximately  



five months into his stay. A third petition to modify or revoke the conduct agreement  



was  filed.  After  being  detained  by  the  police  days  after  running  away,  I.J.  was  



temporarily returned to McLaughlin.  



               I.J. was subsequently placed in a new foster home, and seemed to be doing  



well. But in July 2022, approximately four months later, I.J. ran away from the foster  



home and a fourth petition to modify or revoke the conduct agreement was filed. I.J.  



was missing for almost a month. He was seen running from the police and a juvenile  



probation officer. He was later arrested by the police who had to chase him to arrest  



him. The Division filed a petition to modify or revoke the conduct agreement based on  



I.J.'s  running  from  the  police  and  his  alleged  resisting  arrest.  (The  resisting  arrest  



conduct violation was later dismissed.)   



               I.J.  was  held  in  temporary  detention  at  McLaughlin  while  his  team  



searched for alternative placements. The probation officer and guardian ad litem told  



the  court  that  they  were  trying  to  get  I.J.  into  Raven 's  Way,  a  wilderness  outdoor  



program that I.J. was excited about.   



               I.J. was later released to the Raven's Way program  in Sitka, which he  



successfully completed without running away.   



               After completing Raven 's Way, I.J. was returned to a foster home, where  



he  received  services  through  the  outpatient  program  of  Volunteers  of  America.  I.J.  



struggled in the outpatient program, and Volunteers of America recommended a higher  



level  of  treatment  through  its  residential  substance  abuse  program,  Adolescent  



Residential Center for Help (ARCH).   



               In  accordance  with  this  recommendation,  I.J.  was  placed  at  ARCH.  



However, he ran away less than a month later. When he was found a few days later, he  



                                               - 4 -                                           2785  


----------------------- Page 5-----------------------

tested positive for marijuana. The Division filed a new petition to modify or revoke the  



conduct agreement based on I.J.'s running away and his drug use.   



               I.J. was temporarily detained at McLaughlin pending his next placement.  



He received overall positive reports during his time at McLaughlin.  



               In March 2023, I.J. was placed at the Charlie Elder House, a group home  



that also helps teach independent living skills. I.J. signed a new conduct agreement,  



agreeing to stay at the  Charlie Elder House, not take  "illegal drugs or alcohol,"  and  



"participate in and successfully complete the Charlie Elder House program."   



               A few days after arriving at the Charlie Elder House, I.J. tested positive  



for benzodiazepines. Less than a month later, I.J. ran away from Charlie Elder House.  



I.J. was missing for three weeks. The police ultimately found I.J. in an apartment with  



other  juveniles,  hiding  in  the  closet.  He  lied  to  the  police  about  his  identity.  The  



Division filed a new petition to modify or revoke the conduct agreement based on I.J.'s  



use of benzodiazepines and his act of absconding.   



               At the detention review hearing on May 8, 2023, a former foster parent of  



I.J., Katie Marrera, called into the hearing. Marrera explained that she knew I.J. before  



he went into care, and that she had been "heavily involved in his life and case since he  



came into care." Marrera said that she had talked to her husband, and he was looking  



into getting re-licensed in order to take placement of I.J. Marrera stated that she wanted  



to get I.J. into "wraparound services" and to ensure that he received appropriate mental  



health evaluations. Marrera stated that I.J. kept repeating the same pattern of going to  



treatment and then running, and he needed to be in a place where he felt safe and loved.   



               The guardian ad litem agreed with much of what Marrera said, although  



the guardian ad litem pointed out that I.J. had received "consistent weekly, if not more,  



therapy  to  address  [his]  trauma"  at  the  Pathway  Home,  Raven's  Way,  and  the  



Volunteers of America programs. The guardian ad litem also pointed out that I.J. had  



received wraparound services at another foster home. The guardian ad litem noted that  



I.J. had run away from each placement where he had been receiving services, and he  



                                               - 5 -                                           2785  


----------------------- Page 6-----------------------

expressed concern that without services, I.J. would be "setting himself up to end back  



[at McLaughlin]."   



               I.J.'s case worker from the Office of Children's Services also expressed  



her concern that the places to which I.J. runs are not always safe, and that children on  



the run are vulnerable. The court decided to temporarily detain I.J. at McLaughlin until  



the foster placement with Marrera was available.   



               Nine  days later, on May 17, 2023, I.J. was placed at the Marrera-Castro  



foster home. Less than a month later, I.J. ran away and was missing for nearly three  



weeks. It was also discovered that,  before running away, I.J. had left the placement  



multiple times but either returned or was found. Marrera later testified that she had, at  



one  point,  found  I.J.  in  a  park,  intoxicated,  with  scratches  all  over  his  body.  The  



Division  filed a petition to revoke or modify the conduct agreement based on I.J.'s  



running away.   



               At  the  arraignment  on  the  conduct  violation,  I.J.'s  juvenile  probation  



officer  indicated  that  he  no  longer  believed  any  less  restrictive  alternatives  besides  



McLaughlin remained for I.J. I.J.'s guardian ad litem agreed, noting that Marrera "went  



really out on a limb to help him." The guardian ad litem pointed out that Marrera had  



put an education plan in place, arranged for a physical examination, scheduled him for  



a neuropsychological evaluation, and did "a lot of leg work in hopes of [I.J.] following  



through with his plan to go the Military Youth Academy." However, I.J. still ran away  



from the home and it was actually "a home he wanted to go to, had connection with."   



               I.J.'s  attorney  asked  that  the  team  continue  to  work  together  to  try  to  



resolve  I.J.'s  charges  and  get  him  into  the  Alaska  Military  Youth  Academy.  The  



probation  officer  said  that  he  would  talk  to  the  Alaska  Military  Youth  Academy  



recruiter. In the interim, I.J. received a favorable report from his time at McLaughlin.   



               At  the  next  detention  hearing,  the  probation  officer  reported  that  the  



Alaska  Military  Youth  Academy  was  unable  to  accept  I.J.  for  the  cycle  starting  in  



July 2023, and explained that the Academy generally did not accept youth with a history  



                                               - 6 -                                          2785  


----------------------- Page 7-----------------------

of elopement. I.J.'s attorney noted that the Alaska Military Youth Academy had told  



her that they do not consider applicants until their charges are resolved.  



                 The parties later entered into a plea agreement, in which I.J. admitted to  



five conduct violations for leaving placements and two conduct violations for drug use.  



(I.J.  had  previously  admitted  to  the  fourth-degree  assault  charge  and  two  conduct  



violations for leaving placements.)  



                 A magistrate judge, acting as a standing master, presided over the change  

of plea and disposition hearing.3 (The magistrate judge had also presided over a number  



of detention hearings with I.J. and was familiar with his case.)   



                 Following I.J.'s adjudication as a delinquent minor, the parties addressed  



disposition. The State argued that the only remaining option was a (b)(1) order under  



AS 47.12.120 - i.e., an order that allowed the Department to place I.J. at McLaughlin  



                  4 

Youth Center.   



                 I.J.'s juvenile  probation officer testified that a (b)(1) order was the only  



available  option  for  I.J.  The  probation  officer  pointed  out  that  various  different  



placements had been tried without success and that the only program  from which I.J.  



had not absconded was Raven's Way because "he had nowhere else to go." According  



to the probation officer, McLaughlin was the only placement that could provide for  



I.J.'s  "safety,  his  education,  his  physical  and  mental  health  needs."  The  probation  



officer  also  noted  that  I.J.  would  get  an  opportunity  to  take  a  neuropsychological  



evaluation while at McLaughlin.   



                 Marrera testified at the change of plea/disposition hearing.  She testified  



that she was working to get I.J. a neuropsychological examination and an evaluation for  



fetal  alcohol  spectrum  disorder.  She  said  that  she  was  willing  to  help  look  for  a  



                                    

    3    See Alaska Delinq. R. 4(a) (authorizing the presiding judge to appoint a standing  



master to adjudicate juvenile delinquency cases).  



    4    See AS 47.12.120(b)(1); see also AS 47.12.990(5).  



                                                     - 7 -                                                 2785  


----------------------- Page 8-----------------------

placement  for  I.J.  through  her  network  of  foster  parents,  and  she  did  not  think  



institutionalizing I.J. would improve the situation.   



               I.J.'s Office of Children's Services case worker testified,  indicating that  



she  had  been  unable  to  find  any  placement  for  I.J.  She  reported  that  the  long-term  



program at Raven 's Way had rejected I.J. because of his history of running away. She  



testified that she did not think that I.J. would do well in a foster home because he runs  



away. She believed that it was in I.J.'s best interests to stop the cycle of placements and  



running away.   



               The guardian ad litem agreed that a (b)(1) order was necessary in I.J.'s  



case.   The    guardian    ad  litem   stated   that   it  was   "vital"   that  I.J.  receive   a  



neuropsychological evaluation, which I.J. could only receive if his team knew where he  



was.  The  guardian  ad  litem  noted  that  I.J.  "does  well  with  support.  He's  done  



phenomenal[ly] in detention the last few months. . . . [U]nfortunately, when he's not in  



a place that has extensive twenty-four-seven support for him, he has done poorly." The  



guardian ad litem did not think that there were any less restrictive alternatives available  



and thought that a (b)(1) order was in I.J.'s best interests "to keep him safe from himself,  



to get the services and support he needs."   



               I.J.'s attorney disagreed that a (b)(1) order was appropriate. The attorney  



pointed out that the case began with a fourth-degree assault and that I.J. had already  



served  more  time  than  an  adult  who  committed  that  same  crime  would  serve.  The  



attorney  argued  that  the  team  had  not  tried  other  solutions  like  ankle  monitoring,  



medications, outdoor-based programs, intensive work programs, or involving his tribal  



community.  However,  the  attorney  did  not  name  any  specific  program  that  was  



available to take I.J. The attorney nevertheless argued that institutionalization was not  



the answer.   



               I.J.  also  addressed  the  court  and  explained  why  he  did  not  want  to  be  



institutionalized.   



                                               - 8 -                                          2785  


----------------------- Page 9-----------------------

                  The  magistrate  judge  ultimately  concluded  that  there  were  no  other  



options remaining other than a (b)(1) order. She found that I.J. had been offered multiple  



opportunities  "to  get  out  of  detention,  to  go  back  to  foster  care,  or  to  go  to  a  less  



restrictive treatment program" but that he had squandered each opportunity. She agreed  



that a neuropsychological evaluation was needed and that one had not been scheduled  



because  I.J.  never  stayed  anywhere  for  long  enough.  She  noted  that  there  was  an  



element of public safety in her decision because the public was put at risk by runaway  



minors who are using drugs and alcohol. She explained that she did not consider I.J. to  



be a violent offender, but she was nevertheless ordering institutionalization because all  



the other options had been tried unsuccessfully. She noted her belief that I.J. would  



                                                                                   5 

succeed at McLaughlin and could potentially be released early.    



                  The assigned superior court judge adopted the recommendation and issued  



a (b)(1) order committing I.J. to the Department's custody for a period "not to exceed  



two years."   



                  This appeal followed.   



                    



         Standard of review   



                  On appeal, the parties appear to disagree as to the appropriate standard of  



review.  The guardian ad litem asserts that we review the superior court's disposition  



under the "substantial evidence" test, citing to the seminal juvenile delinquency case  

B.F.L. v. State,  which clearly uses that standard of review.6  "Under the 'substantial  



evidence'  test,  we must  uphold  the  superior  court's  decision  'if  the  record  contains  



                                     

     5   See AS 47.12.120(b)(1).  



     6   B.F.L. v. State, 233 P.3d 1118, 1124 (Alaska App. 2010).   



                                                      - 9 -                                                   2785  


----------------------- Page 10-----------------------

evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the challenged  



                  7 

conclusion.'"   



                  However, I.J. and the State both cite to an older case, Matter of J.H. , for  



the  proposition  that  whether  the  trial  court's  disposition  is  the  least  restrictive  



                                                                               8 

alternative is "a question of law" that is reviewed de novo.     



                  The apparent confusion over the appropriate standard of review is best  



explained  by  turning  to  Alaska  Supreme  Court  cases  that  use  substantial  evidence  



review  in  other  contexts.  For  example,  in  Espindola  v.  Peter  Pan  Seafoods,  Inc.,  a  



worker's  compensation  case,  the  supreme  court  described  its  substantial  evidence  



review  of  the  Alaska  Worker's  Compensation  Appeals  Commission  decision  as  



follows:   



                  We review de novo the Commission 's legal conclusion that  

                  substantial evidence supports the Board's factual findings by  

                  "independently   reviewing   the   record   and   the   Board's  

                  findings." "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as  

                  a  reasonable  mind  might  accept  as  adequate  to  support  a  

                  conclusion."       "Whether        the    quantum        of   evidence       is  



                                     

    7    Id. (quoting Y.J. v. State, 130 P.3d 954, 957 (Alaska App. 2006)).   



     8   See  Matter  of  J.H.,  758  P.2d  1287,  1291  (Alaska  App.  1988)  ("[T]he  ultimate  



determination of whether a particular disposition constitutes the least restrictive alternative  

is a question of law, and not one of fact."), superseded on other grounds by statute as stated  

in B.F.L., 233 P.3d at 1122-24.   



         We note that J.H.  was issued in 1988, prior to the enactment of AS  47.12.140 in  

1996. See  SLA 1996, ch. 59, § 46. Prior to 1996, relying on common law principles, we  

treated rehabilitation as the "paramount" goal of the juvenile justice system. See, e.g., R.P.  

v. State, 718 P.2d 168, 169 n.1 (Alaska App. 1986), superseded on other grounds by statute  

as stated in B.F.L., 233 P.3d at 1122-24. But when the legislature enacted AS 47.12.140,  

it made clear that "there are two primary goals when choosing the proper disposition in a  

delinquency proceeding: the rehabilitative needs of the juvenile and the protection of the  

community." B.F.L., 233 P.3d at 1124. Thus, as we explained in B.F.L ., the underlying  

premise  of  J.H.  and  some  of  our  earlier  cases  -  "the  premise  that,  in  delinquency  

proceedings, the goal of rehabilitation is more important than any other goal - is no longer  

true." Id.  



                                                      - 10 -                                                   2785  


----------------------- Page 11-----------------------

                  substantial is a question of law." "Whether the [B]oard made  

                  sufficient  findings  is a  question  of  law  that  we  review de  

                           [9] 

                  novo."       



Likewise, in  Gottstein v. State, Department of Natural Resources,  the  supreme court  



explained that "[w]e will affirm an agency's factual findings if supported by substantial  



evidence, but what constitutes substantial evidence presents a question of law requiring  



                       10 

de novo review."            



                  In  the  juvenile  delinquency  context,  the  law  is  clear  that  "the  superior  



court  can  authorize  a  detention  placement  whenever  the  State  presents  substantial  



evidence  that  lesser  measures  will  likely  fail  to  meet  the  twin  goals  of  disposition  



                                                                               11 

specified in AS 47.12.140(2) and Delinquency Rule 11(e)."                           



                  Thus, in J.H. , we vacated the superior court's detention order because we  



concluded that "the superior court's finding that institutionalization of J.H. was required  



as the least restrictive alternative is not supported by any substantial evidence in the  

record." 12  In contrast, in  G.A.D. v. State, we affirmed the superior court's detention  



order because we concluded that "[t]he record contains substantial evidence supporting  



[the judge's] decision to commit G.A.D. to the McLaughlin Youth Center as the least  



restrictive  alternative  consistent  with  G.A.D.'s  rehabilitation  and  protection  of  the  



                                     

     9   Espindola v. Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc ., 486 P.3d 1116, 1121 (Alaska 2021) (citations  



omitted); see also Vue v. Walmart Assocs., Inc., 475 P.3d 270, 279 (Alaska 2020)  ("We  

review de novo the Commission 's legal conclusion that substantial evidence supports the  

Board's factual findings by 'independently reviewing the record and the Board's findings.'  

.  .  .  'Whether  the  quantum  of  evidence  is  substantial  is  a  question  of  law.'"  (quoting  

Humphrey   v.   Lowe's   Home   Improvement   Warehouse,   Inc.,   337   P.3d   1174,   1178  

(Alaska 2014))).  



     10   Gottstein v. State, Dep 't of Nat. Res., 223 P.3d 609, 620 (Alaska 2010) (citations  



omitted).  



     11   B.F.L.,  233  P.3d  at  1124  (first  citing   G.A.D.  v.  State,  865  P.2d   100,  102  



(Alaska App. 1993); then citing J.H ., 758 P.2d at 1291-93).  



     12   J.H. , 758 P.2d at 1293.  



                                                      - 11 -                                                   2785  


----------------------- Page 12-----------------------

public." 13 Likewise, in B.F.L., we affirmed the superior court's detention order because  



the  record  "provides  substantial  support  for  the  superior  court's  conclusion  that  a  



 'detention' disposition - i.e., a disposition under subsection (b)(1) of the statute - is  



                                                       14 

the least restrictive alternative available."              



                  We recognize that we have not always been consistent in describing our  

standard of review in juvenile delinquency cases.15 We therefore take this opportunity  



to clarify that we will affirm the superior court's conclusion that a (b)(1) disposition is  



the least restrictive alternative  if the conclusion is supported by substantial evidence,  



although what constitutes "substantial evidence" in this context is a question of law that  



                                                                     16 

we review de novo using our independent judgment.                        



                                     

     13   G.A.D., 865 P.2d at 104.  



     14   B.F.L., 233 P.3d at 1125 (concluding that the magistrate judge and the superior court  



judge "could reasonably conclude that a disposition order under subsection (b)(1) was the  

least restrictive alternative that would satisfy the twin goals of rehabilitation and protection  

of the community").   



     15   See,  e.g.,  R.N.  v.  State,  770  P.2d  301,  304  (Alaska  App.  1989)  ("[W]e  are  not  

convinced  that  the  trial  court  was  clearly  erroneous  in  concluding  that  institutional  

placement was the least restrictive alternative available to treat R.N. 's delinquency and to  

protect the community."); see also C.W. v. State, 2001 WL 1477925, at *2 (Alaska App.  

Nov.  21,  2001)  (unpublished)  (upholding  superior  court  disposition  order  under  an  

independent review because we agreed with the superior court that "there is good reason  

to believe a non-custodial placement will not protect the public from [the juvenile], nor  

will it foster his rehabilitation needs"); M.P.M. v. State , 1998 WL 317621, at *3 (Alaska  

App.  June  17,  1998)  (unpublished)  ("[T]he  question  of  whether  the  superior  court  has  

selected the 'least restrictive' disposition is a question of law, reviewed de novo  by this  

court.");  K.V.H .  v.  State,  1997  WL  563138,  at  *2  (Alaska  App.  Sept.  10,  1997)  

(unpublished) (referring to disposition as a "question of law" but concluding that the  

trial court was "not clearly mistaken" in accepting the recommendation of the State).  



     16   Cf. McClain  v.  State ,  519  P.2d  811,  813-14  (Alaska  1974)  (adopting  a  "clearly  



mistaken"  standard  of  review  for  adult  criminal  sentences  which  requires  the  appellate  

court to independently review the sentencing record but to uphold the sentence if it falls  

within the permissible range of sentences that a reasonable judge might impose).  



                                                     - 12 -                                                   2785  


----------------------- Page 13-----------------------

                  Having clarified the standard of review, we now turn to the  substantive  



arguments in this case.   



                    



         Why  we  conclude  that  substantial  evidence  supports  the  trial  court's  

         conclusion  that  a  (b)(1)  placement  is  the  least  restrictive  alternative  

         available to I.J.  



                  As a general matter, there are essentially three types of disposition orders  



available  to  a  trial  court  if  the  court  decides  to  subject  the  minor  to  some  level  of  

ongoing supervision.17 The least restrictive disposition is defined in subsection (b)(2)  



of  AS 47.12.120.  "Under  this  subsection,  the  court  places  the  minor  on  probation  



(supervised  by  the  Department),  but  releases  the  minor  to  the  custody  of  parents,  



                                                  18 

guardians, or other suitable persons."                 



                  The   next   level   of   restriction   is   defined   in   subsection   (b)(3)   of  



AS 47.12.120. "Under this subsection, the court commits the minor to the custody of  



the Department, giving the Department the authority to release the minor to the custody  



of parents or guardians, or to place the minor in a foster home or any suitable  non- 



                                        19 

detention residential facility."             



                  The  highest  level  of  restriction  is  defined  in  subsection  (b)(1)  of  



AS 47.12.120. "Under this subsection, the court commits the minor to the custody of  



the Department, giving the Department the authority to make any placement it deems  



                                                                               20 

appropriate - including placement in a detention facility."                        



                                      

     17   B.F.L., 233 P.3d at  1119. There is also a fourth option - subsection (b)(4) - if the  

court orders restitution "in lieu of or in addition to the court's order under (1), (2), or (3)  

of this subsection." AS 47.12.120(b)(4).  



     18   B.F.L., 233 P.3d at 1119; see also AS 47.12.120(b)(2).  



     19   B.F.L., 233 P.3d at 1119; see also AS 47.12.120(b)(3).  



    20   B.F.L., 233 P.3d at 1119; see also AS 47.12.120(b)(1).  



                                                      - 13 -                                                    2785  


----------------------- Page 14-----------------------

                 When determining the appropriate disposition for a juvenile who has been  



adjudicated a delinquent minor, AS 47.12.140 requires the court to consider "the best  



interests of the minor" and "the interests of the public" and to order "the least restrictive  



alternative  disposition."  The  "least  restrictive  alternative  disposition"  is  defined  



statutorily as the "disposition that is no more restrictive than is, in the judgment of the  



court,  most  conducive  to  the  minor's  rehabilitation  taking  into  consideration  the  

interests of the public."21 Alaska Delinquency Rule 11(e) provides that the State bears  



the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the disposition is the  



"least restrictive alternative appropriate to the needs of the juvenile and the protection  



                          22 

of the community."             



                 Alaska  Statute  47.12.140  outlines  the  factors  that  the  trial  court  shall  



consider when deciding the appropriate level of disposition. These factors include:   



                  (A) the  seriousness  of  the  minor's  delinquent  act  and  the  

                 attitude of the minor and the minor's parents toward that act;   



                  (B) the minor 's culpability as indicated by the circumstances  

                 of the particular case;   



                  (C) the age of the minor;   



                  (D) the  minor 's  prior  criminal  or  juvenile  record  and  the  

                  success  or  failure  of  any  previous  orders,  dispositions,  or  

                 placements imposed on the minor;   



                  (E) the  effect  of  the  dispositional  order  to  be  imposed  in  

                 deterring the minor from committing other delinquent acts;   



                  (F) the  need  to  commit  the  minor  to  the  department's  

                 custody or to detain the minor in a juvenile treatment facility,  

                 juvenile  detention  facility,  secure  residential  psychiatric  

                 treatment center, or other suitable place in order to prevent  

                 further harm to the public;   



                                     

    21   AS 47.12.140(2).   



    22   Alaska Delinq. R. 11(e).  



                                                     - 14 -                                                  2785  


----------------------- Page 15-----------------------

                  (G) the   interest   of   the   public   in   securing   the   minor 's  

                  rehabilitation; and   



                  (H) the ability of the state to take custody of and to care for  

                  the minor.[23]  



                  In the current case, the trial court imposed a (b)(1) order because it found  



that  all  the  available  less  restrictive placements  had been  tried and  failed. We have  



previously  recognized  that  "[a]  minor 's  history  of  failed  placements  and  continued  



violations  of  the  law  can  justify  the  superior  court 's  decision  to  institutionalize  the  



          24 

minor."        



                  On appeal, I.J. takes issue with the magistrate judge's conclusion that all  



viable  less  restrictive  placements  had  been  tried,  and  he  asserts  that  his  attorney  



proposed some alternatives that could have been explored more. It is true that I.J. 's  



attorney argued that the court should consider an alternative to institutionalization, and  



she   named   various   possibilities   including   another   adventure-based   educational  



program, an intensive work program, or a program with tribal involvement. But she did  



not  identify any actual program that would accept I.J. given his significant history of  



running away.   



                  In  any  case,  the  law is  clear  that  "the  least  restrictive  alternative"  rule  



"does not require that a child be allowed to fail at each [successively more restrictive]  



                                                                                                                 25 

level  of  placement  before  placement  in  the  next  restrictive  level  may  be  made."                          



Rather, the court can institutionalize a minor if the State presents substantial evidence  



                                     

    23   AS 47.12.140(1).   



    24   G.A.D.  v.  State,  865  P.2d  100,  102  (Alaska  App.  1993)  (citing  P.R.J.  v.  State,  



787 P.2d 123, 124-25 (Alaska App. 1990)).  



    25   Id. (quoting Matter of J.H. , 758 P.2d 1287, 1291 (Alaska App. 1988), superseded  



on other grounds by statute as stated in B.F.L., 233 P.3d at 1122-24).  



                                                      - 15 -                                                   2785  


----------------------- Page 16-----------------------

that  lesser  measures  will  likely  fail  to  meet  the  twin  goals  of  rehabilitation  and  



                               26 

protection of the public.          



                 Here, the record supports the magistrate judge's conclusion that all of the  



less  restrictive  options  had  been  tried.  I.J.  faults  the  magistrate  judge  for  failing  to  



mention that he had successfully completed the Raven 's Way adventure program. But,  



as both his probation officer and the OCS case worker noted, given the Raven's Way  



program was located on an island, I.J. "did not have anywhere to run to."   



                 Moreover, while I.J. successfully completed the Raven 's Way program,  



he was unsuccessful in the stepdown outpatient program with Volunteers of America  



that was intended to be the follow up to the Raven 's Way program. And he ran away  



from  the  ARCH  residential  treatment  program  that  was  recommended  when  the  



Volunteers of America outpatient program failed. Notably, his OCS case worker looked  



into  whether  Raven's  Way  would  be  willing  to  accept  I.J.  in  their  longer-term  



residential program, but they denied him placement due to his history of running away,  



and they instead recommended a lockdown program.  



                 I.J. also argues that a (b)(1) order was inappropriate because his original  



crime was only a fourth-degree assault, a misdemeanor. And he asserts that the primary  



problem with his placements was his running away, not continued criminal behavior.  



Relying on the magistrate judge's  finding that he was "not overall what [one] would  



call a violent offender," I.J. argues that the State failed to prove that institutionalization  



was required for public safety.   



                 But,  as  the  guardian  ad  litem  emphasized  in  his  disposition  remarks,  



everyone involved in the case recognized that I.J. was not the typical juvenile offender  



that has to be institutionalized  "not just for their own safety but for the safety of the  



community." Instead, it was I.J.'s own safety and well-being that everyone was worried  



about. The record shows that I.J. put himself in vulnerable situations when he ran away  



                                    

    26   Id.   



                                                    - 16 -                                                 2785  


----------------------- Page 17-----------------------

from his placements, and that he continued to engage in risky and criminal behavior -  



namely, taking drugs and alcohol - after he ran away from his placements.   



                 In contrast, I.J. did extremely well during the times he was temporarily  



detained  at  McLaughlin.  As  the  guardian  ad  litem  pointed  out,  I.J.  had  done  



"phenomenal[ly]" at McLaughlin in the last few months before the disposition hearing.  



But he continued to do  "poorly" whenever he was in a placement that did not have  



"twenty-four-seven  support  for  him."  The  record  also  establishes  that  there  were  



services that I.J. desperately needed -  including a neuropsychological evaluation -  



that he would be able to get at McLaughlin but that he had been unable to get  at any  



other placement because of his constant running away.   



                 Lastly,  I.J.  argues  that  a  (b)(1)  order  for  the  next  two  years  was  so  



disproportionate to the underlying crime of fourth-degree assault as to constitute "cruel  

and unusual punishment" in violation of the state and federal constitutions.27 He points  



out that the maximum penalty for an adult convicted of fourth-degree assault would be  

a year in prison,28  and he asserts that the (b)(1) order in this case could result in his  



detention  "for a period twice as long as an adult sentenced for the same underlying  



conduct."   



                 We have previously rejected such constitutional arguments in the juvenile  



delinquency context because of the differences between the adult criminal system and  



the juvenile justice system. In M.O.W. v. State , for example, the minor was found to be  

in possession of a small amount of marijuana.29 The minor argued that being subjected  



to possible detention as a minor for conduct that would not be a crime for an adult, or  



if a crime would only be penalized by a fine, amounted to an unconstitutional denial of  



                                    

    27   U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Alaska Const. art. I, § 12.   



    28   See AS 12.55.135(a).  



    29   M.O.W. v. State , 645 P.2d 1229, 1230 (Alaska App. 1982).  



                                                   - 17 -                                                 2785  


----------------------- Page 18-----------------------

the  equal protection of the laws and would subject the minor to  "cruel and unusual  

punishment."30  We  rejected  these  contentions  as  "totally  without  merit,"31  citing  to  



Alaska Supreme Court cases that recognized that the "distinct government interests with  



reference  to  children  may  justify  legislation  that  could  not  properly  be  applied  to  



          32 

adults."      



                  We likewise find no merit to I.J.'s claim that Miller v. Alabama dictates a  

different result in this case.33 Miller addresses the constitutionality of life sentences for  



juveniles  who  have  been  waived  out  of  the  juvenile  justice  system  and  into  adult  

criminal court.34 At its heart, Miller is about how children are fundamentally different  



than adults and why they therefore warrant different treatment than adults, even when  

they are waived into the adult criminal system.35 In contrast to the minor defendants in  



Miller , I.J. is in a juvenile justice system specifically designed to address the unique  



attributes  of  minors  and  their  needs.  His  disparate  treatment  from  an  adult  who  is  



convicted of fourth-degree assault is grounded in the recognized differences between  



children and adults and does not raise any constitutional concerns.   



     30   Id. at  1231 n.4.  



     31   Id.  



     32   L.A.M.  v.  State ,  547  P.2d  827,  834  (Alaska  1976);  see  also  Anderson  v.  State,  

562 P.2d 351, 358 (Alaska 1977); A.K. v. State , 2001 WL 864193, at *2 (Alaska App.  

Aug.  1, 2001) (unpublished) (finding no equal protection violation when the length of time  

that the minor  could be under state custody  would  exceed the maximum sentence that a  

court could give to an adult offender convicted of the same offense because  "[t]here is  

substantial authority for treating juvenile offenders differently than adult offenders").  



     33   Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460 (2012).  



     34   Id.  at  479 ("We therefore hold that the Eighth Amendment forbids  a sentencing  



scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.").  



     35   Id. at 471.  



                                                     - 18 -                                                  2785  


----------------------- Page 19-----------------------

                 Although  we  find  no  merit  to  I.J.'s  cruel  and  unusual  punishment  



argument, we do have some concerns about the length of the disposition order in this  



case. The superior court ordered the (b)(1) placement for a period of time "not to exceed  



two  years"  but  there  was  no  actual  discussion  of  why  that  length  of  time  was  



appropriate. Indeed, the magistrate judge was clear that she did not think I.J. would be  



at McLaughlin for the full two years, and that he would likely be released before then.   



                 Alaska Statute 47.12.260 governs the early release of minors who have  



been committed to the custody of the Department. It provides:   



                 A minor found to be a juvenile delinquent who by conduct  

                 gives   sufficient   evidence   of   having   reformed   may   be  

                 released at any time under the conditions and regulations that  

                 the   department   considers   proper,   if   it   appears   to   the  

                 satisfaction  of  the  department  that  there  is  a  reasonable  

                 probability  that  the  minor  will  remain  at  liberty  without  

                                        [36] 

                 violating the law.          



The magistrate judge referenced this provision in her disposition comments. She also  



made clear that she would be monitoring I.J. 's progress on a yearly basis and that his  



lawyer or his guardian ad litem could ask for an earlier hearing based on his progress.  



The magistrate judge extended the appointments of I.J.'s attorney and his guardian ad  



litem to ensure that they would be in a position to request a hearing for early release.  



The guardian ad litem indicated that, like the court, he did not think that I.J. would be  



at McLaughlin for two years.   



                 Given the procedures that are already in place to monitor I.J.'s progress  



and the court's express willingness to consider an early release, we conclude that a  



remand for reconsideration of the length of the order is not necessary. But we remind  



                                    

    36   AS  47.12.260;  see  also  AS  47.12.120(b)(1)  (providing  that  "the  minor  may  be  

released from placement or detention and placed on probation on order of the court and  

may also be released by the department, in its discretion, under AS 47.12.260").  



                                                    - 19 -                                                 2785  


----------------------- Page 20-----------------------

trial courts that they should  carefully consider the appropriate length of a disposition  



order and provide an explanation on the record for why that time period was ordered.  



  



         Conclusion   



                  The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.   



                                                      - 20 -                                                   2785  

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