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Martin C. Smith v State of Alaska (4/28/2024) ap-2775

Martin C. Smith v State of Alaska (4/28/2024) ap-2775

                                                NOTICE 

        The text of this opinion can be corrected before the opinion is published in the 

        Pacific Reporter.  Readers are encouraged to bring typographical or other formal 

        errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts:   



                               303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska  99501 

                                         Fax:  (907) 264-0878 

                                 E-mail:  corrections @ akcourts.gov  



               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 



MARTIN C. SMITH, 

                                                              Court of Appeals No. A-11759 

                                 Appellant,                Trial Court No. 4FA-10-00357 CR 



                        v. 

                                                                        O P I N I O N 

STATE OF ALASKA, 

                                                         

                                 Appellee.                      No. 2775 — April 26, 2024 



                Appeal  from  the  Superior  Court,  Fourth  Judicial  District, 

                Fairbanks, Robert B. Downes, Judge. 



                Appearances:    Robert  John,  Law  Office  of  Robert  John, 

                Fairbanks, for the Appellant.  Timothy W. Terrell, Assistant 

                Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and 

                Kevin G. Clarkson, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.  

                Douglas  O.  Moody,  Assistant  Public  Defender,  and  Beth 

                Goldstein, Acting Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Alaska 

                Public Defender Agency, as amicus curiae. 



                Before:       Allard,   Chief    Judge,    Wollenberg,      Judge,   and 

                                                 * 

                Mannheimer, Senior Judge.   



                Judge WOLLENBERG, writing for the Court. 

                Judge MANNHEIMER, concurring. 



    * 

        Sitting  by  assignment  made  pursuant  to  Article  IV,  Section  11  of  the  Alaska 

Constitution and Administrative Rule 23(a). 


----------------------- Page 2-----------------------

                 Under Article I, Section 8 of the Alaska Constitution, a felony prosecution 



must proceed by grand jury indictment unless the accused waives indictment.  The grand 



jury functions as “both a shield and sword of justice” — on the one hand, tasked with 



bringing criminal charges against the accused when this is warranted, and on the other 



hand,  playing  a  vital  protective  function  by  “operat[ing]  to  control  abuses  by  the 



                                                                        1 

government and protect[ing] the interests of the accused.”   Alaska has strong procedural 



                                                                                                 2 

protections to ensure that the grand jury serves this vital protective function.    



                 History  shows  that  grand  juries  have,  at  times,  declined  to  return  an 



indictment even when the evidence clearly supported the felony charges.  But Alaska 



courts have not yet decided the question raised in this case:  whether, under Alaska law, 



the superior court is required to instruct grand jurors that they have discretion to refuse 



to return an indictment even when they conclude that the evidence supports the proposed 



           3 

charges.   



                 The defendant in this appeal, Martin C. Smith, was indicted on charges of 



                                                                                           4 

second- and fourth-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance.   Smith argues 



     1   Cameron v. State, 171 P.3d 1154, 1156 (Alaska 2007) (alterations in original) (citing 



and quoting Preston v. State, 615 P.2d 594, 602 (Alaska 1980)); see also Zurlo v. State, 506 

P.3d 777, 782 (Alaska App. 2022). 



     2   Cameron, 171 P.3d at 1156-57. 



     3   See Wassillie v. State, 411 P.3d 595, 608 & n.87 (Alaska 2018); State v. Leighton, 336 



P.3d 713, 715-16 (Alaska App. 2014). 



     4   We  affirmed  Smith’s  convictions  in  a  prior  opinion.    Smith  v.  State,  2018 



WL 1779322 (Alaska App. Apr. 11, 2018) (unpublished), aff’d on reh’g, 2018 WL 3387387 

(Alaska App. July 3, 2018) (unpublished).  Smith filed a petition for hearing in the Alaska 

Supreme Court, challenging,  inter alia, our conclusion that he had failed to preserve or 

adequately brief his claim that the grand jury was improperly instructed.  The supreme court 

granted Smith’s petition as to this claim and directed this Court to consider it on the merits.  

                                                                                              (continued...) 



                                                    – 2 –                                                 2775 


----------------------- Page 3-----------------------

that  the  grand  jury  proceedings  in  his  case  were  fatally  flawed  because,  when  the 



presiding judge convened the grand jury and initially instructed the grand jury panel, the 



judge did not affirmatively instruct the grand jurors that they had discretion to refuse to 



indict, even if they concluded that the evidence supported the charges.  Indeed, Smith 



argues that the presiding judge’s instructions to the grand jury actively misled the grand 



jurors by suggesting that they did not have this discretion.   



               For the reasons explained in this opinion, we reject Smith’s contention that 



Alaska courts are constitutionally required to affirmatively instruct grand juries that they 



have discretion to decline to enforce the law in a particular case.  We recognize that, 



throughout history, grand juries have exercised a type of prosecutorial discretion — the 



discretion to decline to indict even when they conclude that the evidence establishes that 



the defendant committed one or more criminal offenses.  Grand juries have also acted as 



a check on vindictive prosecutions — that is, prosecutions which, although supported by 



the evidence, are being brought for improper purposes.   



               But we have not found any support for the notion that the constitution 



requires the superior court to affirmatively instruct the grand jurors that they have this 



power — particularly where the grand jury instructions do not expressly foreclose the 



exercise of this kind of discretion.  



               We have reviewed the grand jury instructions in Smith’s case, and we 



conclude that those instructions adequately apprised the grand jurors of the grand jury’s 



dual function as “a shield and sword of justice,” and that those instructions did not 



    4   (...continued) 



(The supreme court rejected review of Smith’s other challenges.)  We subsequently ordered 

supplemental briefing by the parties, and invited the Public Defender Agency to participate 

as amicus curiae, and we now address Smith’s claim of improper grand jury instruction on 

the merits. 



                                             – 3 –                                         2775 


----------------------- Page 4-----------------------

foreclose the grand jurors from exercising discretion (within the confines of the grand 



jury oath) to decline to indict for reasons other than the insufficiency of the evidence. 



                 Accordingly, we affirm Smith’s convictions. 



         Overview of the grand jury in Alaska and the instructions in this case 



                 Under the Alaska Constitution, felony charges must proceed by grand jury 



                                                               5 

indictment unless the defendant waives indictment.   This constitutional right to a grand 



jury indictment “ensures that a group of citizens will make an independent determination 



about the probability of the accused’s guilt ‘before the accused suffers any of the grave 



                                                                                                    6 

inconveniences which are apt to ensue upon the return of a felony indictment.’”    



                 The Alaska Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the central role of 



the grand jury in the criminal justice process.  In Cameron v. State, the supreme court 



explained that the grand jury acts “as both a shield and sword of justice” — on the one 



hand, tasked with bringing criminal charges against the accused if charges are warranted, 



and on the other hand, playing a vital protective function by “operat[ing] to control 

abuses by the government and protect[ing] the interests of the accused.”7   



    5    Alaska Const. art. I, § 8 (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 



infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases 

arising in the armed forces in time of war or public danger.  Indictment may be waived by 

the accused.”). 



    6    Cameron, 171 P.3d at 1156 (quoting State v. Gieffels, 554 P.2d 460, 465 (Alaska 



 1976)); see also Wassillie, 411 P.3d at 605 (emphasizing “the grand jury’s importance as a 

preliminary step in felony prosecutions” and as a “critical part of Alaska’s constitutional 

framework”). 



    7    Cameron, 171 P.3d at 1156 (alterations in original) (quoting Preston v. State, 615 P.2d 



594, 602 (Alaska 1980)); see also Zurlo v. State, 506 P.3d 777, 782 (Alaska App. 2022). 



                                                   – 4 –                                                2775 


----------------------- Page 5-----------------------

                 Later, in Wassillie v. State, the supreme court reaffirmed the dual nature of 



                          8 

the grand jury’s role.   As explained in  Wassillie, the grand jury not only ensures that a 



felony charge is founded upon probable cause, but it also serves “the invaluable function 



in our society of standing between the accuser and the accused . . . to determine whether 



a charge is founded upon reason or dictated by an intimidating power or by malice and 



                       9 

personal  ill  will.”     The  grand  jury’s  protective  function  is  reflected  in  the  strong 



procedural protections which, under Alaska law, govern the grand jury’s deliberative 



process:    Alaska  law  restricts  the  admissibility  of  hearsay  evidence  at  grand  jury 



proceedings, requires the prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, 

and authorizes the grand jury to call for the production of additional evidence.10  



                 In Smith’s case, at the outset of the grand jury’s session, the presiding judge 

of the Fourth Judicial District instructed the grand jury on its powers and duties.11  Here 



are the relevant portions of that instruction: 



                         As  grand  jurors,  you  will  perform  an  extremely 

                 important function.  Under Alaska’s Constitution, the grand 

                 jury is to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to 

                 bring a person to trial.  This provision imposes a two-fold 

                 duty upon you.  First, grand jurors have an obligation to the 

                 people of the State of Alaska to compel persons charged with 

                 serious criminal conduct to answer for that conduct if there 



    8    Wassillie, 411 P.3d at 607-08. 



    9   Id. at 608 (omission in original) (quoting United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 74 



(1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)). 



    10   Cameron, 171 P.3d at 1157, 1159 (discussing Alaska Criminal Rule 6 and Frink v. 



State, 597 P.2d 154, 164-65 (Alaska 1979), and holding that the prosecutor must inform the 

grand jury whenever the accused clearly and unconditionally informs the State of a desire to 

testify before the grand jury).  



    11  See Alaska R. Crim. P. 6(a), (e)(2). 



                                                   – 5 –                                                 2775 


----------------------- Page 6-----------------------

               are just grounds for the charge.  At the same time, however, 

               grand jurors have an obligation to every individual to ensure 

               that no one is subjected to criminal prosecution without good 

               cause.  



                      . . . .  Once you have heard the State’s evidence, along 

               with any additional evidence presented at the request of the 

               grand  jury,  you  must  decide  whether  that  evidence,  if 

               unexplained or uncontradicted, would warrant conviction of 

               the defendant.  If at least ten of you believe the evidence has 

               met that standard, the indictment should be endorsed “a true 

               bill” and signed by your foreperson.  If not, the proposed 

               indictment should be endorsed “not a true bill” and signed by 

               your foreperson.  



The grand jury was also instructed that the “[g]rand jury proceedings are secret” and 



“[n]o information about grand jury proceedings or deliberations can be disclosed except 



in response to a valid court order.”   



               In  addition,  the  grand  jurors  took  the  oath  set out  in  Alaska Criminal 



Rule 6(e)(1).  Under this oath, the grand jurors swear to “present no one through envy, 



hatred  or  malice,”  nor to  “leave  any  one  unpresented  through  fear,  affection,  gain, 



reward, or hope thereof,” but rather to “present all things truly and impartially as they 



shall come to your knowledge according to the best of your understanding.”  



       Smith’s argument that the court was required to affirmatively instruct the 

       grand jurors of their discretion to decline to indict 



               Smith argues that the grand jury charge was deficient because the Alaska 



Constitution requires the superior court to affirmatively instruct grand jurors that they 



have discretion to decline to indict, even if they conclude that the evidence supports the 



charges.   



               As an initial matter, we note that an instruction that grand jurors have 



unbounded discretion to decline to indict would conflict with the requirements in the 



                                             – 6 –                                         2775 


----------------------- Page 7-----------------------

grand jury oath that grand jurors not “leave any one unpresented through fear, affection, 

gain, reward, or hope thereof” and that they act “impartially.”12  As Judge Mannheimer 



recounts in his concurrence, there are notable examples throughout history of the grand 

jury declining to indict that would seem to violate this oath 13 — an oath that, as Judge 



Mannheimer also explains, has been part of Alaska law since the Carter Code and whose 



origins date back hundreds of years.  Smith contends that the need for the grand jury to 



serve as the conscience of the community is particularly important in jurisdictions, like 



Alaska’s, where the prosecutors are appointed rather than elected.  But prosecutors are 

subject to a similar limitation on their exercise of discretion.14 



                Smith is correct, however, that the grand jury has historically exercised a 

form of prosecutorial discretion.15  Numerous courts have recognized that grand juries 



    12  Alaska R. Crim. P. 6(e)(1). 



    13  As the Ninth Circuit recounts, there have also been historical examples of the exercise 



of  grand  jury  discretion  that  have  been  lauded  —  reflecting  the  fact  that  grand  jury 

nullification has been viewed as serving both positive and negative ends, depending on the 

circumstances.  See United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1199 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(en banc) (“While we celebrate grand jury independence in defense of the First Amendment 

in the case of Peter Zenger and those accused of violating the Alien and Sedition Acts, and 

we  praise  grand  jury  resistance  to  the  morally-obnoxious  fugitive  slave  laws,  we  must 

acknowledge  as  well  that  grand  juries  have  also  refused  to  enforce  lawful  and  wise 

legislation,  including  some  of  the  most  important  legislation  in  American  history:    the 

Reconstruction laws implementing the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.  

Grand jury independence, evidently, has historically served causes both good and ill.”). 



    14  For example, the American Bar Association provides that, “[i]n exercising discretion 



to file and maintain charges,” prosecuting attorneys should not consider “partisan or other 

improper political or personal considerations” or “hostility or personal animus towards a 

potential subject, or any other improper motive of the prosecutor.”  ABA Criminal Justice 

Standards for the Prosecution Function § 3-4.4(b) (4th ed. 2017).  



    15  See 4 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 15.2(g), at 533 (4th ed. 2015) 



                                                                                     (continued...) 



                                               – 7 –                                           2775 


----------------------- Page 8-----------------------

have this discretion.  For example, in  Vasquez v. Hillery, the United States Supreme 



Court stated:  



                The grand jury does not determine only that probable cause 

                exists to believe that a defendant committed a crime, or that 

                it does not.  In the hands of the grand jury lies the power to 

                charge a greater offense or a lesser offense; numerous counts 

                or a single count; and perhaps most significant of all, a capital 

                offense or a noncapital offense — all on the basis of the same 

                facts.  Moreover, “[t]he grand jury is not bound to indict in 

                every case where a conviction can be obtained.”[16]   



Relying  on  Vasquez,  two  former  Alaska  Supreme  Court  justices  have  echoed  this 



principle:  “The grand jury is not bound to indict an accused for a particular crime merely 



    15  (...continued) 



(“The grand jury retains its complete independence in refusing to indict.  That includes the 

authority to refuse to indict even where the evidence presented clearly met the quantum of 

proof needed for indictment.  This authority of the grand jury to ‘nullify’ the law arguably 

was the most important attribute of grand jury review from the perspective of those who 

insisted that a grand jury clause be included in the Bill of Rights.”).   

        Prosecutorial discretion is the prosecutor’s prerogative to refrain from pursuing a 

charge even if the evidence supports it.  See State v. District Court, 53 P.3d 629, 631 (Alaska 

App. 2002) (recognizing that “the executive branch has broad discretion to decide whether 

to  initiate  criminal  charges  and,  if  so,  what  charges  to  bring”);  ABA  Criminal  Justice 

Standards  for  the  Prosecution  Function  §  3-4.4(a)  (4th  ed.  2017)  (“In  order  to  fully 

implement the prosecutor’s functions and duties, including the obligation to enforce the law 

while  exercising  sound  discretion,  the  prosecutor  is  not  obliged  to  file  or  maintain  all 

criminal charges which the evidence might support.”). 



    16  Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986) (alteration in original) (quoting United 



States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 629 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J., dissenting)); see also 

Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (“The content of the charge, 

as well as the decision to charge at all, is entirely up to the grand jury — subject to its 

popular veto, as it were.  The grand jury’s decision not to indict at all, or not to charge the 

facts alleged by the prosecutorial officials, is not subject to review by any other body.” 

(footnote omitted)). 



                                                – 8 –                                             2775 


----------------------- Page 9-----------------------

because there is probable cause.  The grand jury may, in the exercise of its discretion, 

choose a lesser-included offense, or choose not to indict at all.”17   



                 But even if we assume that Alaska grand juries are entitled to exercise a 



form of prosecutorial discretion —  i.e., the right, like the government, to decline to 



pursue  otherwise  valid  charges  when,  for  example,  doing  so  would  be  unjust,  or 

“excessively technical”18 — Smith has pointed to no historical grounding for the notion 



that the Alaska Constitution requires courts to affirmatively instruct grand jurors that 



they have this discretion.  As Smith himself recognizes, there are very few jurisdictions 



that expressly advise grand jurors of their discretion to decline to indict.  Indeed, some 



jurisdictions instruct grand jurors that they have a  duty to indict if they conclude that 



there is probable cause — language that goes well beyond the instruction given to the 



                                     19 

grand jurors in Smith’s case.            



     17  State  v.  Markgraf,  913  P.2d  487,  487  (Alaska  1996)  (Matthews,  J.,  with  whom 



Eastaugh, J., joined, dissenting from the dismissal of a petition for hearing as improvidently 

granted); see also Commonwealth v. Lee, 312 A.2d 391, 393 (Pa. 1973) (“It is for the grand 

jury to determine under which statutes to indict.  The grand jury has ‘the power to refuse to 

indict even where a clear violation of law is shown . . . .  [It] can reflect the conscience of the 

community  in  providing  relief  where  strict  application  of  the  law  would  prove  unduly 

harsh.’” (omission and alteration in original) (quoting 8 J. Moore, Federal Practice § 6.02[1] 

(Cipes ed. 1968))). 



     18  See People v. Sullivan, 503 N.E.2d 74, 77 (N.Y. 1986) (providing that “[c]onsistent 



with centuries of history,” a New York grand jury may “decide that an excessively technical 

application of the law upon a particular defendant would work an unfairness that would be 

contrary to the conscience of the community”); see also  24 Daniel R. Coquilette et al., 

Moore’s Federal Practice § 606.02[1], at 606-12 (3d ed. 2022) (“[T]he grand jury can reflect 

the conscience of the community in providing relief when strict application of the law would 

prove unduly harsh.”). 



     19  See, e.g., Alabama Jury Instructions I.1.I.A (“[W]henever the legal evidence received 



by a Grand Jury establishes probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed and 

                                                                                              (continued...) 



                                                    – 9 –                                                 2775 


----------------------- Page 10-----------------------

               Indeed,  the  charge  that  federal  grand  juries  receive  has  language  that 



appears to limit the grand jury’s discretion to decline to indict — and this federal grand 

jury charge has been upheld against challenges similar to Smith’s.20  The federal grand 



jury charge does not inform grand jurors of a “two-fold” duty, but rather instructs grand 



jurors that their purpose is to “determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify 



a formal accusation against a person” — defined solely as “probable cause to believe that 

the accused is guilty of the offense charged.”21  And the instruction later continues, 



    19  (...continued) 



that a particular person has committed that offense, then the Grand Jury must return a true 

bill    of    indictment.”),       https://judicial.alabama.gov/docs/library/docs/ 

General_Jury_Instructions.pdf  (last  visited  Apr.  22,  2024);  In  re  Standard  Grand  Jury 

Instructions — Criminal Report No. 90-2 , 575 So.2d 1276, 1277 (Fla. 1991) (mem.) (“Your 

duty is only to ascertain whether there is ‘probable cause’ to believe that a crime has been 

committed by the person so accused.  If the evidence is sufficient to constitute ‘probable 

cause,’ then it is your duty to find what is known as a ‘true bill.’”); see also United States v. 

Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (discussing state grand 

jury instructions and noting that a majority of the states to have addressed this issue have 

adopted instructions that imply a duty).  But see John Raymond Fletcher, Associate Judge, 

Seventh Judicial Circuit Court of Md., Charge to a Grand Jury, 18 F.R.D. 211, 214 (1955) 

(“The grand jury may even refuse to indict although its attention is called to a clear violation 

of law.  Presumably this would occur only when prosecution without mercy would result in 

a miscarriage of justice; but the grand jury has that power.”); New York Model Grand Jury 

Impanelment Instruction, at 3-5 (providing that “the grand jury may indict a person for an 

offense”),    https://www.nycourts.gov/JUDGES/CJI/5-SampleCharges/CJI2D.Grand- 

Jury_Rev.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2024). 



    20  Among the federal grand jury instructions upheld against challenge is a provision 



informing grand jurors that they “cannot judge the wisdom of the criminal laws enacted by 

Congress,” and another provision informing grand jurors that they “should vote to indict” 

when they conclude that “there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the 

offense charged.”  See Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d at 1187-88, 1202, 1204; see also United 

States v. Knight, 490 F.3d 1268, 1272 (11th Cir. 2007). 



    21  Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d at 1187.  The grand jurors in Navarro-Vargas received the 



                                                                                   (continued...) 



                                              – 10 –                                          2775 


----------------------- Page 11-----------------------

“[Y]ou should vote to indict where the evidence presented to you is sufficiently strong 



to warrant a reasonable person’s believing that the accused is probably guilty of the 

offense with which the accused is charged.”22  



               In United States v. Marcucci and in United States v. Navarro-Vargas, the 



Ninth Circuit upheld these grand jury instructions against the kind of challenge that 



Smith presents here.  The Ninth Circuit concluded that these instructions sufficiently 



preserve the grand jury’s independent discretion to decline to indict even when the grand 

jurors conclude that a given charge is supported by probable cause.23  The Ninth Circuit 



found that the word “should” did not eliminate the grand jury’s discretion to decline to 

indict.24  And although the Ninth Circuit recognized the importance of the grand jury’s 



independent screening function, it rejected the assertion that the federal constitution 



    21  (...continued) 



model grand jury charge recommended by the Judicial Conference of the United States.  Id. 

at 1186. 



    22  Id. at 1187. 



    23  United States v. Marcucci, 299 F.3d 1156, 1164 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The charge, by 



telling the jury that it ‘should’ rather than ‘shall’ or ‘must’ indict if it finds probable cause, 

leaves room — albeit limited room — for a grand jury to reject an indictment that, although 

supported by probable cause, is based on governmental passion, prejudice, or injustice.”); 

Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d at 1205 (“Even assuming that the grand jury should exercise 

something  akin  to  prosecutorial  discretion,  the  instruction  does  not  infringe  upon  that 

discretion.”). 



    24  See Marcucci , 299 F.3d at 1164; Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d at 1204 (holding that 



instructing the grand jurors that they “should” indict if they find probable cause did not 

violate the grand jury’s independence because “[a]s a matter of pure semantics,” this wording 

“does not ‘eliminate discretion on the part of the grand jurors’” and it “leav[es] room for the 

grand jury to dismiss even if it finds probable cause” (quoting Marcucci , 299 F.3d at 1159)). 



                                              – 11 –                                           2775 


----------------------- Page 12-----------------------

requires courts to affirmatively instruct grand jurors that they have the authority to 

“nullify” the enforcement of the criminal law in a given case.25  



               Smith urges us to adopt the view of the dissenting opinions in Marcucci and 



Navarro-Vargas ; he argues that these dissents are persuasive and that the views they 



espouse should be adopted as a matter of Alaska constitutional law.  But the primary 



concern of the dissenters in Marcucci and Navarro-Vargas was that, in their view, the 

federal grand jury instruction was actively misleading.26  Although the dissenters would 



have endorsed an affirmative instruction on a grand jury’s discretion to decline to indict, 



the dissenters never suggested that the absence of such an affirmative instruction would 



constitute constitutional error, so long as the grand jury charge otherwise left room for 

the exercise of grand jury discretion.27  



               Finally, in Leighton v. State, this Court implicitly rejected the notion that 



Alaska law requires an affirmative instruction explicitly endorsing the grand jury’s 

discretion to refuse to indict.28  We concluded that, in the context of a grand jury charge 



worded like the one in Smith’s case, the word “should” does not set out an inflexible 



    25 Marcucci , 299 F.3d at 1161; Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d at 1199-1202. 



    26 Marcucci , 299 F.3d at 1170-71 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (“A grand jury could be 



instructed using the language of Vasquez, which does not suggest nullification.  Or, it could 

be told either that a showing of probable cause is a necessary requirement for indictment 

without saying more, or that probable cause is a necessary consideration, but not the only 

one.  . . .  Regardless of how new instructions might turn out, as they stand now they are 

constitutionally unsound because they actively mislead grand jurors into thinking they lack 

powers which, as articulated by Vasquez, are clearly vested in them.”); Navarro-Vargas, 408 

F.3d at 1216 (Hawkins, J., joined by Pregerson, Wardlow, W. Fletcher, and Berzon, JJ., 

dissenting) (“These instructions are unconstitutional because they actively mislead grand 

jurors into thinking their powers are more constrained than they are.”). 



    27 See, e.g., Marcucci , 299 F.3d at 1170-71 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). 



    28 State v. Leighton, 336 P.3d 713 (Alaska App. 2014). 



                                            – 12 –                                        2775 


----------------------- Page 13-----------------------

command, but only an “expectation of what ought to be done” with “some inherent 

flexibility . . . to depart from the expectation.”29  And with regard to the third sentence 



of Article I, Section 8 of the Alaska Constitution — “[t]he grand jury shall consist of at 



least twelve citizens, a majority of whom concurring may return an indictment” — we 



concluded that this language did not establish a grand jury’s discretion not to indict even 



after the grand jurors conclude that the evidence supports the charge.  Rather, we held 



that  the  phrase  “may  return  an  indictment”  meant  “is  authorized  to  return  an 

indictment.”30  



               We also noted in Leighton that, to the extent grand juries in Alaska have a 



discretionary screening function that derives from the history and role of the grand jury 



within the structure of the criminal justice system, the language of the grand jury charge 



in Leighton — the same grand jury charge at issue in this case — adequately conveyed 

this concept.31 



               Smith argues that Leighton was wrongly decided, and he — along with the 



amicus curiae — asks us to overrule our holding in that case.  In particular, Smith argues 



that  we  were  wrong  in  Leighton  when  we  concluded  that  neither  the  language  of 



Article I, Section 8 nor the debate regarding this provision at Alaska’s constitutional 



    29  Id. at 715-16 (omission in original). 



    30  Id. (emphasis added).  We reached this same conclusion as to AS 12.40.050, which 



provides,  “The  grand  jury  may  indict  or  present  a  person  for  a  crime  upon  sufficient 

evidence, whether that person has been held to answer for the crime or not.”  Id.  at 716 

(concluding that the word “may” in AS 12.40.050 is being used in the sense of “is authorized 

to”);  cf.  Navarro-Vargas,  408  F.3d  at  1188  (“The  text  of  the  Fifth  Amendment  simply 

provides for the right to indictment by a grand jury and does not explain how the grand jury 

is to fulfill this constitutional role.  Either such details were assumed by the framers of the 

Bill of Rights or they decided to leave such details to Congress, the Executive, and the 

Judiciary.”). 



    31  Leighton , 336 P.3d at 715-16. 



                                              – 13 –                                           2775 


----------------------- Page 14-----------------------

 convention suggested that the framers intended to create or acknowledge a grand jury’s 



 discretion to refuse to indict even when the grand jurors conclude that the charge is 



 supported by the evidence. 



                 But  the  minutes  of  Alaska’s  constitutional  convention  do  not  support 



 Smith’s assertion that the delegates intended for grand jurors to be instructed that they 



 are  authorized  to  refuse  to  return  an  indictment  even  when  they  conclude  that  the 



 evidence presented to them supports the criminal charge.  Even though the proponents 



 of the grand jury clause argued vigorously in favor of keeping the grand jury as an 



 institution  to  protect  individuals  against  criminal  prosecution  based  on  “flimsy”  or 



 insufficient evidence, there is nothing in the record of the convention to suggest that 



 these delegates intended to add grand jury protections that did not exist under the federal 



                                                                                                  32 

 constitution — that is, under the federal law that governed Alaska at the time.                       



     32  See Wassillie v. State, 411 P.3d 595, 605-07 (Alaska 2018) (recounting the debate on 



 the grand jury clause at the Alaska Constitutional Convention); see also 2 Proceedings of the 

 Alaska Constitutional Convention 1336 (Jan. 6, 1956) (remarks of Delegate Edward Davis, 

 sponsor of amendment to require indictment by grand jury in felony cases) (“I am interested 

 in the occasional person who is charged with crime and who is completely innocent of that 

 crime,  and  so  far  as  I  am  concerned  if  even  one  person  is  charged  with  crime,  who  is 

 innocent, and who may have the matter disposed of without having to stand trial, it’s worth 

 the cost[.]”); id. at 1323-24 (remarks of Delegate Ralph Rivers) (“I think [grand juries] serve 

 a useful purpose.  Sometimes . . . the grand jury will bring in a ‘no true bill’ meaning they 

just refused to accuse anybody because the evidence is too flimsy.”); id. at 1331 (remarks of 

 Delegate  Robert  McNealy)  (“[O]ccasionally,  our  appointed  prosecutors  become  a  little 

 overzealous and want to secure a number of convictions and in some of those instances a 

 grand jury will return a no true bill.”); id. at 1334 (remarks of Delegate Mildred Hermann) 

 (“I also have seen the misplaced zeal of some of our district attorneys[.]”). 

         Even though the Fifth Amendment guarantees a right of grand jury indictment in a  

federal  felony case, the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause does not incorporate 

 this right of grand jury indictment against the states.  Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 

 538 (1884).  However, because the Alaska grand jury was derived from the federal model, 

 the historical and structural underpinnings of the federal grand jury right serve as persuasive 

                                                                                             (continued...) 



                                                   – 14 –                                                2775 


----------------------- Page 15-----------------------

               In short, Smith has not met his “heavy threshold burden” of demonstrating 

compelling reasons for overruling Leighton .33 



        Why we conclude that the instructions in this case do not warrant reversal 



               Ultimately, Smith has pointed to no persuasive reason why the grand jury 



charge in his case was so deficient or misleading as to require reversal of his convictions.  



The grand jury instructions as a whole were consistent with the grand jury’s discretion 



to decline to indict.  These instructions explicitly advised the grand jurors that their 



deliberations were secret and could not be disclosed absent a court order, that they had 



“an  obligation  to  every  individual  to  ensure  that  no  one  is  subjected  to  criminal 



prosecution without good cause,” and that they should hold people accountable for 



serious criminal misconduct, but only where there were “just grounds for the charge.” 



               Smith takes issue with the word “obligation,” arguing that it does not afford 



the grand jurors any flexibility to decline to indict once they conclude that the evidence 



supports the charges.  We agree that the word “obligation,” standing alone, seemingly 



precludes discretion.   



               But Smith overlooks the context in which this word appears.  Echoing our 



supreme  court’s  characterization  of  the  grand  jury  “as  both  a  shield  and  sword  of 



justice,” the presiding judge in this case instructed the grand jurors that the determination 



    32  (...continued) 



authority for interpreting the Alaska grand jury right. 

        The concurrence interprets the delegates’ silence on nullification as an affirmative 

indication that they rejected the notion that the grand jury was entitled to exercise this type 

of discretion at all.  But given that this discretion has traditionally been viewed as a function 

of the federal grand jury, the silence was equally consistent with an assumption that the 

discretion was inherent in the grand jury process. 



    33  Buntin  v.  Schlumberger  Tech.  Corp.,  487  P.3d  595,  603  (Alaska  2021)  (quoting 



Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rts. Comm’n, 102 P.3d 937, 943 (Alaska 2004)). 



                                              – 15 –                                         2775 


----------------------- Page 16-----------------------

of whether there is “sufficient evidence to bring a person to trial” imposes a “two-fold 



duty” on the grand jury:  The first of these duties is “an obligation to the people of the 



State of Alaska to compel persons charged with serious criminal conduct to answer for 



that conduct if there are just grounds  for the charge.”  (Emphasis added.)  The second 



duty is “an obligation to every individual to ensure that no one is subjected to criminal 



prosecution without good cause.”  (Emphasis added.) 



               These concepts of “just grounds” and “good cause” invoke fundamental 



concepts of justice and fairness that do not imply that the grand jury’s task is limited to 



simply determining whether the evidence is sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt 

at trial.34  And nothing else in this grand jury instruction limited grand jurors from 



considering what would be “just” in a given situation.  



               Additionally, the grand jurors were required to take the grand jury oath 



specified in Criminal Rule 6(e)(1), in which the grand jurors swear to “present no one 



through  envy,  hatred  or  malice,”  nor  to  “leave  any  one  unpresented  through  fear, 



affection, gain, reward, or hope thereof,” but rather to “present all things truly and 



impartially  as  they  shall  come  to  your  knowledge  according  to  the  best  of  your 



understanding.” 



               On the whole, these instructions informed the grand jurors of the grand 



jury’s independence and did not foreclose the possibility of the grand jury’s refusing to 



indict even if the grand jurors concluded that sufficient evidence supported the charges.  



    34  The concurrence suggests that this analysis takes the concepts of “just grounds” and 



“good cause” out of context since the judge’s prefatory remark explained that under the 

Alaska Constitution, the grand jury is to “determine whether there is sufficient evidence to 

bring a person to trial.”  But the judge then specifically defined this obligation, explaining 

that this provision imposes upon the grand jury the “two-fold duty” discussed above.  There 

is no reason to think the grand jury would have understood its responsibilities to extend 

beyond this two-fold task. 



                                            – 16 –                                        2775 


----------------------- Page 17-----------------------

                  Ultimately, the question in this case, as in Leighton, is not whether it is 



permissible   to  instruct  a  grand  jury  that  it  has  this  kind  of  discretion.    Rather,  the 



question is whether it amounts to constitutional error not to expressly instruct a grand 



                                       35 

jury that it has this discretion.           



                  We conclude that the absence  of  such an express instruction does not 

amount to constitutional error.36  And we further conclude that the grand jury charge in 



this case did not contravene the notion that grand jurors have discretion to decline to 

indict even when they conclude that the evidence supports the charges.37 



     35  Cf. Young v. State, 374 P.3d 395, 428 (Alaska 2016) (“[W]hether or not a requested 



jury instruction should be given lies in the discretion of the trial court.  [A]s long as the 

instructions actually given by the trial court adequately set forth the applicable law, a more 

elaborate explanation of the defendant’s theory of the case is not required unless it would 

 substantially aid the jury in arriving at a just verdict.” (second alteration in original) (internal 

quotations omitted)); Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d at 1208 (“In upholding the model grand jury 

instructions against Appellants’ constitutional challenge, we do not necessarily hold that the 

current instructions could not or should not be improved.  . . .  However, we are not a drafting 

committee for the grand jury instructions.  We are not faced with the question of how to 

reform the modern grand jury but whether its model instructions are constitutional.  To 

answer  this  question,  we  hold  that  the  provisions  of  the  model  grand  jury  instructions 

challenged here are constitutional.” (footnote omitted)). 



     36  We need not decide the precise boundaries of legitimate grand jury discretion because 



we find no support for the position that an affirmative instruction on grand jury discretion 

is constitutionally mandated. 



     37  For the first time in his supplemental reply brief, Smith argues that the prosecutor’s 



 statements during the grand jury orientation would have indicated to the grand jury that their 

only  role  was  to  determine  the  existence  of  probable  cause.    But  Smith  made  no  such 

argument in the trial court, in his initial briefing in this case, or in his opening supplemental 

brief.  Instead, he challenged only the court’s instructions to the grand jury.    Indeed, a 

transcript of the grand jury orientation was not even prepared until after the State filed its 

 supplemental  brief,  at  the  State’s  request.    Accordingly,  any  argument  based  on  the 

prosecutor’s statements is waived.  See Berezyuk v. State, 282 P.3d 386, 398-400 (Alaska 

                                                                                               (continued...) 



                                                    – 17 –                                                  2775 


----------------------- Page 18-----------------------

        Conclusion 



               The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED. 



   37  (...continued) 



App. 2012).  In any event, we read the prosecutor’s comments as simply explaining the 

standard by which the grand jury was, in fact, to determine if the charges had sufficient 

evidentiary support. 



                                             – 18 –                                         2775 


----------------------- Page 19-----------------------

Judge MANNHEIMER, concurring.  



               The defendant in this case, Martin C. Smith, contends that the grand jury 



proceedings in his case were fatally flawed because the presiding judge of the superior 



court gave misleading instructions to the grand jury panel that issued the indictment 



against Smith. 



               Specifically, Smith asserts that, under the Alaska Constitution, even when 



the members of a grand jury panel conclude that the evidence supports a proposed 



indictment,  the  grand  jurors  nevertheless  have  an  absolute,  unfettered  discretion  to 



refuse to issue an indictment — for any reason they see fit.  Smith contends that, in his 



case, the superior court misled the grand jurors by telling them, or at least implying, that 



grand  jurors  have a  duty  to  issue an  indictment  if  they  conclude  that  the  evidence 



supports the proposed charge.  Indeed, Smith contends that when the superior court 



convenes a grand jury, the court must explicitly instruct grand jurors that they have an 



unfettered discretion to refuse to issue an indictment for any reason they see fit.  



               If Smith is correct, two major provisions of Alaska Criminal Rule 6 (the 



rule that governs grand jury proceedings) are unconstitutional.   



               The first of these provisions is Criminal Rule 6(r), which declares that 



grand jurors “shall find an indictment” if they conclude that the evidence they have heard 



would warrant a trial jury in finding the defendant guilty.  If Smith is correct, it is 



unconstitutional to tell grand jurors that there are any circumstances in which they are 



required to return an indictment.  



               The second of these provisions is Criminal Rule 6(e)(1), which requires 



grand jurors to take an oath that they will “diligently inquire and true presentment make” 



of all the matters that come before them.  This oath requires grand jurors to promise that 



they will not “leave any one unpresented [i.e., unindicted] through fear, affection, gain, 



                                            – 19 –                                         2775 


----------------------- Page 20-----------------------

reward,  or  hope  thereof”,  but  that  they  will  instead  “present  all  things  truly  and 



impartially as [these matters] shall come to [their] knowledge according to the best of 



[their] understanding.”   



               These provisions of the grand juror oath are inconsistent with Smith’s 



contention that grand jurors have an absolute, unfettered discretion to decline to issue an 



indictment for any reason they see fit.  The prescribed oath requires grand jurors to 



promise that, when they consider exercising their authority to decline to indict someone, 



they will not allow their decision to be influenced by deference to the defendant’s wealth, 



power, or popularity; nor will they allow their decision to be influenced by a desire to 



gratify community sentiment or expectations, or by a fear of angering the community.  



Instead, the oath requires grand jurors to promise that they will render true and impartial 



justice — that their decisions will not be improperly influenced by the identities of the 



people involved, nor by such factors as the race, religion, or political views of the people 



involved.   



       A  summary  of  this  Court’s  decision,  and  my  reasons  for  writing  this 

        concurrence 



               In  this  Court’s  lead  opinion,  my  colleagues  reject  some  of  Smith’s 



contentions, but they leave other portions of Smith’s argument unresolved.   



               In particular, my colleagues reject Smith’s contention that grand jurors have 



an absolute, unfettered discretion to decline to issue an indictment for any reason they 



see fit, even when the grand jurors conclude that the evidence supports the indictment.  



Instead,  my  colleagues  hold  that  grand  jurors  are  bound  by  the  oath  prescribed  in 



Criminal Rule 6(e)(1) — an oath that forbids grand jurors from refusing or declining to 



indict a defendant for any of the various improper reasons listed in the oath.   



                                             – 20 –                                        2775 


----------------------- Page 21-----------------------

               I agree with my colleagues that the drafters of Alaska’s constitution worked 



under the premise that grand jurors are bound by the provisions of the oath that is now 



codified in Criminal Rule 6(e)(1).  The origins of this oath are more than a thousand 



years old, and the oath has existed in Anglo-American law (in essentially its current 



form) since the late 1200s.  This oath was incorporated by reference in the Carter Code 



of 1900 (the first codification of Alaska law), and this oath was enacted as an express 



provision of the Alaska statutes by the territorial legislature in 1933.  No delegate to our 



constitutional convention expressed any disagreement with this oath or any doubt as to 



whether Alaska grand jurors are bound by the provisions of this oath.  



               Thus, my colleagues and I agree that Alaska grand jurors do not have 



unfettered discretion to ignore the evidence and refuse to issue an indictment for any 



reason they see fit.  



               At the same time, however, my colleagues suggest that Smith may be 



partially  correct — that Alaska grand jurors may have some discretion to refuse to issue 



an indictment even when they conclude that the indictment is supported by the evidence.  



Specifically, my colleagues suggest that, so long as the grand jurors abide by the oath set 



forth in Rule 6(e)(1), Alaska grand jurors may have the discretion to refuse to issue an 



indictment  whenever  the  grand  jurors  conclude  that  the  charges  are  “unjust”  or 



“excessively technical”.  



               But  having  suggested  this  possibility,  my  colleagues  then  decline  to 



definitively resolve this issue of a grand jury’s potential discretion to decline to issue an 



indictment for reasons apart from the sufficiency of the evidence to support the charges. 



               Instead of deciding whether Alaska grand jurors have a limited discretion 



to reject even well-founded felony charges, my colleagues conclude that this issue is 



moot.    According  to  my  colleagues,  this  mootness  arises  from  the  wording  of  the 



superior court’s initial instructions to the grand jury panel in Smith’s case.   



                                            – 21 –                                       2775 


----------------------- Page 22-----------------------

                 The presiding judge began by telling the grand jurors that they were about 



to commence performing “an extremely important function” because, “under Alaska’s 



Constitution, the grand jury is to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to bring 



a person to trial.”  But as my colleagues note in the lead opinion, the presiding judge then 



proceeded to paraphrase the grand jury’s constitutional duty to “determine whether there 



is sufficient evidence to bring a person to trial.”  The judge told the grand jurors that 



“this provision imposes a two-fold duty upon you”:  



                         First, grand jurors have an obligation to the people of 



                 the State of Alaska to compel persons charged with serious 

                 criminal conduct to answer for that conduct if there are just 

                grounds for the charge.  At the same time, however, grand 

                jurors have an obligation to every individual to ensure that 

                 no one is subjected to criminal prosecution without good 

                 cause.  

                   

                 Bear in mind that, when the presiding judge spoke these words, the judge 



had  just  told  the  grand  jurors  that  he  was  explaining  their  constitutional  duty  “to 



determine whether there is sufficient evidence to bring a person to trial.”  Thus, when the 



judge referred to cases where there are “just grounds” for the charge, and when the judge 



contrasted  those  cases  with  instances  where  an  individual  is  subjected  to  criminal 



prosecution “without good cause”, the grand jurors could reasonably interpret the judge 



to be saying (1) that there are “just grounds” for requiring a person to answer a felony 



charge if the evidence supports the charge, and (2) that a person would be subjected to 



prosecution “without good cause” if the evidence did not support the charge. 



                 But in this Court’s lead opinion, my colleagues suggest a broader reading 



of these two phrases.  My colleagues assert that the concepts of “just grounds” and “good 



cause” imply that grand jurors are not limited to evaluating whether the evidence they 



have heard is sufficient to support the proposed charges.  Rather, according to my 



                                                  – 22 –                                              2775 


----------------------- Page 23-----------------------

colleagues, the phrases “just grounds” and “good cause” imply that grand jurors are 



allowed to base their decisions on “fundamental concepts of justice and fairness” — 



considerations which go beyond the task of “simply determining whether the evidence 



is sufficient to establish a defendant’s guilt at trial.”  



               Having  adopted  this  reading  of  the  presiding  judge’s  instruction,  my 



colleagues assert that reasonable grand jurors would have understood the superior court 



to be saying that grand jurors had the power to refuse to issue an indictment if, for 



reasons apart from the sufficiency of the evidence, the grand jurors concluded that it 



would be unjust or unfair for the State to prosecute the charge.  Thus, for instance, the 



grand jurors might refuse to issue an indictment if they personally disagreed with the law 



that formed the basis of the charge, or if they thought that it was unfair to enforce that 



law under the circumstances of the defendant’s case, or if they thought that the proposed 



indictment violated “fundamental concepts of justice and fairness” for some other reason 



— so long as this reason was not directly barred by the provisions of the grand juror oath 



prescribed in Criminal Rule 6(e)(1).  



               Having interpreted the presiding judge’s instruction in this manner, my 



colleagues then conclude that this Court need only decide one component of Smith’s 



claims on appeal.  This one component is Smith’s argument that the superior court is 



required to affirmatively instruct grand jurors that they have a limited authority to engage 



in  nullification.    My  colleagues  hold  that  the  superior  court  is  not  required  to 



affirmatively instruct grand jurors that they can engage in nullification, so long as the 



court’s instructions to the grand jurors do not expressly foreclose  the possibility of 



nullification.  



               In Smith’s case, the superior court’s instructions to the grand jurors do not 



expressly say that grand jurors are prohibited from engaging in nullification.  Indeed, as 



I just explained, my colleagues interpret those instructions as actually suggesting that the 



                                             – 23 –                                         2775 


----------------------- Page 24-----------------------

grand jurors could lawfully engage in nullification.  Then, based on the assumption that 



the grand jurors would have understood the presiding judge’s instruction in this manner, 



my colleagues conclude that the presiding judge in Smith’s case was under no duty to 



affirmatively  instruct  the  grand  jurors  that  they  were  entitled  to  refuse  to  issue  an 



indictment even when they concluded that the evidence supported the charge.   



               And having reached this conclusion, my colleagues declare that this Court 



does not need to decide whether Alaska grand jurors actually have this limited right of 



nullification.   



               My colleagues reason that if, on the one hand, Alaska law does give grand 



jurors a limited right to engage in nullification (limited by the requirements of Alaska’s 



grand juror oath), then the presiding judge’s instructions to the grand jury panel in 



Smith’s case correctly suggested that grand jury nullification was allowed.  If, on the 



other  hand,  Alaska  law  does  not  give  grand  jurors  a  limited  right  to  engage  in 



nullification, then there was no harm — because, even though the grand jurors may have 



falsely believed that they had the discretion to refuse to indict Smith regardless of the 



evidence supporting the indictment, the grand jurors nevertheless indicted Smith.  



               The problem here is that my colleagues cannot justify their conclusion of 



mootness merely by asserting that one or more grand jurors might potentially  have 



interpreted the phrases “just grounds” and “good cause” as authorizing the grand jurors 



to engage in nullification.  Rather, my colleagues’ finding of mootness requires this 



Court to declare that any reasonable person who heard the superior court’s instructions 



would have concluded that, under Alaska law, grand jurors had this kind of discretion 



to ignore the evidence and the law.   



               But this is not the sole reasonable interpretation of the superior court’s 



instructions to the grand jurors.  Rather, I believe that my colleagues’ interpretation of 



                                              – 24 –                                           2775 


----------------------- Page 25-----------------------

the superior court’s instructions hinges on taking the phrases “just grounds” and “good 



cause” out of context.   



                 The superior court employed the phrases “just grounds” and “good cause” 



as part of its explanation of the grand jurors’ duty under the Alaska Constitution “to 



determine whether there is sufficient evidence to bring a person to trial.”  After telling 



the grand jurors that this was the grand jury’s constitutional function, the superior court 



then elaborated by saying that the grand jurors had an obligation “to compel persons 



charged with serious criminal conduct to answer for that conduct if there are just grounds 



for the charge”, as well as a corresponding obligation “to ensure that no one is subjected 



to criminal prosecution without good cause.”   



                 Reasonable grand jurors, hearing these phrases in this context, would not 



necessarily  think  that  the  superior  court  was  describing  a  grand  jury’s  power  of 



nullification.  Rather, reasonable grand jurors might well understand the superior court 



to simply be elaborating on the grand jurors’ constitutional duty to evaluate whether the 



evidence sufficiently supported a proposed indictment.   



                 In other words, reading the superior court’s instruction as a whole (which 



                                   1 

is what Alaska law requires  ), grand jurors could reasonably understand the superior 



court to be saying that when the grand jurors evaluated whether a proposed charge was 



supported by the evidence, this was the same thing as evaluating whether the proposed 



felony  charge  was  supported  by  “just  grounds”  or  whether  (on  the  other  hand)  a 



defendant was being subjected to prosecution “without good cause”.  



                 If at least some reasonable grand jurors could understand the presiding 



judge to be saying only this (and not to be suggesting that grand jurors have the right to 



     1  See, e.g., Kangas v. State, 463 P.3d 189, 194 (Alaska App. 2020).  



                                                  – 25 –                                              2775 


----------------------- Page 26-----------------------

engage in nullification), then the issue of whether Alaska grand jurors actually have a 



right to engage in nullification is not moot.  



               For this reason, I think that this Court must address the question of whether, 



aside from the restrictions of the grand juror oath set forth in Criminal Rule 6(e)(1), 



Alaska grand jurors might have a limited discretion to refuse to issue an indictment even 



though they conclude that the evidence supports the indictment.   



               The answer to this question ultimately hinges on the understanding and 



intentions of the delegates who drafted the grand jury provision of Alaska’s constitution.  



               My   colleagues   are   correct   that   various   courts   and   various   legal 



commentators have declared that grand jurors have the discretion to decline to issue an 



indictment for reasons apart from the sufficiency of the evidence.  But while this Court 



should of course examine the law of other jurisdictions and the views of respected legal 



commentators, the question before this Court is one of Alaska law.  Thus, the answer to 



this question turns on how the delegates to our constitutional convention understood the 



authority and functions of the grand jury when those delegates codified a right to grand 



jury indictment in Article I, Section 8 of the Alaska Constitution. 



               As I explain more fully in this concurrence, the Alaska drafters’ debate over 



our  grand  jury  provision  is  completely  silent  regarding  the  question  of  grand  jury 



“nullification”.  During this debate, no one mentioned the question of whether grand 



jurors might have the discretion to refuse to issue an indictment even when the grand 



jurors conclude that the evidence supports the proposed indictment.   



               The drafters’ silence is significant for two reasons, both having to do with 



the context in which the delegates held their debate.   



               First, under the initial draft of our state constitution, Alaska was going to 



abolish the requirement of grand jury indictments in felony cases.  This meant that the 



delegates who wanted to keep the requirement of a grand jury indictment had to ask the 



                                             – 26 –                                        2775 


----------------------- Page 27-----------------------

convention to amend this initial draft — and, more importantly, those delegates had to 



articulate affirmative reasons for keeping the requirement of grand jury indictments.   



               But  in  the  ensuing  debate,  the  delegates  who  wanted  to  keep  the 



requirement of a grand jury indictment were utterly silent regarding the possibility of 



grand jury nullification.  None of these delegates spoke about a grand jury’s potential 



power to refuse to issue an indictment for reasons apart from the sufficiency of the 



evidence to support the charges.  More importantly, none of these delegates suggested 



that  grand  juries  ought  to  be  engaging  in  nullification,  or  that  nullification  was  a 



beneficial function of the grand jury and a reason to require grand jury indictments.   



               Rather, during this debate, the various delegates who spoke in favor of 



keeping  the  requirement  of  a  grand  jury  indictment  repeatedly  presented  a  single 



argument:    that  grand  juries  were  needed  to  prevent  overzealous  prosecutors  from 



pursuing felony charges when those charges were not supported by the evidence.  



               The utter failure of any delegate to mention grand jury “nullification” is 



particularly striking because, during the months leading up to and surrounding this 



constitutional debate, newspapers and magazines across the United States were filled 



with coverage of one of the most egregious modern examples of jury and grand jury 



nullification:  the failure of a Southern trial jury and, later, a Southern grand jury to take 



any action against the men who openly admitted kidnapping and murdering a Black 



teenager, Emmet Till (because he purportedly made a sexual remark to a White woman). 



               Even though the Emmett Till case filled the media (or perhaps because it 



filled the media), the delegates who favored keeping the requirement of grand jury 



indictments  never  once  asserted  that  grand  juries  were  needed,  or  were  beneficial, 



because of a grand jury’s power to ignore the evidence and refuse to issue an indictment 



based on reasons of politics, social policy, or community sentiment.   



                                              – 27 –                                          2775 


----------------------- Page 28-----------------------

               At the same time, the delegates who wished to abolish the requirement of 



grand jury indictments never argued that grand jury nullification posed a potential danger 



to the rule of law — even though a prime instance of this danger was headline news at 



the time.   



               Rather,  the  delegates  on  both  sides  of  the  debate  apparently  viewed 



instances of grand jury nullification as aberrations — regrettable but unpreventable 



departures from a grand jury’s proper function.  



               All of this brings me to my last point.   



               Throughout  history,  grand  juries  have,  on  occasion,  refused  to  issue 



indictments despite significant or even overwhelming evidence that the defendant was 



guilty of the crime charged in the proposed indictment.  The most famous (or infamous) 



of these instances involved grand jurors who refused to enforce a particular unpopular 



statute, or grand jurors who refused to enforce the criminal law against certain favored 



political, racial, or social groups, or grand jurors who refused to enforce the law when 



the victim of the crime was a member of a disfavored political, racial, or social group.  



               But as the Ninth Circuit pointed out in its en banc decision in United States 



v.  Navarro-Vargas,  408  F.3d  1184  (9th  Cir.  2005),  these  instances  of  grand  jury 



nullification have occurred regardless of the instructions that the grand jurors received 



—  i.e., regardless of whether judges encouraged the grand jurors to flout the law (as 



often happened in pre-Revolutionary War America), or whether judges instructed the 



grand jurors that they were required to follow and enforce the law (instructions which 



became the norm after the Revolution was successful and the new national and state 



governments were formed).  



               This is because a grand jury’s power of nullification ultimately derives from 



the very structure of the grand jury itself.  Under our law, a grand jury’s deliberations are 



secret, the grand jurors are insulated from civil or criminal sanctions for their decisions, 



                                            – 28 –                                        2775 


----------------------- Page 29-----------------------

and no government entity can overturn a grand jury’s decision not to issue an indictment.  



History shows us that the phenomenon of grand jury nullification arises from these 



factors, rather than from anything that judges or prosecutors might tell grand jurors about 



the law governing a grand jury’s decision-making.  “In all of these cases, for better or for 



worse, it is the structure of the grand jury process and its function  in our system that 



makes it independent.”  Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d at 1202 (emphasis in the original). 



                 Just as trial jury nullification has not disappeared despite the fact that 



                                                                                          2 

Alaska law expressly forbids trial jurors from engaging in nullification,  instances of 



grand jury nullification will occasionally occur even though the superior court does not 



(and, in my view, should not) tell grand jurors that they can engage in nullification.  



                                                     I 



         Why I agree with my colleagues that Alaska grand jurors are bound by the 

        provisions of the grand juror oath prescribed in Criminal Rule 6(e)(1) 



                 Alaska Criminal Rule 6(e)(1) declares that grand jurors must take an oath 



before they commence their duties.  In this oath, the grand jurors promise that they will 



“diligently inquire and true presentment make” of all the matters that come before them, 



that they will not “leave anyone unpresented [i.e., unindicted] through fear, affection, 



gain, reward, or hope thereof”, and that they will instead “present all things truly and 



impartially as [these matters] shall come to [their] knowledge according to the best of 



[their] understanding.”   



    2   Hartley v. State, 653 P.2d 1052, 1055 (Alaska App. 1982).  



                                                  – 29 –                                               2775 


----------------------- Page 30-----------------------

                 The origins of this oath are more than a thousand years old, and its major 



                                                                                               3 

provisions have been a fixture of Anglo-American law since the late 1200s.     



                 This grand juror oath was incorporated by reference in the first codification 



of Alaska territorial law, the Carter Code of 1900.  Section 10 of Part Two of the Carter 



Code (“Criminal Procedure”) declared that grand jury proceedings in Alaska were to be 



“conducted in the manner prescribed by the laws of the United States”.  At that time, 



federal law prescribed the following grand jury oath:  



                         You ... do swear that you will diligently inquire, and 



                 true presentment make, of such articles, matters and things as 

                 shall  be  given  you  in  charge,  or  otherwise  come  to  your 

                 knowledge,  touching  the  present  service.  ...    [Y]ou  shall 

                 present no one for envy, hatred or malice; neither shall you 

                 leave any one unpresented for fear, favor, affection, hope of 

                 reward or gain, but shall present all things truly as they come 

                 to   your    knowledge,       according      to   the   best   of    your 

                 understanding.  So help you God!  



    3   See George J. Edwards’s classic treatise, The Grand Jury (1906), pp. 98–100:  



        The grand juror’s oath is of great antiquity.  When, in the time of Aethelred II 

    [978 to 1016 C.E.], the twelve Thanes went out, they “swore upon the [religious] relic 

    that was given them in hand that they would accuse no innocent man nor conceal any 

    guilty one.”  In Bracton’s time [the mid-1200s] the oath and pledge bound the grand 

    jurors to similar action.  ...  [At] the conclusion of the reading of the  capitula by the 

    justices  [who  convened  the  grand  jury],  they  [ i.e.,  the  grand  jurors]  pledged 

    themselves  to  do  faithfully  those  things  which  the  justices  required  of  them,  to 

    aggrieve no one through enmity, nor defer to any one through love, and to conceal 

    [from all persons] what they had heard [during the grand jury proceedings].  This 

    [grand juror oath] ... contains the elements of the oath of the present day.  



         [By] the time of Britton [i.e., about one generation later], but one oath was taken, 

    containing all the elements of ... and more generally conforming to the oath now 

    administered [at the turn of the 20th century].  



                                                  – 30 –                                              2775 


----------------------- Page 31-----------------------

                  

See Charge to Grand Jury, 2 Sawyer 667, 30 Federal Cases 992 (D. California 1872). 



                In  1933,  the  Alaska  territorial  legislature  made  this  oath  an  express 

provision of Alaska’s statutory law, 4 and the oath was codified in 1933 Compiled Laws 



of Alaska, Section 5167: 



                        Sec. 5167.  Oath of grand jury.  Before the grand jury 



                enter upon the discharge of their duties, the following oath 

                shall be administered to them by the clerk of the court:  



                        You and each of you as members of this grand jury, 

                for the United States of America and the Territory of Alaska, 

                ... do solemnly swear that you will diligently inquire and true 

                presentment make of all such matters and things as shall be 

                given  you  in  charge,  or  shall  otherwise  come  to  your 

                knowledge touching this present service.  ...  That you will 

                present  no  one  through  envy,  hatred  or  malice,  or  leave 

                anyone unpresented through fear, affection, gain, reward, or 

                hope thereof; but that you will present all things truly and 

                indifferently  [i.e.,  impartially]  as  they  shall  come  to  your 

                knowledge according to the best of your understanding.  So 

                help you God.  



                Thus, at the time of Alaska’s constitutional convention, the grand juror oath 



that is currently found in Criminal Rule 6(e)(1) had been part of Alaska law for over half 



a century.  No delegate to the convention expressed any disagreement with this oath, nor 



any doubt as to whether Alaska grand jurors are bound by the provisions of this oath.   



                Following statehood, the Alaska Supreme Court re-codified this oath in 



Alaska Criminal Rule 6, the rule governing grand jury proceedings.   



    4   See Laws 1933, ch. 24, § 3.   



                                                 – 31 –                                              2775 


----------------------- Page 32-----------------------

                The history of this oath, and its existence as part of Alaska law for more 



than 50 years before our state constitutional convention, is utterly inconsistent with 



Smith’s claim that the framers of Alaska’s constitution gave grand jurors an unfettered 



discretion to refuse to return an indictment for any reason they see fit.  Rather, this 



history demonstrates that the delegates to our state constitutional convention (and, later, 



the members of our state supreme court) understood the law of Alaska as requiring grand 



jurors to abide by the provisions of this oath — requiring grand jurors to “diligently 



inquire and true presentment make” of all the matters brought before them, requiring 



them to “present all things truly and impartially”, and requiring them to leave no one 



unindicted “through fear, affection, gain, reward, or hope thereof”. 



                                                  II 



        Does any provision of Alaska’s codified law give grand jurors a limited 

        discretion to refuse to issue an indictment even when the grand jurors 

        conclude that the evidence supports the proposed indictment? 



                In Smith’s briefs to this Court, he argues that two provisions of Alaska’s 



codified law — Article I, Section 8 of our state constitution, and AS 12.40.050 — 



expressly grant Alaska grand jurors the discretion to decline to issue an indictment for 



any reason they see fit.   



                Smith’s contention is at least partially wrong — because Alaska grand 



jurors  are  required  to  abide  by  the  provisions  of  the  oath  prescribed  in  Criminal 



Rule 6(e)(1).  But this leaves the question of whether, so long as Alaska grand jurors 



abide by the restrictions imposed by the grand juror oath, the grand jurors have a limited 



discretion to decline to issue an indictment even when they conclude that the evidence 



supports the proposed indictment.   



                                               – 32 –                                            2775 


----------------------- Page 33-----------------------

                 For the reasons I am about to explain, I conclude that the provisions of 



Alaska’s  codified  law  do  not  give  grand jurors  the discretion  to  refuse  to issue  an 



indictment for reasons apart from the sufficiency of the evidence.  



             (a)  Smith’s suggested interpretation of the fourth sentence of Article I, 

             Section 8 of the Alaska Constitution 



                 Smith contends that the wording of the fourth sentence of the grand jury 



provision of our state constitution (Article I, Section 8) expressly grants Alaska grand 



jurors the discretion to decline to issue an indictment for any reason they see fit.  But 



Smith’s argument hinges on a misinterpretation of the language of this sentence.  



                                                                                                      5 

                 The complete text of Article I, Section 8 is found in this footnote,   but 



Smith’s argument is based on the fourth sentence of Section 8:  “The grand jury shall 



consist  of  at  least  twelve  citizens,  a  majority  of  whom  concurring  may  return  an 



indictment.” 



                 Smith notes that  this sentence says that a majority of the grand jurors 



“may return an indictment”, rather than “shall return an indictment”.  Based on the fact 



that this sentence uses the word “may” instead of the word “shall”, Smith argues that the 



framers  of  Alaska’s  constitution  must  have  intended  for  the  grand  jury’s  power  of 



indictment to be discretionary — and that this fourth sentence of Article I, Section 8 



    5    Article I, Section 8 of the Alaska Constitution declares: 



             No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 

    unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the 

    armed forces in time of war or public danger.  Indictment may be waived by the 

    accused.  In that case[,] the prosecution shall be by information.  The grand jury shall 

    consist of at least twelve citizens, a majority of whom concurring may return an 

    indictment.  The power of grand juries to investigate and make recommendations 

    concerning the public welfare or safety shall never be suspended.  



                                                  – 33 –                                                2775 


----------------------- Page 34-----------------------

codifies  the  principle  that  grand  jurors  in  Alaska  have  no  legal  duty  to  return  an 



indictment even when they conclude that the evidence supports the charge against the 



defendant.  



               In State v. Leighton, 336 P.3d 713, 715 (Alaska App. 2014), this Court 



rejected this proposed reading of Article I, Section 8.  However, Leighton ’s discussion 



of this point is short and conclusory.  Here is how I would now explain the result in 



Leighton, and why I reject Smith’s proposed interpretation of Article I, Section 8. 



               Smith’s argument hinges on the ambiguity of the verb “may”.   



               In some contexts, the verb “may” can mean “might or might not” — for 



example, “It may rain this afternoon.” or “We may get our work done by mid-afternoon.”  



The verb “may” can also have a similar meaning — “might or might not” — when we 



speak of people’s potential decisions.  For example, the sentence “Constance may take 



a coffee break before she begins work on her next project” can potentially mean that 



Constance might choose to take a coffee break before beginning her next project, or she 



might choose to begin her next project immediately.  



               But the verb “may” can also mean “is authorized to” or “is permitted to”.  



When a parent tells a babysitter, “The children may have a cookie after  they  have 



finished their soup and toast”, the parent is not describing the children’s potential future 



decision  about  eating  cookies  after  their  meal.   Rather,  the  parent  is  informing  the 



babysitter of a rule:  The children are permitted to have a cookie only after they have 



finished their soup and toast.  



               Similarly, when the managing partner of a law firm tells one of the firm’s 



other lawyers, “You may select one of our junior associates to work full-time with you 



on your case”, the managing partner is giving authorization to the other lawyer — 



permission to select a junior associate to work on the lawyer’s case, to the exclusion of 



all other potential demands on the associate’s time.  



                                             – 34 –                                         2775 


----------------------- Page 35-----------------------

                 Indeed, it now can be seen that my earlier example — “Constance may take 



a coffee break before she begins work on her next project” — is ambiguous.  Its meaning 



depends on who is uttering these words, and in what context.  If this sentence is spoken 



by  a  workplace  supervisor,  the  sentence  might  mean  that  the  supervisor  is  giving 



permission  for Constance to take a break before beginning her next project.  On the other 



hand, if these words are spoken by a friend, co-worker, or subordinate, the sentence can 



simply mean that Constance might or might not decide (at her option) to take a break 



before she commences her next project.  



                 Thus,  the  meaning  of  the  word  “may”  in  a  sentence  often  cannot  be 



understood until one has considered the context in which the word is used.   



                 Smith concedes that the minutes of Alaska’s Constitutional Convention 



do not contain any discussion of why the framers wrote “may return an indictment” 



rather than “shall return an indictment” in Article I, Section 8.  But the wording of this 



fourth sentence, considered as a whole, shows that the word “may” is employed in the 



sense of authorization:  a grand jury is authorized to return an indictment if a majority 



of the grand jurors concur.   



                 This conclusion — that Article I, Section 8 uses the word “may” in the 



sense of “is authorized to” — is bolstered by the pre-statehood provisions of Alaska law 



dealing with the grand jury.  



                 From Alaska’s earliest days under United States governance, Alaska law 



(first federal, and then Alaska territorial law) contained many provisions governing the 



procedures and actions of the grand jury.  The earliest versions of these provisions are 



                                          6 

found in the Carter Code of 1900.     



    6    Many provisions of the Carter Code are direct forerunners of provisions now found 



in Alaska Criminal Rule 6:  the power of the grand jury foreperson to administer oaths, the 

                                                                                          (continued...) 



                                                  – 35 –                                              2775 


----------------------- Page 36-----------------------

                 For present purposes, the most relevant provision of the Carter Code was 



Part Two, Section 29.  This provision prescribed the minimum number of grand juror 



votes required to support an indictment, and this provision was carried forward in all 



                                                                          7 

subsequent codifications of Alaska law, up until statehood:     



                   

                 Sec. 29.  The indictment must be found by twelve jurors 

                 and indorsed by foreman.  That an indictment can not be 

                 found without the concurrence of at least twelve grand jurors; 

                 and when so found it must be indorsed “a true bill,” and such 

                 indorsement signed by the foreman of the jury.  



                 The Carter Code itself did not contain any provision specifying the size of 



the grand jury, but the Carter Code specified (in Section 10 of Part Two) that grand jury 



proceedings in Alaska were to be “conducted in the manner prescribed by the laws of the 



United States”.  And at that time (1900), federal law specified that grand juries had to 



    6   (...continued) 



secrecy of grand jury proceedings, the limitations on who may be present during the sessions 

of the grand jury, the power of the grand jury to seek guidance from the superior court as to 

whether particular facts constitute a crime, or whether there is some legal bar to the proposed 

prosecution of the defendant, the power of the grand jury to call for the presentation of 

potentially exculpatory evidence, and the legal effect of the grand jury’s decision that a 

proposed indictment is “a true bill” or “not a true bill”.   



        Compare Criminal Rule 6(h) with Part Two, Section 17 of the Carter Code; Criminal 

Rule 6(l) with Part Two, Sections 28 and 32 of the Carter Code; Criminal Rule 6(k) with Part 

Two, Section 25 of the Carter Code; Criminal Rule 6(o) with Part Two, Sections 15 and 16 

of the Carter Code; Criminal Rule 6(q) with Part Two, Section 18 of the Carter Code; and 

Criminal Rule 6(n) with Part Two, Sections 31, 33, and 34 of the Carter Code.  



    7   See Section 2138 of CLA 1913, Section 5196 of CLA 1933, and Section 66-8-51 of 



ACLA 1949.  



                                                  – 36 –                                                2775 


----------------------- Page 37-----------------------

                                                                                       8 

consist of at least sixteen grand jurors and no more than twenty-three.    Later, in 1933, 



                                                                                9 

the Alaska territorial legislature codified this same requirement.    



                 Thus, when the pre-statehood law of Alaska specified that at least twelve 



grand jurors had to concur in any indictment, this meant that even if the grand jury was 



at its maximum size of twenty-three members, an indictment required the concurrence 



of a majority of the grand jurors.   



                 This historical context explains the fourth sentence of Article I, Section 8 



of our state constitution:  “The grand jury shall consist of at least twelve citizens, a 



majority of whom concurring may return an indictment.”  This constitutional provision 



was intended to cover the same two subjects as the pre-statehood law that I have just 



discussed.  These subjects were (1) the mandated size of grand jury panels, and (2) the 



number of grand juror votes needed to support an indictment.   



                 Article I, Section 8 significantly relaxed the pre-statehood requirements — 



because, under this constitutional provision, grand juries can consist of as few as twelve 



people, and indictments only need the concurrence of a majority of the grand jurors, even 



when that majority is as small as seven grand jurors.   



                 But more importantly, this history shows that Smith is wrong when he 



argues that the phrase “a majority of whom concurring may return an indictment” was 



intended to codify the notion that grand jurors had the discretion to refuse to indict 



someone, no matter how much evidence supported the charge.  Rather, the purpose of 



    8   See Revised Statutes of the United States (the predecessor to the United States Code), 



Title XIII (“The Judiciary”), chapter 15, Section 808:  “Every grand jury empaneled before 

any district or circuit court shall consist of not less than sixteen nor more than twenty-three 

persons.”  



    9   See Laws 1933, ch. 24, § 2.  This provision was codified as Section 5166, CLA 1933, 



and it was carried forward as Section 66-8-2 of ACLA 1949.  



                                                  – 37 –                                                2775 


----------------------- Page 38-----------------------

this fourth sentence of Article I, Section 8 is to prescribe the required size of grand jury 



panels and the number of grand jurors needed to support an indictment.   



              None  of  Alaska’s  pre-statehood  grand  jury  statutes  spoke  of,  or  even 



suggested, an unbounded grand jury discretion to refuse to issue an indictment regardless 



of the strength of the evidence supporting that indictment.  To the contrary:  Alaska’s 



pre-statehood statutes spoke of a grand jury’s  duty to return an indictment when the 



evidence warranted it.   



              Part Two, Section 19 of the Carter Code declared, “That the grand jury 



ought to find an indictment when all the evidence before them, taken together, is such 



as in their judgment would, if unexplained or uncontradicted, warrant a conviction by the 



trial jury.”  This provision was carried forward in the codification of 1913 (Section 



2128), and then in the codification of 1933 (Section 5183), and then again in the final 



pre-statehood codification of 1949 (Section 66-8-27).  



              The framers of our state constitution were presumably aware that, ever 



since the Carter Code of 1900, Alaska law had spoken in terms of a grand jury’s duty to 



return an indictment if it was supported by the evidence — that grand jurors “ought to 



find an indictment” if the grand jurors concluded that the evidence, if “taken together, 



... would, if unexplained or uncontradicted, warrant a conviction by the trial jury.”  And 



no delegate voiced any objection to the precept codified in these pre-statehood statutes. 



              (I  provide  a  more  detailed  analysis  of  the  phrase  “would  warrant  a 



conviction” a little later in this section, when I discuss the language of Alaska Criminal 



Rule 6(r).)  



              Because Article I, Section 8 of our state constitution was formulated and 



adopted in this legal and historical context, I join my colleagues in rejecting Smith’s 



contention that the fourth sentence of Article I, Section 8 was meant to confer unbounded 



discretion on grand jurors to refuse to return an indictment for any reason.   



                                           – 38 –                                        2775 


----------------------- Page 39-----------------------

                 (Smith also presents a separate argument concerning Article I, Section 8.  



Smith contends that even if the text of Article I, Section 8 does not expressly confer 



discretion on grand jurors to refuse to return an indictment for reasons apart from the 



sufficiency of the evidence, Article I, Section 8 impliedly confers this kind of discretion 



on grand jurors.  I address this argument later in my concurrence — and I explain why 



Smith’s argument is inconsistent with the content of the delegates’ debate regarding 



Article I, Section 8.)  



             (b)  Smith’s suggested interpretation of AS 12.40.050 



                 Smith also argues that AS 12.40.050 (one of a series of statutes governing 



Alaska grand juries) codifies the principle that grand jurors have unbridled discretion to 



decline to issue an indictment even when the grand jurors conclude that the evidence 



supports the proposed indictment.  Smith bases his argument on the fact that AS 12.40.- 



050 says, “The grand jury may indict or present a person for a crime upon sufficient 



evidence ...”.   



                 But Smith’s argument is based on a misquotation of AS 12.40.050.  When 



Smith quotes this statute in his brief, he puts a period after the word “evidence”, as if that 



were the end of the sentence.  But in the statute itself, there is a comma after the word 



“evidence”, and the sentence continues with another clause.  Here is the complete text 



of AS 12.40.050: 



                  

                         Holding   to   answer   as   affecting   indictment   or 

                 presentment.  The grand jury may indict or present a person 

                 for a crime upon sufficient evidence, whether that person has 

                been held to answer for the crime or not.   



                                                  – 39 –                                               2775 


----------------------- Page 40-----------------------

               When AS 12.40.050 is read as a whole, it is clear that this statute uses the 



word “may” in the sense of “is authorized to”.  The statute authorizes a grand jury to 



indict a defendant regardless of whether the defendant has previously been “held to 



answer” — i.e., regardless of whether the grand jury’s indictment will be the first public 



charge filed against the defendant or whether, instead, the defendant has already been 



charged with the crime by complaint or by information, and the defendant has been 



“held to answer” by the district court (i.e., either committed to jail or released on bail to 



await the action of the grand jury).  



               This provision of Alaska law, authorizing a grand jury to indict a person 



regardless of whether a court has already ordered that person to be “held to answer”, has 



been part of Alaska law ever since the Carter Code of 1900.  See Carter Code, Part Two, 

Section 14. 10  This history removes any potential ambiguity in the wording of AS 12.40.- 



050, and it shows that Smith’s suggested reading of this statute is mistaken.  



               (I note, with some chagrin, that this Court’s reading of AS 12.40.050 in 



State  v.  Leighton,  336  P.3d  713  (Alaska  App.  2014),  is  only  partially  correct.    In 



Leighton, 336 P.3d at 716, this Court declared that AS 12.40.050 authorizes a grand jury 



“to return an indictment on charges that the State has not proposed, if the evidence 



justifies the charges.”  That characterization of the statute is correct, as far as it goes, but 



it fails to describe the full scope of the statute.   



               AS 12.40.050 addresses a grand jury’s authority to issue an indictment 



regardless of whether the defendant has already been held to answer.  The category of 



cases where a defendant has not previously been held to answer does, in fact, include 



instances where the State has not proposed any felony charge against the defendant but 



    10  “Section 14.  May indict whether defendant has been held to answer or not.  That 



the grand jury may indict or present a person for a crime, upon sufficient evidence, whether 

such person has been held to answer for such crime or not.”  



                                             – 40 –                                          2775 


----------------------- Page 41-----------------------

the  grand  jury  concludes  that  one  or  more  felony  charges  should  be  prosecuted.  



However, this category of cases also covers instances where the State chooses to present 



its proposed felony charges directly to the grand jury in the first instance, without first 



filing an information or a complaint against the defendant.)  



           (c)  The language of Alaska Criminal Rule 6(r): “would warrant a 

           conviction of the defendant” 



              As I have already discussed, Alaska’s pre-statehood statutes spoke of a 



grand jury’s duty to return an indictment when the evidence warranted it.  Part Two, 



Section 19 of the Carter Code declared, “That the grand jury ought to find an indictment 



when all the evidence before them, taken together, is such as in their judgment would, 



if unexplained or uncontradicted, warrant a conviction by the trial jury.”  This provision 



was carried forward in the codification of 1913 (Section 2128), then in the codification 



of 1933 (Section 5183), and then again in the final pre-statehood codification of 1949 



(Section 66-8-27).  



              This duty is now codified in Alaska Criminal Rule 6(r).  In fact, Rule 6(r) 



words this duty even more emphatically:  “The grand jury shall find an indictment when 



all  the  evidence  taken  together,  if  unexplained  or  uncontradicted,  would  warrant  a 



conviction of the defendant.”  



              The phrase “would warrant a conviction of the defendant” might potentially 



imply a broad standard that leaves room for grand jurors to exercise some discretion 



even when they conclude that the evidence supports the proposed indictment.  But this 



phrase means something quite different in Criminal Rule 6(r).  



              As this Court recognized in Sheldon v. State, 796 P.2d 831, 836–37 (Alaska 



App. 1990), the wording of Rule 6(r) was taken from Section 66-8-27, ACLA 1949 — 



                                            – 41 –                                       2775 


----------------------- Page 42-----------------------

wording that has come down, essentially unchanged, from the Carter Code of 1900.  This 



pre-statehood statute read:  



                         Sufficiency of evidence to warrant indictment.  That 



                 the  grand  jury  ought  to  find  an  indictment  when  all  the 

                 evidence  before  them,  taken  together,  is  such  as  in  their 

                judgment would, if unexplained or uncontradicted, warrant a 

                 conviction by the trial jury. 



                 As we discussed in  Sheldon, the Alaska Supreme Court has frequently 



quoted the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard set forth in Criminal Rule 6(r), and the 



supreme court has consistently indicated, under this test, grand jury proceedings are not 



a “mini trial”.  Rather, a grand jury should return an indictment when the grand jurors 



                                                                       11 

are convinced of the probability of the defendant’s guilt.                 



                 The pre-statehood statute explicitly identified the trial jurors as the people 



who would determine whether the defendant should be convicted — and there is no 



indication that the language of Rule 6(r) was intended to mean anything different.  In 



fact, the Alaska Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Rule 6(r) embodies the same test 



as the pre-statehood statute.  See Lupro v. State, 603 P.2d 468, 473 (Alaska 1979), 



Newsom v. State, 533 P.2d 904, 906 (Alaska 1975), and Taggard v. State, 500 P.2d 238, 



242–43 (Alaska 1972) — all declaring that, under Rule 6(r), the test for determining 



whether the evidence presented to the grand jury is sufficient to support an indictment 



    11  See, e.g., Preston v. State, 615 P.2d 594, 602 (Alaska 1980); State v. Gieffels, 554 



P.2d 460, 465 (Alaska 1976); Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40, 48 (Alaska 1976); Taggard v. 

State, 500 P.2d 238, 242 (Alaska 1972); Burkholder v. State, 491 P.2d 754, 758 (Alaska 

1971).  



        In Adams v. State , 598 P.2d 503, 508 (Alaska 1979), the supreme court referred to the 

test as requiring the State to present a “prima facie case” of the defendant’s guilt, but it does 

not seem that the supreme court meant anything different from the “probability of guilt” 

standard that the court had discussed in its other cases.  



                                                  – 42 –                                                2775 


----------------------- Page 43-----------------------

is whether that evidence, if unexplained or uncontradicted, “would warrant a conviction 



of the person charged with an offense by the judge or jury trying the offense.”  (Emphasis 



added.)   



              Thus, under Criminal Rule 6(r), the grand jurors’ task is to decide whether 



the evidence they have heard would “warrant” (i.e., justify) a finding of guilt by the trier 



of fact at the defendant’s later criminal trial.  (See Sheldon, 796 P.2d at 837, declaring 



that Criminal Rule 6(r) uses the word “warrant” in the sense of “justify”.)  



              This point is crucial:  Criminal Rule 6(r) does not direct grand jurors to 



decide whether they personally think the defendant should be convicted of the charged 



crime.  Rather, Rule 6(r) requires grand jurors to decide whether, if the evidence they 



have heard is later presented to an impartial trier of fact at trial, this evidence would 



warrant the trial jury or trial judge in concluding that the defendant was guilty of the 



charged crime.   



              Both trial juries and trial judges are required by law to be impartial, and 

they are required to apply the law regardless of their personal views or preferences. 12  



              Thus, under Criminal Rule 6(r), grand jurors  must decide whether the 



evidence they have heard would justify a trier of fact in later finding the defendant guilty 



at trial when that trier of fact is  legally barred from exercising discretion based on 



personal doubts about the wisdom of the applicable law or about whether (apart from 



insufficiency of the evidence) the authorities acted in the best interest of society when 



they decided to pursue the charge.  



              This  Court  emphasized  this  point  in Hohman  v.  State,  669  P.2d  1316 



(Alaska App. 1983).  The defendant in Hohman challenged his indictment because the 



grand jurors were instructed:  



    12 See Hartley v. State, 653 P.2d 1052, 1055 (Alaska App. 1982).  



                                           – 43 –                                        2775 


----------------------- Page 44-----------------------

                       [Y]ou are admonished that you are not to undertake to 



               determine [the defendant’s] guilt or innocence.  That is the 

               exclusive  function  of  the  trial  jury.    Your  duty  ...  is  to 

               determine whether there is probable cause to believe that an 

               accused person is guilty of the offense charged.  Your duty in 

               each case is merely to determine whether the evidence is such 

               as  would,  if  unexplained  or  uncontradicted,  warrant  a 

               conviction by the trial jury, and leave the determination of 

               guilt, or innocence, to that body.  



Hohman,  669  P.2d  at  1320.    This  Court  held  that  the  language  of  this  instruction 



accurately embodied the test and the mandate of Criminal Rule 6(r).  Id. 



               To sum up this statutory history and case law:  When Criminal Rule 6(r) 



declares that grand jurors must decide whether the evidence they have heard “would 



warrant a conviction of the defendant”, Rule 6(r) is not telling grand jurors to decide 



whether they personally would convict the defendant.  Nor is Rule 6(r) declaring (or 



even  implying)  that  grand  jurors  have  a discretionary  power  to  decline  to issue  an 



indictment for reasons unrelated to the strength of the government’s evidence.   



               Instead, Alaska cases on this subject repeatedly (and uniformly) hold that, 



under Rule 6(r), the grand jurors’ task is to decide whether the evidence is sufficient to 



later justify someone else — i.e., a group of impartial trial jurors who are required to 



follow the law — in finding the defendant guilty.   



                                              – 44 –                                           2775 


----------------------- Page 45-----------------------

                                                 III 



        Do any of the Alaska Supreme Court’s past decisions recognize a limited 

        discretion on the part of grand jurors to refuse to issue an indictment even 

        when the grand jurors conclude that the evidence supports the proposed 

        indictment? 



                Beginning with its 1962 decision in State v. Shelton, 368 P.2d 817 (Alaska 



1962), the Alaska Supreme Court has issued nine decisions in which the court declared 



that  a  “vital  function”  of  the  grand  jury  is  “the  protection  of  the  innocent  against 



oppression and unjust prosecution.”  Shelton, 368 P.2d at 819.  The supreme court has 

quoted, cited, or otherwise relied on this language from Shelton in eight later cases. 13   



                Taken in isolation, the phrase “protection ... against oppression and unjust 



prosecution” might suggest that grand jurors have the authority to refuse to issue an 



indictment for reasons other than a lack of evidence.  But in each instance where the 



supreme court has used this language (beginning with the Shelton decision itself), the 



court has invariably stated that the grand jury’s function is “the protection of the innocent 



against oppression and unjust prosecution.”   



                Thus, Shelton and the eight later decisions that rely on Shelton do not stand 



for the proposition that grand jurors in Alaska have the discretion to refuse to issue an 



    13  The supreme court directly cited or quoted this passage from Shelton in State v. Parks, 



437 P.2d 642, 643 (Alaska 1968), Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47, 54 (Alaska 1971), Burkholder 

v. State, 491 P.2d 754, 757 (Alaska 1971), Coger v. State, 517 P.2d 1403, 1405 n. 4 (Alaska 

1974), and Adams v. State , 598 P.2d 503, 510 n. 11 (Alaska 1979). 



        The supreme court repeated this language from Shelton, but without explicit citation, 

in State v. Gieffels, 554 P.2d 460, 464 (Alaska 1976).  The supreme court later cited this 

portion of the  Gieffels decision in Frink v. State , 597 P.2d 154, 165 (Alaska 1979).  Still 

later, in Cameron v. State, 171 P.3d 1154, 1156 (Alaska 2007), the supreme court cited this 

portion of Frink, but without explaining that the language of Frink was based on what the 

court had originally said forty-five years earlier in Shelton.  



                                               – 45 –                                            2775 


----------------------- Page 46-----------------------

indictment whenever the grand jurors conclude that the proposed charges, although 



supported by the evidence, are nevertheless “unjust” in some respect.   



                Rather,  in  Shelton  and  these  eight  later  cases,  the  supreme  court  has 



declared that a vital function of the grand jury is to protect innocent people from having 



to face trial on unfounded accusations.  



                See Adams v. State , 598 P.2d 503, 510 n. 11 (Alaska 1979), where the 



supreme court explained:   



                        [T]he purpose served by grand jury indictment is to 



                give one accused of a serious offense the benefit of having 

                private citizens judge whether there is probable cause to hold 

                the accused for trial.  The grand jury protects the innocent 

                from  unjust  prosecution  by  acting  as  a  check  on  the 

                prosecutor.  [Citing Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47, 54 (Alaska 

                 1971),  and  State  v.  Shelton,  368  P.2d  817,  819  (Alaska 

                 1962).]  (Emphasis added.)  

                  

Thus, according to Adams , the grand jury fulfills its function of protecting “the innocent 



from unjust prosecution” when the grand jurors assess the sufficiency of the evidence to 



support the proposed charges under the test set forth in Criminal Rule 6(r).   



                I now turn to one other case where our supreme court has discussed the 



function of the grand jury.   



                In Wassillie v. State, 411 P.3d 595 (Alaska 2018), the supreme court stated 



that the grand jury has two functions:  it “protects against the danger that a defendant will 



be required to defend against a charge for which there is no probable cause to believe 



him guilty”, and it also “serves the invaluable function ... of standing between the accuser 



and the accused to determine whether a charge is founded upon reason or [is] dictated 



by an intimidating power or by malice and personal ill will.”   Wassillie, 411 P.3d at 



607–08.  



                                                 – 46 –                                              2775 


----------------------- Page 47-----------------------

              As authority for the assertion that a grand jury has these separate functions, 



our  supreme  court  cited  (and  quoted  from)  just  one  source:    Justice  O’Connor’s 



concurring  opinion  in  United  States  v.  Mechanik,  475  U.S.  66,  106  S.Ct.  938,  89 



L.Ed.2d. 50 (1986).  Here is the relevant passage from Justice O’Connor’s concurrence 



in Mechanik :  



                     The grand jury has two principal functions.  First, it 



              bears the weighty responsibility of investigating crime and 

              determining whether there is probable cause to believe that a 

              crime has been committed.  [citations omitted]  The second, 

              and no less important, task of the grand jury is to “serv[e] the 

              invaluable function in our society of standing between the 

              accuser and the accused, whether the latter be an individual, 

              minority group, or other, to determine whether a charge is 

              founded upon reason or dictated by an intimidating power or 

              by malice and personal ill will.”  Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 

              375, 390, 82 S.Ct. 1364, 1373, 8 L.Ed.2d 569 (1962).  



Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 73–74, 106 S.Ct. at 943.  



              The problem here is that, in her concurrence, Justice O’Connor is not 



quoting a holding that the U.S. Supreme Court reached in  Wood v. Georgia.  Rather, 



Justice O’Connor is quoting dictum from Wood v. Georgia — and Justice O’Connor is 



mischaracterizing this dictum.   



              The Supreme Court in Wood did not assert, or even imply, that a grand jury 



has the two separate functions that Justice O’Connor describes in her concurrence.  



Rather, the  Wood opinion says that a grand jury has one function:  to assess whether a 



proposed criminal charge is adequately supported by the evidence or is instead “dictated 

by an intimidating power or by malice and personal ill will.” 14   



    14  Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 370; 82 S.Ct. 1364, 1373.  



                                           – 47 –                                       2775 


----------------------- Page 48-----------------------

                The meaning of this passage from  Wood is clarified by examining the 



context in which this passage originated — the facts and issues presented to the U.S. 



Supreme  Court  in  Wood  v.  Georgia,  370  U.S. 375,  82  S.Ct.  1364,  8  L.Ed.2d  569, 



8 L.Ed.2d 569 (1962).  



                The controversy in Wood arose out of the civil rights movement of the late 



1950s and early 1960s, and from a group of superior court judges’ political opposition 



to that movement.  



                As explained by the U.S. Supreme Court, one of the superior court judges 



of Bibb County, Georgia (acting on behalf of all three superior court judges of that 

county 15) convened the local grand jury and specially instructed the grand jurors to 



conduct an investigation into a potentially criminal situation which (the judge asserted) 



                                16 

had arisen in their county.          



                The judge told the grand jurors that there appeared to be an “inexplicable 



pattern of Negro bloc voting” in Bibb County — and that, according to “rumors and 



accusations” which had come to the superior court’s attention, certain candidates for 



public office had paid large sums of money to obtain the Black vote.  The judge further 



alleged that certain Black leaders, after having met and endorsed one candidate, later 



switched their support to an opposing candidate who had put up a large sum of money 



— and that this “create[d] an unhealthy, dangerous, and unlawful situation”  which 

“tend[ed] to corrupt public office holders and some candidates for public office.” 17  



                The  judge  listed  various  criminal  statutes  which  he  claimed  would  be 



violated if the grand jurors concluded that these accusations were well-founded, and the 



    15  Wood, 370 U.S. at 381, n. 3; 82 S.Ct. at 1368, n. 3.   



    16  Id. , 370 U.S. at 376, 82 S.Ct. at 1365.  



    17  Id. , 370 U.S. at 376, 82 S.Ct. at 1365–66.  



                                                 – 48 –                                              2775 


----------------------- Page 49-----------------------

judge gave the grand jurors a list of specific questions which they should answer when 



(as directed by the judge) they conducted their inquiry into these potential election law 

violations. 18   



                The judge issued these instructions to the grand jury in the midst of a local 



political campaign — and, to publicize the fact that he was ordering the grand jury to 



commence this investigation, the judge requested reporters from all the local news media 

to be present in court when the judge delivered his instructions to the grand jurors. 19 



                The following day (while the grand jury was in session investigating the 



matters that the judge had directed them to investigate), the local sheriff, James Wood, 



issued a statement to the press in which he criticized the three judges’ action.   



                Sheriff Wood urged the citizens of Bibb County to take notice that their 



highest judicial officers were engaging in political intimidation and persecution of Black 

voters under the guise of law enforcement. 20  The sheriff characterized the superior 



court’s instructions to the grand jury as mirroring “the style and language of a race- 



baiting candidate for political office”, and he called the judges’ action “one of the most 

deplorable examples of race agitation to come out of Middle Georgia in recent years”.21  



                Sheriff  Wood  predicted  that  the  Black  community  of  Bibb  County 



“[would] find little difference in principle between [this] attempted intimidation of their 



people by judicial summons and inquiry” and the kinds of violent intimidation practiced 



    18  Id. , 370 U.S. at 376–77, 82 S.Ct. at 1366.  



    19  Id. , 370 U.S. at 378–79, 82 S.Ct. at 1366–67.  



    20  Id. , 370 U.S. at 379–380, 82 S.Ct. at 1367.   



    21  Ibid. 



                                                – 49 –                                            2775 


----------------------- Page 50-----------------------

by the Ku Klux Klan. 22  The sheriff declared that the three superior court judges were 



“employing a practice [that was] far more dangerous to free elections than anything they 



want investigated”, and the sheriff expressed his hope that the grand jury “[would] not 



let [itself] be a party to any political attempt to intimidate the [Black people] in this 



                 23 

community.”          



                 The following day, Sheriff Wood delivered an “Open Letter to the Bibb 



County Grand Jury”.  In this letter, the sheriff suggested that the superior court judges’ 



allegation of vote-buying was false — and that, in the sheriff’s opinion, the grand jury 



should instead be investigating the Bibb County Democratic Party Executive Committee 

for corruptly purchasing votes. 24  



                 Based on the sheriff’s public statements, the Bibb County Superior Court 



charged Sheriff Wood with criminal contempt.  The court alleged that the language the 



sheriff had used was calculated to be contemptuous of the court, to ridicule the grand 



jury investigation ordered by the court, and “to hamper, hinder, ... and obstruct” the 

grand jury in its investigation. 25 



                 At the hearing on these charges, the Bibb County superior court found 



Sheriff Wood guilty.  The court made no findings to support its verdicts other than the 

fact that the sheriff had made these public statements. 26  



                 The  U.S.  Supreme  Court  granted  Sheriff  Wood’s  petition  for  writ  of 



certiorari and reversed his convictions on the ground that the First Amendment protects 



    22  Ibid. 



    23  Ibid.  



    24  Id. , 370 U.S. at 380, 82 S.Ct. at 1367–68.   



    25  Id. , 370 U.S. at 380–81, 82 S.Ct. at 1367–68.  



    26  Id. , 370 U.S. at 382, 82 S.Ct. at 1369.  



                                                  – 50 –                                                2775 


----------------------- Page 51-----------------------

citizens  from  being  held  in  contempt  for  out-of-court  statements  unless,  given  the 



circumstances, the person’s statements created a clear and present danger of an imminent 

and serious threat to the fair administration of the judicial process. 27  



              In reaching its conclusion that Sheriff Wood’s statements were protected 



by the First Amendment (thus prohibiting the Bibb County superior court from punishing 



the sheriff for these statements), the U.S. Supreme Court wrote — in obiter dictum — 



about the role that the grand jury plays in the federal system, and why it is important that 



citizens be able to make public statements about matters pending before the grand jury:  



                      Historically, [the grand jury] has been regarded as a 



              primary security to the innocent against hasty, malicious and 

              oppressive persecution; it serves the invaluable function in 

              our society of standing between the accuser and the accused, 

               [no matter whom], to determine whether a charge is founded 

              upon reason or was dictated by an intimidating power or by 

              malice and personal ill will.   



Wood, 370 U.S. at 390, 82 S.Ct. at 1373.  (Emphasis added) 



              Given the wording of this passage, and given the factual context presented 



in  Wood, it is clear that the Wood opinion is describing a single grand jury function — 



the grand jurors’ task of deciding whether a proposed criminal charge is sufficiently 



supported by the evidence to warrant a trial.  In performing this function, grand jurors 



might conclude either that the charge “is founded upon reason” or that the charge has 



been put forward “by an intimidating power” or out of “malice and personal ill will” — 



in other words, the charge is not well-founded.   



              Moreover, this passage from Wood is dictum — because the Supreme Court 



was describing the function of a state grand jury.   



    27 Id. , 370 U.S. at 383–84, 386–387, & 389; 82 S.Ct. at 1369–1372.  



                                            – 51 –                                       2775 


----------------------- Page 52-----------------------

               The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to grand jury indictment in 

felony cases does not apply to the states. 28  This being so, the United States Supreme 



Court has no authority to prescribe the functions of state grand juries such as the Georgia 



grand jury involved in Wood.  Rather, the Supreme Court was broadly characterizing the 



traditional function of grand juries in general — not as a holding, but as dictum.  



               Thus, in  Wassillie v. State, when the Alaska Supreme Court cited Justice 



O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Mechanik, the Alaska Supreme Court was citing 



a mischaracterization of dictum from Wood v. Georgia. 



               Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Mechanik is the sole legal authority that 



the Alaska Supreme Court cited in  Wassillie when the supreme court made  its own 



assertion about a grand jury’s having two separate functions.  As a result, the Wassillie 



opinion does not contain any valid legal authority to support this assertion.  



               I add one final observation about  Wassillie:  Even if Justice O’Connor’s 



concurrence had been a valid characterization of federal grand jury law, this would not 



be binding authority on the question presented in this appeal — because the question 



presented here is one of Alaska law.   



               Here, Smith asserts that Alaska grand jurors have the authority to refuse to 



issue  an  indictment  for  any  reason  they  see  fit,  even  after  the  grand  jurors  have 



concluded that the evidence supporting the proposed charge is sufficient, under the test 



set forth in Alaska Criminal Rule 6(r), to require the defendant to stand trial.   



               This Court has already answered this question in part, by holding that grand 



jurors  are  bound  by  the  provisions  of  the  grand  juror  oath  prescribed  in  Criminal 



Rule 6(e)(1).  But this still leaves the question of whether, apart from the restrictions 



imposed by the grand juror oath, Alaska grand jurors have a limited discretion to refuse 



    28 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538; 4 S.Ct. 111, 122; 28 L.Ed. 232 (1884).  



                                             – 52 –                                         2775 


----------------------- Page 53-----------------------

to issue an indictment even when they conclude that the proposed charge is supported 



by the evidence.  



              Because the federal grand jury requirement does not apply to the states, the 



answer to this question hinges on the intent of the drafters of Alaska’s constitution — 



specifically, the role that these drafters envisioned for the grand jury under Article I, 



Section 8 of our state constitution.  Regardless of whatever authority federal grand jurors 



might have, it is this Court’s duty to ascertain and follow Alaska law on this subject.   



              As I explain later in this concurrence, I conclude (from the record of the 



proceedings  at  our  state  constitutional  convention)  that  the  drafters  of  Alaska’s 



constitution did not envision that grand jurors would have the authority to refuse to issue 



an indictment for any reason they pleased.  



              This same observation (that the question presented here is one of Alaska 



law rather than federal law) applies to the dissenting opinion of Justices Matthews and 



Eastaugh in State v. Markgraf, 913 P.2d 487, 487 (Alaska 1996).  In that dissent, the two 



justices rely on federal authority — the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in  Vasquez v. 



Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 106 S.Ct. 617, 88 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986) — for the proposition that 



grand jurors have the discretion to return a lesser charge, or to refuse to issue any 



indictment at all, even when they conclude that the evidence supports the proposed 



charge.  But Vasquez v. Hillery is not valid authority for this proposition.  



               Vasquez involved a murder prosecution under state law:  the defendant, 



Hillery, had been convicted of murder in California, and he alleged that the indictment 



against him was constitutionally infirm because Black people had been systematically 

excluded from the grand jury. 29  When Hillery’s case reached the Supreme Court, one 



of the arguments made by the State of California was that, even if the selection of the 



    29  Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. at 255–56; 106 S.Ct. at 619.  



                                           – 53 –                                       2775 


----------------------- Page 54-----------------------

grand jurors had been marred by racial discrimination, this would be harmless error — 



because Hillery had received a fair trial, and because the evidence against him was 

overwhelming. 30  



                The Supreme Court rejected the State of California’s argument.  First, the 



Court noted that it had already issued a series of decisions rejecting the notion that a 



criminal  conviction  might  be  allowed  to  stand  despite  racial  discrimination  in  the 

selection of  the  grand  jury. 31  But  then  the  Supreme  Court added  that,  even  if  the 



defendant had received a fair trial, it was impossible to tell whether unlawful racial 



discrimination might have affected the grand jury’s decision to indict the defendant in 



the first place:   



                       [We are not] persuaded that discrimination in the grand 



               jury has no effect on the fairness of the criminal trials that 

                result from that grand jury’s actions.  The grand jury does not 

                determine only that probable cause exists to believe that a 

                defendant committed a crime, or that it does not.  In the hands 

                of the grand jury lies the power to charge a greater offense or 

                a  lesser  offense;  numerous  counts  or  a  single  count;  and 

                perhaps  most  significant  of  all,  a  capital  offense  or  a 

                noncapital  offense  —  all  on  the  basis  of  the  same  facts. 

                Moreover, “[t]he grand jury is not bound to indict in every 

                case where a conviction can be obtained.”   United States v. 

                Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 629 ([2nd Cir.] 1979) (Friendly, 

                J., dissenting).  Thus, even if a grand jury’s determination of 



    30  Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 260, 106 S.Ct. at 622.  



    31  Id. , 474 U.S. at 260–62, 106 S.Ct. at 622–23.  See, in particular, Rose v. Mitchell, 443 



U.S. 545, 556; 99 S.Ct. 2993, 3000; 61 L.Ed.2d 739 (1979), declaring that discrimination on 

the basis of race in the selection of grand jurors “strikes at the fundamental values of our 

judicial system and our society as a whole”, and that a criminal defendant’s right to equal 

protection of the laws is denied when the defendant is indicted by a grand jury from which 

members of a racial group have been purposefully excluded.  



                                               – 54 –                                           2775 


----------------------- Page 55-----------------------

               probable cause is confirmed in hindsight by a conviction on 

               the indicted offense, that confirmation in no way suggests 

               that  the  discrimination  did  not  impermissibly  infect  the 

               framing of the indictment and, consequently, the nature or 

               very existence of the proceedings to come.  



Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 263, 106 S.Ct. at 623.  



               It is important to note, when construing this passage from Vasquez, that the 



Supreme Court does not cite any California law to support its description of a California 



grand jury’s discretionary authority.  The only law cited by the Supreme Court is the 



dissenting opinion in a Second Circuit case, United States v. Ciambrone.   



               As I have already explained, the federal courts have no power to dictate the 



functions or authority of state grand juries.  Thus, in Vasquez, the Supreme Court is not 



announcing or proclaiming the authority of a California grand jury.  Rather, the Supreme 



Court appears to have simply assumed that California grand juries had the discretionary 



authority to refuse to issue an indictment, or to indict the defendant only on a lesser 



charge, even when the grand jurors concluded that the evidence supported the proposed 



charge.  



               Ironically, the Supreme Court made this assumption about a California 



grand jury’s discretion so that the Court could then limit this assumed discretion — by 



declaring that it is unconstitutional (under the federal constitution) for a state grand jury 



to  exercise  this  kind  of  discretion  when  the  grand  jury’s  decision  is  motivated  or 



influenced by racial discrimination.  



               But in any event, this passage from Vasquez v. Hillery is not authority for 



the proposition that grand jurors in Alaska have the discretion to refuse to issue an 



indictment even when they have concluded that the evidence supports the proposed 



charge.  



                                             – 55 –                                         2775 


----------------------- Page 56-----------------------

                                              IV 



       Smith’s alternative argument, based on the history of the grand jury in 

       America and on the debate at Alaska’s constitutional convention, that 

       Article I, Section 8 should be interpreted as endowing grand juries with a 

       right of nullification  



               Smith argues that grand juries in England and America have traditionally 



exercised  a  power  of  nullification  —  the  power  to  refuse  to  issue  indictments  for 



political, social, or personal reasons, apart from whether the evidence is sufficient to 



support the proposed charge.  Smith further contends that grand juries have always been 



encouraged  and  expected  to  exercise  this  power  of  nullification  —  to  act  as  the 



“conscience of the community” by refusing to return indictments if the grand jurors 



disputed the wisdom of the criminal laws they were being asked to enforce, or if the 



grand jurors disagreed with the application of those laws to particular defendants, or if 



the grand jurors felt that the particular victims of the crime did not merit the protection 



of the law.  



               Smith further argues that Article I, Section 8 of the Alaska Constitution 



implicitly incorporates this view of the proper function of the grand jury.  He contends 



that  when  the  delegates  to  Alaska’s  constitutional  convention  drafted  Article  I, 



Section  8  (the  provision  that  guarantees  felony  defendants  the  right  to  grand  jury 



indictment), those delegates were working under the assumption that Alaska grand juries 



had a right of nullification, and that this was an essential component of the grand jury’s 



function.  



               Based on his interpretation of Article I, Section 8, Smith argues that it is 



unconstitutional for a court to instruct grand jurors that they have any duty to return an 



indictment, even when the grand jurors conclude that the evidence supports the charge.  



In fact, Smith argues that our constitution requires courts to affirmatively instruct grand 



                                            – 56 –                                        2775 


----------------------- Page 57-----------------------

jurors that they are under  no duty to return an indictment, even when the evidence 



supports the charge — and that, instead, grand jurors have a right to refuse to return an 



indictment if they disagree with the law or with the law’s application to the case before 



them.   



               Smith is correct that, over the past three centuries, American grand juries 



have sometimes refused to return indictments even though the law and the evidence 



apparently supported the charges.  The most notable of these instances of nullification 



occurred when grand jurors sympathized with the political or social aims of the persons 



accused.  



               But the question here is not whether grand jurors have sometimes willfully 



ignored the law or willfully refused to enforce it.  Rather, the question is whether the 



drafters of Article I, Section 8 of the Alaska Constitution considered this behavior to be 



an essential component of what grand jurors should be doing.   



               For the reasons I explain in this section of my concurrence, I conclude that 



the drafters of Article I, Section 8 did not intend to codify the right of nullification that 



Smith proposes.  The framers of our state constitution did not presume that grand jurors 



had  a  right  of  nullification,  nor  did  the  framers  view  nullification  as  an  essential 



component of the grand jury’s function.   



               If any of the delegates had thought that grand juries should engage in 



nullification, and that society was better off because of it, they never spoke up — and 



they certainly had reason to speak up, given the fact that the initial draft of our state 



constitution abolished the requirement of grand jury indictment.  This meant that the 



proponents  of  requiring  a  grand  jury  indictment  in  felony  cases  had  to  articulate 



affirmative reasons for keeping this requirement in our state constitution.  But when the 



delegates engaged in their lengthy debate over whether the Alaska Constitution should 



include a requirement of grand jury indictment, there was no mention of grand jury 



                                              – 57 –                                          2775 


----------------------- Page 58-----------------------

nullification  —  even  though  an  egregious  example  of  trial  jury  and  grand  jury 



nullification was making national news at the time.   



                This leads me to conclude that if any of the delegates gave thought to the 



question of grand jury nullification, they did not view instances of nullification as a 



positive reason for keeping the requirement of grand jury indictment in Article I, Sec- 



tion 8.  Rather, they viewed instances of nullification as a departure from a grand jury’s 



proper function.  



                (a)  The historical record fails to support Smith’s assertion that 

            American law has traditionally encouraged and expected grand jurors 

            to engage in nullification.  



                The institution of the grand jury under English law can be traced back to 

the Middle Ages. 32  But until the late 1600s, the grand jury did not function as a “shield 



of justice” or a buffer between the monarch and the citizenry.  Rather, the grand jury 



functioned primarily as a prosecutorial arm of the Crown, “oppressive and much feared 

by the common people”. 33  Although grand juries were theoretically convened to screen 



and impartially evaluate criminal accusations, there was significant pressure on grand 



    32  The Constitutions of Clarendon, enacted under King Henry II in 1164, provided in 



Article 6 that “laymen [i.e., non-clergy] ought not to be accused unless through reliable and 

legal  accusers  and  witnesses  in  the  presence  of  the  bishop  ...  .    And  if  those  who  are 

inculpated are such that no one wishes or dares to accuse them [publicly], the sheriff, being 

requested by the bishop, shall cause twelve lawful men of the neighbourhood or town to 

swear in the presence of the bishop that they will make manifest the truth in this matter, 

according to their conscience.”  (Available online through the Yale Law School’s Avalon 

Project:  https://avalon.law.yale.edu/medieval/constcla.asp.) 



    33  United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1190 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc), 



quoting  Helene  E.  Schwartz,  Demythologizing  the  Historic  Role  of  the  Grand  Jury , 

10 American Criminal Law Rev. 701, 709 (1972).  



                                                 – 58 –                                              2775 


----------------------- Page 59-----------------------

jurors to return indictments against whomever the Crown accused.  English kings and 



queens were enriched by the confiscated goods and lands of convicted felons, and the 



Crown would often levy fines against grand juries if they failed to reach their quota of 



                34 

accusations.         



                 The first recorded instance in which a grand jury acted as a shield against 



royal  power  was  in  1681,  when  a  London  grand  jury  refused  to  indict  the  Earl  of 

Shaftesbury after King Charles II sought his indictment on a charge of treason. 35  While 



the London grand jury’s refusal to indict Shaftesbury is often hailed as an early blow 



against royal tyranny, the truth is more ambiguous:  The grand jurors who refused to 



indict Shaftesbury were hand-picked by the Sheriff of London, who was a political ally 

of Shaftesbury and a political foe of King Charles II. 36   



    34  Ibid. 



    35  Id. , 408 F.3d at 1190–91.  For more details, see the article “Shaftesbury, Anthony 



Ashley Cooper, 1st Earl of” in the 1911 edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica, available 

through en.Wikisource.org.   



    36   The  conflict  between  Shaftesbury  and  King  Charles  II  was  an  outgrowth  of  the 



 150-year-long political struggle between Protestants and Catholics in England (beginning 

when Henry VIII broke with the Catholic Church in 1534).  Shaftesbury, who was radically 

anti-Catholic, feared that King Charles would die childless and that Charles’s brother James, 

who was a Catholic, would ascend the throne.  Shaftesbury therefore tried several times to 

have Parliament enact laws that would exclude James from the line of succession and that 

would require King Charles to divorce his childless wife (so that Charles would remarry and 

produce an heir who, presumably, would be raised a Protestant).  King Charles apparently 

suspected that Shaftesbury’s activities included more than simply asking Parliament to enact 

anti-Catholic laws, so he sought to have Shaftesbury indicted on a charge of treason.  



         The Sheriff of London was the official in charge of appointing all the grand jurors in 

London — and he was a political and religious ally of Shaftesbury.  Although there were 

significant reasons to doubt the evidence against Shaftesbury, the Sheriff decided to take no 

chances:  he packed the grand jury with supporters of the Protestant cause.  As anticipated, 

                                                                                             (continued...) 



                                                   – 59 –                                                2775 


----------------------- Page 60-----------------------

               But regardless of how one might view the Shaftesbury case, it is clear that 



the grand jury underwent a major transformation in the American colonies beginning in 



the late 1600s.  The colonies not only adopted the institution of the grand jury; they 



transformed it by expanding its powers and its sphere of authority — giving it the 



authority  not  only  to  investigate  crimes,  but  also  to  investigate  and  report  on  the 



functioning of government institutions.  This historical development was described by 



the Ninth Circuit in  United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2005) 



(en banc):  



                       In   America,    ...  grand    juries   exercised    broad, 



               unorthodox  powers[:]    inspecting  roads,  jails,  and  other 

               public  buildings;  monitoring  public  works  expenditures, 

               construction and maintenance; proposing new legislation; and 



                   36  (...continued) 



these hand-picked grand jurors refused to indict Shaftesbury.  



        The following year (1682), King Charles engineered the appointment of a new mayor 

and a new sheriff in London.  This new sheriff seemed sure to appoint grand jurors who 

would support a renewed effort to indict Shaftesbury, so Shaftesbury fled to Amsterdam.  

He died there one year later.  



        As it happened, the English political theorist and philosopher, John Locke, was the 

long-time  employee  and  personal  physician  of  Shaftesbury’s  family.    Through  Locke’s 

writings,  and  because  of  the  ultimate  triumph  of  the  Protestant  cause  in  the  Glorious 

Revolution of 1688, the London grand jury’s refusal to indict Shaftesbury came to be seen 

as a historic protection of individual liberties.  



        See the article “Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, 1st Earl of” in the 1911 edition 

of the Encyclopedia Britannica, available through en.Wikisource.org; and Michael Barone’s 

“Guide      to    Government”,         Lesson      16:    “Grand       Jury”,    available      at 

https://www.guidetogovernment.org/2018/06/19/lesson-16-grand-jury/ and the Wikipedia 

article,  “Anthony  Ashley  Cooper,  1st  Earl  of  Shaftesbury”:    https://en.wikipedia.org/- 

wiki/Anthony_Ashley_Cooper,_1st_Earl_of_Shaftesbury. 



                                              – 60 –                                          2775 


----------------------- Page 61-----------------------

                criticizing poor administration.  The colonial grand jury still 

               performed a quasi-prosecutorial role by accusing individuals 

                suspected  of  crimes,  but  ...  with  their  expanding  quasi- 

                legislative   and   quasi-administrative   roles,   grand   juries 

                acquired greater popularity because they were regarded as 

               more representative of the people.  Through presentments and 

                other customary reports, the American grand jury in effect 

                enjoyed    a   roving    commission      to   ferret  out   official 

               malfeasance or self-dealing of any sort and bring it to the 

                attention of the public at large, becoming, as James Wilson 

               put it, a “great channel of communication, between those who 

               make and administer the laws, and those for whom the laws 

                are made and administered.”  



Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d at 1191–92.  



                (The enduring results of this colonial American legal development are 



found in present-day Alaska law.  AS 12.40.030 declares that grand juries “shall have 



the power to investigate and make recommendations concerning the public welfare or 



safety”,  and  AS  12.40.060  declares  that  grand  juries  are  guaranteed  access  “at  all 



reasonable  times”  to  our  state’s  jails  and  prisons,  to  all  public  offices,  and  to  the 



examination of all public records in the state.)  



               Because American colonial grand juries continued to serve their historical 



role as accusatory bodies, there were occasions in the mid-1700s (during the lead-up to 



the American Revolution) when colonial grand juries refused to return indictments in 



high-profile, politically charged cases.   



                One of the most celebrated examples is the case of John Peter Zenger, a 



newspaper publisher who was charged with libel in 1734 after he criticized the royal 



Governor of New York.  Under the law at the time (which declared that the truth of a 



public criticism was no defense to a charge of libel), it seems clear that Zenger was guilty 



of libel.  Nevertheless, successive grand juries refused to indict him — not because of 



                                               – 61 –                                           2775 


----------------------- Page 62-----------------------

insufficient  evidence,  but  because  the  grand  jurors  were  politically  opposed  to  the 

prosecution. 37  



               As the Revolutionary War drew closer, the grand jury became popular in 



America “at least as much from its success as a political weapon as from its role in the 

criminal justice system.” 38  Not only did colonial grand juries refuse to indict people who 



committed crimes against British officials and British interests,39 but they also assumed 



an  active  public  role  in  the  political  conflict  between  the  colonists  and  the  British 



government.  As explained by the Ninth Circuit in Navarro-Vargas, 



                       Colonial grand juries publicly called for boycotts of 



               British goods, condemned British rule, criticized the use of 

               the  tea  tax  to  pay  British  officials’  salaries,  and  indicted 

               British soldiers for breaking and entering into the homes of 

               private  citizens.    Where  the  king’s  grand juries  had  once 

               colluded with the king’s prosecutors, in pre-Revolutionary 

               America,      colonial    grand    juries   resisted    the   king’s 

               representatives  in  America.    The  historical  division  of 

               authority  between  grand  juries  and  prosecutors  became  a 

               fissure exposing the political division between the colonists 

               and  their  king.    Grand  jurors,  selected  from  the  public, 

               frustrated prosecutors loyal to the king by refusing to indict 

               those charged under unpopular laws imposed by the Crown, 

               often [at] the urging of colonial judges.  Grand jury present- 

               ments ... [also] became excellent mediums of propaganda as 



    37  Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d at 1192.  



    38  Ibid. , quoting Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect 



the Accused, 80 Cornell Law Rev. 260, 285 (1995).  



    39  See Richard D. Younger, The People’s Panel: the Grand Jury in the United States, 



1634–1941 (1963), p. 28, discussing how Boston grand juries refused to indict the editors of 

the Boston Gazette for libeling the governor of Massachusetts, and likewise refused to indict 

the leaders of the Stamp Act rebellion.  (Cited in Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d at 1192.)  



                                               – 62 –                                           2775 


----------------------- Page 63-----------------------

               grand juries issued stinging denunciations of Great Britain 

               and stirring defenses of [the colonists’] rights as Englishmen. 



Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d at 1192 (citations and internal quotes omitted). 



               After the American colonies won their independence and established a 



federal government, grand juries would still refuse to return indictments from time to 



time  in  politically  charged  cases,  even  when  the  evidence  apparently  justified  the 



accusation.  



               For example, in the 1790s, during Great Britain’s war with republican 



France, pro-French American grand juries refused to indict Americans who aided the 



French privateers who were preying on British shipping, even though such assistance 

violated the federal Neutrality Proclamation. 40  And at the turn of the 19th century, 



American  grand  juries  sometimes  refused  to  indict  persons  who  were  accused  of 



violating the much-reviled Sedition Act of 1798, which made it a crime to publish any 



“false, scandalous and malicious writing” critical of either Congress or the President, or 

to conspire “to oppose any measure or measures of the [federal] government”. 41   



               Two generations later, in the years leading up to the Civil War, grand juries 



in the North often refused to indict persons who violated the Fugitive Slave Act — the 



act which required the residents of the Northern states to aid federal authorities in the 

capture and return of run-away slaves. 42   



               In the years following the Civil War, Southern grand juries worked to 



frustrate the enforcement of Reconstruction-era laws (laws designed to ensure the rights 



    40 Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d at 1193.  



    41 Ibid. ,  and  Wikipedia,  “Alien  and  Sedition  Acts”:  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/- 



Alien_and_Sedition_Acts. 



    42 Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d at 1194.  



                                            – 63 –                                         2775 


----------------------- Page 64-----------------------

of the newly freed Black citizenry) by refusing to indict Ku Klux Klan members and 



other White people who were accused of committing crimes against Black people.  As 



described  in  Navarro-Vargas,  these  Reconstruction-era  grand  juries  “served  as  a 



principal weapon of Southern whites in their struggle against [the Republican Party] and 

[Black] rights.”43 



               Given the politicized role that grand juries played in the years leading up 



to the American Revolution, it might not be surprising that grand juries occasionally 



engaged in nullification during later periods of political turmoil after the Revolution.  



But what is potentially surprising is that grand jurors continued to engage in nullification 



even though American judges were no longer urging them to flout the law.  



               As  explained  by  the  Ninth  Circuit  in  Navarro-Vargas,  the  judiciary’s 



attitude toward grand jury nullification changed dramatically after the American colonies 



won the Revolutionary War.  Before the American victory, when the law to be ignored 

was British law, colonial judges often encouraged grand jury nullification. 44  But this 



judicial attitude changed radically after the American colonies won the their indepen- 



dence and the law to be ignored was now American law.  At that point, American judges 



began instructing grand jurors that they must not engage in nullification — that, instead, 



grand jurors had a duty to abide by the law and to return an indictment free of favoritism, 



even when the grand jurors sympathized with the accused or when they disagreed with 

the law they were being asked to apply. 45  



    43 Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d at 1194–95, quoting Marvin E. Frankel and Gary Naftalis, 



The Grand Jury:  An Institution On Trial (2nd ed. 1977), p. 14.  



    44 Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d at 1192:  “[Colonial] grand jurors, selected from the public, 



frustrated prosecutors loyal to the king by refusing to indict those charged under unpopular 

laws imposed by the Crown, often [at] the urging of colonial judges.”   



    45  See Navarro-Vargas,  408  F.3d  at  1193:    “In  many post-revolution  cases,  judges 



                                                                                 (continued...) 



                                            – 64 –                                        2775 


----------------------- Page 65-----------------------

                 Modern-day state and federal pattern grand jury instructions continue to 



embody this view of the grand jurors’ duty.  For example, the federal pattern instructions 



affirmatively forbid grand jurors from basing their decisions on their individual views 



about the law, or their individual views about the appropriate punishment for someone 



who violates a particular law:  



                         You cannot judge the wisdom of the criminal laws 



                 enacted by Congress, that is, whether or not there should or 

                 should not be a federal law designating certain activity as 

                 criminal.  That is to be determined by Congress and not by 

                 you.   



                         Furthermore, when deciding whether or not to indict, 

                 you   should   not   consider   punishment   in   the   event   of 

                 conviction.   

                         .  .  . 



                         Your task is to determine whether the government’s 

                 evidence as presented to you is sufficient to cause you to 

                 conclude  that  there  is  probable  cause  to  believe  that  the 

                 person being investigated committed the offense charged.  To 

                 put  it  another  way,  you  should  vote  to  indict  where  the 

                 evidence presented to you is sufficiently strong to warrant a 

                 reasonable person’s belief that the person being investigated 

                 is probably guilty of the offense charged.  



                     45  (...continued) 



instructed [grand] jurors to enforce federal laws, even if the jury thought the laws unjust or 

unconstitutional.    Justice  Chase  instructed  a  Philadelphia  grand  jury  that  until  a  law  is 

repealed, even if it is unconstitutional, every citizen has a duty to ‘submit to it’.  Similarly, 

Chief Justice Jay explained that a grand juror, just like a judge, must apply the law of the land 

even if it is a subject of heated public debate[,] as the duty to enforce the law must override 

‘individual scruples and misgivings.’ [This] duty to submit to the laws was a common theme 

among grand jury charges contemporaneous with the adoption of the Bill of Rights [in the 

early 1790s].”  



                                                   – 65 –                                                2775 


----------------------- Page 66-----------------------

Benchbook for U.S. District Court Judges (6th edition, 2013), Section 7.04 (“Grand 



Jury selection and instructions”), Instructions 9, 10, & 25, pp. 249 & 252.  



               Many states have grand jury instructions which embody this same approach 



— except that, instead of telling grand jurors that they “should” return an indictment if 



the evidence supports the charge, several of these states expressly instruct grand jurors 



that,  if  they  conclude  that  the  evidence  supports  the charge,  they  “shall”  return  an 

indictment, or that it is their “duty” to return an indictment. 46   



               In other words, contrary to Smith’s assertions about American legal history, 



we as a society do not encourage grand jurors to engage in nullification.  Quite the 



opposite.   



               (b)  When the delegates to our constitutional convention debated 

           whether to enact Article I, Section 8, no delegate mentioned grand jury 

           nullification as a reason for preserving Alaska’s pre-statehood grand 

           jury  requirement,  nor  did  any  of  the  opposing  delegates  mention 

           nullification  as  a  danger  that  justified  abandoning  the  grand  jury 

           requirement.   



               When the delegates to Alaska’s constitutional convention debated Article I, 



Section  8,  they  were  not  discussing  a  straightforward  proposal  to  codify  Alaska’s 



existing territorial grand jury requirement in the new state constitution.  Rather, the 



delegates were debating a committee proposal to eliminate Alaska’s existing grand jury 



requirement.   



               The committee assigned to draft Alaska’s Bill of Rights (i.e., Article I of 



our constitution) concluded that, given the protections of modern criminal procedure, the 



grand jury (as an institution) was antiquated and unnecessary.  For this reason, the 



    46  Many of these state grand jury instructions (but not Alaska’s) are listed in Navarro- 



Vargas, 408 F.3d at 1197.   



                                             – 66 –                                          2775 


----------------------- Page 67-----------------------

committee proposed eliminating the requirement of a grand jury indictment in felony 



cases  and,  instead,  allowing  felony  prosecutions  to  go  forward  based  simply  on  a 



charging document — an “information” — filed by the prosecutor’s office.   



               In response to this Committee proposal, Delegate Edward Davis introduced 



an amendment to restore the territorial requirement of a grand jury indictment.   



               During the ensuing debate, several delegates spoke approvingly of the 



grand jury’s role in screening a prosecutor’s charging decisions, and of occasions where 



territorial grand juries had declined to issue an indictment.  Ultimately, the delegates 



voted to keep the requirement of a grand jury indictment, and this right became codified 



in Article I, Section 8 of our state constitution. 



               (The history that I am about to summarize is also recited in  Wassillie v. 



State, 411 P.3d 595, 605–07 (Alaska 2018).)  



               Smith asserts that the convention debate proves that the framers of Alaska’s 



constitution endorsed the principle of grand jury nullification.  I agree that the delegates’ 



debate  helps  to  clarify  this  issue,  but  I  draw  a  very  different  conclusion  from  the 



delegates’ debate.  Based on what the delegates said about grand juries, and also based 



on what the delegates did not say about grand juries, I conclude that Article I, Section 8 



was not intended to codify or otherwise endorse the practice of grand jury nullification.  



               (1)  The context of the delegates’ debate  



               As I have already explained, Alaska territorial law required a grand jury 



indictment in all felony prosecutions, but territorial law also required grand jurors to 



make  their  decisions  based  on  the  evidence  presented  to  the  grand  jury,  without 



partisanship or favor.   



                                             – 67 –                                          2775 


----------------------- Page 68-----------------------

               Section 66-8-27 of ACLA 1949 (the last pre-statehood codification of 



Alaska law) declared that “the grand jury ought to find an indictment when all the 



evidence before them, taken together, is such as in their judgment would, if unexplained 



or uncontradicted, warrant a conviction by the trial jury.”  At the time of Alaska’s 



constitutional convention, this provision of territorial law had been in effect for more 



than half a century (ever since the Carter Code of 1900).  



               In addition, the grand jury oath mandated by territorial law (Section 66-8-3 



of ACLA 1949) required grand jurors to “diligently inquire and true presentment make” 



of all the matters brought before them, to decide these matters “truly and indifferently” 



(i.e., impartially), to refuse to indict anyone out of “envy, hatred or malice”, and to leave 



no one unindicted because of “fear, affection, gain, reward, or hope thereof”.   



               In sum:  When the framers of our state constitution debated whether the 



Alaska Bill of Rights should include a grand jury requirement, Alaska law had, for 



decades, imposed duties on grand jurors that were inconsistent with Smith’s assertion 



that our constitution guarantees grand jurors the unfettered discretion to refuse to return 



an indictment for any reason they see fit.  



               (2)  What the delegates said during their debate 



              During the debate on whether Alaska should abandon its territorial law 



requirement of grand jury indictment, several convention delegates spoke in favor of 



abolishing this requirement.  These delegates noted that most other states had already 



abolished the grand jury or had made grand jury indictment optional at the prosecutor’s 

discretion. 47  These delegates also argued that the grand jury, as an institution, did not 



    47 Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention, Vol. 2, p. 1323 (remarks of 



                                                                                (continued...) 



                                            – 68 –                                        2775 


----------------------- Page 69-----------------------

add anything of substance to the procedural protections already afforded to criminal 



suspects.  Thus, these delegates argued, grand juries would be an unnecessary and costly 

burden on the new state government. 48  



                As I noted earlier, Delegate Edward Davis was the one who introduced the 



amendment to restore the territorial requirement of a grand jury indictment.  Davis told 



the convention that, in his experience, the grand jury  did serve a useful purpose — 



because grand juries could put an early stop to criminal prosecutions that were not 



supported by sufficient evidence:  



                         In some cases — not often, it is true — but in some 



                cases, a person against whom criminal charges have been 

                filed by the district attorney or by private parties is released 

                by the grand jury, as there does not appear to be sufficient 

                cause to hold [the person] for trial.  That, of course, is the 

                purpose of [requiring an] indictment.   



Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention (January 6, 1956), Vol. 2, p. 1322 



(quoted in Wassillie v. State, 411 P.3d 595, 605 (Alaska 2018)).  



                Delegate Davis conceded that grand jury proceedings were conducted by 

prosecutors whose aim, generally, was to procure an indictment. 49  Nevertheless, Davis 



pointed out that grand juries did, from time to time, decline to issue an indictment.  



                  



                    47   (...continued) 



Delegate Seaborn Buckalew), p. 1324 (remarks of Delegate Warren Taylor).   



    48  Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention, Vol. 2, pp. 1323 & 1325–26 



(remarks of Delegate Seaborn Buckalew), p. 1324 (remarks of Delegate Warren Taylor), 

pp.  1324–25  (remarks  of  Delegate  Irwin  Metcalf),  p.  1325  (remarks  of  Delegate  John 

Hellenthal), p. 1333 (remarks of Delegate Dorothy Awes).  



    49  Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention, Vol. 2, p. 1327.   



                                                 – 69 –                                               2775 


----------------------- Page 70-----------------------

                         The present grand jury [that] just finished sitting in 

                 Anchorage has returned probably ten “no true bills”.  For 

                 those [of you] who are not lawyers, a “no true bill” means 

                 that somebody has been charged with a crime by the district 

                 attorney, and the district attorney, with all the control of the 

                 proceedings before the grand jury, has presented all of his 

                 evidence to the grand jury, and, in spite of that, the grand jury 

                 has said that there is no cause to hold this man for trial, and 

                 the man has been released without going through a trial to a 

                 regular jury.   



                         Certainly, under those circumstances, it can’t be said 

                 that  the  grand  jury  serves  no  useful  purpose.    It serves  a 

                 distinctly useful purpose ... .  It might be me, it might be you, 

                 it might be anybody that was charged with [a] crime and was 

                 not guilty of that crime and should be released by a grand 

                jury when the evidence was produced before the grand jury. 

                         .  .  .  



                         [I acknowledge that, currently, grand juries meet so 

                 infrequently  that  defendants  often  waive  their  right  to  an 

                 indictment,  so  that  their  cases  can  go  forward.    But]  I 

                 certainly hope that we preserve the right to have the criminal 

                 matters investigated by a grand jury if the accused wants it 

                 done that way.  



Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention (January 6, 1956), Vol. 2, p. 1327.  



                 Other convention delegates expressed their faith in the grand jury as an 



institution that could check the government’s power to pursue felony charges in instances 



where the evidence did not justify a criminal prosecution.  



                                                  – 70 –                                              2775 


----------------------- Page 71-----------------------

               For instance, Delegate Ralph Rivers argued that grand juries served a useful 



purpose because “sometimes the grand jury will [return] a ‘no true bill’ ... because the 

evidence is too flimsy”. 50  



               Similarly, Delegate Robert McNealy (a former United States attorney) 



focused his comments on the adverse consequences suffered by innocent people in the 



occasional  case  where  “our  appointed  prosecutors  become  a  little  overzealous”.  



McNealy described “four or five instances” in which “prominent citizens of the town 



who  were  not  criminally  inclined”  nevertheless  became  the  subjects  of  criminal 



investigations, but the grand jury refused to indict them, so no harm was done “to the 

reputation of these few people where it was not warranted.” 51  



               Delegate Victor Rivers explained that he favored requiring a grand jury 



indictment  to  make  sure  that  “a  person  [who]  is  innocent  does  not  [have  to  be] 



subject[ed] to the blasting of the press that he might be [subjected] to if he goes [to trial]” 



— for, “even though he be acquitted, he is bound to get a considerable amount of adverse 

publicity.” 52   



               Delegate Marvin “Muktuk” Marston agreed that the grand jury could serve 



as a useful protection for the citizenry.  He described a case where a friend of his “came 



afoul of the law and landed in the jail” and had no money to make bail — meaning that 



“if that man had had to sit [in jail pending] trial”, he “would have lost his job” and 



“wouldn’t  have  had  the  money  to  fight  [the  charge]”.   But  the grand  jury  allowed 



Marston  to  appear  before  them  and  plead  the  man’s  case,  and  the  grand  jury  then 



    50 Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention, Vol. 2, pp. 1323–24.  



    51 Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention, Vol. 2, p. 1331. 



    52 Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention, Vol. 2, p. 1335.   



                                             – 71 –                                         2775 


----------------------- Page 72-----------------------

returned a “no true bill”.  Based on that incident, Marston declared that he was going to 

vote for Delegate Davis’s amendment. 53   



                Delegate Mildred Hermann seconded this view — explaining that, in her 



twenty years of experience as a defense attorney in Alaska, she had seen “the misplaced 



zeal of some of our district attorneys”, and she had “seen a great many innocent people 



plead guilty rather than wait for the grand jury to meet”.  (At that point in Alaska history, 



grand juries generally met only once or twice a year.)   



                Delegate Hermann assured the other delegates that she “[didn’t] believe in 



protecting the guilty”, but she “[did] believe in considering [people] innocent until they 



are proved guilty”, and she declared that she had found, from her personal experience, 



“that the grand jury protects the public — not the criminal nor the alleged criminal, but 



the public as a whole.”  For this reason, she announced her support for Delegate Davis’s 

amendment. 54  



                Delegate  Davis  had  the  last  word  on  his  proposal  to  reinstate  the 



requirement of a grand jury indictment.  He told the Convention: 



                        I am interested in the occasional person who is charged 



                with crime and who is completely innocent of that crime, and 

                so far as I am concerned if even one person is charged with 

                crime,  who  is  innocent,  and  who  may  have  the  matter 

                disposed of without having to stand trial, [then] it’s worth the 

                cost [of having a grand jury].  And it seems to be apparent 

                here, from everything that has been said, that in spite of the 

                fact  [that]  the  district  attorney  controls  the  grand  jury,  ... 

                [and] in spite of the fact that the grand jury hears only one 

                side of the thing, the grand jury occasionally, and we might 

                say even frequently, finds there is not cause to hold a man for 



    53  Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention, Vol. 2, p. 1330.  



    54  Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention, Vol. 2, pp. 1334–35.  



                                                – 72 –                                            2775 


----------------------- Page 73-----------------------

               trial who has been charged by the district attorney.  That 

               ought to be sufficient to show that the grand jury serves a 

               distinct useful purpose, not for those evilly disposed, but for 

               you and for me and for all of us.  



               Following this debate, Alaska’s constitutional framers overwhelmingly 



adopted Delegate Davis’s proposed amendment — language that ultimately became 

Article I, Section 8 of our constitution. 55   



               (3)  What the delegates did not say during their debate 



               It   is   important   to   remember   that,   during   the   debate   at   Alaska’s 



constitutional convention, the delegates were not discussing some idealized or theoretical 



version of the grand jury.  Rather, the delegates were debating whether to abandon the 



requirement of a grand jury indictment in felony cases or, instead, retain the grand jury 



as it existed under Alaska territorial law.   



               At the time of our constitutional convention, Alaska territorial law declared 



that grand jurors “ought to find an indictment when all the evidence before them ... , if 

unexplained or uncontradicted, [would] warrant a conviction by the trial jury.” 56  This 



rule had been a fixture of Alaska law since the Carter Code of 1900. 57  During the debate 



over Article I, Section 8, no delegate voiced any reservation concerning, or objection to, 



this longstanding Alaska law — even though this law was at odds with the notion that 



grand jurors could refuse to return an indictment for any reason they saw fit.  



    55 Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention, Vol. 2, pp. 1336–37.   



    56  Section 66-8-27 of ACLA 1949.   



    57  Carter Code, Part Two, Section 19.  



                                              – 73 –                                          2775 


----------------------- Page 74-----------------------

                Likewise, Alaska territorial law (beginning in 1933) required grand jurors 



to take an oath that they would “diligently inquire and true presentment make” of all the 



matters brought before them, that they would decide all matters “truly and indifferently” 



(i.e.,  impartially),  and  that  they  would  not  leave  anyone  unindicted  “through  fear, 



                                                   58 

affection, gain, reward, or hope thereof”.             



                Again, no delegate to our constitutional convention voiced any reservations 



concerning, or objections to, these precepts during the debate over Article I, Section 8 



— even though these precepts, too, are at odds with the notion that grand jurors should 



be authorized to refuse to return an indictment for any reason they see fit.  



                The fact that no delegate questioned these duties imposed by Alaska’s 



existing grand jury law is significant because of the context in which the delegates 



debated whether  to codify a requirement of grand jury indictment in the new state 



constitution.  The drafting committee had recommended abolishing the requirement of 



a grand jury indictment.  Thus, the delegates who wished to retain the requirement of a 



grand jury indictment in felony cases had to articulate affirmative reasons for keeping 



this requirement.  



                But none of the delegates who spoke in favor of retaining the requirement 



of grand jury indictment argued, or even suggested, that grand juries were necessary or 



beneficial because of their power of nullification.  No delegate mentioned — much less 



praised — a grand jury’s power to disregard the law or to independently assess the 



wisdom of the law.  No delegate suggested that a grand jury’s proper role was to stop the 



government  from  pursuing  even  well-founded  felony  charges  if  the  grand  jurors 



sympathized with the defendant, or if the grand jurors felt antipathy toward the victim 



of the crime.   



    58  Section 5167 of CLA 1933 and, later, Section 66-8-3 of ACLA 1949.  



                                                 – 74 –                                               2775 


----------------------- Page 75-----------------------

               Instead, as I have explained, the supporters of the grand jury requirement 



uniformly spoke of the societal benefit of having grand jurors independently assess 



whether the evidence reasonably supported the proposed felony charge — so that no one 



would be forced to endure lengthy pre-trial detention, a felony trial, and the attendant 



adverse effects on a defendant’s reputation, all based on flimsy evidence.   



               Given the context of this debate — i.e., given the fact that the delegates who 



supported the requirement of a grand jury indictment had to affirmatively articulate the 



reasons for keeping this requirement — the delegates’ complete silence on the issue of 



nullification  is  starkly  at  odds  with  any  assertion  that  the  convention’s  decision  to 



approve Article I, Section 8 represented an endorsement of grand jury nullification.  It 



is much more likely that, if the convention delegates considered nullification at all, they 



viewed it as an unfortunate departure from the grand jurors’ duty.   



           (c)  Conclusion  



               Based  on  this  examination  of  the  general  history  of  the  grand  jury  in 



America, the particular history of the grand jury in Alaska, and the context and content 



of the debate over the grand jury at Alaska’s constitutional convention, I conclude that 



Article I, Section 8 of our state constitution was not intended to codify a grand jury’s 



right to engage in nullification.  



               I therefore join my colleagues in holding that the superior court is not 



required to affirmatively instruct grand jurors that they can engage in nullification.  In 



fact, in my view, it would be consistent with Article I, Section 8 if the superior court 



affirmatively instructed grand jurors that they must not engage in nullification.  



                                              – 75 –                                          2775 


----------------------- Page 76-----------------------

                                               V 



        The two sides of grand jury nullification — and why we can expect this 

       phenomenon to occur from time to time, regardless of what instructions the 

       superior court gives to grand jurors 



               When a grand jury refuses to issue an indictment despite the evidence, or 



in defiance of the law, any assessment of the grand jury’s action will generally depend 



on the political, social, or moral viewpoint of the person who is doing the assessing.  



People who approve of a grand jury’s refusal to issue an indictment may well view the 



grand jury’s action as a laudable instance of the citizenry standing up to government 



tyranny or over-reach.   



               This is how modern-day Americans generally characterize the actions of 



the colonial grand juries who, in the years leading up to the Revolution, refused to indict 



people who brazenly violated British tax laws, or who even assaulted and terrorized the 

officials whose job was to collect those taxes. 59   



    59 See Kevin K. Washburn, “Restoring the Grand Jury”, 76 Fordham Law Review, 2333, 



2346 (2008): 



        [I]n the paradigmatic cases commonly discussed in the historical narrative, the 

    grand jury’s primary method for exercising its power was not a rigorous review of 

    facts, but [rather] a stubborn refusal to enforce general laws [when] the grand jurors 

    [disagreed] with the legislator’s right to impose such laws, or at least the prosecutor’s 

    decision to enforce them in a given context.  So, for example, the grand jurors ... in 

    the [pre-Revolutionary War] tax protestor cases ... did not believe that the protesters 

    were being wrongly accused of [refusing to pay] their taxes.  Rather, ... the grand 

    juries simply disagreed with the substance of these laws.  



       See also Richard D. Younger,  The People’s Panel:  The Grand Jury in the United 

States, 1634–1941 (1963), p. 28 (noting a Massachusetts grand jury’s refusal to indict the 

leaders   of   the   Stamp     Act   riots  in   Boston).       According     to  the   website 

                                                                                  (continued...) 



                                             – 76 –                                         2775 


----------------------- Page 77-----------------------

                But for the many Americans who opposed the separation from England, or 



who simply valued the rule of law and the settling of disputes through peaceful political 



means, the actions of these colonial grand juries amounted to public incitements of 



lawlessness and domestic terrorism.   



                Indeed,  this  is  how  modern-day  Americans  generally  characterize  the 



actions of the post-Civil War grand juries in the South, who were notorious for their 



refusal to indict White defendants accused of committing violent crimes against newly 



freed Black citizens.  Nowadays, most people would say that these grand juries played 



a condemnable role in a decades-long campaign of racial terrorism against Black people.  



But at the time, in the post-Civil War South, the actions of these grand juries “served ... 



to popularize the grand jury [among White southerners] as a body which embodied and 



furthered the interests of the local community against an oppressive government, ... a 

bulwark of liberty.” 60  



                These instances of nullification are not confined to the distant past.  At the 



very time when the framers of Alaska’s constitution were meeting in Fairbanks, the 



racially motivated murder of a Black teenager, Emmett Till, and the acts of jury and 



    59  (...continued) 



https://www.pbs.org/ktca/liberty/popup_stampact.html, the Stamp Act rioters ransacked the 

Boston home of the newly appointed stamp commissioner, Andrew Oliver — leading him 

to   resign   his   position   the   next   day.      Thereafter,   threats   and   physical   attacks   on 

Crown-appointed stamp commissioners became a popular tactic of tax protestors throughout 

the colonies.  Tarring and feathering began to appear in New England seaports in the 1760s, 

and it was most often used by patriot mobs against loyalists.  By November 1, 1765 — the 

day the Stamp Act was officially to take effect — there was not a single stamp commissioner 

left in the colonies to collect the tax.  



    60  Ric Simmons, “Re-examining the Grand Jury: Is There Room for Democracy in the 



Criminal Justice System?”, 82 Boston University Law Review 1, 14 (2002).  



                                                 – 77 –                                              2775 


----------------------- Page 78-----------------------

grand  jury  nullification  that  thwarted  all  attempts  to  prosecute  his murderers,  were 

making national (and international) headlines. 61   



               As I explained earlier, most American jurisdictions affirmatively instruct 



grand jurors that they are required to follow the law, and that they are forbidden from 



making their decisions based on favoritism toward the defendant or antipathy toward the 



victim.  So how is it that grand jury nullification continues to occur?  



               Instances of grand jury nullification appear to be the inevitable result of our 



society’s dedication to three legal principles that guarantee the independence of grand 



juries  —  principles  whose  importance  outweighs  the  risk  of  occasional  grand  jury 



nullification.  These three principles are:  



    61  See the Library of Congress article, “The Murder of Emmett Till”, https://www.- 



loc.gov/collections/civil-rights-history-project/articles-and-essays/murder-of-emmett-till/, 

as  well  as  the  time-line  of  events  published  on  the  American  Experience  website, 

https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/till-timeline/.  See also the descrip- 

tion  found  on  the  website  of  the  University  of  Missouri  (Kansas  City)  Law  School, 

http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/till/tillaccount.html, the description found on the 

website of American Public Media, www.apmreports.org/story/2018/06/05/all-white-jury- 

acquitting-emmett-till-killers, and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emmett_Till. 



        On January 24, 1956 (during Alaska’s constitutional convention), Look magazine 

published a post-trial interview with one of Till’s murderers, J.W. Milam.  In this interview, 

Milam  —  who  was  now  safe  from  prosecution  —  openly  bragged  about  torturing  and 

murdering  Till.    See  “The  Shocking  Story  of  Approved  Killing  in  Mississippi”  (Look , 

January 24, 1956).  At the time, Look was one of America’s most popular magazines. The 

U.S. Census Bureau reported that there were 48 million households in America, and Look 

had a circulation of nearly 4 million copies per issue.  See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/- 

Look_(American_magazine).  



                                              – 78 –                                          2775 


----------------------- Page 79-----------------------

        •  a grand jury’s deliberations should be kept secret;  



        •  grand jurors should not be subjected to civil or criminal sanctions based on 



           their service as grand jurors; and  



        •  no government official or entity should be able to overturn a grand jury’s 



           decision not to indict.  



While these principles guarantee the grand jury’s independence, they also implicitly 



empower grand jurors to engage in nullification from time to time, especially when 



political or social tensions are high.   



               As the Ninth Circuit observed in  United States v. Navarro-Vargas, no 



matter  what  instructions  grand  jurors  might  receive,  the  potential  for  grand  jury 



nullification  will  remain  so  long  as  our  law  mandates  the  secrecy  of  grand  jury 



deliberations and the non-reviewability of a grand jury’s decision not to indict.  Grand 



jurors may depart from the law by refusing to indict for violations of laws that th ey 



disagree with, or by improperly taking into account the race, gender, or ethnicity of the 



accused or the victim.  “In all of these cases, for better or for worse, it is the structure of 



the  grand  jury  process  and  its function   in  our  system  that  makes  it  independent.”  



Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d at 1202 (emphasis in the original). 



               In  other  words,  because  grand  juries  have  the  power   to  engage  in 



nullification,  they  will  occasionally  exercise  that  power,  no  matter  how  they  are 



instructed by the court.  But contrary to what Smith argues in this appeal, Alaska courts 



are not obligated to encourage grand jurors to engage in nullification or to instruct grand 



jurors that this is their proper function.   



               As this Court now explicitly holds, grand jurors are bound by the oath set 



forth in Criminal Rule 6(e)(1) — the oath to “present all things truly and impartially”, 



and to leave no one unindicted “through fear, affection, gain, reward, or hope thereof”. 



                                             – 79 –                                         2775 


----------------------- Page 80-----------------------

But I conclude that the grand jurors’ obligation to dispassionately apply the law is 



broader than that.   



               As I have just discussed, the debate at Alaska’s constitutional convention 



shows that the delegates viewed grand jury nullification as an aberration rather than as 



a right or an essential function of the grand jury.   



               And as I discussed earlier in this concurrence (at pages 41 through 44), the 



Alaska Supreme Court and this Court have repeatedly held that when Criminal Rule 6(r) 



directs grand jurors to decide whether “the evidence ... would warrant a conviction of the 



defendant”,  this  does  not  mean  that  grand  jurors  are  supposed  to  decide  whether 



they personally think the defendant should be convicted of the charged crime.  Rather, 



Rule 6(r) requires grand jurors to decide whether, if the evidence they have heard is later 



presented to an impartial trier of fact who is required to dispassionately apply the law, 



that evidence would warrant that trier of fact (a trial jury or trial judge) in concluding that 



the defendant was guilty of the charged crime.   



               I therefore conclude that Criminal Rule 6(r) means what it says:  “The 



grand jury shall find an indictment when all the evidence taken together, if unexplained 



or uncontradicted, would warrant a conviction of the defendant.”  And I also conclude 



that Alaska grand jurors are expected to apply the law dispassionately in all respects 



when they assess whether a proposed criminal charge is sufficiently supported by the 



evidence to warrant requiring the defendant to stand trial. 



               As I have explained, there is no practical way to stop grand juries from 



engaging in nullification from time to time.  But in my view, the superior court would 



act properly if it affirmatively instructed grand jurors that it is their duty to adhere to the 



law and to return an indictment if they conclude that the evidence they have heard 



satisfies the test set forth in Criminal Rule 6(r).  



                                             – 80 –                                         2775 

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