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Hutton v. State (7/26/2013) ap-2395

Hutton v. State (7/26/2013) ap-2395

                                                NOTICE 



        The text of this opinion can be corrected before the opinion is published in the 

        Pacific Reporter.   Readers are encouraged to bring typographical or other formal 

        errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts. 



                               303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska  99501
 

                                         Fax:   (907) 264-0878
 

                         E-mail:   corrections @ appellate.courts.state.ak.us
 



                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 



TRACY G. HUTTON,                                ) 

                                                )            Court of Appeals No. A-10836 

                            Appellant,          )         Trial Court No. 3AN-08-11797 CR 

                                                ) 

             v.                                 ) 

                                                )                 O P I N I O N 

STATE OF ALASKA,                                ) 

                                                ) 

                            Appellee.           ) 

                                                )              No. 2395 - July 26, 2013 



                Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, 

                Anchorage, Patrick J. McKay and Jack Smith, Judges. 



                Appearances: Renee McFarland, Assistant Public Defender, and 

                Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. 

                Kenneth M. Rosenstein, Assistant Attorney General, Office of 

                Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Michael C. 

                Geraghty, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee. 



                Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, Allard, Judge, and Bolger, 

                Supreme Court Justice.* 



                BOLGER, Justice. 



    *   Sitting   by   assignment    made    pursuant    to  article  IV,  section  16   of  the  Alaska 



Constitution and Administrative Rule 24(d). 


----------------------- Page 2-----------------------

                 Tracy Hutton and Amanda Topkok were sitting in Hutton's vehicle near 



Tikishla Park in east Anchorage. A truck pulled up next to them, and someone fired a 



shot that hit Topkok in her left shoulder. Topkok asked Hutton to take her to the hospital, 



and he started driving in the same direction that the truck had gone. The truck stopped 



at a stoplight at DeBarr Road, and Hutton pulled up on the left side of the truck. Hutton 



then fired several shots in the direction of the truck, turned left onto DeBarr Road, and 



drove up to the emergency entrance at Alaska Regional Hospital across the street. 



                 Hutton   was   charged   with   three   felonies:   Count   I   charged   that   Hutton 



committed   first-degree   misconduct   involving   weapons   for   knowingly   discharging   a 



firearm   from   a   propelled   vehicle   under   circumstances   manifesting   a   substantial   and 



unjustifiable risk of physical injury to a person or damage to property; Count II charged 



that    he  committed       second-degree       misconduct      involving     weapons     for   knowingly 



discharging   a   firearm   in   the   direction   of   a   dwelling;   and   Count   III   charged   that   he 



committed   third-degree   misconduct   involving   weapons   for   knowingly   possessing   a 



concealable firearm after having been convicted of a felony. 



                 Before trial, Hutton requested that Count III be bifurcated so that the jury 



would not hear   the   evidence of his felony convictions when it considered the other 



charges. His attorney stated that "I can't imagine   that we're going to request a jury 



decision if he's found guilty of Count I and Count II." The trial judge, Superior Court 



Judge Patrick J. McKay, suggested a special interrogatory, and noted that "if he's found 



guilty of I and II, then obviously he has a gun." Later, while the parties were discussing 



jury instructions before closing arguments, Hutton's attorney stated that Hutton agreed 



to a special interrogatory that had been submitted by the prosecution. 



                                                      2                                                2395
 


----------------------- Page 3-----------------------

                Hutton did not assert any affirmative defenses at trial; the essence of his 



closing argument was that the State had not proven that he was the one who fired the 



shots at the intersection. 



                The jury found Hutton guilty of Count I, and not guilty of Count II, and on 



the special interrogatory it found that Hutton "knowingly possessed a firearm capable of 



being concealed on his person." After the verdict was returned, Judge McKay asked the 



jury to wait in the jury room while he considered the procedure to determine Count III. 



                Judge McKay noted that the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt 



that Hutton knowingly possessed a firearm capable of being concealed on his person. 



Hutton's attorney indicated that Hutton wanted to admit that he had been previously 



convicted of a felony. After the judge had questioned Hutton about this admission, the 



prosecutor requested that the court confirm that Hutton was willing to waive his right to 



a jury trial on this issue. 



                Hutton expressed some confusion about this procedure and spoke with his 



attorney. Then the judge clarified that he could recall the jury to make a decision on 



Count   III.   But   after   some   additional   conversation,   Hutton's   attorney   indicated   that 



Hutton wanted to waive his right to a jury trial on this issue, and Hutton confirmed that 



he was making a knowing and voluntary decision to give up this right. Hutton's attorney 



then stipulated to the admission of judgments showing that Hutton had been convicted 



of felonies in 2000 and 2006. The judge then entered a guilty verdict on Count III, based 



on the judgments for Hutton's prior felony convictions, Hutton's admissions, and the 



special interrogatory concluding that Hutton had knowingly possessed a concealable 



firearm. 



                Hutton was sentenced before Superior Court Judge Jack  Smith. The judge 



allowed Hutton to represent himself at sentencing. Hutton argued that the presumptive 



                                                   3                                              2395
 


----------------------- Page 4-----------------------

sentences that would otherwise apply should be mitigated because he had been under 



duress when he committed these offenses. He was not willing to admit that he fired a 



gun, but he explained that he had driven through a red light and committed other traffic 



violations to avoid getting shot. He stated that he did not chase the truck; he only knew 



one route from the park to the hospital, and he took that route. 



                 After Hutton's argument, Judge Smith told the State that he believed that 



the mitigating factor described in AS 12.55.155(d)(3) could apply to Hutton's conduct. 



In   response,   the   State   argued   that   Hutton   did   not   take   the   most   direct   route   to   the 



hospital,   that   Hutton   drove   at   a   high   speed   to   the   intersection   where   the   truck   was 



stopped, and that Topkok testified at trial that Hutton was following the truck. The State 



argued that some witnesses testified that Hutton "drove fast to that intersection, and after 



making [a] U-turn, opened fire on this other truck, which was not any type of a duress 



situation." In reply, Hutton repeated that he had been required to commit several traffic 



violations because of the circumstances, but that "I never once shot back at them." 



                 Judge   Smith   concluded   that   Hutton       had   failed   to   prove   by   clear   and 



convincing evidence that he was acting under duress when he committed these felony 



offenses. Hutton now appeals from both his conviction and his sentence. 



        Discussion 



                 The jury instructions stated the wrong mental state for the 

                 charge of misconduct involving weapons in the first degree, 

                 but this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 



                 The jury instruction on the elements of Count I required the State to prove 



that: "(1) the defendant knowingly discharged a firearm from a propelled vehicle; (2) 



while     the  vehicle    was   being    operated;    and   (3)  under    circumstances       manifesting 



substantial and unjustifiable risk of physical injury to a person or damage to property." 



                                                     4                                                2395
 


----------------------- Page 5-----------------------

"Substantial and unjustifiable risk" was defined for the jury as "a risk of such a nature 



and degree that the conscious disregard of it, or a failure to perceive it, constitutes a 



gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the 



situation." (Emphasis added). Hutton argues that these instructions improperly diluted 



the mental element required to prove this crime. 



                 Hutton raised no objection to these jury instructions at trial, so he must 

show plain error on appeal.1 Incorrect language in a jury instruction will be plain error 



when "(1) the error is not the result of an intelligent waiver or a strategic decision not to 



object, (2) the error affects substantial rights, (3) the error is obvious, and (4) the error 

is prejudicial."2 



                 Misconduct       involving     weapons     in  the   first  degree   is  defined    in  AS 



11.61.190(a)(2) as "discharg[ing] a firearm from a propelled vehicle while the vehicle 



is being operated and under circumstances manifesting substantial and unjustifiable risk 



of physical injury to a person or damage to property." This statute does not specify any 



mental element, but the phrase "substantial and unjustifiable risk" is used in the separate 

statutory definitions of both "recklessly" and "with criminal negligence."3 But, "if a 



provision of law defining an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, the 



    1    See Alaska R. Crim. P. 30(a) ("No party may assign as error any portion of the charge 



or omission therefrom unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its 

verdict ... ."). 



    2    Lengele v. State , 295 P.3d 931, 937 (Alaska App. 2013) (citing Khan v. State , 278 



P.3d 893, 900 (Alaska 2012)). 



    3    AS 11.81.900(a)(3) & (a)(4). 



                                                      5                                                2395
 


----------------------- Page 6-----------------------

culpable mental state that must be proved with respect to (1) conduct is 'knowingly'; and 

(2) a circumstance or a result is 'recklessly.'"4 



                 A person acts "recklessly" with regard to a circumstance or  result when he 



consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstance exists or 

the   result   will   occur.5   A  person   acts   "with   criminal   negligence"   with   regard   to        a 



circumstance or result if the person fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk 



that the circumstance exists or the result will occur, and if a reasonable person would 

have perceived that risk.6  So proof that the offender "failed to perceive" a risk would be 



sufficient if the offense requires only criminally negligent misconduct, but this proof 



would be insufficient to show that the offender acted recklessly. 



                 In Smith v. State, this court considered the presumptive term for a person 



                                                                       7 

convicted of first-degree misconduct involving weapons.  We stated that "[i]t is not clear 



whether the legislature intended in enacting the first-degree weapons misconduct statute 



to require proof of recklessness or criminal negligence when it required proof that the 



defendant   discharged   a   firearm   under   circumstances   manifesting   a   substantial   and 

unjustifiable risk of physical injury."8 We noted that the statute requires "proof that the 



defendant acted recklessly, or at least negligently, with respect to the possibility that 

discharge of a firearm might endanger someone."9   But the question whether the statute 



    4    AS 11.81.610(b).
 



    5    AS 11.81.900(a)(3). 
 



    6    AS 11.81.900(a)(4).
 



    7    28 P.3d 323, 324 (Alaska App. 2001).
 



    8    Id. at 325 (internal quotation marks omitted).
 



    9    Id . at 326.
 



                                                       6                                                 2395
 


----------------------- Page 7-----------------------

required recklessness or mere negligence was not before us in the Smith case, and we did 



not decide which mental state was required. 



                 The State argues that the legislative history of this statute suggests that the 



mental state was intended to be no greater than criminal negligence. The State first points 



to   proceedings   involving   Senate   Bill   194,   introduced   on   January   8,   1996.   This   bill 



included a proposed amendment to the existing statutes to add a provision stating that a 



person commits misconduct involving weapons in the second degree if the person: 



                 [KNOWINGLY] participates as a member of a criminal street 

                 gang and, acting for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in 

                 association with a criminal street gang or any of its members, 

                 the person knowingly discharges a firearm from a propelled 

                 vehicle     while   the   vehicle    is  being   operated     and   under 

                 circumstances manifesting a reckless disregard for a risk of 

                 damage to property or a risk of physical injury to a person.10 



                 At    a  Senate    Judiciary     Committee      meeting,     a  representative      of  the 



Department   of   Law       noted   that   the  proposed   language   regarding        street   gangs   was 



unnecessary because the intent was to criminalize the knowing discharge of a firearm 

from a propelled vehicle.11 She also suggested changing the mental state to "reckless" to 



be uniform with other code sections. 12 Following this testimony the bill was amended to 



include the language currently codified in AS 11.61.190(a)(2).13 In the House Judiciary 



    10   S.B.   194,   19th  Leg.   (1996)   (the  proposed     amendment      would    remove    the  word 



[KNOWINGLY]). 



    11  Minutes      of  Senate   Judiciary    Committee,     Senate    Bill  194,   Testimony     of  Anne 



Carpeneti, 365 (Jan. 19, 1996). 



    12  Id. 



    13  See      C.S.S.B.     194     (JUD),     19th     Leg.,    Second      Session,     available      at 



http://www.legis.state.ak.us/pdf/19/bills/sb0194b.pdf (last visited July 9, 2013). 



                                                      7                                                2395
 


----------------------- Page 8-----------------------

Committee there was testimony that one of the purposes of the bill was to elevate the 

crime of weapons misconduct when drive-by shootings are involved.14 



               The State argues that this history establishes that the legislature rejected 



recklessness in favor of a lesser mental state. But since the "substantial and unjustifiable 



risk" language used in AS 11.61.190 is also used in the definitions of both recklessness 



and criminal negligence, this history does not clearly indicate that the legislature rejected 



recklessness as the mental state required for this crime. In view of the presumption 



imposed by AS 11.81.610(b), the burden is on the State to prove that the statute requires 



a mental state other than recklessness. We are not convinced that the State has met that 



burden. 



               The State concedes that a failure to instruct a jury on the proper mental state 

is a claim of constitutional error.15 But the State argues that, assuming the instruction was 



improper, any reasonable juror would have concluded that Hutton acted recklessly in this 



case. 



               In Anderson v. State , we recently held that a jury instruction that omits an 



element of the offense is prejudicial if "there is a reasonable possibility that the jury 



would have reached a different verdict if they had been asked to decide whether the 

government had proved the omitted element."16 In Adams v. State , the Alaska Supreme 



    14  Minutes of House Judiciary Committee, Senate Bill 194, Testimony of Sherman 



Ernouf, 2155 (Mar. 27, 1996). 



    15  See Pitka v. State, 995 P.2d 677, 680 (Alaska App. 2000) (failure to instruct on an 



essential element of a crime is constitutional error). 



    16  289 P.3d 1, 6-7 (Alaska App. 2012) (emphasis removed). 



                                               8                                          2395
 


----------------------- Page 9-----------------------

Court recently stated that another type of constitutional violation would be considered 

to be prejudicial unless it was shown to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.17 



                The element at issue in this case was the risk that discharging a firearm as 



Hutton did would cause physical injury to a person or damage to property. The jury 



verdict established that the jury necessarily found that a reasonable person in Hutton's 



place would have perceived that risk. Under Anderson , the question is whether there is 



a reasonable possibility that the jury, if properly instructed, would not have found that 



Hutton was aware of and consciously disregarded that same risk. Under Adams , we 



would ask whether the State has shown that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable 



doubt. We conclude that there was no prejudice to Hutton under either formulation of the 



question. 



                Topkok testified that, after she was shot, Hutton followed the truck, pulled 



up beside it, and started shooting at it. Hutton was especially likely to be aware of the 



risk of injury from a gunshot because his passenger had just been shot while she was 



sitting in his vehicle. We conclude that no reasonable juror could have concluded that 



Hutton was unaware of the risk of physical injury to a person or damage to property 



when he shot into a truck next to his vehicle. 



                Moreover, Hutton did not offer any evidence or argument contesting this 



element of the offense. The defense did not argue that the person who fired these shots 



was unaware of the danger involved. The defense theory at trial was that Hutton did not 



fire any shots. The question of whether these shots were fired recklessly or with criminal 



negligence   was   not   a   contested   issue.   We   thus   conclude   that   there   is   no   reasonable 



    17   261 P.3d 758, 773 (Alaska 2011). 



                                                    9                                                2395 


----------------------- Page 10-----------------------

possibility that the jury, if properly instructed, would have rendered a verdict of acquittal; 



the error in the jury instructions was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 



               The superior court reasonably concluded that Hutton was 

               guilty of misconduct involving weapons in the third degree 

               after Hutton waived his right to a jury trial. 



               Hutton also argues that the superior court erred when it determined that he 



was guilty of misconduct involving weapons in the third degree, the statute that prohibits 



a convicted felon from possessing a concealable firearm. This is the count for which 



Hutton's attorney requested bifurcation of the trial proceedings to prevent the trial jury 



from learning of his felony convictions when they considered the other elements of the 



pending charges. Along with its verdicts on Count I and II, the jury returned a special 



interrogatory finding that the State had proven that Hutton had knowingly possessed a 



firearm capable of being concealed on his person. 



               After questioning Hutton and his attorney, the court concluded that Hutton 



had knowingly admitted that he had previously been convicted of a   felony   and that 



Hutton had waived his right to a jury trial on this issue. The State then introduced two 



felony    judgments   showing    Hutton's   prior  convictions   for  misconduct   involving   a 



controlled substance in the third degree and misconduct involving weapons in the third 



degree.    Based   on  this  evidence,   the  court  concluded    that  Hutton  was   guilty  of 



misconduct involving weapons in the third degree as charged in Count III. 



               Hutton argues that the special interrogatory was not adequate to advise the 



jury of the presumption of innocence and the requirement that the jury was required to 



reach a unanimous decision in its response.   Hutton did not object to the wording of the 



                                               10                                          2395
 


----------------------- Page 11-----------------------

 special interrogatory at trial; he agreed to the interrogatory submitted by the State. Under 

these circumstances, Hutton must show plain error to prevail on appeal.18 



                 Hutton correctly points out that criminal defendants are presumed innocent 

until proven guilty.19 In this case, however, the jury was given the pattern instruction that 



the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt are the 



distinguishing features of a criminal trial. This instruction indicated that the presumption 



of   innocence   and   burden   of   proof   apply   to   the   entire   trial,   and   did   not   distinguish 



between the verdict forms and the special interrogatory. Also, the special interrogatory 



itself began "Did the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt ... ." (Emphasis added). 



This reminded the jury that the burden was on the State and that Hutton was presumed 



innocent until proven guilty. Hutton has not established that the superior court committed 



any error with regard to the presumption of innocence. 



                 Hutton also argues that the special interrogatory failed to protect his right 

to a unanimous jury verdict.20  Hutton notes that the verdict forms used the phrase "We, 



the jury" for Counts I and II, and argues that since the special interrogatory did not use 



that language, there is a "significant possibility" that the jury did not understand that its 



decision on the special interrogatory needed to be unanimous. 



    18    See Alaska R. Crim. P. 30(a). 



    19    See   In  re  Winship ,   397   U.S.   358,   363   (1970)   (stating  that   the  presumption   of 



innocence is a "bedrock axiomatic and elementary principle whose enforcement lies at the 

foundation of the administration of our criminal law") (internal quotation marks omitted); 

Brown v. State , 601 P.2d 221, 225 (Alaska 1979). 



    20   See Khan v. State, 278 P.3d 893, 897 (Alaska 2012). 



                                                     11                                                2395
 


----------------------- Page 12-----------------------

                 In response, the State argues that the jury instructions must be viewed in 



          21 

context.     The special interrogatory was provided to the jury with the packet of jury 



instructions, just after the   verdict form. Instruction 32 specifically told the jury that 



"[e]ach of your verdicts must be unanimous." Common sense indicates that the jury 



would probably view the special interrogatory as similar to the verdicts and apply the 



same rules. We conclude that Hutton has failed to establish any error in the wording of 



the special interrogatory. 



                 Hutton also argues that he did not make a knowing and voluntary waiver 



of his right to a jury trial for this charge. Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(a) states 



that "[c]ases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant waives a 



jury trial in writing with the approval of the court and the consent of the state." However, 



in  Walker v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the writing requirement under 



Rule 23(b) (which governs how a defendant can stipulate to a trial with fewer than 12 



jurors) is not absolute, and that a writing is simply the best evidence of a defendant's 

waiver.22    For a valid waiver, the defendant must personally inform the court that he is 



giving up his right to a jury trial, and the waiver must be knowing and voluntary.23 



                 In a later case, the supreme court held that a waiver colloquy was sufficient 



when the court confirmed that the defendant understood that he had the right to a jury 



trial,  that if he waived this right the judge would decide the case, and that he was aware 



    21   See Baker v. State, 905 P.2d 479, 490 (Alaska App. 1995) ("[J]ury instructions are 



not to be viewed in isolation; instead, we must assess the group of instructions as a whole."). 



    22   578 P.2d 1388, 1390 (Alaska 1978). 



    23   See id.  (knowing and voluntary); McGlauflin v. State , 857 P.2d 366, 368 (Alaska 



App. 1993) (personal, knowing, voluntary, and intelligent), abrogated on other grounds by 

State v. Coon , 974 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1999). 



                                                     12                                               2395
 


----------------------- Page 13-----------------------

of   what   he   was   doing   by   signing   the   waiver.24    The   proper   standard   of   review   for 



considering   the   validity   of   a   jury   trial   waiver   is   whether   the   trial   court's   finding   is 

supported by substantial evidence.25 



                 In   this   case,   Hutton   initially   said   he   was   willing   to   admit   that   he   had 



previously been convicted of a felony, and then he equivocated. But then the court gave 



Hutton an opportunity to speak with his attorney. The court then clarified that Hutton 



understood that he did not have to admit his prior felony convictions, that he could make 



the State prove the prior felony convictions, that Hutton made his admission voluntarily, 



and that he knew what he was doing. 



                 After the judge accepted Hutton's admission, the prosecutor noted that 



Hutton had the right to a jury trial on Count III. Judge McKay again told Hutton that he 



could make the State prove Hutton's prior convictions to a jury beyond a reasonable 



doubt. When Hutton said,"You know, it's not making that much sense to me," Judge 



McKay   explained   that   Hutton   could   waive   his   right   to   a   jury   trial   and   try   that   one 



element to the court or he could just let the jury hear the issue. 



                 Judge   McKay   then   asked   if Hutton   wanted   a   jury   trial or   a   court   trial. 



Hutton spoke with his attorney, who said that Hutton was willing to waive his right to 



a jury regarding his prior convictions. The court addressed Hutton personally, and asked 



if   Hutton   understood   that   based   on   the   jury's   conclusion   that   he   had   possessed   a 



handgun, the judge would find that he was guilty of this charge. Hutton indicated that he 



understood. The court asked Hutton if he knew he was giving up his right to a jury trial 



on the issue and if he made this decision knowingly, and Hutton responded, "Yes." 



    24    Walunga v. State, 630 P.2d 527, 528 n.6 (Alaska 1980). 



    25   Id. at 528 n.4. 



                                                      13                                                   2395 


----------------------- Page 14-----------------------

                Judge McKay again asked whether Hutton understood he was waiving his 



right to a jury trial on the issue of whether he was a convicted felon; Hutton responded 



yes. Judge McKay clarified that Hutton could appeal the jury's finding that he possessed 



a concealable handgun, but not the issue of whether he was a convicted felon. Hutton 



stated that he understood, that he was willing to waive his right to a jury trial knowingly 



and voluntarily, and that he had enough time to talk with his attorney. The prosecutor 



then offered judgments of two of Hutton's previous felonies into evidence, and Hutton's 



attorney stipulated that these judgments should be admitted. 



                Although Hutton expressed hesitation several times during this colloquy, 



he was able to speak with his attorney every time he had a question. We conclude that 



there is substantial evidence that Hutton knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived 



his right to a jury trial on the issue of whether he had any prior felony convictions. 



                Hutton     also   argues   that   the  jury  did   not  determine     whether     Hutton 



recklessly disregarded the fact that he had previously been convicted of a felony. To 



convict a person of third-degree misconduct involving weapons in the third degree, it is 



not enough to show that the person had a prior felony conviction; it must also be proven 

that the defendant recklessly disregarded the fact of his prior conviction.26 



                Again, Hutton did not raise this issue in the superior court, so we must find 

plain error to reverse this conviction, including a finding of prejudice.27 As noted above, 



we recently held that a jury instruction that omits an element of the offense is prejudicial 



if "there is a reasonable possibility that the jury would have reached a different verdict 



if   they   had   been   asked   to   decide   whether   the   government   had   proved   the   omitted 



    26   See Afcan v. State, 711 P.2d 1198, 1199 (Alaska App. 1986) (recklessness is the 



applicable mental state for the circumstances of this offense). 



    27   Lengele v. State, 295 P.3d 931, 937 (Alaska App. 2013). 



                                                   14                                                2395 


----------------------- Page 15-----------------------

element."28    And     the   Alaska    Supreme     Court    recently    stated  that   another   type   of 



constitutional violation would be considered to be prejudicial unless it was shown to be 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.29 Again, we conclude that Hutton did not suffer any 



prejudice when judged under either standard. 



                At trial, the evidence that Hutton knew that he had been convicted of two 



prior felonies was uncontested. One exhibit established that on November 22, 2000, 



Hutton had been convicted on his plea to the charge of misconduct involving a controlled 



substance in the third degree. A   second exhibit showed that on February 17,   2006, 



Hutton had been convicted on his plea to misconduct involving weapons in the third 



degree for being a felon in possession of a concealable firearm, the same charge involved 



in this case. (The circumstances of this 2006 conviction would require Hutton to be 



aware of the fact that he had previously been convicted of a felony in August 2000.) 



Hutton's   signature   appears   at   the   conclusion   of   the   2006   judgment.   Based   on   these 



exhibits, the trial judge could reasonably conclude that Hutton knew that he had been 



convicted of these felonies. 



                Moreover, Hutton never argued to the court or to the jury that he was not 

aware   that   he   had   been   convicted   of   the   felony.30 The   entire   point   of   the   special 



interrogatory was to remove any issue concerning his convictions from consideration by 



the trial jury and to leave this issue up to the trial judge. At the conclusion of trial, Hutton 



admitted that he had previously been convicted of a felony, and the trial judge found that 



his admission was knowing and voluntary. Hutton's knowing admission that he had 



    28   Anderson  v. State, 289 P.3d 1, 6-7 (Alaska App. 2012) (emphasis removed). 



    29   Adams v. State , 261 P.3d 768, 773 (Alaska 2011). 



    30   See Sergie v. State , 105 P.3d 1150, 1155 (Alaska App. 2005). 



                                                    15                                                2395 


----------------------- Page 16-----------------------

previously been convicted of a felony necessarily established that he knew that he had 



been   previously   convicted   of   a   felony.   We   conclude   that   the   trial   court's   failure   to 



specifically   address   this   issue   was   harmless   beyond   a   reasonable   doubt;   there   is   no 



reasonable possibility that a judge or jury   could reach a different conclusion on this 



issue. 



                 The sentencing court reasonably concluded that Hutton was 

                 not acting under duress. 



                 Hutton also argues that the superior court erred at the sentencing hearing 



when it rejected his proposed mitigating factor, that he committed the offense under 



"some   degree   of   duress,   coercion,   threat,   or   compulsion   insufficient   to   constitute   a 

complete defense."31 We review the superior court's factual findings regarding the nature 



of a defendant's conduct for clear error, but independently review whether, given those 

findings, the defendant has established the mitigating factor.32 



                 To establish the duress mitigating factor, a defendant must present facts that 

would come close to establishing a trial defense.33 The mitigating factor "is not so broad 



as 'to encompass behavior that is merely impulsive or the result of situational stress.'"34 



    31   AS 12.55.155(d)(3). 



    32   Michael v. State , 115 P.3d 517, 519 (Alaska 2005). 



    33   See Hart v. State , 702 P.2d 651, 663-64 (Alaska App. 1985) (holding that mental 



illness that did not establish a trial defense could qualify as a mitigating factor); Bell v. State , 

658    P.2d   787,   791  (Alaska    App.    1983)   (holding    that  facts  that  would    come   close   to 

establishing a necessity defense would establish this factor). 



    34   Bynum v. State , 708 P.2d 1293, 1294 (Alaska App. 1985) (quoting Lee v. State , 673 



P.2d 892, 896 (Alaska App. 1983)). 



                                                      16                                                2395
 


----------------------- Page 17-----------------------

                In   this case, some of the circumstances could suggest that Hutton   was 



shooting at the truck in self defense - to protect himself and his passenger while he 



drove to the hospital. At sentencing, Hutton argued that the route he took was the only 



one he knew to get to the hospital, and that he did not try to pursue the truck. But Hutton 



never offered any evidence that he fired shots into the truck because he was required to 



do   so.   Instead,   Hutton   consistently   argued   that   he   should   not   have   been   convicted, 



because the State did not prove that he shot at the truck. 



                The sentencing judge found that Hutton had not proven this mitigating 



factor by clear and convincing evidence. In particular, the judge found that although 



Hutton   was   initially   a   victim,   he   then   chased   the   shooter   and   endangered   others   by 



engaging in a "gun battle." 



                Topkok's   trial   testimony      provided   a   sufficient   basis   for   these   factual 



findings. We therefore conclude that these findings were not clearly erroneous.                   Based 



on these findings, we agree with the judge's conclusion that Hutton had not proven this 



mitigating factor. 



        Conclusion 



                We AFFIRM the superior court's judgment. 



                                                    17                                              2395
 

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