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NOTICE
The text of this opinion can be corrected before the
opinion is published in the Pacific Reporter. Readers
are encouraged to bring typographical or other formal
errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate
Courts:
303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501
Fax: (907) 264-0878
E-mail: corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| MICHAEL ROCKWELL, | ) |
| ) Court of Appeals No. A-9748 | |
| Appellant, | ) Trial Court No. 3AN-04-508 Cr |
| ) | |
| v. | ) |
| ) O P I N I O N | |
| STATE OF ALASKA, | ) |
| ) | |
| Appellee. | ) |
| ) No. 2233 September 4, 2009 | |
Appeal from the
Superior Court, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Michael L. Wolverton and John
Suddock, Judges.
Appearances: Renee McFarland, Assistant
Public Defender, Anchorage, and Quinlan
Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the
Appellant. Kenneth M. Rosenstein and Eric
A. Ringsmuth, Assistant Attorneys General,
Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals,
Anchorage, and Talis J. Colberg, Attorney
General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer
and Bolger, Judges.
BOLGER, Judge.
Following a two-car collision, Rockwell was convicted
of felony driving while under the influence and driving with a
revoked license.1 In his original appeal to this court, he
argued, among other things, that the police interrogated him in
violation of Miranda v. Arizona2 and his right to counsel, and
that, consequently, the superior court should have suppressed the
statements he made during that interrogation. In our earlier
decision in Rockwell v. State, we resolved these claims largely
in Rockwells favor, but remanded the case to the superior court
for additional findings on precisely when Rockwells interrogation
became custodial for Miranda purposes.3 We also directed the
superior court to determine whether Rockwell was entitled to
reversal of his convictions because his statements were
erroneously admitted at his trial.4
On remand, the superior court held that Rockwells
interrogation became custodial as soon as he was seated in the
patrol car for questioning. The court then held that Rockwell
was entitled to reversal of his convictions because he might have
advanced a different defense if he had not been forced to contend
at trial with all of the conflicting statements he made to the
police.
For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the
error in admitting Rockwells statements was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. We therefore reverse the decision of the
superior court and affirm Rockwells convictions.
Facts and Proceedings
The facts of this case are recounted in more detail in
our earlier opinion. Rockwell was involved in a two-car crash,
and shortly afterwards Anchorage Police Officer Amanda Patton saw
him get out of the drivers seat of his car.5 Rockwell initially
admitted to Officer Patton that he had been driving, but quickly
changed this account and said that he had not been driving.6
Officer Patton went to interview the driver of the
other car and Officer Stephen Busby asked Rockwell to step over
to his patrol car. Officer Busby observed that Rockwell had
bloodshot, watery eyes and that he appeared to be intoxicated.
Rockwell admitted that he was intoxicated and that his drivers
license was revoked. But he claimed that another man, Joshua
Fagg, had been driving the car and fled from the scene
immediately after the collision.7
Officer Busby then asked Rockwell to sit in the
backseat of his patrol car; Busby later testified that he asked
Rockwell to do this because it was cold outside (about ten
degrees Fahrenheit) and to move Rockwell away from traffic.8
Busby did not handcuff Rockwell and told him that he was not
under arrest.9 But before Rockwell got into the patrol car,
Busby searched him for weapons and retrieved the keys to the car
from his back pocket.10 Moreover, Rockwell could not leave the
patrol car without Busbys help because the rear doors did not
open from the inside though there was no evidence that Rockwell
was ever aware of this.11
In the patrol car, Busby questioned Rockwell about his
identity and his automobile insurance. Rockwell admitted that he
had no insurance, but reiterated that his license was revoked and
that he had not been driving. Busby asked Rockwell how he could
contact Fagg, the man Rockwell had identified as the driver.12
Rockwell replied that he did not know how to contact Fagg, but he
described what Fagg was wearing and told Busby which direction
Fagg ran after the accident. Busby then left the patrol car for
about twenty seconds; when he returned, he told Rockwell that he
was going to take him to the police substation for field sobriety
tests.13
Busby continued to question Rockwell in the patrol car
and at the substation, where he administered field sobriety
tests.14 He then arrested Rockwell for driving under the
influence and transported him to a second substation for a breath
test, which showed a blood alcohol level of .130 percent.15
After the breath test, Busby advised Rockwell of his Miranda
rights.16 Rockwell demanded an attorney, but when Busby offered
him a phone to call an attorney, Rockwell declined. Busby
continued to question Rockwell.17
In our earlier decision, we divided Rockwells
interrogation into four parts: (1) the initial contact on the
street at the scene of the accident; (2) the interrogation in the
patrol car up until the point Busby announced that he would be
transporting Rockwell to the police substation for field sobriety
tests; (3) the continued interrogation in the patrol car and at
the two substations, up until Rockwell was advised of his Miranda
rights; and (4) the interrogation after Rockwell was advised of
his Miranda rights and asserted his right to counsel.18 We ruled
that Rockwells questioning on the street was not custodial, but
that the interrogation became custodial, at the latest, several
minutes into the patrol car interview, when Busby announced he
was transporting Rockwell to the substation for field sobriety
tests.19 We also ruled that Rockwells right to counsel was
violated after he was advised of his Miranda rights, because the
police interrogated him after he had already demanded an
attorney.20
Because we lacked findings on all of the pertinent
facts, we could not determine whether Rockwell was in custody
during the first part of the patrol car interview (before Busby
announced that he was taking Rockwell to the substation for field
sobriety tests). We therefore remanded the case to the superior
court for additional findings on when the interview became
custodial.21 We also directed the superior court to determine
which of Rockwells statements should have been excluded at trial,
and whether Rockwell was entitled to reversal of his convictions
because those statements were admitted or, alternatively,
whether the courts error in admitting the statements was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.22
The Superior Courts Miranda Custody Analysis
As we discussed in our earlier decision, police
officers are not required to give Miranda warnings during a
traffic stop unless and until the initial stop ripens into full-
blown custody.23 Generally a person is in custody when there is
some actual indication of custody, such that a reasonable person
would feel he was not free to leave and break off police
questioning.24 When we remanded this case, we viewed the
question of whether Rockwell was in custody during the first part
of the patrol car interview as hinging on two unresolved factual
questions: whether Busby retained Rockwells keys during the
interview, and whether Rockwell knew he could not leave the
patrol car during the interview because the doors did not open
from the inside.25
Superior Court Judge Michael L. Wolverton made
findings on both of these issues. He found that there was no
evidence to indicate or suggest that Busby ever returned the
defendants keys while he was sitting in the patrol car. He also
adopted our observation that there was no testimony that
Rockwell knew that he was unable to get out of the backseat of
the patrol car unless the officer let him out. Thus, Judge
Wolvertons findings on the custody issue were split: One finding
(that Busby kept Rockwells keys) suggested that Rockwell was in
custody, and the other (that Rockwell was unaware he could not
open the rear patrol car doors) suggested that he was not.
However, Judge Wolverton did not rely on these
findings, at least not expressly, when he reversed his earlier
decision and held that Rockwell was in custody throughout the
patrol car interview. Instead, Judge Wolverton relied on our
general discussion in Brown v. State26 about the psychological
pressures inherent in traffic stops. Judge Wolverton concluded
that our decision in Brown which was issued after Judge
Wolvertons initial order denying Rockwells motion to suppress
was instructive, if not decisive, on the [custody] issue.
Brown involved a routine traffic stop for an equipment
violation: A state trooper stopped Brown because the light
illuminating her license plate was dirty.27 Brown had a valid
drivers license and there were no warrants for her arrest, so the
trooper decided to let her go with a warning.28 But the trooper
did not tell Brown why he had stopped her, or that he had decided
not to issue her a citation; instead, he obtained Browns consent
to search her person and car for both weapons and drugs. During
this search, he found a crack cocaine pipe in the lining of
Browns coat, and cocaine in her purse.29
We ruled that this search violated article I, section
14 of the Alaska Constitution.30 We cited several factors to
support our conclusion: The search for weapons and drugs was
unrelated to the reason for the stop (a traffic violation) and
was not supported by any suspicion of criminal activity. The
trooper never told Brown why she was stopped, and she was
therefore ignorant of the basis for the troopers assertion of
authority over her, with no way of knowing if she had the right
to refuse his request. And finally, the trooper never told Brown
that she was, or would soon be, free to go.31
The circumstances in Brown, and the legal issues it
raised, are distinct from this case. The question here is not
whether the police violated the search and seizure clause of the
Alaska Constitution by requesting consent to search for weapons
and drugs during a routine traffic stop, but whether Rockwell was
in custody for Miranda purposes when the police questioned him
after a traffic accident.
As Rockwell points out, however, Judge Wolverton did
not rely on Brown for its legal holding, but for its general
discussion of the psychological pressures inherent in traffic
stops. Judge Wolverton quoted our observation in Brown that an
officer retains the upper hand and the accouterments of authority
during a traffic stop, and that most motorists will not feel free
to walk away, and do not know when the officer lacks the
authority to detain them.32 Based on these observations, Judge
Wolverton concluded that, in spite of Officer Busbys low-key and
quiet demeanor, these psychological pressures were such that a
motorist in Rockwells situation would not feel free to leave.
Unlike the defendant in Brown, who was never told why
she was stopped, Rockwell knew why Officer Busby detained him:
because he was involved in a vehicle collision. But even if we
were to assume that Rockwell did not feel free to leave during
the early part of the patrol car interview because of the same
psychological pressures present in Brown, or in traffic stops
generally, that does not establish that Rockwell was in custody
for Miranda purposes. Both the United States Supreme Court and
the Alaska Supreme Court have recognized that a person who is in
custody for [F]ourth [A]mendment purposes, i.e., a person who has
been seized, is not necessarily entitled to Miranda warnings.33
Miranda warnings are required only if the motorist is detained
under circumstances substantially more coercive than the typical
traffic stop, and that coercion actually impairs the free
exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination ... .34 On
the question of whether Rockwells circumstances met this higher
standard, Brown offers no real guidance.
In light of Judge Wolvertons findings on remand, it is
arguable that Rockwell was in custody during the early part of
the patrol car interview. But we need not resolve that question
because, even assuming Rockwell was in custody throughout the
patrol car interview, the superior courts error in admitting his
statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Admission of Rockwells Statements was Harmless Error
Judge Suddocks ruling
On remand, Rockwells case was transferred to Superior
Court Judge John Suddock, who presided over Rockwells trial, for
a decision on whether the error in admitting Rockwells custodial
statements prejudiced the outcome of his trial. Judge Suddock
found that the error in admitting Rockwells statements was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and that Rockwell was
therefore entitled to a reversal of his convictions.
When evidence obtained in violation of the defendants
constitutional rights is improperly admitted at trial, we apply
the standard announced in Chapman v. California to assess whether
the error entitles the defendant to a reversal.35 Under Chapman,
constitutional error is harmless only if the government proves
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to
the verdict obtained.36 The question is whether there is a
reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have
contributed to the conviction.37 This standard applies when
evaluating whether a defendant was prejudiced by the admission of
evidence obtained in violation of Miranda38 or the right to
counsel.39
When we previously remanded Rockwells case, we
recognized that the superior courts error in admitting Rockwells
statements was potentially harmless under the Chapman standard.
We noted that many of the statements seemingly support the
defense that Rockwell offered at trial, and they are seemingly
redundant of the admissible statements that Rockwell made when
Busby first questioned him on the street i.e., Rockwells
assertion that Joshua Fagg had been driving the car, and that
Fagg had fled the scene following the accident.40
Judge Suddock did not apply this analysis. He did not
consider whether the erroneously admitted statements supported
Rockwells defense, or were redundant of other admissible
evidence. Nor did he base his ultimate conclusion that Rockwell
was entitled to reversal of his convictions on a finding that the
wrongly admitted statements contributed to the jurys finding of
guilt. Instead, Judge Suddock speculated that if the court had
properly excluded Rockwells statements to the police, Rockwell
might have abandoned his defense that Fagg was driving and
claimed that he lied to the police about Fagg to protect the
identity of the real driver. Judge Suddock found that the
admission of Rockwells statements to the police compromised this
alternative defense because the many inconsistencies in Rockwells
statements made him far less credible. But for the statements,
Judge Suddock reasoned, Rockwell would have been forced to
contend with only one lie [that Fagg was driving], understandable
in human terms, but not a panoply of details regarding Mr. Fagg.
This analysis improperly focused on a hypothetical
defense. Harmless error review looks to the record of the actual
trial to determine if the courts error contributed to the verdict
obtained.41 As the United States Supreme Court explained in
Sullivan v. Louisiana:
Harmless-error review looks ... to the basis
on which the jury actually rested its
verdict. The inquiry, in other words, is
not whether, in a trial that occurred
without the error, a guilty verdict would
surely have been rendered, but whether the
guilty verdict actually rendered in this
trial was surely unattributable to the
error. That must be so, because to
hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never
in fact rendered no matter how inescapable
the findings to support that verdict might
be would violate the jury-trial
guarantee.42
A harmless error analysis cannot be based on
speculation about how the defendant might have argued his case if
there had been no error. Such an analysis would entitle a
defendant to reversal in any case where the court could
hypothesize an arguably more effective defense strategy. A
reviewing court cannot meaningfully predict or assess what
verdict a jury might have reached based on a litigation strategy
that was never pursued, testimony that was never offered, or
impeachment that never took place. The Supreme Court recognized
this principle in Coy v. Iowa, when it held that the state courts
assessment on remand of whether a violation of the defendants
constitutional right to confront a witness was harmless cannot
include consideration of whether the witness[s] testimony would
have been unchanged, or the jurys assessment unaltered, had there
been confrontation; such an inquiry would obviously involve pure
speculation.43
Alaska courts have similarly recognized that harmless
error review cannot be based on speculation. For instance, in
State v. Wickham, the Alaska Supreme Court held that a defendant
must testify to preserve a claim that the trial court erred in
ruling that the State could impeach a defendants testimony with
evidence of his prior convictions.44 The supreme court reasoned
that the factual vacuum caused by the absence of the defendants
testimony creates an unacceptable level of speculation when
making the harmless error determination.45
Likewise, in Sam v. State,46 we held that a defendant
who abandoned his diminished-capacity defense could not later
claim that the court erred by preliminarily ruling that the State
would be entitled to call an expert to rebut that defense if it
was offered. Citing Wickham, we noted the inherent uncertainty
and artificiality of applying a harmless error analysis in a
purely hypothetical or abstract context ... .47 In Sam, this
uncertainty was pronounced: There was no offer of proof
detailing Sams diminished capacity defense or the States rebuttal
testimony; nor did the State unequivocally commit itself to
calling the expert.48 We thus concluded that [a]ny attempt to
divine the likely effect of the alleged error in these
circumstances would amount to pure speculation.49
In this case, Judge Suddocks harmless error analysis
hinged on the speculative assumption that Rockwell would have
presented a different defense if his statements had been properly
excluded at trial. But Rockwell never advanced this alternative
defense in the superior court, and there was no offer of proof
detailing the evidence he would have offered to support the
defense, or the evidence the State would have presented to rebut
it. We do not know if Rockwell would have taken the stand and
testified that someone other than Fagg was the driver, or whether
the State would have sought to admit Rockwells suppressed
statements to impeach that testimony.50 As in Wickham and Sam,
we cannot divine the likely effect of the courts error in this
purely hypothetical context.
That is not to say that our assessment of whether a
defendant is prejudiced by a trial courts error may never take
account of the effect of that error on the defendants trial
strategy. We considered, but did not resolve, this question in
Motta v. State.51 In Motta, the defendants confession was
admitted at trial, and the defendant then testified to
essentially the same version of events contained in that
confession.52 After we determined that the court erred in
admitting Mottas confession, we asked the parties for additional
briefing on whether our harmless error analysis should take into
account the possibility that Motta might not have testified, or
might have testified differently, if the court had granted his
suppression motion.53 In our subsequent memorandum decision, we
noted that there was some authority holding that a defendants
trial testimony is tainted if he is compelled to testify to
overcome the impact of an illegally obtained confession.54 But
we reached no decision on whether to follow that authority in
Mottas case, because we concluded that his testimony was not so
tainted.55
There is no indication in this case that Rockwells
chosen defense was compelled by the courts error in admitting his
illegally obtained statements. Rockwell never asserted in
superior court, or in his original briefing on appeal (that is,
in the briefing he submitted before his case was remanded), that
he would have argued his case differently had his motion to
suppress been granted much less that he would have adopted the
particular defense that Judge Suddock proposed. Any number of
factors might have influenced Rockwells defense, not the least of
which is what Rockwell told his attorney about what happened. As
Rockwell concedes, there is no hint in the record that he told
the police that Fagg was driving to protect the identity of some
other driver.
Rockwell argues that the reason there is no evidence
to support this alternative defense is that he was forced to
contend with his statements at trial, thus precluding such a
defense. This was also apparently Judge Suddocks view; he found
that but for the [wrongly admitted] statements, Rockwells lawyer
could have defended on the basis that Rockwell ... lied to
protect the actual driver by blaming Josh Fagg (who was in South
America at the time of the incident).
We have no doubt that Rockwells credibility was
seriously undermined by the many inconsistent statements he made
to the police (which are well documented in Judge Suddocks
order). But those inconsistencies did not undermine Rockwells
credibility with respect to whether Fagg or someone else was
driving. Rather, they undermined the credibility of Rockwells
assertion that he was not driving. The evidence that directly
challenged Rockwells claim that Fagg was driving was the evidence
that Fagg was in Peru at the time. If that evidence (Faggs
testimony, his passport, and other travel documents) did not
persuade Rockwell to alter his defense, it is hard to see how
suppression of evidence that went to his general credibility
would have. We find no basis in the record to conclude that the
admission of Rockwells statements precluded (or even discouraged)
Rockwell from arguing that he told the police that Fagg was
driving to protect the identity of the real driver.
Because we conclude that Rockwells defense was not
compelled by the superior courts error in admitting his illegally
obtained statements, we have no reason to decide whether we would
apply a different analysis, or reach a different conclusion on
the question of prejudice, if Rockwell had convinced us that his
defense was so tainted.
Harmless Error Analysis
Because Judge Suddock made factual findings on remand,
the only issue before us is one of law: whether there is a
reasonable possibility that the erroneously admitted statements
contributed to the jurys verdicts.56
The only disputed issue at Rockwells trial was whether
he was driving; he did not contest that he was intoxicated or
that his license was revoked. Judge Suddock found that the State
proved with admissible evidence that Rockwells defense that Fagg
was driving was demonstrably bogus. There was substantial
evidence to support this finding. Fagg testified that he
traveled to Peru in December 2003 and did not leave until March
2004. (The offenses took place on January 16, 2004.) Faggs
testimony was corroborated by his passport, which was stamped
when he entered Peru from Ecuador on December 27, 2003, and again
when he departed Peru on March 23, 2004. The court also admitted
an immigration card Fagg filled out when he entered Peru on
December 27, 2003, and a bus ticket he purchased while there.57
Rockwell argues that this evidence was not conclusive
because there was no specific evidence that Fagg was out of the
country on the night of the offenses. Rockwell observes that
there was no stamp in Faggs passport showing that he reentered
the United States, and yet he appeared in person at Rockwells
trial. But as Fagg testified, the United States does not stamp
the passports of its citizens. And if Fagg left Peru and
returned to the United States before the January incident, as
Rockwell suggests, his passport would show that he reentered Peru
sometime between January and his final departure from Peru on
March 23, 2004. Rockwell has thus not established that Judge
Suddock clearly erred in his finding.
Moreover, there was other admissible evidence to
undermine Rockwells claim that Fagg was driving. Officer Patton
testified that she saw Rockwell get out of the drivers side of
the vehicle, and that Rockwell admitted to having done this.
Rockwell also initially admitted to Patton that he had been
driving, though he quickly changed his account and said that Fagg
had been driving. Furthermore, Officer Busby testified that he
retrieved the keys to the car from Rockwells back pocket, and
that the car was registered to Rockwell.
The jury also heard the grand jury testimony of the
driver of the other car, who testified that he observed two
people Rockwell and a man in a dark suit get out of the drivers
side of the vehicle, and that the other man ran from the scene.
(Officer Patton partially contradicted this testimony at trial,
testifying that the driver of the other car told her at the scene
that Rockwell was driving and that the other man fled from the
passenger side of the car.58) But given how the case was
litigated that is, given Rockwells defense that Fagg was
driving, and the States evidence that Fagg was in Peru there is
no reasonable possibility that the jury would have acquitted
Rockwell based on this grand jury testimony, even if the court
had properly excluded Rockwells illegally obtained statements.
We therefore conclude that the superior courts error in admitting
Rockwells statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the decision of
the superior court and AFFIRM Rockwells conviction.
_______________________________
1 AS 28.35.030(n) and AS 28.15.291(a)(1), respectively.
2 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
3 176 P.3d 14, 22-23 (Alaska App. 2008).
4 Id. at 23.
5 Id. at 17.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 17, 20.
9 Id. at 17.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 21.
12 Id. at 20.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 17.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 19.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 22.
21 Id. at 20-21, 23.
22 Id. at 23.
23 Id. at 18 (quoting Blake v. State, 763 P.2d 511, 515
(Alaska App. 1988)).
24 McCollum v. State, 808 P.2d 268, 269 (Alaska App. 1991)
(quoting Hunter v. State, 590 P.2d 888, 895 (Alaska 1979)).
25 Rockwell, 176 P.3d at 21.
26 182 P.3d 624 (Alaska App. 2008).
27 Id. at 626.
28 Id. at 627.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 634.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 630.
33 Blake, 763 P.2d at 514 (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468
U.S. 420, 437-39, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3148-50, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317
(1984) and Waring v. State, 670 P.2d 357, 366 n.19 (Alaska
1983)); see also Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 436-37, 104 S. Ct. at 3148-
49 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S. Ct.
1391, 1396, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1979)) ([W]e have long acknowledged
that stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants
constitutes a seizure within the meaning of [the Fourth]
Amendmen[t], even though the purpose of the stop is limited and
the resulting detention quite brief.(alterations in original)).
34 Blake, 763 P.2d at 515 (emphasis added); see also
McCollum, 808 P.2d at 269.
35 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967).
36 Id. at 24, 87 S. Ct. at 828.
37 Id. at 23, 87 S. Ct. at 827 (quoting Fahy v.
Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87, 84 S. Ct. 229, 230, 11 L. Ed. 2d
171 (1963)).
38 See McMahan v. State, 617 P.2d 494, 497 (Alaska 1980);
Scharver v. State, 561 P.2d 300, 303 (Alaska 1977); Kalmakoff v.
State, 199 P.3d 1188, 1203 (Alaska App. 2009); Jones v. State,
65 P.3d 903, 909-10 (Alaska App. 2003).
39 See Gunnerud v. State, 611 P.2d 69, 76 (Alaska 1980);
Lewis v. State, 779 P.2d 806, 808 (Alaska App. 1989).
40 Rockwell, 176 P.3d at 23.
41 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S. Ct. at 828.
42 508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2081-82, 124 L. Ed.
2d 182 (1993) (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted)
(quoting Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 404, 111 S. Ct. 1884,
1893, 114 L. Ed. 2d 432 (1991), overruled on other grounds by
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 n.4, 112 S. Ct. 475, 482 n.4,
116 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1991)).
43 487 U.S. 1012, 1021, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2803, 101 L. Ed.
2d 857 (1988).
44 796 P.2d 1354, 1358 (Alaska 1990).
45 Id.
46 842 P.2d 596, 598-99 (Alaska App. 1992).
47 Id. at 599.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 See State v. Batts, 195 P.3d 144, 148 (Alaska App.
2008).
51 911 P.2d 34, 41 (Alaska App. 1996).
52 Id. at 38.
53 Id. at 41.
54 Motta v. State, Alaska App. Memorandum Opinion and
Judgment No. 4227 at 13 n.24 (June 7, 2000), 2000 WL 727765 at
*7 n.24 (citing Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 225, 88
S. Ct. 2008, 2011, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1047 (1968) (Having released the
spring by using the petitioners unlawfully obtained confessions
against him, the Government must show that its illegal action did
not induce his testimony.)) (declining to resolve the States
contention that Harrison was no longer good authority after
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 84 L. Ed. 2d 222
(1985)).
55 Motta, 911 P.2d at 40 n.2; Motta, Memorandum Opinion
and Judgment No. 4227 at 13-14, 2000 WL 727765 at *8.
56 See, e.g., State v. Shewfelt, 948 P.2d 470, 471 (Alaska
1997); Motta, 911 P.2d at 39-41.
57 Rockwell, 176 P.2d at 23.
58 Id. at 17.
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