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Chawn D. Summerall v. State of Alaska (7/5/2024) ap-2783

Chawn D. Summerall v. State of Alaska (7/5/2024) ap-2783

                                                          NOTICE  

          The text of this opinion can be corrected before the opinion is published in the  

          Pacific Reporter. Readers are encouraged to bring typographical or other formal  

          errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts:  

            

                                      303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501  

                                                  Fax: (907) 264-0878  

                                         E-mail: corrections@akcourts.gov  

                                                                  

                                                                  

                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA  

  

  

CHAWN D. SUMMERALL,                                                    

                                                                             Court of Appeals No. A-13956  

                                        Appellant,                        Trial Court No. 3KO-10-00279 CR  

                                                                       

                              v.                                       

                                                                                         O P I N I O N  

STATE OF ALASKA,                                                       

                                                                       

                                        Appellee.                                No. 2783 - July 5, 2024  

                                                                       

  

                    Appeal  from  the   Superior  Court,   Third  Judicial  District,  

                    Kodiak, Daniel Schally, Judge.  

                      

                    Appearances:  Renee  McFarland,  Assistant  Public  Defender,  

                    and  Samantha  Cherot,  Public  Defender,  Anchorage,  for  the  

                    Appellant.  Ann B. Black, Assistant Attorney General, Office  

                    of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney  

                    General, Juneau, for the Appellee.  

                      

                    Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Harbison and Terrell, Judges.  

                      

                    Judge HARBISON.  

  



                    In 2010, Chawn D. Summerall was convicted of first-degree assault for  



                                                 1 

conduct that took place in 2008.  Summerall was sentenced to 20 years with 9 years  



                                          

     1    Former AS 11.41.200(a) (pre-Oct. 2019).   


----------------------- Page 2-----------------------

suspended (11 years to serve) and 5 years of probation. He was released to probation in  



December 2016. For several years, Summerall complied with the terms of his probation.  



However, between May 2020 and December 2021, he committed numerous probation  



violations.  The  State  filed  four  petitions  to  revoke  his  probation,  and  each  petition  



resulted in Summerall's probation being revoked.   



                 In   this   appeal,   Summerall   challenges   the   superior   court's   fourth  



disposition order, which addressed a probation violation that occurred in 2021. In this  



order,  the  superior  court  revoked  Summerall's  probation,  imposed  some  of  the  



suspended time, and extended his term of probation by 1 year (from 5 years to 6 years).  



Summerall argues that this extension of his probation was illegal because it exceeded  



the maximum allowable term under the former version of AS 12.55.090(c) that was in  



effect  between  2016  and  2019.  Alternatively,  Summerall  argues  that  the  court  was  



clearly mistaken in extending his probation.   



                 Alaska   Statute   12.55.090(c)   has   been   amended   three   times   since  



Summerall  committed  the  underlying  offense.  Summerall's  first  claim  requires  this  



Court to determine which version of the statute applied when the superior court revoked  



Summerall's probation for the fourth time: the 2007 law (which established a 10-year  



probation maximum); the 2016 law (which lowered the maximum to 5 years); or the  



2019 law (which raised the maximum back to 10 years). The extension of Summerall's  



probation from 5 years to 6 years was legal under the 2007 and 2019 laws, but illegal  



under the 2016 law.  



                 As  we  are  about  to  explain,  we  conclude  that  the  superior  court's  



disposition order was legal because the 2019 law applied and the extended probationary  



                                                                                                              2 

term (6 years) is within the 10-year maximum probationary term set out under that law.   



                                    

    2    We  note  that  applying  the  2019  law  does  not  violate  the  prohibition  against  the  

application of ex post facto laws under the United States  and Alaska  Constitutions. U.S.  

Const. art. I, § 9; Alaska Const. art. I § 15. An ex post facto law is one that is both penal in  

nature  and  retrospectively  applied.  A  law  is  retrospective  if  it  is  "passed  after  the  

occurrence  of  a  fact  or  commission  of  an  act  [and]  retrospectively  changes  the  legal  



                                                     - 2 -                                                 2783  


----------------------- Page 3-----------------------

We also conclude that the superior court's decision to extend Summerall's probation  



was not clearly mistaken. We thus reject Summerall's claims and affirm his sentence.  



                    



         The relevant legislation and the events in Summerall's case   



                  In 2007, AS 12.55.090(c) set the maximum term of probation for a class A  



                                   3 

felony offense at 10 years.  This 10-year maximum was in effect during the commission  



of Summerall's offense in 2008, when he was sentenced, and when the judgment was  



entered against him.  



                  In  2016,  as  part  of  Senate  Bill  91  (S.B.  91),  the  legislature  amended  



                                                                                                           4 

AS  12.55.090(c)  by  reducing  the  maximum  term  of  probation  to  5  years.   The  



applicability provision of this law indicated that it would apply to "probation  ordered  



on or after the effective date [July 12, 2016], for offenses committed before, on, or after  



                         5 

the effective date."    



                  In   2019,  the  legislature  amended  AS  12.55.090(c)  to  increase  the  



                                                          6 

maximum  term  of  probation  to  10  years.   The  applicability  provision  of  this  law  



                                     

consequences or relations of such fact or deed." Danks  v. State, 619 P.2d 720, 722 n.3  

(Alaska 1980)  (internal quotations and citations omitted). For retroactivity purposes, the  

critical date is that of the underlying criminal offense (rather than the date that supervised  

release is violated).  Because the  2019 law did not provide for a greater penalty than the  

2007 law - it merely restored the penalty that had been in effect under that law - applying  

the 2019 law does not violate the ex post facto clause for defendants sentenced under the  

2007  law.  However,  for  defendants  who  were  sentenced  when  S.B.  91  was  in  effect,  

S.B. 91's  ameliorative  5-year  probation  maximum  would  apply  even  if  the  defendant  

committed a probation violation after the 2019 amendment raised the probation maximum  

to 10 years.   



    3    SLA 2007, ch. 24, § 22.   



    4    SLA 2016, ch. 36, § 79.  



     5   SLA 2016, ch. 36, §  185(i) (emphasis added).  



    6    SLA 2019 (1st Special Session), ch. 4, § 68.   



                                                       - 3 -                                                   2783  


----------------------- Page 4-----------------------

indicated  that  this  amendment  would  apply  "to probation   ordered  on  or  after  the  



                                                                                                           7 

effective date [July 9, 2019] for conduct occurring on or after the effective date."   



                  In May 2020, Summerall violated his probation for the first time. Between  



2020 and 2021, Summerall repeatedly violated his probation. Relevant to this appeal,  



Summerall violated his probation in December 2021, and the superior court entered a  



disposition  order  in  January  2022.  In  its  order,  the  court  imposed  a  period  of  



incarceration and extended Summerall's probation from 5 years to 6 years.   



                    



         Why  we  conclude  that  the  2019  law  applies  to  the  disposition  of  

         Summerall's 2021 probation violation  



                  Summerall contends that the trial court was required to apply the 2016 law  



- i.e., S.B. 91 - when it determined the appropriate disposition of his fourth petition  



to  revoke  probation.  Summerall  acknowledges  that  the  2019  law  sets  the  probation  



maximum for his offense at 10 years. However, he notes that the applicability provision  



of the 2019 statute refers to "conduct" that occurred "on or after" July 9, 2019, and he  



argues that, by "conduct," the legislature meant the underlying criminal offense, rather  



                                                      8 

than the acts that violated his probation.   Because his underlying offense occurred in  



2008, Summerall contends that the 2019 law did not apply to his case.  



                  Summerall instead argues that the applicable maximum probation term is  



controlled by S.B. 91 -  the 2016 amendment to AS 12.55.090(c). The applicability  



provision of that law states that it "applies to probation  ordered on or after the effective  



                                                                                                                 9 

date . . . for offenses committed before, on, or after the effective date [July 12, 2016]."   



                                     

    7    SLA 2019 (1st Special Session), ch. 4, §  142(d)(1) (emphasis added).  



     8   To the extent the language is ambiguous, Summerall adds that the rule of lenity  

should "preclude H.B.  49's application to individuals facing disposition for a probation  

violation who were originally sentenced to a term of probation before H .B. 49's revision  

to AS  12.55.090(c) took effect."   



    9    SLA 2016, ch. 36, §  185(i) (emphasis added). Johnson v. State held that "probation  



ordered" refers to "any new periods of probation-as well as any extension of the original  



                                                      - 4 -                                                   2783  


----------------------- Page 5-----------------------

Summerall argues that S.B. 91 applied to his case because (1) the court entered the  



disposition order extending his probation in  January 2022, which was "on or after"  



S.B. 91's effective date of July 12, 2016 and (2) he committed the underlying offense  



in 2008, which was "before, on, or after" the bill's effective date.   



                 By  contrast,  the  State  interprets  the  2019  amendment's  reference  to  



"conduct" to mean the act of violating probation rather than the act of committing the  



underlying criminal offense. Under this interpretation, the 2019 law applies because  



Summerall's   probation   violations   occurred   "on   or   after"   its   effective   date   of  



July 9, 2019.  



                 The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law to which we  

apply  our  independent  judgment.10  When  "interpreting  a  statute,  we  consider  its  



language,  its  purpose,  and  its  legislative  history,  in  an  attempt  to  give  effect  to  the  



legislature's intent, with due regard for the meaning the statutory language conveys to  

others."11 Under Alaska's sliding scale approach to statutory interpretation, "the plainer  



the  statutory  language  is,  the  more  convincing  the  evidence  of  contrary  legislative  

purpose or intent must be."12   



                 We begin by considering the statutory language of the 2019 amendment  



to AS 12.55.090(c). To determine what the legislature meant by the word "conduct" in  



                                    

probation period-ordered on or after the effective date." Johnson v. State , 477 P.3d 665,  

668 (Alaska App. 2020). Because Summerall's period of probation was extended, he had  

probation ordered in 2022 under our interpretation of that phrase in Johnson .  



     10   Kohlhaas v. State , 518 P.3d 1095, 1103 (Alaska 2022).  



     11   State v. Planned Parenthood of the Great Nw., 436 P.3d 984, 992 (Alaska 2019)  



(internal quotations omitted).  



     12   Muller v. BP Expl. (Alaska) Inc. , 923 P.2d 783, 788 (Alaska 1996).   



                                                     - 5 -                                                 2783  


----------------------- Page 6-----------------------

this statute, we must consider its plain meaning not in isolation, but in the context of  

the whole statute.13   



                  Two canons of construction prove useful in this analysis. First, under the  



canon of consistent usage  (a canon that "is not . . . cast aside lightly"), "words are  

presumed to bear the same meaning throughout a text."14 And second, when interpreting  



a  statute,  we  must  presume  that  "the  legislature  intended  every  word,  sentence,  or  



provision of a statute to have some purpose, force, and effect, and that no words or  

provisions are superfluous."15  



                  When   considered   in   isolation,   the   word   "conduct"   is   ambiguous.  



"Conduct"  could  plausibly  refer  to  the  act  of  committing  the  underlying  criminal  



offense, as Summerall claims,  or  it could refer to the act of violating a condition of  



probation, as the State claims. However, surrounding statutory provisions lend support  



to the State's position that "conduct" means the act of violating a condition of probation.  



                  The applicability section, section 142 of the 2019 law, has eleven separate  

subsections.16 Seven of these subsections, including subsection (d) at issue in this case,  



state that they apply "on or after the effective date . . . for conduct occurring on or after  



                                     

     13   Murphy v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough , 494 P.3d 556, 564 (Alaska 2021) (explaining  



that "we do not read portions of a statute in isolation. When construing a statute, we must,  

whenever  possible,  interpret  each  part  of  section  of  a  statute  with  every  other  part  or  

section, so as to create a harmonious whole." (internal quotations and alterations omitted));  

Ward v. State, Dep't of Pub. Safety, 288 P.3d 94, 98-99 (Alaska 2012).  



     14   Forrer  v.  State,  471  P.3d  569,  597  (Alaska  2020)  (internal  citations  omitted)  



(applying  the  canon  to  the  interpretation  of  Alaska's  constitution);  see  also  Bohn  v.  

Providence Health Servs. -  Washington, 484 P.3d 584, 595 (Alaska 2021) (applying the  

canon to the interpretation of an Alaska statute).   



     15   Johnson v. State , 380 P.3d 653, 656 (Alaska 2016).   



     16   SLA 2019 (1st Special Session), ch. 4, §  142.  



                                                      - 6 -                                                   2783  


----------------------- Page 7-----------------------

the effective date."17 Two other subsections state that they apply to "offenses committed  



on or after the effective date."18  Another subsection states that it applies to "offenses  



committed before, on, or after the effective date."19 The fact that some of section 142's  



subsections refer to "conduct" and others refer to "offenses" indicates that these terms  



have distinct meanings. If "conduct" and "offense" had interchangeable meanings, the  



legislature would have used one consistent term.  



                  Of  these  two  terms,  "offense"  is  more  specific  and  "conduct"  is  more  

general. "Offense" generally refers to a crime or violation,20 whereas "conduct" refers  



more  generally  to  "[p]ersonal  behavior,  whether  by  action  or  inaction,  verbal  or  

nonverbal; the manner in which a person behaves; collectively, a person's deeds."21   



                  The text thus supports the State's interpretation: that "conduct" means the  



act of violating probation. The legislature's decision to use the terms "conduct" and  



"offense" in different subsections of the applicability section, coupled with the plain  



meaning  of  those  terms,  suggests  that  the  terms  have  different  meanings.  Had  the  



legislature intended for section 142 to only apply to crimes that were committed on or  



after  the  effective  date,  the  legislature  would  have  stated  that  this  provision  of  law  



applied to "offenses" committed on or after the effective date in every subsection rather  



                                     

     17   SLA 2019 (1st Special Session), ch. 4, §  142 (b), (d) - (i) (emphasis added).   



     18   SLA 2019 (1st Special Session), ch. 4, §  142 (a), (c), (emphasis added).   



     19   SLA 2019 (1st Special Session), ch. 4, § 142(j).  



    20   See offense, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). The term "offense" is defined  



in  AS  11.81.900(b)(41)  as  "conduct  for  which  a  sentence  of  imprisonment  or  fine  is  

authorized; an offense is either a crime or a violation."   



    21   Conduct, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). The term "conduct" is defined in  



AS  11.81.900(b)(7) as "an act or omission and its accompanying mental state."  



                                                      - 7 -                                                   2783  


----------------------- Page 8-----------------------

than  to  "conduct"  committed  on  or  after  the  effective  date,  as  used  in  some  

subsections.22   



                  We  have  also  considered  the  statute's  legislative  history.  In  2019,  the  



Governor drafted a crime bill and transmitted  it to the House (H.B. 49) and Senate  



(S.B. 32) for concurrent consideration. Ultimately, only H.B. 49 was enacted into law.   



                  On January 22, 2019, the Governor provided the house with a letter to  

accompany H.B. 49.23 In it, the Governor explained that "the most serious threat facing  



Alaska is crime" and that the passage of S.B. 91 in 2016 "limited our ability to address  



the increase in crime" and "contributed to the loss of ... our ability to keep Alaskans  

safe."24 The Governor explained that H.B. 49, if enacted, would "repeal[] provisions of  



S.B. 91  that  relate  to  the  classification  of  crimes,  sentencing,  and  probation  of  



offenders"  and  would  "return[]"  the  "maximum  probation  lengths  .  .  .  to  lengths  

allowable before the passage of S.B. 91."25  



                  In February 2019, H.B. 49 was introduced in the House Rules Committee.  



In this original bill, AS 12.55.090(c)'s applicability provision had identical language to  



the bill that was ultimately enacted:   



                  AS 12.55.090(c), as amended by sec. 37 of this Act, applies  

                  to probation ordered on or after the effective date of sec. 37  

                  of this Act for conduct occurring on or after the effective  

                  date of sec. 37 of this Act.[26]  



                                     

    22   Notably,  the  legislature  used  the  term  "conduct"  (rather  than  "offense")  in  the  



applicability provision for all subsections relating to probation and parole. See  SLA 2019  

(1st Special Session), ch. 4, §  142(d)-(h).  



    23   Letter from Governor Mike Dunleavy to the Chief Clerk of the Alaska House of  



Representatives regarding House Bill 49 (January 22, 2019).   



    24   Id.   



    25   Id.  



    26   H.B. 49, 31st Leg., 1st Sess. (Version A) (as introduced, Feb. 20, 2019).   



                                                      - 8 -                                                   2783  


----------------------- Page 9-----------------------

                 On   March   25,   2019,   Deputy   Attorney   General   Robert   Henderson  



appeared  before  the  House  Judiciary  Committee.  Henderson  explained  that  H.B. 49  



would "return[] Alaska's . . . sentencing laws to what they were before 2016," which  

would  provide  "more  options"  to  judges  in  exercising  their  sentencing  discretion.27  



Henderson also briefly addressed AS 12.55.090(c), stating that H.B. 49 "returns the law  



to what it was pre-2016 as with regard to the availability and the length of probation  

and it increases probation."28   



                 H.B. 49 was enacted in summer 2019.29 While many committee hearings  



were held prior to the law's passage, the legislature did not substantively discuss the  



applicability provision of the bill. However, during that same legislative session, the  



Governor introduced S.B. 32 in the Senate. The legislature did discuss the applicability  



provision of the original version of S.B. 32, which had identical language to the original  

version of H.B. 49, and thus is relevant to our analysis.30   



                 Summerall contends that these discussions support his view that when the  



legislature  enlarged  the  period  of  probation  for  "conduct"  occurring  on  or  after  the  



effective date, it was referring to the commission of the underlying criminal offense  



rather than the act of violating probation.  



                 Summerall  relies on a  discussion  that  took  place on February 8,  2019,  



when Deputy Attorney General Robert Henderson appeared before the Senate Judiciary  



Committee.  Henderson  explained  S.B. 32's  proposed  change  to AS 12.55.090(c)  as  



follows:   



                                    

    27   Audio of House Judiciary Committee, House Bill 49, testimony of Deputy Attorney  



General Robert Henderson, at 1:06:08 -  1:07:04 (Mar. 25, 2019).   



    28   Id. at 2:52:20 - 2:52:46.   



    29   SLA 2019 (1st Special Session), ch. 4.  



    30   Compare  S.B. 32, 31st Leg.,  1st Sess. (Version A) (as introduced, Jan. 23, 2019),  



with H.B. 49, 31st Leg., 1st Sess. (Version A) (as introduced, Feb. 20, 2019).  



                                                     - 9 -                                                 2783  


----------------------- Page 10-----------------------

                 So moving to section 37, section 37 increases the maximum  

                 period of probation for felony sex offenses from 15 years to  

                 25 years. It also increases the maximum period of probation  

                 for  all  other  offenses  to  10  years.  One  of  the  things  that  

                 S.B. 91 did is it limited the length of time a person could be  

                 put  on  probation  depending  on  which  offense  they  were  

                 convicted  of.  This  returns  that  discretion  to  the  court  and  

                 allows the court to put somebody on probation for the length  

                 of   time   necessary,   based   on   that   judge's   independent  

                 judgment as to what would be  appropriate and necessary.[31]  



                 Following this explanation, Chairwoman Shelley Hughes and Henderson  



discussed how someone sentenced while S.B. 91 was in effect would be impacted by  



these changes:   



                         Hughes :  What  happens  if  someone  were  sentenced  

                 during the period  S.B.  91 was in effect. Does this  apply to  

                 them? Or will they have the shorter probation periods?   



                         Henderson :  Madame  Chair,  I  am  thinking,  because  

                 that has to do with the applicability section, a person would  

                 be - the criminal penalties that would govern that conduct  

                 would  be  what  existed  at  the  time  they  committed  the  

                 offense.[32]  



                 Ultimately, S.B. 32 proceeded through the Senate Judiciary, State Affairs,  



and  Finance  Committees.  The  last  committee  meeting  on  S.B.  32  was  held  on  



May 3, 2019. Ultimately, it was S.B. 32's companion bill, H.B. 49, that was signed into  



law.   



                 On  appeal,  Summerall  contends  that  Henderson's  answer  to  Hughes's  



question equated the term "conduct" in the applicability section with the term "offense."  



But Henderson was not asked to discuss the bill's impact on probation revocations for  



people  sentenced prior  to  S.B.  91;  instead,  Hughes's  question  asked  about  people  



                                    

    31   Audio of Senate Judiciary Committee, Senate Bill 32, testimony of Deputy Attorney  



General Robert Henderson, at 2:29:13 - 2:29:51 (Feb. 8, 2019).   



    32   Id. at 2:29:51 - 2:30:24.   



                                                    -  10 -                                               2783  


----------------------- Page 11-----------------------

sentenced  during  the  time  that  S.B.  91  was  in  effect.  We  accordingly  do  not  view  



Henderson's  response  as  useful  in  determining  whether  the  legislature  intended  the  



increased probation period to apply to a disposition order entered in connection with a  



crime that was committed before S.B. 91 was enacted.  



                 For similar reasons, we reject Summerall's claim that Johnson v. State  

supports his position.33  In Johnson, we held that  the probation maximums set out in  



S.B. 91 apply where a defendant committed their offense before S.B. 91, but had their  

probation revoked  during  the time that  S.B.  91 was effective.34 Johnson  is factually  



distinct  from  the  present  matter  because  Summerall  committed  his  offense  before  



S.B. 91 but violated probation and had his probation revoked after S.B. 91 was repealed.   



                 "The goal of statutory construction is to give effect to the legislature 's  

intent, with due regard for the meaning the statutory language conveys to others."35 As  



we have explained, the legislature's stated intention was to repeal S.B. 91 and to return  



the  maximum  period  of  probation  to  10  years .  This  goal  is  better  effectuated  by  



interpreting  "conduct"  to  mean  a  new  probation  violation,  because  the  amendment  



would apply to a broader swath of cases. Furthermore, both the plain language of the  



2019 amendment to AS 12.55.090(c)  and the statute's legislative history support the  



interpretation  that  the  term  "conduct"  refers  to  a  defendant's  act  of  violating  their  



probation  rather  than  their  act  of  committing  the  underlying  criminal  offense .  



Interpreted this way, the court lawfully extended Summerall's probation from 5 to 6  



years because the 2019 amendment to AS  12.55.090(c) -  allowing for a maximum  



term of probation of 10 years - applied to the 2022 disposition of his 2021 probation  



                                    

    33   Johnson v. State , 477 P.3d 665 (Alaska App. 2020).   



    34   Id. at 666-69.  



    35   City of Valdez v. State, 372 P.3d 240, 254 (Alaska 2016) (quoting City of Fairbanks  



v. Amoco Chem. Co., 952 P.2d 1173, 1178 (Alaska 1998)).  



                                                    -  11 -                                                2783  


----------------------- Page 12-----------------------

violation.  We  accordingly  reject  Summerall's  challenge  to  the  extension  of  his  



probation.  



                   



         Why we conclude that the superior court's decision to extend Summerall's  

        probation was not clearly mistaken   



                 In State v. Pulusila , the Alaska Supreme Court explained the standard for  



sentencing defendants following probation violations:  



                 The trial court has substantial  discretion at the disposition  

                 stage. A trial court can impose a sentence less than jail time  

                 or otherwise change the terms and conditions of probation  

                 without imposing full remaining jail time. . . . A court can  

                 consider any relevant information in the record, including  

                 "the  original  offense,  the  offender,  and  the  defendant's  

                 intervening conduct."[36]   



On appeal, a sentence will only be reversed if the disposition was clearly mistaken -  

i.e., outside the permissible range of reasonable sentences.37   



                 The  "clearly  mistaken  test  is  founded  on  two  concepts:  first,  that  



reasonable  judges,  confronted  with  identical  facts,  can  and  will  differ  on  what  



constitutes an appropriate sentence;  . . . second, that society is willing to accept these  



sentencing  discrepancies,  so  long  as  a  judge's  sentencing  decision  falls  within  a  

permissible range of reasonable sentences."38  



                 Summerall argues that the trial court was clearly mistaken in extending  



his probation by 1 year (from 5 years to 6 years). In support of this claim, he cites to  



research that "longer terms of probation can be counterproductive," and that the 1-year  



                                    

    36   State v. Pulusila, 467 P.3d 211, 218 (Alaska 2020) (quoting Betzner v. State, 768  



P.2d 1156 (Alaska App.  1989)).   



    37   McClain v. State , 519 P.2d 811, 813-14 (Alaska 1974); Covington v. State, 747 P.2d  



550, 554 (Alaska App. 1987); Smith v. State, 349 P.3d 1087, 1091 (Alaska App. 2015).  



    38   Smith, 349 P.3d at 1091 (omission in original) (internal quotations omitted).  



                                                    -  12 -                                                2783  


----------------------- Page 13-----------------------

extension was clearly mistaken because the outstanding 18 months that Summerall had  



on probation (notwithstanding the extension) was "sufficient" to usher his "reentry back  



into society." Summerall did not specifically address why, in the context of his case,  



the 1-year extension was clearly mistaken.   



                 In 2010, Summerall was convicted of first-degree assault for his part in  

beating a man who later died of his injuries.39 He was sentenced to 20 years with 9 years  



suspended (11 years to serve), and 5 years of probation. During the sentencing hearing,  



the court remarked that Summerall had a "severe alcohol problem." This remark was  



supported  by  (1)  the  facts  of  the  offense  as  described  in  the  presentence  report,  



(2) Summerall's criminal history, and (3) Summerall's own allocution to the court. The  



court found that, although the record supported sentencing Summerall to 20 years flat,  



due to Summerall's recent sobriety, a suspended sentence with a probation term tailored  



to address his substance abuse was warranted.   



                 Between May 2020 and December 2021, Summerall violated conditions  



of his probation four separate times. Each violation stemmed from Summerall either  



using  alcohol  or  drugs,  or  failing  to  submit  to  testing  for  alcohol  or  drugs.  The  



seriousness of Summerall's violations  appeared to escalate, as did the severity of the  



court's  disposition  orders.  Summerall  received  14  days  for  his  first  violation  -  



consuming alcohol; 75 days followed by up to 6 months in a  Community Residential  



Center  (CRC)  for  his  second  violation  -  using  methamphetamine  and  refusing  to  



provide a urine sample; and 180 days for his third violation  -  using marijuana and  



again using methamphetamine.  



                 In January 2022, the court held a combined adjudication and disposition  



hearing on Summerall's fourth petition to revoke probation. At this hearing, Summerall  



admitted  to  violating  his  probation  by  using  marijuana  and  methamphetamine.  The  



                                    

    39   Summerall was acquitted of second-degree murder, but the jury found him guilty of  



first-degree assault.  



                                                   -  13 -                                               2783  


----------------------- Page 14-----------------------

prosecutor explained to the court that Summerall's drug use while on probation had  



been   "pretty   consistent."   Ultimately,   the   court   revoked   Summerall's  probation,  



sentenced him to 6 months to serve, extended his probation by 1 year, and authorized  



his probation officer to admit him to CRC (substance abuse treatment) for 6 months.  



The court explained that it had "reentry concerns" relating to Summerall's drug and  



alcohol addictions. The court found that a "sufficiently lengthy period of probation"  



was  needed  to  ensure  that  Summerall  would  "have  a  successful  reentry  back  into  



society."   



               This 1-year extension of Summerall's probation was not clearly mistaken.  



As  the  court  noted,  by  extending  Summerall's  probation  by  1  year,  the  court  was  



addressing Summerall's substance abuse issues in order to further his rehabilitation. A  



period of probation would provide Summerall with both monitoring and an incentive to  



access  substance  abuse  treatment  resources  -  tools  that  could  help  him  regain  his  



sobriety.   



               When  Summerall  was  sentenced  on  the  underlying  offense,  the  court  



indicated  that  Summerall's  sobriety  was  very  important  to  the  protection  of  the  



community and to Summerall's rehabilitation. The 1-year extension of Summerall's  



probation  was  supported  by  the   Chaney  criteria,  and  was  reasonable  under  the  



circumstances. We accordingly reject Summerall's claim that the court's disposition  



order was clearly mistaken.  



        Conclusion  



               We AFFIRM the judgment of the superior court.  



                                             - 14 -                                         2783  

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