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Tolookqaqsiiq Hank v. State of Alaska (6/7/2024) ap-2779

Tolookqaqsiiq Hank v. State of Alaska (6/7/2024) ap-2779

                                                          NOTICE  

          The text of this opinion can be corrected before the opinion is published in the  

          Pacific Reporter. Readers are encouraged to bring typographical or other formal  

          errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts:  

            

                                      303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501  

                                                  Fax: (907) 264-0878  

                                         E-mail: corrections@akcourts.gov  

            

            

                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA  

  

  

TOLOOKQAQSIIQ HANK,                                                    

                                                                            Court of Appeals No. A-13652  

                                       Appellant,                        Trial Court No. 3AN- 19-00787 CR  

                                                                       

  

                              v.                                       

                                                                                         O P I N I O N  

STATE OF ALASKA,                                                       

  

                                                                       

                                       Appellee.                                No. 2779 - June 7, 2024  

  

                                                                       

  

                    Appeal  from  the   Superior  Court,  Third  Judicial  District,  

                    Anchorage, William F. Morse, Judge.  

                      

                    Appearances: Marianna C. Carpeneti, Carpeneti Law Office,  

                    LLC, Homer (opening brief) and Daniel Westerburg, Attorney  

                    at Law, Green Valley, Arizona (reply brief, oral argument, and  

                    supplemental brief), under contracts with the Office of Public  

                    Advocacy, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Diane L. Wendlandt  

                    (initial   brief)     and   Hazel   C.         Blum       (oral   argument         and  

                    supplemental  brief),  Assistant  Attorneys  General,  Office  of  

                    Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney  

                    General, Juneau, for the Appellee.   

                      

                    Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Harbison and Terrell, Judges.   

                      

                    Judge ALLARD.  

                      



                    Tolookqaqsiiq Hank was convicted, following a jury trial, of third-degree  



weapons misconduct (felon in possession) after his stepmother found him sleeping next  


----------------------- Page 2-----------------------

  



               1 

to a pistol.  Prior to trial, Hank's attorney stated that Hank would stipulate to two of the  



three elements required to prove felon in possession. Specifically, Hank would stipulate  



that he had previously been convicted of a felony and that he was aware that he had  



previously  been  convicted  of  a  felony.  Hank's  attorney  explained  that  Hank  was  



stipulating  to  these  facts  for  "strategic  reasons"  in  order  to  prevent  the  jury  from  



learning about the nature of his prior convictions.  



                  The  prosecutor  agreed  to  the  stipulation,  provided  that  the  court  made  



clear that the stipulation constituted proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements  



covered  by  the  stipulation.  Hank's  attorney  agreed,  and  the  superior  court  later  



instructed the jury that it "must" accept the stipulated facts as true. The jury ultimately  



convicted Hank, rejecting his defense that he did not knowingly possess the pistol. At  



sentencing, the court imposed a sentence of two years to serve, which was the lowest  



sentence within the applicable presumptive range.  



                  Hank  raises  two  arguments  on  appeal.  First,  he  contends  that  it  was  



structural  error  for  the  superior  court  to  instruct  the  jury  on  the  parties'  stipulation  



without first obtaining his personal waiver of his right to a jury trial on the two elements  



of the offense that would be established by the stipulation. Second, Hank argues that  



the  superior  court  plainly  erred  at  sentencing  by  failing  to  find,  sua  sponte,  the  



mitigating factor described by AS 12.55.155(d)(9) - i.e., that his conduct was among  



the least serious within the definition of the offense. For the reasons explained here, we  



reject both claims of error and we affirm Hank's conviction and sentence.   



                    



          Underlying facts and prior proceedings   



                  At  the  time  of  the  incident,  Hank  was  staying  with  his  father  and  



stepmother,  and  was  sleeping  on  the  floor  of  their  living  room.  According  to  the  



testimony at trial, when his stepmother woke up to get one of her children ready for  



                                       

     1   AS 11.61.200(a)(1).  



                                                        - 2 -                                                    2779  


----------------------- Page 3-----------------------

  



school, she saw that Hank had a pistol lying on the floor next to him. She woke up Hank  



and  told him  to put  the gun  away  because  she was worried  about  the  safety of  her  



children. Instead, Hank rolled over to cover up the gun. Hank's stepmother then texted  



a person about the gun, who in turn called the police.  



                  When the police arrived, they woke up Hank and found a pistol in a hat  



on the floor where Hank had been sleeping. Later, when Hank was searched at the jail,  



officers  found  five  bullets  in  his  pockets  that  matched  the  caliber  of  the  gun.  Both  



Hank's stepmother and his father testified that neither kept guns in the house.  



                  Hank  testified  in  his own defense. In his  testimony, Hank denied  ever  



knowingly possessing the firearm. Hank claimed that the first time he saw the gun was  



when the police woke him up. Hank's defense was that his stepmother had planted the  



gun on him so that he would be sent back to jail.  



                  The  jury  rejected  this  defense  and  found  Hank  guilty  of  third-degree  



weapons  misconduct.  At  sentencing,  the  defense  attorney  did  not  propose  any  



mitigating  factors  and  the  superior  court  found  none.  The  court  sentenced  Hank  to  



                                                                                                            2 

2 years to serve, the minimum sentence under the applicable presumptive range.   



                  This appeal followed.  



                    



         Hank's argument  that  it  was  structural  error  for  the  superior  court  to  

         instruct the jury that they must accept the stipulated facts as true without  

        first obtaining Hank's personal jury trial waiver    



                  To  prove  Hank  guilty  of  third-degree  weapons  misconduct  (felon  in  



possession), the State was required to prove the following elements beyond a reasonable  



doubt:  (1)  Hank  knowingly  possessed  a  firearm  capable  of  being  concealed  on  his  



                                      

     2   As a third felony offender convicted of a class C felony, Hank faced a presumptive  

range of 2 to 5 years to serve. See former AS 12.55.125(e)(3) (July 12, 2016 through July 8,  

2019).  



                                                       - 3 -                                                   2779  


----------------------- Page 4-----------------------

  



person; (2) Hank had previously been convicted of a felony; and (3) Hank was aware  



                                                                                                      3 

of, or recklessly disregarded the fact that he had been convicted of a felony.   



                  Prior to trial, Hank's attorney stated that Hank would stipulate that he had  



previously  been  convicted  of  a  felony.  She  stated  she  was  stipulating  for  "strategic  



reasons" - so that the jury would not hear any details about his prior convictions. The  



prosecutor stated that Hank would also have to stipulate that he was aware that he had  

a prior felony conviction.4 Hank's attorney agreed that Hank would stipulate to this fact  



as well. The prosecutor further stated that the State would agree to a stipulation only if  



the language of the stipulation made clear that the stipulation satisfied those elements  



beyond a reasonable doubt. Hank's attorney agreed to this. The jury was subsequently  



instructed that the parties had stipulated that Hank had a prior  felony  conviction  and  



that he was aware of that conviction, and therefore the jury "must" accept these facts as  



true. The prosecutor also told the jurors during closing arguments that they "d[id not]  



need to deliberate" on the elements that were covered by the stipulation because those  



elements were "already proven beyond reasonable doubt" through the stipulation.  



                  Hank  did  not  object  to  this  course  of  action  during  the  trial  court  



proceedings.  Nor  is  there  anything  in  the  record  to  suggest  that  Hank  was  in  



disagreement  with  the  strategic  decision  to  stipulate  to  these  elements.  But  Hank  



nevertheless argues for the first time on appeal that it was error for the court to instruct  



the  jury  that  it  "must"  accept  the  stipulated  facts  as  true  without  first  obtaining  his  



personal jury trial waiver . He further argues that the failure to obtain his personal jury  



trial waiver was structural error - that is, it was error that requires automatic reversal  



                                      

     3   See AS 11.61.200(a)(1); Afcan v. State , 711 P.2d 1198, 1199 (Alaska App. 1986)  



("As an aspect of the mens rea requirement  in this case, it was necessary for the state to  

establish that [the defendant] was aware of or recklessly disregarded the fact that he had  

been convicted of a felony.").  



     4   See Afcan, 711 P.2d at 1199.   



                                                       - 4 -                                                  2779  


----------------------- Page 5-----------------------

  



of  his  conviction  regardless  of  whether  he  actually  disagreed  with  his  attorney's  



decision to stipulate, or whether that decision caused him prejudice.   



                   Hank's argument partly rests on his assumption that a defense attorney's  



stipulation to facts that establish an element of a criminal offense necessarily qualifies  



as a defendant's waiver of the right to a jury trial on that element, such that a personal  



colloquy  with  the  defendant  is  required  under  Alaska  law.  But  we  have  previously  



                                                                                         5 

rejected such an assumption in a number of published decisions.    



                   The first time we rejected this type of claim was more than twenty-five  

years ago in Ross v. State .6 In that case, we clarified that "a defendant's willingness to  



stipulate to prior convictions does not answer the question of who will be the trier of  

fact on this element of the crime."7 As we explained,   



                   Criminal  cases  are  decided  by  jury  unless  the  defendant  

                   waives the right to jury trial and the government consents to  

                   have the case tried to the court. In a jury trial, even when the  

                   parties reach a stipulation concerning the  defendant's prior  

                   convictions, the stipulation will be presented to the jury, and  

                                                                                        [8] 

                   the jury will decide the prior convictions element.                      



                                                                                                                       9 

                   We relied on this same reasoning in a more recent case, Marshall v. State .   



Marshall  involved  a  defendant  who  was  charged  with  failure  to  register  as  a  sex  

offender.10 At trial, Marshall's defense attorney stipulated to the fact that Marshall was  



required to register as a sex offender in order to prevent the jury from learning that  



                                       

     5   See Marshall v. State, 436 P.3d 1065 (Alaska App. 2018); Ross v. State, 950 P.2d  



587 (Alaska App. 1997); Tallent v. State, 951 P.2d 857 (Alaska App. 1997).   



     6   Ross, 950 P.2d at 591.  



     7   Id.  



     8   Id.  



     9   Marshall , 436 P.3d at 1068-69.  



     10   Id. at 1067.  



                                                         - 5 -                                                    2779  


----------------------- Page 6-----------------------

  



Marshall's prior sex offense was for sexual abuse of a minor.11  Like Hank, Marshall  



obtained the benefit of this stipulation at trial only to argue on appeal that his conviction  



should  be  reversed  because  the  court  accepted  the  stipulation  without  obtaining  a  

personal waiver from Marshall. 12 Also like Hank, Marshall argued that the absence of  



a personal waiver was structural error requiring automatic reversal of his conviction,  



                                 13 

regardless of prejudice.              



                   We  rejected  this  argument  based  on  our  reasoning  in  Ross .  As  we  



explained, "there is a distinction between a defendant stipulating to facts at a jury trial  

and a defendant waiving his right to a jury trial on those  same facts."14  Noting that  



Marshall's jury was instructed on all of the elements of the crime, including the element  



that was the subject of the stipulation, we concluded that  a personal waiver was not  



                                                                       15 

required because the jury remained the fact finder.                         



                   In Marshall, we acknowledged that the prosecutor had argued to the jury  



that "the State does not need to prove [the first element], with the stipulation," but we  



concluded that the prosecutor's statement (which was not objected to) was an inartful  



way of expressing what was otherwise true - which was that the stipulation was proof  



                                                                                                                    16 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the State was entitled to rely on to meet its burden.                                    



                   This case is very similar to Marshall . Like in Marshall , the jury in Hank's  



case was instructed on all of the elements of felon in possession, including the elements  



                                       

     11   Id.  



     12   Id. at 1067-68.  



     13   See id. at 1069.  



     14   Id. at 1068.  



     15   Id. at 1068-69.  



     16   Id. at 1068.  



                                                         - 6 -                                                     2779  


----------------------- Page 7-----------------------

  



that had been stipulated to by the defense. The jury was also instructed on the State's  



burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  



                  On  appeal,  Hank  seeks  to  distinguish  Marshall  from  his  case  on  the  



ground that Marshall  did not involve a mandatory  stipulation instruction. The jury in  



Marshall was instructed only that the parties had "agreed" or "stipulated" to the facts  

of the non-contested element.17 In contrast, Hank's jury was directly instructed that it  



"must" accept the stipulated facts as true. Hank argues that the mandatory stipulation  



instruction meant that the court was required to obtain a personal jury trial waiver from  



the defendant.  



                  Hank  bases  his  argument  on  two  separate  grounds.  The  first  is  some  



inartful language in Marshall . In describing the jury instructions in Marshall, we noted  



that  "at  no  time was the  jury  instructed  that  the  stipulation relieved  the State  of  its  



burden of proving this element. And  at no time was the jury told that, because of the  



                                                                                                           18 

stipulation, the jurors did not need to deliberate on this element of the offense."                             



                  Hank argues that his case is distinguishable from Marshall  because the  



prosecutor in his case told the jury that they did not need to "deliberate" on the elements  



covered by the stipulation because the elements had been "proven" by the stipulation.  



But this (unobjected-to) statement is similar to the (also unobjected-to) statement by the  



prosecutor in Marshall . In neither case was the State "relieved" of its burden of proving  



                                                                                                                   19 

the elements; rather the stipulation functioned as the State's proof of those elements.                                



Likewise, even when the jury is instructed that it "must" accept a stipulation as true, it  



                                      

     17   Id. at 1067-68.  



     18   Id.  



     19   See id.  at 1068 ("[T]he prosecutor was not arguing that the State did not have a  



burden to prove the first element beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, the prosecutor was  

pointing out that the stipulation was evidence and that the State was entitled to rely on this  

evidence to meet its evidentiary burden on that element.").  



                                                       - 7 -                                                   2779  


----------------------- Page 8-----------------------

  



is still the case that the jury remains as the fact finder, and it is the jury (not a judge)  



                                                                                         20 

who ultimately finds the defendant guilty in such circumstances.                               



                   Hank's case is therefore distinguishable from the cases that he cites in  



support of his argument that the superior court needed to obtain Hank's personal jury  



trial waiver before instructing the jury with a mandatory stipulation instruction. In his  

briefing, Hank  cites to two cases - Hutton v.  State21  and Lane v. State22 -  that he  



asserts stand for the proposition that a trial court must obtain a defendant's personal  



jury trial waiver whenever an element of an offense is "taken away" from the jury. But  



in both cases, the element actually was literally "taken away" from the jury in the sense  

that the judge replaced the jury as fact finder.23 That is why a personal jury trial waiver  



was required under Alaska law.   



                   In Hutton v. State, for example, the defendant's trial for being a felon in  

possession was bifurcated.24  During the first portion of the trial, the jury determined,  



inter alia, that Hutton had possessed a firearm.25  The parties then discussed whether  



Hutton would proceed to a jury trial on the remaining elements of the charge, namely  

whether he had been convicted of a felony.26 Hutton ultimately admitted to the element  



                                       

     20   See id.  ("In a jury trial, even when the parties reach a stipulation concerning [an  

element  of  the  offense],  the  stipulation  will  be  presented  to  the  jury  and  the  jury  will  

decide." (alterations in original) (quoting Ross v. State, 950 P.2d 587, 591 (Alaska App.  

 1997))).  



     21   Hutton v. State, 350 P.3d 793 (Alaska 2015).  



     22   Lane v. State , 382 P.3d 1188 (Alaska App. 2016).  



     23   Hutton, 350 P.3d at 794-95; Lane , 382 P.3d at 1191.  



     24   Hutton, 350 P.3d at 794.  



     25   Id.  



     26   Id.  



                                                         - 8 -                                                    2779  


----------------------- Page 9-----------------------

  



and waived his right to a jury trial, accepting the trial judge as fact finder.27 On appeal,  



the Alaska Supreme Court reversed because Hutton had not been notified that the State  



was  actually  required  to  prove  an  additional  element:  that  he  knew  or  recklessly  

disregarded  the  fact  that  he  had  been  convicted  of  a  felony.28  The  supreme  court  



concluded that in the absence of notice as to this element, Hutton's waiver was not  



valid.  



                   In Lane v. State , the defendant was convicted of various crimes after a jury  

trial.29  His attorney then asked the  superior court  to make a post-verdict finding that  



Lane was "guilty but mentally ill."30  A "guilty but mentally ill" verdict requires an  



additional  "finding  of  fact  over  and  above  the  specific  elements  of  the  defendant's  



crime" - namely, that "because of mental disease or defect, the defendant 'lacked the  



substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct or to conform  

their conduct to the requirements of law.'"31 The court made the requested finding after  



a brief colloquy with the defendant, in which the defendant indicated that he did not  



                                                                  32 

understand what his attorney was talking about.                       



                   On appeal, this Court noted that it was not clear how to categorize the  



attorney's post-trial request for a "guilty but mentally ill" verdict, and that it could be  



categorized as either (1) an offer to enter a post-trial plea or (2) an offer to have Lane  



waive his right to a jury trial on the additional finding that distinguishes a "guilty but  



                                       

     27   Id. at 794-95.  



     28   Id. at 798-99.  



     29   Lane v. State , 382 P.3d 1188, 1189 (Alaska App. 2016).  



     30   Id.  



     31   Id. at 1191 (quoting State v. Clifton, 315 P.3d 694, 700-01 (Alaska App. 2013)).   



     32   Id. at 1190-91.  



                                                         - 9 -                                                    2779  


----------------------- Page 10-----------------------

  



mentally ill" verdict from a verdict of "guilty."33 But we concluded it was not necessary  



to resolve this question because we concluded the court was required to obtain Lane's  



"personal and knowing approval of the defense attorney's proposed waiver" in either  



       34 

case.      



                   Hank also cites to Tallent v. State in support of his claim that a mandatory  



stipulation  instruction  on  one  or  more  elements  requires  an  on-the-record  personal  

waiver from the defendant.35 But Tallent is also inapposite. In Tallent, this Court noted:  



"[T]he fact that a defendant's prior convictions might be proved by stipulation (rather  



than  through  the  introduction  of  testimony  and/or  documents)  does  not  resolve  the  



question of whether the jury or the trial judge will be the trier of fact on the issue of the  

prior convictions."36 This Court then cited to an Alaska Supreme Court case, Mead v.  



State, as an example of a case in which the defendant's prior conviction was addressed  



through a stipulation, but the stipulation was given to  the jury and the jury therefore  

remained  the  trier  of  fact  on  the  stipulated  element.37  (Although  Tallent  does  not  



expressly  note  this,  it  is  worth  noting  that  the  stipulation  instruction  in  Mead  was  

mandatory, not permissive.38) This Court then contrasted the stipulation in Mead , where  



the jury remained the fact finder, with  a situation  in which the defendant personally  



                                       

     33   Id. at 1191-92.  



     34   Id. at 1191.  



     35   Tallent v. State, 951 P.2d 857 (Alaska App. 1997).  



     36   Id. at 863.  



     37   Id. (citing Mead v. State , 445 P.2d 229, 234 (Alaska 1968)).  



     38   See id.; Mead , 445 P.2d at 234.  



                                                         - 10 -                                                    2779  


----------------------- Page 11-----------------------

  



waived their right to a jury trial and "consent[ed] to have the trial judge decide the  



                                              39 

question of the prior conviction."                 



                   Hank is therefore incorrect when he claims that Alaska law supports his  



arguments. On the contrary, to the extent that Alaska case law exists in this area, it  



suggests that personal jury trial waivers are required when the judge replaces the jury  



as fact finder but are not required in the stipulation context, regardless of whether the  



stipulation instruction is permissive or mandatory in nature.   



                   The  second  ground  for  Hank's  claim  -  that  a  mandatory  stipulation  



instruction can constitute structural error if it is not accompanied by a personal jury trial  



waiver - is a series of judicial notice cases issued by this Court in the late 1980s and  

early 1990s: Smallwood v. State,40 Rae v. State,41 and Fielding v. State .42 In those cases,  



we held that it was structural error for the trial court to take conclusive judicial notice  

of an element of the offense.43 In Rae v. State, for example, we reversed the defendant's  



conviction for driving while license revoked because the superior court took conclusive  

judicial  notice  of  the  fact  that  the  defendant's  license  had  been  revoked .44  As  we  



explained, the court's instruction to the jury that it "must" accept the judicially noticed  



facts as conclusively proven violated Alaska Evidence Rule 203(c) and "deprive[d] the  



                                       

     39   Tallent, 951 P.2d at 863.  



     40   Smallwood v. State, 781 P.2d 1000 (Alaska App. 1989).  



     41   Rae v. State, 884 P.2d 163 (Alaska App. 1994).  



     42   Fielding v. State, 842 P.2d 614 (Alaska App. 1992).  



     43   Smallwood, 781 P.2d at 1004-05; Rae, 884 P.2d at 167; Fielding, 842 P.2d at 615- 



 16.  



     44   Rae, 884 P.2d at 166-67.  



                                                        - 11 -                                                   2779  


----------------------- Page 12-----------------------

  



defendant of his right to be convicted only upon a jury's finding of proof beyond a  



                          45 

reasonable doubt."             



                   But  in Marshall, we distinguished this line of cases on the ground that  

they  involved  judicially  noticed  facts  rather  than  stipulated  facts.46  This  distinction  



between judicially noticed facts and stipulated facts is reflected in the rules of evidence  



and in the current criminal pattern jury instructions.   



                   Alaska Evidence Rule 203(c) states that "[i]n a criminal case, the court  



shall instruct the jury that it may, but it is not required to, accept as conclusive any fact  



ju dicially noticed." The current criminal pattern jury instruction follows this rule and  



states:   



                   When certain facts are generally known, or can be accurately  

                   determined from a reliable source, the law permits me to take  

                  judicial notice of those facts.    



                   I have taken judicial notice of the following fact[s]: (State  

                   the fact[s] being judicially noticed). You may conclude that  

                   [this fact is][these facts are] true, but you are not required to  

                           [47] 

                   do so.        



In  contrast,  the  criminal  pattern  jury  instruction  for  stipulated  facts  uses  mandatory  



language:   



                   The prosecution and the defense have agreed, or stipulated,  

                   to the following fact[s]: [State the stipulated fact[s].]. Both  

                   parties accept these facts as true. Because there is no dispute  

                                                                                           [48] 

                   about these facts, you also must accept them as true.                         



                                       

     45   Id. at 167.  



     46   Marshall v. State , 436 P.3d 1065, 1069 (Alaska App. 2018).  



     47   Alaska Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 1.16A (2012).  



     48   Alaska Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 1.16B (2012).  



                                                        - 12 -                                                    2779  


----------------------- Page 13-----------------------

  



                   The  "use note"  for the pattern jury  instruction does not assert that trial  



                                                                                                                    49 

courts must obtain a personal on-the record waiver before giving the instruction.                                        



                   The distinction between judicially noticed facts and stipulated facts is also  

reflected in our recent decision, Alvarado v. State .50 Alvarado involved a defendant who  



was charged with multiple counts of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor and incest for  



conduct involving his six-year-old  daughter. One of the elements that the State was  



required to prove  for each count was that the defendant was either over sixteen years  

old  or  over  eighteen  years  old  at  the  time  of  the  offense.51  At  trial,  the  prosecutor  



                                                                                                                           52 

requested that the superior court "take  'judicial notice '" of the defendant's birthdate.                                     



This was technically error because a birthdate on a pleading is not the kind of fact that  

can be judicially noticed.53 However, the defense attorney agreed that the court could  



take  judicial  notice  of  the  defendant's  birthdate,  and  the  attorney  confirmed  the  

birthdate  for  the  court.54  The  superior  court  subsequently  instructed  the  jury  using  



mandatory language. The jury was instructed, "Because that is judicial notice, you shall  



take that as a proven fact that the defendant was born February 2, 1975. That's not an  

issue."55  The  defense  attorney  did  not  object  to  this  conclusive  judicial  notice  



                 56 

instruction.          



                                        

     49   See id.  



     50   Alvarado v. State , 440 P.3d 329, 331-34 (Alaska App. 2019).  



     51   Id. at 331.  



     52   Id.  



     53   Id. at 332-33.  



     54   Id. at 331.  



     55   Id.  



     56   Id.  



                                                          - 13 -                                                       2779  


----------------------- Page 14-----------------------

  



                   However,  on  appeal,  the  defendant  argued  that  the  conclusive  judicial  



notice  instruction  constituted  structural  error  and  required  automatic  reversal  of  his  



conviction. We acknowledged that there were cases where we had held that a conclusive  

judicial notice instruction constituted structural error. 57 But we distinguished Alvarado  



from those cases on the ground that the defense attorney had conceded the truth of the  

"judicially noticed" fact in Alvarado .58  As we explained, in this circumstance, "[t]he  



court's primary error . . . was in using the words  'judicial notice ' to describe what it  

was doing when, in truth,  [the fact]  had been stipulated to by both parties."59  Chief  



Judge Mannheimer concurred in the judgment, concluding that there had been no error  



because the instruction should be viewed as a stipulation instruction despite the label  



the parties and judge had given it, and therefore "the judge could properly tell the jurors  



                                                                                        60 

that they should consider this [fact] to be conclusively proved."                           



                   Our reasoning in Alvarado is therefore predicated on the assumption that  



a trial court may properly instruct the jury on a stipulation using mandatory language  



and that doing so does not require a personal jury trial waiver from the defendant.    



                   This   is   not   to   say   that   a   personal   waiver   would   necessarily   be  



inappropriate  in  the  stipulation  context.  As  we  explained  in  Marshall,  there  are  



jurisdictions  that  require  a  personal  waiver  from  the  defendant  before  accepting  

stipulations that essentially amount to a guilty plea.61 There are also jurisdictions that  



                                       

     57   Id. at 332.  



     58   Id. at 332-33.  



     59   Id. at 333.  



     60   Id. at 337 (Mannheimer, C.J., concurring).  



     61   Marshall v. State , 436 P.3d 1065, 1069 n.16 (Alaska App. 2018) (collecting cases).  



                                                        - 14 -                                                    2779  


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prohibit trial courts from accepting stipulations to which the defendant has expressly  



                62 

objected.            



                       In his reply brief, Hank cites to various jurisdictions that require the trial  



court to obtain on-the-record personal waiver from the defendant before the jury can be  

instructed on a stipulation that covers an element of the charged offense.63 But there are  



                                                                                               64 

also many jurisdictions that do not require such waivers.                                            



                                               

      62   Id. at 1069 n.17 (collecting cases).  



      63   See, e.g., Brown v. State, 719 So.  2d 882, 889 (Fla. 1998); State v. Lee, 977 P.2d  



263, 271 (Kan. 1999); State v. Nichols, 541 S.E.2d 310, 323 (W. Va. 1999), superseded on  

other grounds by rule, W. Va. R. Evid. 701; Ferguson v. State , 210 S.W.3d 53, 57-58 (Ark.  

2005); State v. Murray, 169 P.3d 955, 964 (Haw. 2007).   



           We  note  that  Hank  appears  to  have  incorrectly  included  Illinois  as  one  of  the  

jurisdictions that require s a personal colloquy. Hank cites to an intermediate appellate court  

decision that suggests that trial courts should require a personal colloquy. See People v.  

Peete,  743  N.E.2d  689,  695  (Ill.  App.  2001).  But  he  ignores  later  case  law  from  the  

 Supreme  Court  of  Illinois  that  more  squarely  holds  that  a  personal  colloquy  is  only  

necessary "when counsel's stipulations render defendant's trial the 'practical equivalent of  

a plea of guilty.'" People v. Phillips, 840 N.E.2d 1194, 1203 (Ill. 2005) (citations omitted).   



           Hank also cites to a Colorado case, People v. Oliver, 452 P.3d 112, 117 n.3 (Colo.  

App. 2018), that does not appear to be on point. The procedural posture in  Oliver is very  

 similar to the procedural posture of Hutton, in that the jury entered an answer to a special  

interrogatory  but  was  never  instructed  on  the  stipulated  element  and  did  not  find  the  

defendant guilty of the charged offense. Id.  at  115-17; see also Hutton v. State, 350 P.3d  

793, 794 (Alaska 2015). Under those circumstances, we would agree that a personal jury  

trial waiver is required. But this is different from the procedural posture of Hank's case,  

where the jury was instructed on all of the elements of the charged offense and it was the  

jury (not the judge) who found Hank guilty of the offense. We also note that the court in  

 Oliver  expressly states that "Colorado law suggests counsel can stipulate to an element,"  

and it cites approvingly to state and federal cases where the courts have allowed counsel to  

 stipulate without requiring a personal colloquy from the defendant. Oliver, 452 P.3d at 116- 

 17.   



      64   See, e.g.,  United States v. Ferreboeuf, 632 F.2d 832, 836 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding  



that a defense attorney has implied authority for stipulation of element but cannot stipulate  

over a defendant's objection); Poole v. United States, 832 F.2d 561, 564 (11th Cir. 1987)  

(holding  that  stipulation  to  an  element  that  a  bank  was  federally  insured  is  a  tactical  



  



                                                                    - 15 -                                                               2779  


----------------------- Page 16-----------------------

  



                  Reviewing the case law from other jurisdictions, it appears that whether  



to require an on-the-record personal waiver before accepting a defense stipulation is  



ultimately  a  policy  call  on  which  jurisdictions  differ.  At  its  heart,  an  on-the-record  

personal waiver is a prophylactic measure.65 It is designed to ensure that the defendant  



is in agreement with their defense attorney's concession(s), and it promotes judicial  



economy by avoiding challenges to the validity of stipulations on appeal or in post- 



conviction relief.   



                  But  as  Professor  LaFave  writes,  "the  criminal  justice  process  cannot  



                                                                                                                 66 

readily require an open court waiver as to all rights that it deems 'fundamental.'"                                  



Requiring a personal colloquy with the defendant comes at a cost, especially if it occurs  



in  the  middle  of  trial:  it  may  slow  down  and  confuse  trial  proceedings,  disrupt  the  



                                     

decision that counsel is entitled to make); United States v. Hicks, 495 F. App'x 633, 643- 

44 (6th Cir. 2012) (concluding  that a personal colloquy  is  only required if  a stipulation  

amounts to a guilty plea); People v. Adams, 862 P.2d 831, 839 (Cal.  1993) (holding that  

whereas a personal colloquy is required for a guilty plea, it is not required for evidentiary  

stipulations that are not tantamount to a guilty plea); People v. Phillips, 840 N.E.2d 1194,  

1203 (Ill. 2005) (holding that a personal colloquy is only required if the stipulation is the  

"practical equivalent of a plea of guilty");  Commonwealth v. Walorz, 944 N.E.2d 1061,  

1065 (Mass. App. 2011) (concluding that no colloquy was required where the stipulation  

was  insufficient  by  itself  to  sustain  a  conviction  for  the  charged  offense);  State  v.  

Humphries, 336 P.3d 1121, 1124-25 (Wash. 2014) (en banc) (holding that a  stipulation  

cannot be accepted over defendant's objection, but that no personal colloquy is otherwise  

required); see also State v. Hochrein, 303 P.3d 1249, 1254-55 (Idaho App. 2013) (finding  

no plain error where a court did not conduct a personal colloquy because it was not obvious  

error); State v. Roman, 356 P.3d 185, 188 (Utah App. 2015) (dismissing the defendant's  

argument that a personal colloquy was required because the argument was not preserved  

and was not plain error).   



     We note that there are some federal cases that do not require personal colloquies even  

though  they  seemingly  adopt  Hank's  view  that  an  elemental  stipulation  waives  the  

defendant's right to a jury trial on that element. See, e.g., United States v. Mason, 85 F.3d  

471 (10th Cir. 1996).    



     65   See People v. Cross, 347 P.3d 1130, 1132 (Cal. 2015).  



     66   3 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 11.6(c), at 931 (4th ed. 2015).  



                                                      - 16 -                                                 2779  


----------------------- Page 17-----------------------

  



attorney-client  relationship,  and,  if  the  remedy  for  failing  to  conduct  a  colloquy  is  



automatic reversal, result in a windfall to defendants by requiring courts to conduct new  



trials even when the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently agreed to their  

attorney's  actions.67  Deciding  whether  to  require  an  on-the-record  waiver  of  a  



defendant's personal right requires courts to balance these competing concerns.  



                       Balancing those concerns here, we agree with the Washington Supreme  



Court and the Ninth Circuit, which have held that a stipulation to an element, unlike a  



guilty  plea  or  a  pretrial  waiver  of  the  right  to  a  jury  trial,  does  "not  need  to  be  



                                                                                                                                                    68 

accompanied by a colloquy on the record between the defendant and the trial court."                                                                      



The courts explained, "Such a rule would needlessly delay and confuse the conduct of  

a typical trial."69 Instead, "when a stipulation is agreed to by the defendant's attorney  



in  the  presence  of  the  defendant,  the  trial  court  may  presume  that  the  defendant  



                                                                                                                                 70 

consents, unless the defendant objects at the time the stipulation is made."                                                           



                       We conclude that this is an appropriate rule because defense stipulations  



generally concern facts about which no reasonable person could disagree and for which  



allowing the State to present affirmative evidence would pose a risk of serious prejudice  



to  the  defendant  (e.g.,  whether  the  defendant  has  previously  been  convicted  of  a  

crime).71   Although   some   defendants   may   refuse   to   stipulate   even   under   these  



                                                

      67   See id.  



      68   Humphries, 336 P.3d at 1124-25; see also Ferreboeuf, 632 F.2d at 836 ("Appellant  

asks that we make a rule requiring the trial court to question defendants personally as to  

the voluntariness of any stipulation of a crucial fact. This we decline to do.").  



      69   Ferreboeuf, 632 F.2d at 836.   



      70   Humphries, 336 P.3d at 1125.  



      71   See, e.g., Marshall v. State , 436 P.3d 1065, 1066 (Alaska App. 2018) (requirement  

to register as a sex offender); Alto v. State , 64 P.3d 141, 146 (Alaska App. 2003) (prior  

offense was a felony);  Tallent v. State, 951 P.2d 857, 859 (Alaska App. 1997) (existence  



  



                                                                      - 17 -                                                                   2779  


----------------------- Page 18-----------------------

  



circumstances,  there  is  little  reason  to  believe  this  is  sufficiently  likely  to  justify  



requiring an on-the-record colloquy in every case.   



                  For these reasons, we hold that a court may accept a mandatory stipulation  



without first obtaining the defendant's on-the-record waiver as long as the stipulation  



does not effectively amount to a guilty plea and there is no indication in the record that  



the defendant disagrees with the decision to stipulate. We therefore reject Hank's claim  



that it was structural error for the court to accept the mandatory stipulation without first  



obtaining a personal waiver from Hank.  



  



         Why we conclude that Hank's conduct was not among the least serious  

         included in the definition of the offense  



                  At sentencing, Hank did not propose any mitigating factors. But on appeal,  



Hank contends that the superior court made findings during the sentencing hearing that  



supported the mitigating factor described by AS 12.55.155(d)(9) - that "the conduct  



constituting the offense was among the least serious conduct included in the definition  



of the offense." Specifically, the court stated:  



                  The particular charge is, you know, is modest. Misconduct  

                  Involving Weapons in the third degree, you know, a felon in  

                  possession is, you know - it's just you were asleep on top  

                  of  a  gun.  I  mean  there  was  no  use  of  it,  there  was  no  

                  brandishing of it, there was no nothing. So the crime itself  

                  was -  I won't say. If I had just the behavior of the crime  

                  itself, it would be amongst the least serious.  



                  The court went on to say that, given Hank's extensive history of assaults,  



it still viewed the crime as requiring significant isolation. On appeal, Hank argues that  



the court plainly erred by not sua sponte finding the "least serious" mitigating factor.  



                                      

of prior conviction); Ross v. State, 950 P.2d 587, 589  (Alaska App.  1997) (existence of  

prior convictions).   



                                                      -  18 -                                                 2779  


----------------------- Page 19-----------------------

                 As a general matter, whether the conduct underlying an offense is among  



                                                                                                          72 

the least serious conduct included in the definition of the offense is a question of law.                     



We have reviewed the record, and we conclude that the evidence presented at trial did  



not establish that Hank's conduct was among the least serious conduct included in the  



definition of the offense.  It is true that Hank was asleep for much of the time that he  



was possessing the gun during the relevant incident. But he also continued to possess  



the gun after his stepmother asked him to put it away, and he remained in possession of  



it when the police arrived. Moreover, the testimony that no one kept a gun in the house  



provided circumstantial evidence that Hank brought it into the house with him. And he  



did not secure the gun in a safe place that was out of reach of the children who he knew  



were   in   the   home.   Hank's   conduct   therefore   falls   within   the   relatively   broad  



presumptive  middle  ground  of  conduct  that  the  crime  of  third-degree  weapons  



                        73 

misconduct covers.          



         Conclusion  



                 The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.  



    72   See Michael v. State , 115 P.3d 517, 519 (Alaska 2005) (holding  that the correct  

standard of review for the application of statutory aggravating and mitigating factors is de  

novo review).  



    73   See State v. Parker, 147 P.3d 690, 695 (Alaska 2006) (explaining that aggravating  



and mitigating factors "identify[] relatively narrow circumstances that tend to make a given  

case atypical and place it outside the relatively broad presumptive middle ground" (quoting  

Knight v. State, 855 P.2d 1347, 1349 (Alaska App. 1993))).  



                                                   - 19 -                                              2779  

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