Made available by Touch N' Go Systems, Inc. and
This was Gottstein but needs to change to what?
406 G Street, Suite 210, Anchorage, AK 99501
(907) 274-7686 fax 274-9493

You can of the Alaska Court of Appeals opinions.

Touch N' Go®, the DeskTop In-and-Out Board makes your office run smoother. Visit Touch N' Go's Website to see how.


J. M. C. Evangelista v. State of Alaska (5/31/2024) ap-2778

J. M. C. Evangelista v. State of Alaska (5/31/2024) ap-2778

                                                         NOTICE  

          The text of this opinion can be corrected before the opinion is published in the  

          Pacific Reporter. Readers are encouraged to bring typographical or other formal  

          errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts:  

            

                                     303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501  

                                                 Fax: (907) 264-0878  

                                        E-mail: corrections@akcourts.gov  

                                                                 

                                                                 

                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA  

  

  

JOSE MIGUEL CONTRERAS                                                

EVANGELISTA,                                                               Court of Appeals No. A-13636  

                                       Appellant,                       Trial Court No. 3AN-19-04920 CR  

                                                                                                  

                             v.                                                                   

                                                                                       O P I N I O N  

STATE OF ALASKA,                                                                                  

                                                                                                  

                                       Appellee.                             No. 2778 - May 31, 2024 

  



                   Appeal  from  the   Superior  Court,   Third  Judicial  District,  

                   Anchorage, Frank A. Pfiffner, Judge.  

                     

                   Appearances:   Michael  Horowitz,  Law   Office  of   Michael  

                   Horowitz, Kingsley, Michigan, under contract with the Public  

                   Defender  Agency,  and  Samantha  Cherot,  Public  Defender,  

                   Anchorage,  for  the  Appellant.  RuthAnne  Beach,  Assistant  

                   Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and  

                   Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.  

                     

                   Before: Wollenberg, Harbison, and Terrell, Judges.  

                     

                   Judge TERRELL.  

                     

                   Jose Miguel  Contreras Evangelista fired  two rounds  of gunshots at  his  



neighbors' occupied trailer home. For this conduct, a jury found Evangelista guilty of  



two  counts  of  attempted  first-degree murder,  two  counts of second-degree weapons  


----------------------- Page 2-----------------------

                                                                                                                     



                                                                       1 

misconduct, and seven counts of third-degree assault.  At sentencing, the superior court  



merged two of the assault counts into the attempted murder convictions and sentenced  



Evangelista to a composite term of 47 years with 10 years suspended (37 years to serve).   



                  Evangelista raises three claims on appeal.   



                  First, Evangelista argues that the superior court impermissibly shifted the  



burden  of proof when responding  to a jury question.  While the court's response was  



inartfully worded in  one respect,  we conclude that  the jury instructions,  as a whole,  



properly  informed  the  jury  of  the  applicable  law .  Accordingly,  we  conclude  that  



Evangelista has not demonstrated plain error.  



                  Second, Evangelista argues that the superior court violated the prohibition  



on double jeopardy when it declined to merge the second-degree weapons misconduct  



counts   into   the   convictions   for   attempted   first-degree   murder.   Because   these  



convictions constitute separate offenses under the Alaska and federal double jeopardy  



clauses, we conclude that the court was not required to merge these convictions.  



                  Finally, Evangelista claims that  the  superior  court's sentencing remarks  



were  insufficient  and  that  his  composite  sentence  is  excessive.  After  reviewing  the  



sentencing record, we conclude that neither contention has merit.   



                    



         Background facts and proceedings  



                  Rosalin Diaz  de Mercado  ("Diaz"), her husband  Ramon Mercado,  and  



their  three sons  lived in a trailer home  next door to  Evangelista.  At the time of the  



offenses,  the  Mercado-Diaz  family  and  Evangelista  had  been  neighbors  for  several  



years.  The  inception  of  their  relationship  was  friendly,  but  they  later  had  what  



Evangelista's counsel described as a "falling out." As a result, the Mercado-Diaz family  



had a security camera installed outside of their trailer, trained on Evangelista's trailer.   



                                     

     1   AS     11.41.100(a)(1)(A)         &     AS     11.31.100(a),       AS     11.61.195(a)(3)(B),        and  



AS  11.41.220(a)(1)(A), respectively.   



                                                       - 2 -                                                   2778  


----------------------- Page 3-----------------------

                                                                                                              



                 One night in May 2019 when her husband was out of town working, Diaz,  



her  three children, and  one of her children's  friends  were in bed for the night  when  



multiple rounds of gunfire struck the trailer. Diaz's oldest son, eighteen-year-old Juan  



Mercado, called 911 and reported that his neighbor was shooting at their trailer.   



                 Anchorage  Police  Officers  Aaron  Richwine  and  Noel  Senoran  were  



among the officers  dispatched, and they  entered the Mercado-Diaz trailer  upon  their  



arrival at the scene. After the officers were inside for a few minutes, a second series of  



gunshots  erupted.  Multiple  bullets  struck  the  trailer,  with  one  bullet  nearly  hitting  



Officer Richwine's face.   



                 Meanwhile, additional officers were outside the trailer. When the second  



round of shots occurred, officers saw muzzle flashes coming from Evangelista's trailer.  



Officer Jose Maldonado laid on the Mercado-Diaz family's porch with his rifle pointed  



at  Evangelista's  trailer.  Another  officer  flashed  a  light  into  Evangelista's  window,  



permitting Officer Maldonado to see a man running toward the back of the trailer.   



                 The  police  set  up  a  perimeter  around  Evangelista's  trailer  while  other  



officers evacuated the neighborhood and closed the road to prevent people from coming  



and  going.  After  unsuccessful  attempts  to  contact  Evangelista,  officers  contacted  a  



SWAT  team  for  assistance.  Following  a  nearly  five-hour  standoff,  Evangelista  



surrendered and was arrested. Officers did not find anyone else inside the trailer.   



                 Evangelista was indicted on two counts of attempted first-degree murder,  



two counts of second-degree weapons misconduct, and seven counts of third-degree  



assault.  The  attempted  murder  counts  were  for  shooting  at  Diaz  prior  to  the  police  



arriving (Count I) and for shooting at Diaz, Juan Mercado, and Officer Richwine when  



they were together inside the trailer (Count II). The second-degree weapons misconduct  



counts were for firing a round of bullets into the Mercado-Diaz trailer prior to the police  



arriving  (Count III)  and for firing into the trailer after the police arrived  (Count IV).  



The seven counts of third-degree fear assault were for recklessly causing a number of  



individual victims fear of imminent,  serious physical injury by means of a dangerous  



                                                   - 3 -                                                2778  


----------------------- Page 4-----------------------

                                                                                                             



instrument - Diaz (one count for shots fired before police arrived, and one count for  



shots fired after they arrived), her three sons, and Officers Richwine and Senoran.   



                 Evangelista's case proceeded to a jury trial. The State's witnesses testified  



to the version of events described above.  



                 Evangelista testified and denied having fired any of the shots. Evangelista  



testified that he met a man he knew only as "Jimmy" at the Anchorage Rescue Mission  



and asked Jimmy to help him fix up his trailer in exchange for money and a place to  



stay. Evangelista testified that when he came home from work, he could tell that Jimmy  



had been drinking. He and Jimmy argued over money. Evangelista testified that he went  



to  his  bedroom,  drank  several  beers,  and  took  Tylenol  PM  and  prescription  pain  



medication. He testified that he fell asleep watching a movie while wearing headphones.  



Evangelista  stated that he was unaware of what was going on outside his trailer until  



the early morning hours when the police detonated several devices outside his trailer in  



an effort to force him outside. Evangelista asserted that Jimmy was the likely shooter.  



Evangelista claimed in his closing argument that the police efforts to set up a perimeter  



were insufficient and that Jimmy had managed to escape  undetected from the trailer,  



thus explaining why police did not find anyone else in Evangelista's trailer.   



                When discussing  the jury instructions, the  superior  court  stated  that  the  



attempted first-degree murder charge in Count II raised factual unanimity concerns by  



charging conduct directed at three victims. The court explained that the State's proposed  



instruction and verdict form did not cure the problem because it did not ask the jury to  



identify which, if any, of the three named victims it found Evangelista had intended to  



murder. To address this, the court issued a verdict form that instructed the jury to circle  



the names of those victims Evangelista had targeted. The verdict form read:  



                We,     the    jury,   find    the   defendant,      JOSE      MIGUEL  

                 CONTRERAS EVANGELISTA,  



                 [Guilty or Not Guilty]   



                                                   - 4 -                                               2778  


----------------------- Page 5-----------------------

                                                                                                                   



                 of  Attempted  Murder  In  The  First  Degree  as  charged  in  

                 Count  II.  If  you  find the  defendant  guilty, please  indicate  

                 which individual or individuals the guilty verdict relates to  

                 by  circling  the  name  or  names  of  the  following  persons:  

                 Ros[a]lin Diaz, Juan Mercado, Officer Aaron Richwine.   



                 During  deliberations,  the  jury   submitted  a  note  with  three  related  



questions about the verdict form for Count II:  



                 What is  [the]  significan[ce]  of circled names in  Count II?  

                 Does the jury need to agree on all  [the] names? What is the  

                 next step for Count II if the jury agrees on at least 1or 2 of  

                 the three named persons[?]   



                 The  superior  court convened the parties and read  its proposed response.  



Evangelista did not object to the court's proposed response, which stated:   



                 In order for the jury to find the defendant guilty o n Count II,  

                 the  jury  must  find  unanimously  that  at  least  one  of  the  

                 alleged victims was the subject of attempted murder in the  

                 first degree. See Instruction No. 17[.] The court must know  

                 which  alleged  victim  or  victims  the  defendant's  conduct  

                 relates to. Hence you must circle the name of that person or  

                 persons. On the other hand, if you unanimously agree that  

                  [the] defendant did not commit attempted murder in the first  

                 degree  as  to  all  of  the  alleged  victims,  you  must  return  a  

                 verdict of not guilty on Count II.   



                 The jury  convicted Evangelista on all  charged counts. The jury circled  



Diaz's name on the Count II verdict form. The jury also found four aggravating factors.  



                 At sentencing, the  superior  court merged two of the  assault counts with  



                                                                               2 

Evangelista's convictions for attempted first-degree murder.  The court then analyzed  



the  Chaney  criteria  and  sentenced  Evangelista  on  the  remaining  nine  counts  to  a  



composite term of 47 years with 10 suspended (37 years to serve).   



                                     

    2    The  superior  court  merged  the  attempted  first-degree  murder  and  third-degree  



assault counts which were based on Evangelista's act of shooting at Diaz before the police  

arrived. The court also merged the attempted first-degree murder and third-degree assault  

counts which were based on his act of shooting Diaz after the police arrived.  



                                                      - 5 -                                                  2778  


----------------------- Page 6-----------------------

                                                                                                                       



         Why we conclude that the superior court's response to the jury's question  

         does not constitute plain error  



                  On appeal, Evangelista argues that the superior court's response to the jury  



question  regarding  the  verdict  form  for  Count  II  shifted  the  burden  of  proof  to  the  



defense and impermissibly raised the standard for acquittal. Specifically, he challenges  



the  last  sentence  of  the  court's  response,  which  stated:  "On  the  other  hand,  if  you  



unanimously agree that  [the] defendant did not commit attempted murder  in the first  



degree as to all of the alleged victims, you must return a verdict of not guilty on Count  



     3 

II."  He argues that this language wrongly implied that the jury could only acquit him  



on this count if it affirmatively found that he was innocent.  



                  "[W]hen  an  appellate  court  reviews  claims  of  error  involving  jury  



instructions, the question is not whether the challenged jury instruction might contain  



                                                        4 

language  that  could  be  misinterpreted."   Instead,  "the  question  is  whether  the  jury  



                                                                                                                    5 

instructions,  taken  as  a  whole,  properly  informed  the  jury  of  the  applicable  law."   



Furthermore,  because  Evangelista failed to object to this instruction below, he must  



                                6 

demonstrate plain error.    



                  If taken out of context, we agree that the superior court's response - that  



the  jury  should  return  a  not  guilty  verdict  if  it  "unanimously  agree[d]  that  [the]  



defendant did not commit attempted murder" - could be read to suggest that the jury  



should only return a "not guilty" verdict if it affirmatively concluded that Evangelista  



                                      

     3   Emphasis added.  



     4   Kangas v. State, 463 P.3d 189, 194 (Alaska App. 2020).  



     5   Id.  (emphasis  in  original)  (first  citing  Lynden  Inc.  v.  Walker ,  30  P.3d  609,  617  



(Alaska 2001); and then citing Baker v. State, 905 P.2d 479, 490 (Alaska App. 1995)).  



     6   Adams  v.  State ,  261  P.3d  758,  764  (Alaska  2011)  ("Plain  error  is  an  error  that  



(1) was  not  the  result  of  intelligent  waiver  or  a  tactical  decision  not  to  object ;  (2)  was  

obvious; (3) affected substantial rights; and (4) was prejudicial.").   



                                                       - 6 -                                                     2778  


----------------------- Page 7-----------------------

                                                                                                                 



was innocent. It therefore would have been better if the court had instructed the jury,  



for  example,  "If  you  unanimously  agree  that  the  State  has  failed  to  prove  the  



defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to all of the victims, you must return a  



verdict of not guilty on Count II."  



                 But the jury instructions, taken as a whole,  informed the jury that the State  



bore  the  burden  of  proving  each  element  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.  The  jury  



instructions explained the burden of proof and the presumption of innocence:  



                 To overcome the presumption of innocence, the prosecution  

                 must prove every element of the crimes charged beyond a  

                 reasonable doubt.  



                 . . .  The prosecution always has the burden of proving the  

                 defendant  guilty  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.  This  burden  

                 never  shifts  throughout  the  trial.  The  defendant  is  not  

                 required  to  prove  his  or  her  innocence  or  to  produce  any  

                 evidence at all.  



The  elements  instruction  for  the  attempted  first-degree  murder  count  also  clearly  



explained that the jury should return a "not guilty" verdict unless the jury unanimously  



agreed that the State proved  every element beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to  



at least one of the victims. And the prosecutor  explained in his closing argument that  



the State bore the burden of proving all the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.   



                 To  accept  Evangelista's  argument  on  appeal,  we  would  be  required  to  



adopt the implausible conclusion that the jury ignored these prior invocations of the  



beyond a reasonable doubt standard based on an ambiguous sentence in the court's  



response to a jury question about a separate issue. We would be required, in other words,  



to  read  the  challenged  language  in  isolation,  rather  than  in  the context  of  the  other  



instructions provided to the jury, in contravention of our well-established case law.   



                 Because the jury instructions, taken as a whole, informed the jury of the  



applicable law, Evangelista has failed to show that the court committed plain error.  



                   



  



                                                     - 7 -                                                 2778  


----------------------- Page 8-----------------------

                                                                                                                      



         Why we affirm the superior  court 's decision not  to merge the attempted  

        first -degree murder and second-degree weapons misconduct counts  



                  At sentencing, the  superior  court  considered whether  the  second-degree  



weapons misconduct counts (knowingly discharging a firearm at or in the direction of  



a dwelling)  should merge with the convictions for attempted first-degree murder, i.e.,  



whether  each  second-degree  weapons  misconduct  count   should  merge  with  the  



attempted  first-degree  murder  count  stemming  from  the  same  round  of  shots. After  



raising the issue sua sponte, the superior court declined to merge the two sets of counts,  



finding that the two statutes vindicated sufficiently different societal interests. The court  



noted  that  while  attempted  murder  narrowly  protects  against  harm  to  a  specific  



individual, weapons misconduct protects against "the more generalized risk [posed by]  



shooting into a dwelling." On appeal, Evangelista contends that this ruling violated his  



rights  under  the  Alaska  and  federal  double  jeopardy  clauses  by  imposing  multiple  



punishments for the same offense.  



                  We  begin  with  Evangelista's  claim  under  the  Alaska  Constitution.  In  



Whitton v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court announced the test for determining whether  



two separate crimes comprise a single offense under Alaska's double jeopardy clause  



                                                          7 

in Alaska Constitution Article I,  Section 9.  Under this test, courts must first compare  



the different statutes "as they apply to the facts of the case," to determine whether they  



                                                          8 

"involved differences in intent or conduct."  Next, courts must consider any differences  



                                                                                                9 

"in light of the basic interests of society to be vindicated or protected."  If differences  



between the statutes  are "significant or substantial in relation to the societal interests  



                                      

     7   Whitton v. State, 479 P.2d 302 (Alaska 1970).   



     8   Id. at 312.   



     9   Id.  



                                                       - 8 -                                                    2778  


----------------------- Page 9-----------------------

                                                                                                                   



involved," then the court may impose separate convictions.10 However, if there are no  



functional  differences  between  the  statutes,  or  if  the  differences  identified  "are  



insignificant or insubstantial," then the two statutes are considered the "same offense"  

under Alaska's double jeopardy clause.11  



                 Evangelista's convictions for attempted first-degree murder and second- 



degree weapons misconduct stem from the same acts - firing bullets at the Mercado- 



Diaz family's trailer before and after the police arrived . Evangelista was convicted of  



attempted  first-degree  murder  under AS  11.41.100(a)(1)(A)  and AS  11.31.100(a)  on  



the theory that he intended to cause another person's death and took a substantial step  



toward      that   objective.      Evangelista      was     convicted      of   second-degree         weapons  



misconduct under AS  11.61.195(a)(3)(B) on the theory that he knowingly discharged a  



firearm at or in the direction of a dwelling.  



                 Evangelista  contends  that  these  statutes  are  similar  because  they  both  



protect individuals from  either harm or the risk of harm. But these  statutes  also have  



significant  differences.  Attempted  murder  requires  that  the  defendant  act  with  the  

specific intent to kill  an individual.12  In  contrast, second-degree weapons misconduct  



does not require proof  that the defendant intended to cause harm to an individual, or  

that the dwelling was even occupied when the shooting occurred.13   



                 Indeed, the legislative history of AS 11.61.195(a)(3)(B) demonstrates that  



this  subsection  of  the  weapons  misconduct  statute  was  intended  to  address  the  



generalized threat to public safety posed by discharging firearms into buildings without  



                                     

     10   Id.; Rofkar v. State, 273 P.3d 1140, 1143 (Alaska 2012).   



     11   Whitton, 479 P.2d at 312; Rofkar, 273 P.3d at 1143.   



     12   AS 11.41.100(a)(1)(A) & AS 11.31.100(a).  



     13   See AS 11.61.195(a)(3)(B).  



                                                      - 9 -                                                  2778  


----------------------- Page 10-----------------------

                                                                                                                    



regard for the presence of people in  the  target building  or other nearby buildings.14  



When  the  legislature  amended  this  provision  in  1997  to  its  current  form,  the  bill's  



sponsor  emphasized  that  the  amended  language  would  make  it  a  felony  offense  to  



discharge a firearm into a building regardless of whether the shooter knew the building  

was occupied at the time.15 And much of the discussion in the legislature focused on  



how this  offense would encompass certain types of shootings that the assault statutes  

- which require an individual target - did not reliably cover.16   



                  Thus, while attempted murder is more narrowly focused on protecting an  



individual         from        harm,        second-degree            weapons          misconduct           under  



AS  11.61.195(a)(3)(B)  more  broadly  focuses  on  protecting  neighborhoods  from  the  



                                     

     14   See Minutes of Senate Judiciary Comm., Senate Bill 70, Tape 97-24, Side A at 00,  



introductory comments of Senator Dave Donley (Mar. 26, 1997) (explaining that shooting  

at a dwelling without proof that the shooter knew the dwelling was occupied was only a  

misdemeanor and stating that the bill was intended to make such conduct a felony); id. at  

385,  comments  of  Senator  Drue  Pearce  (stating  that  she  did  not  believe  "the  people  

involved  in  the  drive-by  shootings  consider  whether  the  buildings  are  occupied"  and  

expressing a desire that such conduct be a felony); Minutes of Senate Health, Education  

and  Social  Services  Comm.,  Senate  Bill  70,  Tape  97-16,  Side  A  at  478,  comments  of  

Senator  Dave  Donley (Feb. 21, 1997)  (explaining that the bill addresses "a gap" in  the  

criminal law by making the discharge of a firearm into a building when there is a "high  

possibility that someone is living in that building" a felony).  



     15   Minutes  of  Senate  Judiciary  Comm.,  Senate  Bill  70,  Tape  97-24,  Side  A  at  00,  



introductory comments of Senator Dave Donley (Mar. 26, 1997).  



     16   See Minutes of Senate Judiciary Comm., Senate Bill 70, Tape 97-24, Side A at 373,  

testimony  of  Assistant  Attorney  General  Anne  Carpeneti  (Mar.  26,  1997)  (stating  that  

under the existing assault statutes, "if a person is put in fear, the offender would be charged  

with assault"); id. at 373, comments of Senator Dave Donley (stating while assaults require  

a victim, the bill makes it so that second-degree weapons misconduct "does not require that  

a real person be present during the shooting").  



                                                     -  10 -                                                  2778  


----------------------- Page 11-----------------------

                                                                                                                    



generalized threat of gun violence.17 These differences between the two statutes appear  



"significant or substantial."  



                  But  that  does  not  end  our  inquiry,  as  Whitton  instructs  that  we  also  



evaluate  differences  between  these  statutes  in  the  context  of  Evangelista's  case.  



Evangelista's convictions arose from two separate acts of shooting at the Mercado-Diaz  



trailer. When the first shooting occurred, the Mercado-Diaz family occupied the trailer.  



When the second shooting occurred, the Mercado-Diaz family and Officers Richwine  



and Senoran occupied the trailer. Additionally, other police officers had arrived and set  



up a perimeter around Evangelista's trailer .  



                  Evangelista was convicted of attempted first-degree murder for shooting  



at one person, Diaz. However, Evangelista was convicted of weapons misconduct for  



shooting  at  a  dwelling  that  had  many  people  inside  it  and  was  located  in  a  dense  



residential area.  The  attempted murder  charges targeted the  specific threats to Diaz's  



life, but the weapons-misconduct  charges targeted the more generalized threats to the  



Mercado-Diaz  family,  their  neighbors,  and  the  police  officers.  These  case-specific  



differences reinforce that attempted  first-degree  murder and  second-degree  weapons  



misconduct constitute separate offenses.  



                                     

     17   In  Young  v.  State,  331  P.3d  1276,  1284  (Alaska  App.  2014),  we  examined  



AS  11.61.190(a)(2), a separate theory of weapons misconduct that criminalizes shooting a  

firearm from a vehicle under circumstances that create a substantial and unjustifiable risk  

of  harm  to  persons  or  property.  We  analyzed  the  legislature's  purpose  in  enacting  this  

provision and concluded that it targeted conduct that created "a generalized public danger  

. . . regardless of whether any person was actually injured, or was even placed in fear, by  

the shooting." Id. Accord Her v. State,  2018 WL 4492835, at *5 (Alaska App. Sept. 19,  

2018) (unpublished). Our reasoning in Young is persuasive in Evangelista's case. Like the  

statutory provision in  Young, AS  11.61.195(a)(3)(B) targets the generalized community  

threat of discharging a firearm rather than the specific harm to an individual.  



                                                     -  11 -                                                  2778  


----------------------- Page 12-----------------------

                                                                                                                     



                  For these reasons, the differences between these statutes are "significant  



or  substantial  in  relation  to  the  societal  interests  involved,"  warranting  separate  

convictions under the Alaska Constitution.18  



                  We  now  turn to Evangelista's double jeopardy claim under the United  



States  Constitution.  Under  federal  law,  the  permissibility  of   imposing   separate  



convictions  hinges  on  legislative  intent  -  i.e.,  "whether  the  legislature  intended  to  

preclude separate conviction and punishment for two offenses." 19 The primary tool of  



statutory interpretation for discerning this  intent is the  test  set out in Blockburger  v.  

United  States.20  Under  the  Blockburger  test,  separate  convictions  are  presumptively  



warranted if  either  statute contains  an element that the other statute does not.21 While  



the Blockburger test is a useful tool for discerning legislative intent, the outcome of the  



test  "is not controlling when  [contrary]  legislative intent is clear from the face of the  

statute or the legislative history."22  



                  Under the  Blockburger  test, attempted first-degree murder and  second- 



degree weapons misconduct constitute separate offenses. Each statute requires proof of  



an element that the other statute does not. Attempted first-degree murder requires proof  



of the defendant's specific intent to kill, whereas the theory of second-degree weapons  



misconduct  set  out  in  AS  11.61.195(a)(3)(B)  requires  that  the  defendant  shoot  at  a  



                                     

     18   Whitton v. State, 479 P.2d 302, 312 (Alaska 1970).  



     19   Linden v. Anchorage ,  501 P.3d 238, 244 (Alaska App. 2021);  Whalen v. United  



States, 445 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1980).   



    20   Blockburger v.  United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).   



    21   Id.  at 304; Todd v. State, 917 P.2d 674, 678 (Alaska 1996) (explaining that under  



federal  law,  "[i]f  the   statutes  pass  muster  under  the  Blockburger  test,  cumulative  

punishment is presumptively allowable.")  



    22   Garrett  v.  United  States,  471  U.S.  773,  779  (1985);  Albernaz  v.  United  States ,  



450 U.S. 333, 340 (1981); Linden , 501 P.3d at 244.   



                                                      -  12 -                                                  2778  


----------------------- Page 13-----------------------

                                                                                                                      



dwelling.23 The legislative history of second-degree weapons misconduct reinforces the  



differences between these statutes. While attempted first-degree murder focuses on the  



defendant's  intent  to  harm  an  individual,  second-degree  weapons  misconduct  under  



AS  11.61.195(a)(3)(B) focuses on the generalized risk to public safety from shooting at  



a dwelling, untethered from whether the defendant intended individualized harm.   



                  Because   attempted   first-degree   murder   and   second-degree   weapons  



misconduct  are  presumptively  separate  offenses  under  the  Blockburger  test  and  the  



legislative history does not rebut this presumption, we conclude that the federal double  



jeopardy clause does not require merger here.   



           



          Why we reject Evangelista's sentencing claims  



                  Evangelista raises two sentencing claims. First, Evangelista contends that  



the  superior  court's  sentencing  comments  were  inadequate  to  support  the  sentence  



imposed. Second, Evangelista contends that his composite sentence is excessive.   



                  The  superior  court  merged  Evangelista's  assault  and  attempted murder  



convictions for shooting at Diaz and sentenced him on the remaining nine counts (two  



counts  of  attempted  first-degree  murder,  two  counts  of  second-degree  weapons  



misconduct,  and  five  counts  of  third-degree  assault).  At  trial,  the  jury  found  four  



aggravating factors. At sentencing, the  superior court noted the jury's  findings  of the  



aggravators,  analyzed  each  of  the  Chaney  criteria,  and  sentenced  Evangelista  to  a  

composite term of 47 years with 10 years suspended (37 years to serve).24   



                                      

     23   Compare AS 11.41.100(a)(1)(A) & AS 11.31.100(a) with AS 11.61.195(a)(3)(B).   



     24   Evangelista's  composite  sentence  is  broken  down  as  follows:  for  each  count  of  

attempted first-degree murder, 15 years to serve with 10 additional years suspended (active  

time  consecutive  to  the  other);  for  each  count  of  second-degree  weapons  misconduct,  

 1 year to serve (consecutive to each other and the attempted first-degree murder sentences);  

and  for  each  count  of  third-degree  assault,  2  years  to  serve  (consecutive  to  the  other  

sentences, and partially consecutive to each other (1 year consecutive, 1 year concurrent)).  



                                                      -  13 -                                                   2778  


----------------------- Page 14-----------------------

                                                                                                                    



                  Evangelista  first  argues  that  the  superior  court's  sentencing  comments  



were  inadequate  because  they  were  "merely  rhetorical  and  did  not  support  the  



imposition   of   any   particular   sentence."   Alaska   Statute   12.55.005   requires   that  



sentencing courts consider seven factors in sentencing, commonly known as the Chaney  

criteria.25 The sentencing record  should indicate that the court considered each factor,  



and we urge courts to thoroughly explain why they have chosen a particular sentence.  



However,  a remand  is only warranted if the court's sentencing  comments  "afford  no  



insight into its reasons for imposing a particular sentence  or when they  affirmatively  

indicate that the sentence was not properly based on the relevant Chaney factors."26  



                  We have independently reviewed the court's sentencing remarks and find  



that they offer sufficient insight into why the court imposed Evangelista's sentence and  



were  not  "merely  rhetorical."  The  court  examined  the  facts  of  the  case  in  detail,  



particularly   while   discussing  the   potential   merger   of   counts   and   the  proposed  



aggravating  and  mitigating  factors.  The  court  then  examined  the  sentencing  law  



applicable  to  attempted  first-degree  murder,  compared  Evangelista's  case  to  other  



attempted first-degree murder cases, and analyzed each of the Chaney factors.   

                  Evangelista  also  argues  that  his  composite  sentence  is  excessive.27  We  



review a criminal sentence under the "clearly mistaken" standard, a deferential standard  



that recognizes that a "permissible range of reasonable sentences" could be imposed in  

any given case.28 Evangelista  faced  a sentencing range of 5 to 99 years for attempted  



                                     

    25   See State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 444 (Alaska 1970).  



    26   Arnold  v.  State,  751  P.2d  494,  506  (Alaska  App.  1988)  (citing  Smith  v.  State,  



691 P.2d 293, 295 (Alaska App. 1984)).   



    27   When reviewing a composite sentence, we do "not require that a specific sentence  



imposed for a particular count or offense be individually justifiable as if that one crime  

were considered in isolation." Felber v. State, 243 P.3d 1007, 1013 (Alaska App. 2010).   



    28   McClain v. State , 519 P.2d 811, 813-14 (Alaska 1974).  



                                                     -  14 -                                                  2778  


----------------------- Page 15-----------------------

                                                                                                                      



first-degree murder (two counts).29 As a first felony offender, Evangelista was subject  



to  a  presumptive  sentencing  range  of  0  to  2  years  for  second-degree  weapons  

misconduct (two counts)  and 0 to 2 years for third-degree assault (five counts).30 The  



superior  court  sentenced  Evangelista  to  a  composite  sentence  of  47  years  with  10  



suspended (37 years to serve).   



                  We have independently reviewed the sentencing record and conclude that  



Evangelista's   sentence   is   not   clearly   mistaken.   The   superior   court   found   that  



Evangelista  created  a  "serious  risk"  when  he  fired  eight  gunshots  into  an  occupied  



trailer. The superior court found that Evangelista was no doubt aware that Diaz and her  



children were inside the trailer and that he was aware of the substantial police presence  



when he fired the second round of shots. The superior court noted Evangelista's lack of  



remorse, as evidenced by Evangelista's prison phone calls to his sister where he blamed  

his neighbors for the criminal charges.31 The superior court also noted that Evangelista's  



conduct had seriously impacted the sense of safety of his neighbors.32   



                  Given the seriousness of Evangelista's conduct, the court's concerns about  



his lack of remorse,  and the court's careful evaluation and balancing of the  Chaney  

factors, we conclude that Evangelista's composite sentence is not clearly mistaken.33  



                    



                                      

    29   AS  12.55.125(b).  



     30   Former AS 12.55.125 (d)(1), (e)(1) (pre-July 2019).  



     31   The  presentence  report  noted  that  a  police  officer  had  listened  to  calls  between  



Evangelista and his sister, in which he "stated that the charges against him were unfair and  

were made by his 'snitch neighbors,' his neighbors were 'fucking with him,' he believed  

he was arrested 'unjustly,' and blamed his neighbors for accusing and harassing him."  



     32   The presentence report noted that Diaz told police that Evangelista was known for  



routinely shooting his gun into the air in an apparent effort to frighten his neighbors.  



     33   Felber  v.  State,  243  P.3d  1007,  1013  (Alaska  App.  2010);  Morrissette  v.  State ,  



524 P.3d 803, 807 (Alaska App. 2023) (citing McClain , 519 P.2d at 813-14).   



                                                      -  15 -                                                   2778  


----------------------- Page 16-----------------------

       Conclusion  



              For the reasons stated in this decision, the judgment of the superior court  



is AFFIRMED.   



                                          - 16 -                                      2778  

Case Law
Statutes, Regs & Rules
Constitutions
Miscellaneous


IT Advice, Support, Data Recovery & Computer Forensics.
(907) 338-8188

Please help us support these and other worthy organizations:
Law Project for Psychiatraic Rights
Soteria-alaska
Choices
AWAIC