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Belinda Danice Nelson v State of Alaska (2/18/2022) ap-2721

Belinda Danice Nelson v State of Alaska (2/18/2022) ap-2721

                                                                         NOTICE
  

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                                                303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska  99501
  

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                       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA  



BELINDA DANICE NELSON,  

                                                                                   Court of Appeals Nos. A-13008 & A-13014  

                         Appellant/Cross-Appellee,                                         Trial Court No. 1KE-17-00024 CR  



                                     v.  

                                                                                                              O P I N I O N  

STATE OF ALASKA,  



                         Appellee/Cross-Appellant.                                            No. 2721 - February 18, 2022  

                                                                                                                                       



                         Appeal   from   the   District   Court,   First   Judicial   District,  

                                                                              

                         Ketchikan, Kevin G. Miller, Judge.  



                         Appearances:   Emily L. Jura, Assistant Public Defender, and  

                                                                 

                         Samantha             Cherot,          Public   Defender,                  Anchorage,              for      the  

                         Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Michal Stryszak, Assistant Attorney  

                                                                           

                         General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Kevin G.  

                                                           

                         Clarkson, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee/Cross- 

                                                              

                         Appellant.  



                         Before:   Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Harbison,  

                                                                    

                         Judges.  



                         Judge WOLLENBERG.  



                         Belinda Danice Nelson was charged with driving under the influence and                                                             



refusal to submit to a chemical test after she drove her car into a ditch in Metlakatla.                                                                     At  



her bench trial, Nelson argued that the government violated her right to due process by                                                                       


----------------------- Page 2-----------------------

failing to advise her of her right to an independent chemical test. She further argued that,  

                                                                                                                               



as a result of this violation, the district court was required to presume that an independent  

                                                                                                                   



test would have revealed either no alcohol or a low level of alcohol in her blood.  

                                                                                                                             



                    The State did not dispute, and the court agreed, that Nelson's right to due  

                                                                                                                                



process was violated by the failure to advise her of her right to an independent chemical  

                                                                                                                        



test.  But the court concluded that the proper remedy for this violation was to presume  

                                                                                                             



only that the result of the test would have been below .08 percent.  The court ultimately  

                                                                                                                      



found Nelson guilty of driving under the influence, but acquitted her of refusal to submit  

                                                                                                                           



to a chemical test.  

                      



                    Nelson  now  appeals  her  conviction,  primarily  challenging  the  district  

                                                                                                                          



court's ruling regarding the applicable presumption.  

                                                                                   



                    For the reasons we explain in this opinion, we agree that the presumption  

                                                                                                                  



adopted by the district court was insufficiently favorable to Nelson, and we reverse her  

                                                                                                                                



conviction for driving under the influence.  

                                                   



          Factual and procedural background  

                                                 



                    In the fall of 2016, Nelson crashed her car into a ditch in  Metlakatla.  

                                                                                                                                      



Metlakatla  Police  Chief  Bruce  Janes  responded  to  the  scene.                                  Upon  arrival,  Janes  

                                                                                                                            



observed Nelson unsuccessfully attempting to drive her car out of the ditch.  According  

                                                                                                                     



to Janes, Nelson was uncooperative, initially refused to get out of her car, and later  

                                                                                                                              



refused to perform field sobriety tests.   He also testified that her breath smelled of  

                                                                                                                                 



alcohol, and she staggered when she tried to walk.  

                                                                      



                    Janes arrested Nelson for driving under the influence.  

                                                                                        



                                                               - 2 -                                                          2721
  


----------------------- Page 3-----------------------

                     At the police station, Janes asked Nelson if she would submit to a breath                               



test,   but   Nelson   remained   silent.     Janes   did   not   notify  Nelson   of   her   right   to   an  



                                          1  

independent chemical test.                                                                                         

                                            No breath or blood test was ever conducted.  



                                                                                                                            

                     Nelson        was       charged         with      driving        under        the     influence         under  



                                2 

                                                                                                                          

AS 28.35.030(a)(1).   Under this portion of the statute, the government is not required  



                                                                                                                                    

to prove that the defendant's blood or breath alcohol content was at a particular level as  



                                                                

determined by a chemical test.  Instead, the government must prove that the defendant  



                                                                                                                                3  

                                                                                                                                    

was "actually impaired" by the consumption of alcohol (or a controlled substance).                                                 In  



                                                                                                                                    

this type of case, however, evidence of a defendant's blood or breath alcohol content as  



                                                                                                                                 

determined by a chemical test may be relevant to determining whether the defendant was  

impaired.4  



                                                                                                                              

                     Nelson waived her right to a jury trial, and her case proceeded to a bench  



                                                                                                                                  

trial.  Nelson testified in her own defense.  She testified that she had been having car  



                                                                                                                                 

problems, which contributed to her driving into the ditch.   She denied drinking any  



      1    See AS 28.35.033(e) (codifying right to independent chemical test);  Gundersen v.  



Anchorage , 792 P.2d 673, 676-77 (Alaska 1990) (holding that the Alaska due process clause  

                                                                                                                                    

requires that a defendant accused of driving under the influence be given an opportunity to  

                                                                                                                       

challenge the reliability of the police-administered breath test, and that notice of the right to  

obtain an independent chemical test, and assistance in obtaining that test, satisfies that right).  



     2    Nelson   was   also   charged   with   refusal   to   submit   to   a   chemical   test   under  

                                                      

AS 28.35.032(a).   The trial court  acquitted her of  that charge, finding that there was a  

                                                                               

reasonable doubt as to whether Nelson knowingly refused to submit to the test.  



     3     See Comeau v. State, 758 P.2d 108, 110 (Alaska App. 1988); Anderson v. Anchorage ,  

                                                                                                                      

645 P.2d 205, 212 (Alaska App. 1982).  



     4     See AS 28.35.033(a) (establishing presumptions for whether a vehicle operator was  



under the influence based on specific ranges of chemical test results); see also Anderson, 645  

                                                                      

P.2d at 212 (discussing former version of statute).  



                                                                -  3 -                                                         2721
  


----------------------- Page 4-----------------------

alcohol that day. She also testified that Janes became combative with her before she had                                                                                                                           



the opportunity to cooperate.                   



                                  After the State rested its case, Nelson's attorney argued that Janes's failure                                                                                            



to advise Nelson of her right to an independent test violated her right to due process                                                                                                                   



under the Alaska Constitution.   Citing the Alaska Supreme Court's decision in                                                                                                                            Snyder  



v.  State, Nelson's attorney asked the court to presume that the result of an independent                                                                                                    



                                                                                                                                                                          5  

test, had one been conducted, would have been favorable to Nelson.                                                                                                                            

                                                                                                                                                                              More specifically,  



                                                                                                                                                                                                               

Nelson's attorney asked the court to presume that an  independent test would  have  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                   

revealed that Nelson "had no alcohol in her system or, at the very least, that it was so low  



                                                                                      

that she was not impaired by it."  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                               

                                  The State did not dispute that Nelson's due process rights were violated.  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                  

But the State did challenge Nelson's proposed remedy.  The State argued that it was  



                                                                                                                                                                                                             

sufficient for the court to presume that an independent test would have revealed a blood  



                                                                                    

alcohol level below .08 percent.  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                    

                                  The district court concluded that a due process violation had occurred but  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                         

agreed with the State as to the appropriate remedy.  In particular, the court stated that it  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                

was "assuming that, had Ms. Nelson submitted to a test, it would have been below .08,"  



                                                                                                                            

but that it was "not presuming that it was .000."  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                               

                                  The court ultimately found Nelson guilty of driving under the influence.  



                                                                                                                                                                                                               

The court acknowledged that Nelson had testified that she had not had anything to drink  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                   

and that the accident had been caused by mechanical problems. But the court found that  



         5       See Snyder v. State  (Snyder I), 930 P.2d 1274, 1278-79 (Alaska 1996) (holding that  



the police must afford the defendant an opportunity to obtain an independent test, even when                                                             

the defendant refuses to take the statutorily prescribed test, and that the remedy for violating                                                                                               

this requirement under those circumstances is for the fact-finder to presume that the results  

of an independent test would have been "favorable" to the defendant).  



                                                                                                        - 4 -                                                                                                    2721
  


----------------------- Page 5-----------------------

Nelson's testimony was not credible.                                                                                     Instead, the court credited Janes's testimony (and                                                                                                



the testimony of an additional witness on the scene) that Nelson smelled of alcohol and                                                                                                                                                                                      



was unable to stand on her own.                                                          



                       Why we reject the State's request to affirm Nelson's conviction on the                                                                                                                                                           

                      ground that her due process rights were not violated                                                                                                                         



                                           We must first address a preliminary claim that is raised by the State in a                                                                                                                                                                



cross-appeal: that although                                                              Snyder  generally requires the police to offer an independent                                                                                            



chemical test to a person arrested for driving under the influence, Nelson's case falls into                                                                                                                                                                                 



                                                                                                                                                                                                      6  

an exception and therefore no due process violation occurred.                                                                                                                                                                                                                    

                                                                                                                                                                                                            In particular, relying on  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              

Janes's testimony about the unavailability of independent tests in Metlakatla and the  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        

difficulty of traveling to Ketchikan given the time of Nelson's arrest relative to the flight  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    

and ferry transport times, the State contends that obtaining an independent test would  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          

have been impracticable in this case.  The State therefore argues that there was no need  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 

for a favorable presumption of any kind and that we can affirm Nelson's conviction on  



                                                                       

this alternate ground.  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      

                                            It is true that, under Snyder, an independent test is not constitutionally  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              

required "if obtaining an independent test is impracticable or exceedingly burdensome"  



                                                                                7  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          

under the circumstances.                                                              But the State never argued in the trial court that it would have  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                

been impracticable or burdensome to obtain an independent test in this case. Indeed, the  



           6          The State raises this claim in a cross-appeal, although strictly speaking, a cross-appeal                                                                                                 



as to this issue was unnecessary because the State, as the appellee, may argue for affirmance                                                                                                                             

on any ground established by the record.                                                                                          See Millman v. State, 841 P.2d 190, 195 (Alaska  

App. 1992).  (We note that a cross-appeal was necessary as to a different claim initially                                                                                                                                                                        

raised by the State - that the trial court erred in dismissing the refusal charge - but the                                      

 State did not pursue that issue in its briefing.)  



           7          Snyder I, 930 P.2d at 1278.  



                                                                                                                                     -  5 -                                                                                                                                2721
  


----------------------- Page 6-----------------------

 State did not dispute that the failure to offer Nelson an independent test violated her right                                                                                                                                                          



to due process.                                  



                                         As a result, the district court never made any factual findings as to whether                                                                                                                        



anindependent test would                                                      havebeen impracticableor exceedingly burdensomegiven                                                                                                                           the  



time and place of Nelson's arrest.  And as an appellate court, we are not authorized to                                                    



make factual findings in the first instance. Given the absence of the factual findings that                                                                                                                                                                



would be necessary to decide this claim, we reject the State's request to affirmthe court's                                                                                                                                                       



                                                                                                     8  

decision on this alternate ground.                                                                       



                                                                                                                                                                                                                            

                     Why we agree with Nelson that the presumption adopted by the district  

                                                                                             

                     court was insufficiently favorable  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         

                                         Onappeal, Nelsonarguesthatthedistrictcourt erred whenit presumed only  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          

that the result of an independent chemical test would have been below .08 percent.  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               

Citing  Snyder  and  AS  28.35.033(a),  Nelson  argues  that  the  court  was  required  to  



                                                                                                                                                            

presume that the result would have been below .04 percent.  



           8        See Seybert v. Alsworth                                                , 367 P.3d 32, 38-39 (Alaska 2016) ("[W]e will affirm on   



independent  grounds  not  relied  on  by   the  superior  court  only   when   those  grounds  are  

established by the record as a matter of law.");                                                                                    Irby v. Fairbanks Gold Mining, Inc. , 203 P.3d  

 1138, 1142 (Alaska 2009) ("The principle that [an appellate court] can affirm on alternative   

grounds applies 'only to issues of law that find support in settled facts' and 'does not extend     

to   new   theories  that  would  normally   be  resolved  by   discretionary   powers  traditionally  

reserved for trial courts - powers relying on case-specific consideration of disputed or                                                                                                                                             

disputable issues of fact.'" (quoting                                                                      Vaska v. State, 135 P.3d 1011, 1019 (Alaska 2006)));  

Burnett v. State, 264 P.3d 607, 612 (Alaska App. 2011) (noting that an appellee "is entitled  

to argue for affirmance of the district court's decision on any legal ground revealed by                                                                                                    

undisputed facts in the trial court record"); see also Meidinger v. Koniag, Inc., 31 P.3d 77,  

 88 (Alaska 2001) (concluding that the issues raised in the cross-appeal were not preserved  

for review).  



                                                                                                                            -  6 -                                                                                                                       2721
  


----------------------- Page 7-----------------------

                       In   Alaska,   a   person   accused   of   driving   under   the   influence   has   the  



                                                                                                                9  

constitutional and statutory right to an independent chemical test.                                                                       

                                                                                                                   This right is violated  



                                                                                                                                                  

if  the  government  refuses  a  defendant's  request  for  an  independent  test  or  if  the  



                                                                                                                                  10  

                                                                                                                                            

                                                                                                                                      In Snyder  

government fails to notify the defendant of their right to an independent test. 



                                                                                                                                                  

v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court held that a person has the right to an independent test  



                                                                                                                           11  

                                                                                                                    

even if the person refuses to take the statutorily prescribed breath test. 



                                                                                                                                                  

                       When the defendant submits to a breath test, but the State violates the  



                                                                                                                                                    

defendant's due process right to an independent chemical test, the proper remedy is  



                                                    12  

                                                                                                                                               

suppression of the breath test.                         But in Snyder, the supreme court stated that when there  



                                                                                                                                         

is no test to suppress - as is the case here - suppression is not a meaningful sanction  



                                                                13  

                                                                                                                                    

for the State's due process violation.                              Instead, the supreme court held, the appropriate  



                                                                                                                                                 

remedy is for the fact-finder to presume that the results of an independent test, had one  



                                                                                                               14  

                                                                                                                     

been conducted, would have been "favorable" to the defendant. 



      9     AS 28.35.033(e); Gundersen v. Anchorage, 792 P.2d 673, 676-77 (Alaska 1990).  



      10    Snyder I, 930 P.2d at 1278;  Gundersen, 792 P.2d at 677 (holding that "clear and   



express notice of a defendant's statutory right to an independent test under these conditions        

satisfies the requirements of due process").  



      11    Snyder I, 930 P.2d at 1278 ("[W]e believe that in the DWI context the accused's right  



                                                                           

and the state's duty extend to the opportunity to obtain an independent chemical test, and that  

                            

this opportunity must be made available to the accused whether or not the accused agrees to  

                                                                                       

submit to a breath test.").  The independent test, if performed, does not preclude the State  

          

from charging the defendant with refusal to submit to the statutorily-prescribed breath test.  

Id. at 1277 n.3.  



      12    Id. at 1279.  



      13    Id.  



      14    Id.  



                                                                       -  7 -                                                                  2721
  


----------------------- Page 8-----------------------

                             The issue presented here is whether the presumption adopted by the district                                                                   



court in this case - that an independent test would have revealed an amount below .08                                                                                             



-  was sufficiently "favorable" to Nelson.                                



                             The   Snyder   court   did   not   define   with  precision   what   it   meant   by  



"favorable."    Instead, the court cited to AS 28.35.033 as "establishing presumptions                                                                      



                                                                                                                                    15  

regarding intoxication on the basis of blood alcohol content."                                                                           



                                                                                                                                                                                  

                            Alaska Statute 28.35.033(a) establishes three possible presumptions for  



                                                                                                                                                                                   

cases in which there is an admissible chemical test and the State chooses to prosecute the  



                                                                                                                                                                          

defendant under an impairment theory. Subsection (a)(1) provides that if the test reveals  



                                                                                                                                                                                 

a blood or breath alcohol level of .04 or lower, "it shall be presumed that the person was  



                                                                                                                                                                                   

not under the influence of an alcoholic beverage." Subsection (a)(2) provides that if the  



                                                                                                                                                                                    

test reveals a blood or breath alcohol level of more than .04 but less than .08, there is no  



                                                                                                                                                                                   

presumption as to whether the defendant was or was not under the influence of an  



                                                                                                                                                                                    

alcoholic beverage.  And subsection (a)(3) provides that if the test reveals a blood or  



                                                                                                                                                                                   

breath alcohol level of .08 or more, "it shall be presumed that the person was under the  



                                                       

influence of an alcoholic beverage."  



                                                                                                                                                                               

                             On appeal, Nelson argues that, of these three subsections, only the first,  



                                                                                                                                                                                    

subsection  (a)(1),  can  be  accurately  described  as  adopting  a  presumption  that  is  



                                                                                                                                                                                           

"favorable" to the defendant.  The plain language of the statute supports this position.  



                                                                                                                                                                                     

Subsection (a)(1) requires a presumption that the person was not under the influence of  



                                                                                                                                                                               

an  alcoholic  beverage,  whereas  subsection  (a)(2)  requires  no  presumption,  and  



subsection (a)(3) requires a presumption that the person was under the influence of an  



                                            

alcoholic beverage.  



        15    Id. at 1279-80.  



                                                                                       -  8 -                                                                                  2721
  


----------------------- Page 9-----------------------

                       Nelson's position is further supported by the supreme court's decision in                                    



Snyder II - a decision addressing the administrative revocation of Snyder's driver's                                                     



                                                                                                       16  

license based on the same incident that gave rise to                                   Snyder I  .                                      

                                                                                                           In Snyder II, the supreme  



                                                                                                                                        

court characterized its holding in Snyder I  as follows:   "Because the police violated  



                                                                                                                                                   

Snyder's right to due process by refusing him an independent blood test, we ordered in  



                                                                                                                                              

Snyder I that courts apply a presumption that the blood test results would have been  



                                                                                                                                17  

                                                                                                                                          

favorable to him and thus supported his claim that he was not intoxicated."                                                         In support  



                                                                                                                                 

of this assertion, the court expressly cited the blood alcohol percentage contained in  



                                                                                                                                                   

AS 28.35.033(a)(1) - noting that, while a blood alcohol level below .05 percent (a  



                                                                                        18  

                                                                                                                                      

number that has now been amended to .04 percent)                                           "does not automatically exonerate  



                                                                                                                                           

a defendant" of driving under the influence, "it establishes a presumption that a person  



                                                                                     19  

                                                                         

is not under the influence of intoxicating liquor." 



                                                                                                                            

                       Based on this discussion in Snyder II, we conclude that AS 28.35.033(a)(1)  



                                                                                                          

establishes the favorable presumption required by Snyder I.  



                                                                                                                                

                       Here,  the  district  court  agreed  with  Nelson  that  she  was  entitled  to  a  



                                                                                                                                                

"favorable" presumption, but it only presumed that the result of an independent test  



                                                                                                                                

would have revealed a blood alcohol level below .08 percent.  This was insufficiently  



                                                                                                                                                  

"favorable"  because  the  presumption  that  the  person  is  not  under  the  influence  of  



                                                                                                                                                        

intoxicating liquor is only triggered when the blood alcohol level is .04 percent or less.  



      16    Snyder v. State, Dep't of Pub. Safety, Div. of Motor Vehicles  (Snyder II), 31 P.3d 770  



(Alaska 2001).  



      17   Id. at 775.  



      18    SLA 2001, ch. 63, § 14.  



      19    Snyder II, 31 P.3d at 775 & n.21.  



                                                                       -  9 -                                                                 2721
  


----------------------- Page 10-----------------------

The trial court should therefore have presumed that Nelson's breath test would have                                                                       



yielded a result of .04 or less.                          



                                                                                                                                 20  

                         We note, however, that this presumption is rebuttable.                                                                              

                                                                                                                                      Even when the  



                                                                                                                                                           

fact-finder is required to presume that the results of an independent test would have been  



                                                                                                                                                             

.04  percent  or  lower,  the  State  may  still  present  evidence  to  demonstrate  that  the  



                                                                                                                                            

defendant was nonethelessunder theinfluenceofalcohol (either singlyor in combination  



                                                                                                                                                         

with other qualifying substances), and the fact-finder may still conclude, if the other  



                                                                                                                                               

evidence is sufficiently persuasive, that the State has established beyond a reasonable  



                                                                                             21  

                                                                           

doubt that the defendant was under the influence. 



                                                                                                                                             

                         Thus,  because  the  trial  court  did  not  apply  a  sufficiently  "favorable"  



                                                                                                                                                              

presumption for purposes of the supreme court's decisions in Snyder I and Snyder II, we  



                                                                                                                                                            

conclude that Nelson's conviction must be vacated and her case remanded for a new trial  



                                                                                                                                    22  

                                                                                                                      

in which the proper presumption under AS 28.35.033(a)(1) is applied. 



             Conclusion  



                                                                                                                                                             

                         Nelson'sconvictionfordrivingundertheinfluenceisREVERSED, and this  



                                                                                                                                             

case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  



      20     See Anderson v. Anchorage                       , 645 P.2d 205, 212 (Alaska App. 1982) (construing a prior  



version of AS 28.35.033(a) & (c), which contained nearly identical language, as creating a   

rebuttable presumption).  



      21     See  AS 28.35.033(c) (providing that the presumptions set out in AS 28.35.033(a)  

                     

"may not be construed to limit the introduction of any other competent evidence bearing  

                                                                                                                                    

upon the question of whether the person was or was not under the influence of intoxicating  

                                                                                                                                              

liquor").  



      22     Because we are remanding for a new trial, we need not address Nelson's claim that  

                                                                                                                                                             

the trial court erred in allowing the investigating officer to offer an opinion as to whether  

Nelson was intoxicated.  



                                                                            -  10 -                                                                        2721
  

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