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NOTICE
The text of this opinion can be corrected before the opinion is published in the
Pacific Reporter. Readers are encouraged to bring typographical or other formal
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303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501
Fax: (907) 264-0878
E-mail: corrections @ appellate.courts.state.ak.us
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
MAIDIE MAILLELLE, )
)
) Court of Appeals No. A-10682
)
Appellant, ) Trial Court No. 4AK-08-064 Cr
)
v. )
) O P I N I O N
)
STATE OF ALASKA, )
)
)
)
Appellee. ) No. 2354 - April 27, 2012
Appeal from the Superior Court, Fourth Judicial District, Bethel,
Leonard R. Devaney III, Judge.
Appearances: Julia D. Moudy, Assistant Public Defender, and
Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Terisia K. Chleborad, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and John J.
Burns, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer and Bolger,
Judges.
MANNHEIMER, Judge.
Maidie Maillelle pleaded guilty to a charge of second-degree assault for
striking her 20-year-old daughter with a truck and injuring her severely.
Maillelle had consumed at least two bottles of vodka, and her daughter was
standing in front of the truck to prevent Maillelle from driving. Maillelle accelerated the
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vehicle toward her daughter, struck her, and dragged her underneath the truck for about
50 feet. Maillelle then put the vehicle in reverse and ran over her daughter again. At this
point, Maillelle stopped, looked down at her daughter, and then drove away.
Maillelle's daughter's medical expenses were paid by the State of Alaska's
Medicaid program. These expenses totaled slightly less than $102,000.
At Maillelle's sentencing, the State asked the superior court to order
Maillelle to pay restitution to the State, in reimbursement of this Medicaid assistance.
Maillelle objected to the State's request; she argued that the State - i.e., the Medicaid
program - was neither a "victim" nor a provider of medical care to the victim within the
meaning of the restitution statute.
The superior court ruled in the State's favor on this issue and ordered
Maillelle to make the restitution. Maillelle now appeals.
The statute in question, AS 12.55.045(a), declares that, unless potential
recipients of restitution decline their statutory right to repayment, the sentencing court
shall order the defendant to pay restitution ...
to the victim or other person injured by the offense, [or] to a
public, private, or private nonprofit organization that has
provided or is or will be providing counseling, medical, or
shelter services to the victim or other person injured by the
offense, or as otherwise authorized by law.
In this appeal, Maillelle relies on the clause, "including restitution to ... a
public, private, or private nonprofit organization that has provided ... medical ... services
to the victim". Maillelle points out that the Medicaid program does not directly provide
medical services to anyone. Rather, Medicaid is an insurance program. Focusing on this
distinction, Maillelle argues that even though Medicaid reimbursed the medical facilities
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and medical personnel who provided medical services to her daughter, Medicaid did not
itself provide these medical services.
Maillelle concedes that if the hospital and the medics, doctors, nurses, and
pharmacists who provided care to her daughter had sought restitution during the
sentencing proceedings, they would have been entitled to restitution under the statute.
But according to Maillelle, Medicaid is not entitled to restitution under AS 12.55.045(a)
- because the statute only allows a court to order restitution to organizations "that
[have]provided ... medical ... services to the victim".
Maillelle's argument is seemingly inconsistent with this Court's decision
in Lonis v. State , 998 P.2d 441 (Alaska App. 2000). In Lonis , we held that a sentencing
court was authorized, pursuant to AS 12.55.045, to order a defendant to pay restitution
to an insurance company that had compensated the victim for the losses attributable to
the defendant's crime. Id. at 447-48.
We gave two rationales for this decision. First, we noted that if an
insurance company suffered a loss as a result of the defendant's crime, the company
itself would qualify for restitution because the company was a "victim or other person
injured by the offense". 1 Second, we noted that even if the insurance company did not
qualify as a "victim or other person injured by the offense", the sentencing court could
have ordered the defendant to pay restitution directly to the victim - and, because the
victim's loss had already been compensated by the insurance company, the insurance
company would have been entitled to recoup this money from the victim. 2 We
1 Lonis , 998 P.2d at 447-48.
2 Ibid.
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concluded that a defendant has no standing to complain when, in this situation, a court
orders the restitution to be paid directly to the victim's insurer. 3
Maillelle argues that our decision in Lonis does not apply to her case
because Medicaid assistance is different from the insurance offered by private
companies. Maillelle points out that a person must enter into a contract with an
insurance company, but a person's entitlement to Medicaid benefits is automatic -
guaranteed by federal and state law. Based on this distinction, Maillelle argues that an
insurance company suffers a "loss" when it pays benefits to an insured, but the
government does not suffer a "loss" when the Medicaid program pays compensation to
a medical provider, because Medicaid benefits are an entitlement.
We find this argument unpersuasive. Medicaid is a form of insurance, even
though the recipient of Medicaid benefits does not directly contract with the government
for this insurance coverage. Medicaid funds were used to pay for the medical treatment
that Maillelle's daughter received. And Maillelle does not dispute that her daughter
needed this treatment as a result of Maillelle's criminal conduct. Thus, the State of
Alaska (and the federal government, to the extent of its obligation to reimburse the State
of Alaska for Medicaid expenses) have lost money as a result of Maillelle's crime. We
therefore conclude that the State is a "victim or other person injured by the offense"
within the meaning of AS 12.55.045(a).
We also note, as we did in Lonis , that Maillelle probably does not have
standing to complain that the sentencing court ordered Maillelle to pay an uncontested
amount of restitution to one person as opposed to another. As we explained earlier,
Maillelle concedes that the sentencing court could properly have ordered her to pay the
same amount of restitution to the hospital and the medics, doctors, nurses, and
3 Id. at 448.
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pharmacists who provided her daughter's medical care. But if the sentencing court had
done that, the Medicaid program would be entitled to recoup this money from the
medical care providers. Thus, as in Lonis , Maillelle would have no standing to object
to the sentencing court's decision to order this same restitution paid directly to the State.
Finally, Maillelle notes that, in a case similar to her own (an assault that
required the victim to receive medical treatment), the Iowa Court of Appeals ruled that
it was improper to order the defendant to pay restitution to the Iowa Department of
Human Services, the government agency that ended up paying for the victim's medical
care. State v. Stewart, 778 N.W.2d 62, 63-65 (Iowa App. 2009). Maillelle asks us to
follow the reasoning of this Iowa case.
But the Iowa restitution statute, Iowa Code § 910.2, is drawn more narrowly
than Alaska's restitution statute. The Iowa statute authorizes a sentencing court to order
restitution to a "victim", while our statute authorizes restitution to a "victim or other
person injured by the offense". Iowa law defines a "victim" as "a person who has
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the offender's criminal activities". Iowa Code
§ 910.1(5). But, according to the Stewart court, "pecuniary damages" are limited to
damages not paid by an insurer. Stewart, 778 N.W.2d at 63-64, citing Iowa Code
§ 910.1(3).
Moreover, the Iowa court felt obliged to construe its restitution statute
narrowly. Id. at 64. The Alaska Legislature, on the other hand, has made it plain that it
intends Alaska's statute to be construed broadly. The statute itself declares that when a
court determines the amount of restitution and the method of payment, "the court shall
take into account ... (1) [the] public policy that favors requiring criminals to compensate
for damages and injury to their victims; and (2) [the] financial burden placed on the
victim and those who provide services to the victim and other persons injured by the
offense as a result of the criminal conduct of the defendant."
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We further note that, the last time this Court interpreted the restitution
statute narrowly, the legislature promptly responded by amending the statute to overturn
our decision. See Demers v. State , 42 P.3d 1, 2 (Alaska App. 2002), and SLA 2003,
ch. 26, § 1.
For these reasons, we decline to follow the Iowa Court of Appeals' decision
in Stewart.
To conclude: The State of Alaska, through its Medicaid program, paid for
the medical services that Maillelle's daughter required as a result of Maillelle's criminal
conduct. The government of Alaska is therefore a "victim or other person injured by
[Maillelle's] offense". Moreover, Maillelle has no standing to complain that the
sentencing court ordered her to pay the restitution directly to the State, rather than
ordering her to pay the restitution to her medical care providers, who would then have
to turn the money over to the State.
The judgement of the superior court is AFFIRMED.
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