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NOTICE
The text of this opinion can be corrected before the opinion is published in the Pacific
Reporter. Readers are encouraged to bring typographical or other formal errors to the
attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts.
303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501
Fax: (907) 264-0878
E-mail: corrections @ appellate.courts.state.ak.us
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
CYNTHIA LORD, )
) Court of Appeals No. A-10117
Appellant, ) Trial Court No. 3AN-04-2620 CR
)
v. ) O P I N I O N
)
STATE OF ALASKA, )
)
Appellee. ) No. 2330 - October 28, 2011
)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Philip R. Volland, Judge.
Appearances: Josie Garton, Assistant Public Defender, and
Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Nancy R. Simel, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special
Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Daniel S. Sullivan,
Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer and Bolger,
Judges.
COATS, Chief Judge.
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Cynthia Lord was charged with three counts of murder in the first degree1
for killing her three sons, Christopher, Michael, and Joseph. Superior Court Judge Philip
R. Volland conducted a non-jury trial. Lord asserted that she was not guilty by reason
of insanity.2 But Judge Volland found that Lord was guilty but mentally ill.3
Lord asserts that Judge Volland erred in reaching this verdict. She contends
that she established that she was not guilty by reason of insanity by showing that she did
not "appreciate the nature and quality" of her conduct. She also attacks Judge Volland's
interpretation of the Alaska statutes defining the defense of insanity and the
constitutionality of those statutes.
In this decision we uphold Judge Volland's verdict that Lord was guilty but
mentally ill. We also uphold the constitutionality of the Alaska statutes which define the
defense of insanity.
Alaska's insanity defense
Before 1972, Alaska applied a version of the M'Naghten test.4 Under this
test, a defendant could be found not guilty by reason of insanity if either she did not
appreciate the nature and quality of her conduct or she did not understand the
wrongfulness of her conduct.5 In 1972, the Alaska Legislature added the "substantial
1 AS 11.41.100.
2 See generally AS 12.47.010 (stating standard for affirmative defense of insanity).
3 See generally AS 12.47.030 (stating standard for guilty but mentally ill).
4 See Schade v. State, 512 P.2d 907, 910-11 (Alaska 1973); Chase v. State, 369 P.2d
997, 1000 (Alaska 1962).
5 Hart v. State, 702 P.2d 651, 656 (Alaska App. 1985) (quoting Wayne R. LaFave
(continued...)
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capacity test" which allowed the defense of insanity when the defendant lacked the
substantial capacity to conform her conduct to the requirements of the law.6
In 1982, the legislature amended AS 12.47, greatly limiting the defense of
insanity.7 Alaska Statute 12.47.010(a) limits the defense to situations where the
defendant "was unable, as a result of mental disease or defect, to appreciate the nature
and quality of [their] conduct." In addition, AS 12.47.020 provides a "diminished
capacity" defense. Under that statute, if all of the other elements of a crime have been
proven, but, because of a mental disease or defect, there is a reasonable doubt about
whether the defendant had the culpable mental state to commit the crime, the defendant
must be found not guilty by reason of insanity.8
The major change in the statutes establishing the insanity defense is
contained in AS 12.47.030. That statute establishes the verdict of guilty but mentally ill
if "the defendant lacked, as a result of a mental disease or defect, the substantial capacity
either to appreciate the wrongfulness of that conduct or to conform that conduct to the
requirements of the law."9 Under the law as it existed prior to the 1982 amendments, a
defendant who, because of mental disease or defect, did not appreciate the wrongfulness
of her criminal act or who could not conform her conduct to the requirements of the law
5 (...continued)
& Austin W. Scott Jr., Criminal Law § 37, at 275 (1972)).
6 Schade, 512 P.2d at 911.
7 Hart, 702 P.2d at 654.
8 AS 12.47.020(b).
9 AS 12.47.030(a).
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would be found not guilty by reason of insanity. Under the 1982 amendments, this same
defendant would be found guilty but mentally ill.
A defendant found guilty but mentally ill is not relieved of criminal
responsibility. Alaska Statute 12.47.050(a) directs the court to sentence a defendant
found guilty but mentally ill "as provided by law." In other words, the statute directs the
sentencing judge to impose a sentence based upon the normal Chaney sentencing criteria.
The statute directs the Department of Corrections to provide mental health treatment to
the defendant until the defendant "no longer suffers from a mental disease or defect that
causes the defendant to be dangerous to the public peace or safety."10 During treatment,
the defendant may not be released on furlough or on parole.11 At the successful
conclusion of this treatment, the defendant must serve the remainder of her sentence.12
This disposition for persons found guilty but mentally ill differs from the
disposition for persons found not guilty by reason of insanity. Defendants found not
guilty by reason of insanity may be released immediately if they prove to the court by
clear and convincing evidence that they are "not presently suffering from any mental
illness that causes [them] to be dangerous to the public."13 Until that time, they are
committed to the Commissioner of Health and Social Services for treatment for a period
not to exceed the maximum term of imprisonment for the crime for which they were
10 AS 12.47.050(b).
11 AS 12.47.050(d).
12 AS 12.47.050(c).
13 AS 12.47.090(c).
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found not guilty by reason of insanity.14 They are entitled to yearly hearings where they
have the opportunity to establish that they are "not presently suffering from any mental
illness that causes [them] to be dangerous to the public."15 If they are still in custody at
the end of the maximum term of imprisonment for the crime for which they were found
not guilty by reason of insanity, the State can file a petition for civil commitment.16
Factual and procedural background
Judge Volland issued a written verdict in this case. The following facts are
from that verdict:
Cynthia Lord is gravely disabled by mental illness.
She suffers from schizoaffective disorder, depressive type.
This disorder is characterized by delusions, hallucinations,
disordered thought process and disturbed emotional
experience. Ms. Lord has been in and out of psychiatric
hospitals since age 17, and had been receiving mental health
services in Anchorage regularly since 1994. Her condition is
not likely to improve although medication may reduce her
hallucinations. Since at least 2003, Ms. Lord has had
delusions about a force she calls "Evil," delusions about
being watched by police and the CIA, and about Satanic
labels on food. Although suffering from delusions part of the
time, Ms. Lord has been able to secure employment in the
past, attend school at Wayland Baptist University, take care
of her children, and undertake daily life care responsibilities
such as shopping, cooking, housecleaning, etc.
14 AS 12.47.090(c)-(d).
15 AS 12.47.090(e).
16 AS 47.30.700.
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On March 16, 2004, the Anchorage Police Department
received a 911 call from Ms. Lord reporting that she had
"killed my three boys." APD had had experiences with Ms.
Lord before, and the police response was initially skeptical
about her report. However, when officers entered her home,
they found the bodies of Ms. Lord's three children: Joseph,
age 16, Michael, age 18, and Christopher, age 19. Each boy
had been killed by a single shot to the head.
Ms. Lord gave a voluntary statement to police that day.
She told APD Detectives Mark Huelskoetter and Glen
Klinkhart that she had purchased a gun in October 2003,
when she made the decision to kill her sons. Ms. Lord said
that on the day before [she killed her sons] she mixed some
of her medication with Crystal Light so that her boys would
drink it and get sleepy. She set her alarm for early in the
morning and woke at approximately 2:30 a.m. It took her
about an hour to work up the courage to kill Michael, her
eighteen year old, during which time she drank alcohol. She
first worried that the gunshot would wake the other boys or
her neighbors. She then covered Michael's body with a
blanket and waited for her other sons to wake up.
Ms. Lord told police that when Joseph, the youngest,
woke up she told him that Michael was sick and would not be
going to school. Joseph then left to attend classes at East
High. When Christopher woke up around 10:00 a.m., she
waited until he was playing video games in front of the
entertainment center. She then shot him in the head, pulled
his body into another room, and covered it with clothes so
that Joseph would not see it when he came home.
Christopher had asked about Michael, but Ms. Lord told him
that Michael was sick as she had told Joseph. She then
locked the door so "that when Joey came home ... I would be
ready with the gun." When Joseph returned from school at
around 2:30 p.m. and walked in the door, Ms. Lord waited
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until Joseph's face was turned away from her and shot him in
the back of the head. She then contemplated killing herself
for a couple of hours and eventually called the police around
4:30 p.m. Ms. Lord told detectives she expected punishment
for what she did.17
Several psychologists testified at the trial. Judge Volland summarized their
testimony:
Dr. [David] Sperbeck spent approximately eleven hours
interviewing Ms. Lord, exclusive of psychological testing.
Dr. Sperbeck testified that Ms. Lord had good recall of
events and described the shootings to him in greater detail
than to police. He testified that Ms. Lord told him that she
couldn't tell what was real or not and that she didn't want her
children to grow up in a world of deception and lies. Ms.
Lord told Dr. Sperbeck that she knew the boys were her
children but that they acted like robots. Dr. Sperbeck
testified that, despite the fact that Ms. Lord's actions were
prompted by her hallucinations, she clearly knew that she
was killing her children.
He testified that his opinion was that "Lord understood the nature and
quality of her conduct" in that she "under[stood] the consequences of [her] act[s]." She
"understood that placing a gun to the head of her children would kill them." Dr.
Sperbeck was confident from her repeated statements to him that she knew she was
killing her boys." Judge Volland found that Dr. Lawrence Maile testified similarly to Dr.
Sperbeck:
Based on Ms. Lord's systematic planning to kill her sons, her
ability to identify her sons, distinguish them as human beings,
and describe the consequences of her direct actions on her
17 (Footnotes omitted).
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sons, Dr. Maile expressed the professional opinion that there
[were] no impediments to Ms. Lord being found criminally
responsible for the charges she faces.
Dr. Bruce Gage testified for the defense. Judge Volland summarized his
testimony as follows:
Dr. Gage concluded that Ms. Lord did "understand that she
was killing her boys so, to that extent, she understood the
nature of her act." However, Dr. Gage was of the opinion
that this did not take into account Ms. Lord's reason for
killing her children, i.e., to save them. Dr. Gage was of the
opinion that if this motivation and context for her act is
considered, Ms. Lord did not understand the nature and
quality of her conduct. Dr. Gage opined that if Ms. Lord
believed she was saving her children, she did not appreciate
the quality of her act because she did not appreciate its true
consequences.
Cynthia Lord testified at the trial. Judge Volland summarized her testimony
as follows:
During her testimony, [Ms. Lord] spoke with the same flat
affect that was characteristic of her interview with police, and
apparently characteristic of her discussions with mental
health professionals for the last decade. She described her
delusions at length. Ms. Lord retold the killing of her
children with the same detail she gave to police. On
cross-examination, Ms. Lord admitted that she knew she was
pointing a gun at Michael and that when she shot the gun it
would kill him. She stated that had her daughter been in the
home at the time, she would have killed her also "because
she's one of the siblings." Ms. Lord testified that she knew
Michael was dead after she shot him. She also admitted that
after killing Joseph, she thought: "Oh my god, I killed my
son." Regarding Christopher, she admitted on
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----------------------- Page 9-----------------------
cross-examination that "I got the gun and I shot him in the
head" and that she had told [another examining doctor] that
she shot him in the back of the head because she did not want
the last thing he saw to be his mother shooting him. As to
Joseph, she said "I shot him." She acknowledged that when
she shot her boys, she intended to pull the trigger and knew
that a bullet would go into their heads and they would die.
She admitted they were her boys and that they were human.
She said she thought about killing herself "because she
couldn't live without them."18
Under AS 12.47.020(b), a defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity if,
"as a result of mental disease or defect, there is a reasonable doubt as to the existence of
a culpable mental state that is an element of the crime ... ." In reaching his verdict, Judge
Volland first addressed this issue, concluding that the evidence presented at trial
established that Cynthia Lord, in spite of her mental disease or defect, had the mens rea
for murder in the first degree.
In order for the State to establish the mens rea for murder in the first degree,
the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Lord intended to cause the death
of Michael, Joseph, and Christopher. Alaska law states that a person acts intentionally
"when the person's conscious objective is to cause that result; when intentionally causing
a particular result is an element of an offense, that intent need not be the person's only
objective."19
In his findings, Judge Volland found that "the evidence is overwhelming
that Ms. Lord engaged in a deliberate, conscious, and detailed plan to kill her three sons."
18 (Footnotes omitted).
19 AS 11.81.900(a)(1).
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He then set out in detail Lord's meticulous planning that led to the murders. He referred
to the testimony of the psychologists who testified at trial:
According to Dr. Sperbeck and Dr. Maile, Ms. Lord knew her
sons were her sons at the time of the shootings. Even Dr.
Gage stated in his written report that Lord knew she was
killing her sons. Dr. Gage also acknowledged that Ms. Lord
had to have the intent to kill her sons to also have the intent
to save them.
Having established that, in spite of her mental disease or defect, Lord had
the mens rea to commit murder in the first degree, Judge Volland next turned to
AS 12.47.010(a), which provides for an affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of
insanity when the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that "when
the defendant engaged in the criminal conduct, the defendant was unable, as a result of
mental disease or defect, to appreciate the nature and quality of that conduct."
Judge Volland first discussed State v. Patterson,20 in which the Alaska
Supreme Court held that the legislative history of the 1982 revision of the Alaska statutes
modifying the defense of insanity showed that the legislature intended to restrict the
insanity defense so that it was no longer sufficient for the defendant to prove that,
because of mental disease or defect, she was unable to either appreciate the wrongfulness
of her conduct or conform her conduct to the requirements of the law.21
The supreme court examined the meaning of AS 12.47.010(a) - in
particular, the meaning of "unable, as a result of mental disease or defect, to appreciate
20 740 P.2d 944 (Alaska 1987).
21 Id. at 949.
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the nature and quality of [that] conduct."22 The legislative history contains two examples
of defendants who are unable to appreciate the nature and quality of their acts: a
defendant who is "unable to realize that he is shooting someone with a gun when he pulls
the trigger on what he believes to be a water pistol, or a murder defendant who believes
he is attacking the ghost of [his] mother rather than a living human being."23 According
to the House Judiciary Committee report, the defense of insanity would not apply "to a
defendant who contends that he was instructed to kill by a hallucination, since the
defendant would still realize the nature and quality of his act, even though he thought it
might be justified by a supernatural being."24
Turning to the facts of this case, Judge Volland concluded:
[T]o appreciate the nature and quality of murder means that
the defendant must have understood the act that he or she
engages in will cause the death of another person. Thus, for
Ms. Lord to prevail on the defense of insanity under AS
12.47.010(a), she must show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that she was unable, as a result of her mental
illness, to recognize that pointing a gun at the head of her
sons and pulling the trigger, knowing they were her sons,
would kill them.
The court rejects Dr. Gage's reasoning that
understanding the "quality" of an act requires inquiry into the
context of the act and the defendant's motivation. In the
court's view this invites an inquiry into wrongfulness. This
is especially true in Ms. Lord's case. Ms. Lord's motivation
to save her children is precisely why she did not consider the
22 Id. at 946-49.
23 Id. at 946 n.8.
24 Id.
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act to be wrongful. Even Dr. Gage admitted that in Ms.
Lord's case, her motivation and belief that her act was not
wrong "correspond."
Judge Volland summarized why he concluded that Lord did not establish
that she failed to appreciate the nature and quality of her conduct:
There is much evidence that Ms. Lord appreciated that she
was killing her children. She stated the same to Dr. Sperbeck
and Dr. Maile and admitted in her own testimony that after
killing Michael, she recognized that she had just shot one of
her children. Ms. Lord had to work up the courage to shoot
Michael. She covered her children after she shot them so she
would not see them. She shot her sons in the back of the
head or while they were sleeping so they would not see their
mother shoot them. She shot each boy in a way that would
cause instant death and the least pain. [The court finds that
these actions are not consistent with a mother shooting
someone she believes are non-human clones or robots. The
evidence at trial that Ms. Lord did not believe her boys were
her boys was equivocal at best. The court does not find that
Ms. Lord's statement to Dr. Sperbeck that "I was 80% sure
I'd never see them again on this earth" evidenced that she did
not believe she was killing them. Ms. Lord's admissions on
cross-examination convinced the court that she knew she was
killing her boys.] Because of this, the court concludes that
the defense has not established by a preponderance of the
evidence that Ms. Lord failed to appreciate the nature and
quality of her conduct as a result of her mental disease.25
Judge Volland concluded, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Lord
was guilty but mentally ill. He concluded that the "evidence is undisputed that Ms. Lord
suffers from a severe, disabling mental illness," and that she "killed her children to save
25 Footnote incorporated as bracketed text.
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them from 'Evil' and to send them to heaven. She believed that she was doing the right
thing and would do it over again; she testified to this belief at trial. The court finds her
belief genuine and firmly held."
Why we uphold Judge Volland's verdict that Lord was guilty but
mentally ill
Lord argues that Judge Volland interpreted the Alaska statutes setting out
the defense of insanity too narrowly. She argues that, in arriving at his verdict, Judge
Volland only relied on AS 12.47.020, the diminished capacity statute, which provides
for the insanity defense where the court finds that, "as a result of mental disease or
defect, there is a reasonable doubt as to the existence of a culpable mental state that is an
element of the crime."
Lord argues that the defense of insanity is broader, because
AS 12.47.010(a) provides for the affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of insanity
when the defendant engaged in criminal conduct but "was unable, as a result of mental
disease or defect, to appreciate the nature and quality of that conduct."
In rejecting Lord's defense that she was not guilty by reason of insanity,
Judge Volland first found that, in spite of the fact that the "evidence [was] undisputed
that Ms. Lord suffers from a severe, disabling mental illness," she formed the culpable
mental state to commit murder in the first degree. He found that "the evidence is
overwhelming that Ms. Lord engaged in a deliberate, conscious, and detailed plan to kill
her three sons."
Lord agrees that this finding was sufficient for Judge Volland to reject a
"diminished capacity" defense under AS 12.47.020. But she asserts that Judge Volland
erred in using this same finding to reject her defense of not guilty by reason of insanity
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under AS 12.47.010. Lord argues that if the legislature intended to restrict the insanity
defense to only an inquiry about whether a defendant could form the mens rea to commit
the crime, then AS 12.47.010 would be superfluous. She contends that the legislative
history of the statute does not indicate that the legislature intended to "eliminate the
application of an independent insanity defense to the vast majority of crimes," and that
a narrow interpretation of AS 12.47.010 would eliminate the insanity defense for crimes
with a mens rea requirement of intent, knowledge, or recklessness. Lord asserts that a
narrow interpretation of AS 12.47.010 in conjunction with the more severe sentencing
provisions of the guilty but mentally ill statutes would violate Lord's federal and state
guarantees to due process and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
Lord argues, for instance, that the evidence presented at trial showed that
she did not appreciate the nature and quality of her acts because she had no
understanding of the meaning of death. But Judge Volland rejected the factual basis for
this argument. He concluded that Lord knew that she was killing her boys and
appreciated the nature of death based upon her testimony that she "was 80% sure I would
never see them again on this earth."
It appears to us that, in explaining his verdict, Judge Volland carefully
considered the testimony of the psychologists as well as Lord's hallucinations and
delusions in reaching his verdict. He concluded that, in spite of these mental defects,
Lord understood the nature and quality of her acts. He carefully set out her meticulous
planning and reasoning as she planned and then carried out the killing of her sons. He
concluded that she understood what she was doing and understood the concept of
death - that by killing her sons, she knew with substantial certainty that she was
removing them from this earth and that she would never see them alive again. Judge
Volland found that, because of her mental illness, Lord sincerely believed that she was
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doing the right thing by killing her sons "to save them from 'Evil' and send them to
heaven." He concluded that, although Lord knew what she was doing, because of her
mental disease or defect, she "lacked the substantial capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of her conduct." He reasoned that, given these conclusions, Lord was
guilty but mentally ill.
Judge Volland found that Lord appreciated the nature and quality of her
acts but lacked the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct. We conclude
that Judge Volland's findings are supported by the evidence and that Judge Volland's
findings support the verdict that Lord was guilty but mentally ill.
Why we reject Lord's constitutional attacks
Lord's initial constitutional attack is based upon her argument about the
interpretation of AS 12.47.010, which provides that defendants are not guilty by reason
of insanity if they can show that they were "unable, as a result of a mental disease or
defect, to appreciate the nature and quality of [their] conduct." Lord argues that Judge
Volland interpreted AS 12.47.010 to not provide a broader defense of not guilty by
reason of insanity than is provided in the "diminished capacity" statute, AS 12.47.020.
But Judge Volland carefully considered whether Lord appreciated the nature and quality
of her conduct. He concluded that she did. And we have upheld those findings.
Lord raises a more fundamental attack on the statutes setting out the defense
of not guilty by reason of insanity. Lord argues that it violates both the United States and
Alaska constitutions to impose criminal responsibility in cases where a defendant does
not have the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct.
It seems clear that if the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant possessed the mens rea required under the criminal statute, the United States
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Constitution does not require any further inquiry into the defendant's mental state to
support a conviction.26
Lord argues that we should interpret the Alaska Constitution more broadly
than the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the federal Constitution.27 But we
have previously rejected constitutional attacks on the Alaska statutes setting out the
defense of not guilty by reason of insanity. In Hart v. State,28 the defendant argued that
holding someone criminally responsible who lacked the capacity to conform her conduct
to the requirements of the law violated the due process, cruel and unusual punishment,
and equal protection clauses of the United States and Alaska Constitutions.29 We
observed that the Alaska statutes required the State "to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
26 See, e.g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535-36 (1968) (refusing to define an
insanity defense in constitutional terms and stating that "The doctrines of actus reus, mens
rea, insanity, mistake, justification, and duress have historically provided the tools for a
constantly shifting adjustment of the tension between the evolving aims of the criminal law
and changing religious, moral, philosophical, and medical views of the nature of man. This
process of adjustment has always been thought to be the province of the States."); see also
Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 752-53 (2006); Walker v. Endell, 850 F.2d 470, 473 (9th Cir.
1987) (rejecting the argument that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution
requires that "criminal intent" be an element of kidnapping and robbery); Davis v. McCotter,
766 F.2d 203, 204 (5th Cir. 1985) (rejecting argument that "voluntariness" is a
constitutionally required element of robbery); United States v. Mitchell, 725 F.2d 832, 835
(2d Cir. 1983) (refusing to "constitutionaliz[e] particular formula for disproving the defense
of duress").
27 Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute, 138 P.3d 238, 245 (Alaska 2006) (citing
Anchorage Police Dep't Employees Ass'n v. Municipality of Anchorage , 24 P.3d 547, 550
(Alaska 2001), & Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 170 (Alaska 1972) (recognizing that the
Alaska Constitution's guarantees of privacy and individual liberty are "broader in scope"
than those in the Federal Constitution)).
28 702 P.2d 651 (Alaska App. 1985).
29 Id. at 653.
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that the defendant engaged in conscious voluntary acts ... and possessed the requisite
mens rea for the offense."30 We ultimately concluded that "the State may
constitutionally eliminate a separate insanity defense based on 'irresistible impulse' or
inability to conform one's conduct to the requirements of the law."31 We stated that the
"determination of the point at which a person's mental condition justifies exculpation
is ... an ethical question for legislators and juries, not courts."32 We also upheld the
statutes establishing the verdict of not guilty but mentally ill against constitutional attack
in Barrett v. State.33 We adhere to those decisions.
Judge Volland required the State to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Lord possessed the mens rea for first-degree murder
Lord argues that Judge Volland impermissibly shifted the burden of proving
the mens rea of first-degree murder - i.e., the intent to cause death - on to her. But the
record clearly shows that in reaching his verdict, Judge Volland first considered the issue
of whether there was a reasonable doubt about whether Lord had the mens rea to commit
murder in the first degree. Judge Volland carefully examined the evidence in concluding
that Lord had the mens rea to commit murder in the first degree. He concluded that the
State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Lord intended to cause the death of
30 Id. at 655-56 (footnotes omitted).
31 Id. at 659 (footnote omitted).
32 Id. (citations omitted); see also Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law, §
7.1(d) at 521-23 (2d ed. 2003) (collecting arguments in favor of and opposed to abolishing
the insanity defense).
33 772 P.2d 559, 573 (Alaska App. 1989).
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Michael, Joseph, and Christopher Lord. The record is therefore clear that Judge Volland
correctly applied the standard of proof.
Conclusion
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.
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