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opinion is published in the Pacific Reporter. Readers
are encouraged to bring typographical or other formal
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303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| W.S., a minor, | ) |
| ) Court of Appeals No. A-9819 | |
| Appellant, | ) Trial Court No. 4FA-04-157 DL |
| ) | |
| v. | ) |
| ) O P I N I O N | |
| STATE OF ALASKA, | ) |
| ) | |
| Appellee. | ) No. 2140 January 11, 2008 |
| ) | |
Appeal from the Superior Court, Fourth Judi
cial District, Fairbanks, Randy M. Olsen,
Judge.
Appearances: James M. Hackett, Fairbanks,
for the Appellant. Diane L. Wendlandt,
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special
Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and
Talis J. Colberg, Attorney General, Juneau,
for the Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer
and Stewart, Judges.
MANNHEIMER, Judge.
In this appeal, we are asked to construe the provisions
of law governing restitution in juvenile delinquency cases.
W.S. was adjudicated a delinquent minor for assaulting
a twelve-year-old boy. As explained in more detail below, the
superior court ordered W.S. and his parents to pay restitution to
the victims aunt (who was the boys guardian and physical
custodian) and to a mental health counselor who provided
counseling services to the victim following the offense. W.S.
argues that, in a juvenile delinquency case, the superior court
lacks the authority to order restitution payments to anyone
except the direct victim of the minors offense.
In addition, W.S. argues that any restitution
obligation imposed by the superior court in a delinquency
proceeding should terminate when the courts disposition order is
accomplished i.e., when the term of the minors
institutionalization or probation ends.
Finally, W.S. argues that when the superior court
assesses a minors restitution obligation in a delinquency case,
the court is obliged to take into account not only the amount of
the victims loss but also the minors ability to pay.
For the reasons explained here, we conclude that the
superior court had the authority to order restitution to the
victims aunt and to the mental health counselor. We further
conclude that W.S.s obligation to pay this restitution is not
extinguished when the minors term of institutionalization or
probation ends. Indeed, under Alaska law, a minors obligation to
pay restitution is not extinguished even when the superior court
loses its juvenile jurisdiction over the minor which normally
occurs when the minor turns nineteen.1
With regard to the argument that the superior court is
obliged to consider a minors ability to pay when assessing the
amount of restitution, we consider this to be a close question.
However, we need not resolve that question in the present case,
because the record provides no reason to believe that the amount
of restitution ordered in this case is beyond the means of W.S.
and his parents.
Underlying facts
W.S. was accused of sexually abusing a ten-
year-old boy and a twelve-year-old boy at a youth club
facility in Fairbanks. The two victims stated that
W.S. had penetrated them anally and had performed or
attempted to perform oral sex on them.
Based on these allegations, and also based on
an earlier incident in which W.S. broke into a
neighbors home and damaged a window, the State filed a
delinquency petition against W.S.. This petition was
ultimately resolved by a plea agreement.
With respect to the incident involving the
two boys, the State dropped the charges involving the
younger boy, and the State reduced the charges
involving the other boy, Z.L., to one count of fourth-
degree assault and one count of harassment.2 With
respect to the unlawful entry into the neighbors house,
W.S. entered an admission to first-degree trespass and
fourth-degree criminal mischief. Under the plea
agreement, W.S. would be placed on probation, with the
terms and conditions to be decided by the superior
court.
At the disposition hearing, the superior
court accepted the plea agreement and scheduled a later
hearing where the State could present evidence on the
issue of restitution. Based on the evidence presented
at the restitution hearing, the superior court directed
W.S. and his parents to pay restitution in the amount
of $3,185.
(See AS 47.12.120(b)(4), which directs the
superior court to order both the minor and the minors
parents to pay any restitution obligation.)
This restitution of $3,185 included $1,485 to
reimburse Z.L.s aunt (who was his custodian) for the
hours she missed from work in order to care for Z.L.
following the attack. It also included $1,300 as
reimbursement for the costs of professional mental
health counseling for Z.L..
Because Z.L.s aunt could not afford the
mental health counselors normal hourly rate, the
counselor agreed to provide the services at half her
normal rate. Accordingly, the superior court ordered
restitution of $650 to Z.L.s aunt (for the portion of
the fee that the aunt paid) and $650 to the mental
health counselor herself (for the remainder of the fee,
which was essentially donated).
W.S.s argument that the superior court had no authority
to order restitution in favor of Z.L.s aunt and the
mental health counselor
W.S. argues that, even though the superior
court had the authority to order restitution for any
loss suffered by Z.L. (the direct victim of the
offense), the superior court had no authority to order
restitution for the time that Z.L.s aunt missed from
her employment. W.S. further argues that the superior
court had no authority to order restitution in favor of
Z.L.s aunt or the mental health counselor for the cost
of Z.L.s mental health counseling.
The superior court clearly had the authority
to order restitution in favor of Z.L.s aunt. In fact,
the superior court was obliged to order restitution in
favor of the aunt.
Under AS 47.12.120(b)(4), [if] the [superior]
court finds that the minor is delinquent, it shall ...
order the minor and the minors parent to make suitable
restitution. Moreover, subsection (A) of this same
statute declares the court may not refuse to make an
order of restitution to benefit the victim of the
[delinquent] act.
Z.L.s aunt qualifies as a victim for this
purpose. AS 47.12.990(16) declares that the term
victim has the same meaning in juvenile delinquency
proceedings as it does under AS 12.55.185, the statute
that defines victim for purposes of adult criminal
sentencing proceedings. And under AS 12.55.185(19)(B),
the term victim includes not only the direct victim of
the unlawful act, but also a parent, ... guardian, or
custodian of the direct victim if the direct victim is
a minor.
W.S. concedes that Z.L.s aunt was his
physical custodian and primary caretaker during the
pertinent time. Moreover, the superior court found
that Z.L.s aunt was effectively Z.L.s guardian because
she had a power of attorney authorizing her to make all
parental decisions for him. Thus, not only did the
superior court have the authority to order restitution
in favor of Z.L.s aunt, but the superior court was
obliged to do so.
The remaining question is whether the
superior court had the authority to order restitution
in favor of the mental health counselor.
W.S. interprets AS 47.12.120(b)(4) as
forbidding the superior court from authorizing
restitution in favor of anyone who is not a victim of
the delinquent act as defined in AS 47.12.990 and AS
12.55.185. This is an incorrect reading of the
statute.
As we noted earlier, AS 47.12.120(b)(4)
declares that the superior court shall ... order the
minor and the minors parent to make suitable
restitution. In other words, if a minor is found to be
delinquent, the superior court is under a duty to order
suitable restitution.
Subsection (A) of this statute then states
that, in discharging this duty to order suitable
restitution, the superior court may not refuse to make
an order of restitution to benefit the victim of the
[delinquent] act. In other words, restitution in favor
of the victim is the least that the superior court can
do when discharging its more general duty to order
suitable restitution. This statute does not forbid the
superior court from ordering restitution in favor of
other persons, so long as the restitution falls within
the rubric of suitable restitution.
The delinquency statutes offer no further
definition or explanation of suitable restitution.
However, in AS 47.12.010(12), the legislature declared
that one of its purposes in enacting the current
version of the delinquency laws was to ensure that
[the] victims ... of crimes committed by juveniles are
afforded the same rights as [the] victims ... of crimes
committed by adults.
With respect to court-ordered restitution in
adult criminal proceedings, this Court has already held
that the purpose of the restitution statutes is to make
full restitution available to all persons who have been
injured as a result of criminal behavior, to the
greatest extent possible.3 Because the legislature
intended to authorize broad restitution in adult
criminal proceedings, and because the legislature
intended that the victims of juvenile delinquency
should receive the same rights as the victims of adult
crimes, we conclude that the phrase suitable
restitution as used in AS 47.12.120(b)(4) should be
interpreted in light of the statutes that govern
restitution in adult criminal proceedings, and that
suitable restitution in delinquency cases presumptively
encompasses the types of restitution that are allowed
in adult criminal cases.
(Indeed, in the past, this Court has looked
to the provisions of Title 12 when interpreting the
restitution provisions of the delinquency statutes.4)
AS 12.55.045(a) authorizes restitution awards
to reimburse the cost of mental health counseling in
adult criminal cases. This statute says, in relevant
part, that a sentencing court shall ... order [the]
defendant ... to make restitution:
to a public, private[,] or private nonprofit
organization that has provided or ... will be
providing counseling, medical, or shelter
services to the victim or other person
injured by the offense ... .
We have interpreted this statute
broadly as authorizing restitution not only
for a victims past mental health counseling,
but also a victims future counseling when the
need for this counseling, and the projected
amount of the counseling expenses, are firmly
established. Peratrovich v. State, 903 P.2d
1071, 1078 (Alaska App. 1995); Reece v.
State, 881 P.2d 1135, 1138 (Alaska App.
1994).
Given the broad authorization for
counseling restitution that is codified in AS
12.55.045(a), we conclude that suitable
restitution in delinquency cases includes
mental health counseling for crime victims.
In the present case, the mental
health counselor normally charged $100
per hour for her services. Because Z.L.s
aunt was unable to pay this amount, the
counselor reduced her fee to $50 per hour so
that Z.L. could get the counseling he needed.
Thus, the counselor essentially donated half
of her fee to facilitate the provision of
counseling services to the victim of W.S.s
offense. It was proper for the superior
court to order W.S. and his parents to
reimburse the mental health counselor for
this money.
W.S.s argument that his restitution obligation should
terminate when his term of probation ends
W.S. argues that any restitution obligation
imposed by the superior court in a delinquency
proceeding must terminate when the minor
successfully completes the terms of the courts
disposition here, the period of W.S.s juvenile
probation.
In support of his position, W.S. points to
the Juvenile Justice Standards promulgated by the IJA-
ABA (Institute of Judicial Administration American Bar
Association), which state that a juveniles duty to make
restitution should be of limited duration, and that the
duration of this duty should in no case exceed the
maximum term of custody or supervision permitted for
the juveniles offense.5
But AS 47.12.170(a) expressly declares that
an order of restitution entered by the superior court
in a delinquency proceeding under AS 47.12.120 is a
civil judgment that remains enforceable after the
expiration of the courts [juvenile] jurisdiction over
the minor. Because the legislature has spoken on this
subject, it does not matter what position the American
Bar Association endorses. For, as this Court
recognized in K.L.F. v. State, 790 P.2d 708, 711-12
(Alaska App. 1990), if the statutes enacted by our
legislature embody a policy that is different from the
policy advocated by the IJA-ABA, we are obliged to
implement the intent of our legislature.
(See also State v. Wentz, 805 P.2d 962, 966
n. 5 (Alaska 1991), where our supreme court declared
that if the ABA Standards tend to conflict with the ...
sentencing scheme established by the legislature, the
latter will prevail.)
In W.S.s opening brief, he does not mention
AS 47.12.170(a), much less discuss the discrepancy
between this statute and the position advocated by the
IJA-ABA standards. However, in his reply brief, W.S.
apparently concedes that the statute controls because
in that brief, for the first time, W.S. argues that the
statute is unconstitutional.
W.S.s constitutional argument is premised on
Alaska Delinquency Rules 1(c) and 1(d).
Delinquency Rule 1(d) states that the
Delinquency Rules were promulgated under the Alaska
Supreme Courts constitutional authority to enact rules
of procedure (see Article IV, Section 15 of the Alaska
Constitution) and that, as a consequence, the
Delinquency Rules supersede any inconsistent statute
enacted by the Alaska Legislature unless that statute
was passed by a two-thirds majority for the express
purpose of changing the rule. And Delinquency Rule 1(c)
states that the Delinquency Rules are to be construed
to promote ... expeditious determination of juvenile
matters [and] the best interests of the juvenile.
W.S. asserts that, because AS 47.12.170(a)
calls for restitution obligations to be enforceable
beyond the time when the superior court loses its
juvenile jurisdiction over the minor, this statute is
inconsistent with [the] expeditious determination of
juvenile matters [and] the best interests of the
juvenile. W.S. therefore concludes that the statute is
inconsistent with Delinquency Rule 1(c). And, based on
this conclusion, W.S. argues that the statute is
unconstitutional because it is inconsistent with a
delinquency rule, and because it was not passed by a
two-thirds majority for the express purpose of amending
Delinquency Rule 1(c).
There are several flaws in W.S.s argument.
First, W.S. never presented this argument to
the superior court, nor did he include it in his
opening brief. Rather, the argument is presented for
the first time in W.S.s reply brief. Arguments
presented for the first time in a reply brief are
waived.6
W.S. argues that we should not apply this
rule of waiver to him. He asserts that his argument
about the constitutionality of AS 47.12.170(a) is
merely a response to the States argument that the
superior court was obliged to follow this statute, no
matter what contrary position the IJA-ABA standards
advocated.
It is true that a reply brief is designed to
allow an appellant to respond to the arguments raised
in the appellees brief. But here, W.S.s response is in
fact a new constitutional claim.
In his opening brief, W.S. omitted all
mention of the governing statute. He proceeded as if
there were no statutory law on this point, and as if
this Court were free to adopt the IJA-ABA standard if
it seemed reasonable and beneficial. Then the State
filed its brief, pointing out that there was indeed a
statute on point, and that the courts are obliged to
follow this statute despite any contradictory policy
advocated by the IJA-ABA. Only then did W.S. think to
level a constitutional challenge against this statute.
In a broad sense, W.S.s constitutional
argument is a response to the States brief. But it is
a new claim, and it is waived.
Moreover, W.S.s claim is premised on a
misreading of Delinquency Rule 1(c). This rule does
not purport to give the Alaska Supreme Court the
authority to review all statutes dealing with juvenile
delinquency matters, and to effectively veto these
statutes if, in the supreme courts view, they appear to
be inconsistent with [the] expeditious determination of
juvenile matters [and] the best interests of the
juvenile. Rather, Delinquency Rule 1(c) states that
the Delinquency Rules themselves are to be interpreted
in a manner that promotes these goals.
It remains true that, under Delinquency Rule
1(d), the legislature is not free to alter a procedure
specified in the Delinquency Rules unless the
legislature does so under the procedure specified in
Article IV, Section 15 of our state constitution i.e.,
by passing a statute (by a two-thirds majority)
containing a provision that expressly declares the
legislatures intention to alter one or more of the
Delinquency Rules.
But none of the Delinquency Rules specifies
whether a minors restitution obligation may extend
past the end of the minors probation, or past the time
when the superior court loses its juvenile jurisdiction
over the minor. In fact, the word restitution does not
appear in the Delinquency Rules. Thus, AS 47.12.170(a)
is not inconsistent with any of the Delinquency Rules.
For these reasons, we reject W.S.s contention
that a minors restitution obligation must terminate
when the minors probation ends, or even when the
superior court loses its juvenile jurisdiction over the
minor.
W.S.s argument that the superior court was obliged to
consider his ability to pay when fixing the amount of
his restitution obligation
The superior court ordered W.S. and his
parents to pay restitution in the amount of $3,185,
which was the entire amount of the expenses verified by
Z.L.s aunt and the mental health counselor. W.S.
argues that it was improper for the superior court to
order this restitution without first inquiring whether
W.S. had the financial ability to pay this amount of
money.
Again, W.S. relies on the IJA-ABA Juvenile
Justice Standards, which declare that the amount of a
restitution obligation should be directly related to
the juveniles offense, the actual harm caused, and the
juveniles ability to pay.7 But as we explained earlier
in this opinion, the fact that the IJA-ABA standards
advocate a particular policy may provide useful
guidance when the statutes and rules governing
delinquency proceedings are silent or ambiguous, but
these standards can not be employed to supplant or
override contrary policies enacted by our legislature.
In J.C.W. v. State, 880 P.2d 1067, 1072
(Alaska App. 1994), this Court held that the superior
court must consider the minors ability to pay when
fixing the amount of restitution in a delinquency
proceeding. However, our decision was based in large
measure on the fact that, at that time, the
corresponding adult restitution statutes likewise
required a sentencing court to consider a defendants
ability to pay. Id. In footnote 7 of our opinion in
J.C.W., 880 P.2d at 1072, we noted that the legislature
had recently amended the adult restitution statute to
restrict and, in many instances, prohibit a
sentencing court from considering a defendants ability
to pay when setting the amount of restitution. See
former AS 12.55.045(f) & (g), enacted by SLA 1992,
ch. 71, 4. In this footnote in J.C.W., we stated that
we intended to express no view on whether this
restriction would affect [future] juvenile delinquency
proceedings. J.C.W., 880 P.2d at 1072 n. 7.
Nevertheless, as we noted earlier, when the
Alaska Legislature enacted the current version of the
juvenile delinquency statutes in 1996,8 the
legislature declared that one of its purposes was to
ensure that [the] victims ... of crimes committed by
juveniles are afforded the same rights as [the] victims
... of crimes committed by adults. AS 47.12.010(12).
Under the current version of AS 12.55.045(g),
a court imposing restitution in a criminal case is
prohibited from considering the defendants ability to
pay when assessing the amount of the restitution
obligation. In other words, restitution should be
awarded for the full amount of the victims loss,
regardless of the defendants ability to pay.
This fact that the legislature has decreed
that restitution in criminal cases is to be awarded
without regard to the defendants ability to pay
suggests that when the legislature directed the
superior court to order suitable restitution in
delinquency cases (see AS 47.12.120(b)(4)), the
legislature intended superior court judges to award
restitution to the same extent that restitution would
be awarded in an analogous adult criminal case under
AS 12.55.045(g) in other words, restitution for the
full amount of a victims loss, regardless of the minors
ability to pay.
This Court recently upheld the
constitutionality of AS 12.55.045(g) against the
arguments that due process and a defendants right to
rehabilitation required a sentencing court to consider
a defendants ability to pay when the court set the
amount of restitution in an adult criminal case. In
Hodges v. State, 158 P.3d 864 (Alaska App. 2007), we
held that the legislature could lawfully direct
sentencing courts to order restitution for the full
amount of a victims loss, without regard to the
defendants ability to pay although sentencing courts
are still obliged to consider a defendants ability to
pay when they set the terms under which the restitution
obligation will be enforced (i.e., the frequency and
amount of the defendants payments).
Given our conclusion that AS 12.55.045(g) is
constitutional, and given the mandate of
AS 47.12.010(12) that the victims of delinquent acts
are to be accorded the same rights they would receive
if they were victims of a crime committed by an adult,
it would seem that the superior court is not obliged to
consider indeed, the superior court should not
consider a delinquent minors ability to pay when the
court sets the amount of the suitable restitution
required by AS 47.12.120(b)(4).
But this tentative conclusion is clouded by
events that transpired in the 2004 session of the
legislature.
During the 2004 session, the legislature
considered House Bill 357, a bill that again amended
the restitution statutes, for the avowed purpose of
requir[ing] judges to order restitution from criminals
in all cases where a victim has suffered a financial
loss.9
During its debates on HB 357, the legislature
considered amending AS 47.12.120(b), the statute that
governs restitution in juvenile delinquency cases.
Initially, HB 357 would have added the following
provision to this statute: The court may take into
consideration the delinquent minors ability to pay past
age 19, or the age [at] which the court retains [sic:
loses] jurisdiction over the minor, when determining
the amount of the ... restitution.10 The legislature
eventually decided not to add this language to the
statute, because they concluded that the superior court
already had the authority to take a minors long-term
ability to pay into account.11
This discussion obviously supports the
conclusion we reached in the preceding section of this
opinion: the conclusion that the legislature intended
a minors restitution obligation to continue after the
minors term of probation ended, and even after the
superior court lost its juvenile jurisdiction over the
minor. But this discussion is also premised on the
idea that the superior court should be taking the
minors ability to pay into account when setting the
amount of restitution.
Moreover, another provision of the current
delinquency code, AS 47.12.120(b)(4)(C), authorizes the
superior court to require the minor and the minors
parents to submit financial information ... for the
purpose of establishing the amount of restitution or
enforcing an order of restitution under AS 47.12.170.
(Emphasis added) This provision likewise suggests that
the superior court should be considering the minors
ability to pay when setting the amount of restitution.
(The State argues that the financial
information required by AS 47.12.120(b)(4)(C) is
intended only for the purpose of establishing a payment
schedule or otherwise fashioning the terms under which
the restitution order will be enforced, and that this
financial information is to have no effect on the
amount of restitution ordered. But the States
suggested reading of the statute is contradicted by the
words of the statute itself, and the State cites no
legislative history or other authority to support its
view that the statute should be interpreted in this
limited way.)
In sum, while there is some authority to
support the proposition that the superior court should
not consider a minors ability to pay when setting the
amount of restitution, there is also authority for the
opposite proposition the view that the superior court
should take the minors ability to pay into account.
We conclude that we need not resolve this
issue in W.S.s case. Even if the superior court was
obliged to consider W.S.s ability to pay when the court
set the amount of restitution, the record shows that
the superior court at least implicitly found that W.S.
would be able to pay the restitution. Further, the
record contains no suggestion that W.S. will be unable
to satisfy the restitution obligation.
As we explained earlier, the superior court
ordered restitution in the amount of $3,185. Pursuant
to AS 47.12.120(b)(4), the court made W.S. and his
parents jointly and severally liable for this amount.
Moreover, the superior court ordered both W.S. and his
parents to apply for the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend
if they are eligible and there is nothing in the
record to suggest that they are not eligible.
At the hearing, the superior court noted that
W.S. could seemingly pay the entire restitution
obligation from his Permanent Fund dividends. Thus,
the superior court found that the restitution
obligation appeared to be within W.S.s means.
(The restitution order in this case was
entered in February 2007. We take judicial notice that
the Permanent Fund Dividend for 2007 was $1,654.12
Assuming that the amount of the dividend remains
relatively constant, W.S. will be able to pay the
entire restitution obligation in two years, without
contribution from his parents, by using his Permanent
Fund dividends.)
In addition, as this Court noted in J.C.W.,
the fact that a minor is made jointly liable with other
people for the restitution means that the minors share
of this obligation will probably be considerably less
than the whole. J.C.W., 880 P.2d at 1072-73. Here,
W.S. will be responsible for the entire $3,185 only if
his parents pay nothing. If, on the other hand, W.S.
contributes his dividend from the current year and his
parents contribute one of their dividends, this would
satisfy the restitution obligation in a single year.
In other words, the record shows that the
superior court at least implicitly considered W.S.s
ability to pay, and there is nothing in the record to
suggest that W.S. and his parents are ineligible for
the Permanent Fund Dividend, or that W.S. otherwise
lacks the means to pay. Thus, even assuming that the
superior court proceeded under the assumption that
W.S.s ability to pay was not relevant to the issue of
how much restitution should be ordered, and even
assuming that this assumption was mistaken, any error
was harmless.
Conclusion
The judgement of the superior court is
AFFIRMED.
_______________________________
1 See AS 47.12.160(a).
2 AS 11.41.230(a)(3) and AS 11.61.120(a)(1), respectively.
3 Ned v. State, 119 P.3d 438, 446 (Alaska App. 2005); Lonis v.
State, 998 P.2d 441, 447 n. 18 (Alaska App. 2000).
4 See R.I. v. State, 894 P.2d 683, 685-86 (Alaska App. 1995)
(employing adult restitution provisions when analyzing the
superior courts restitution authority in delinquency cases);
J.C.W. v. State, 880 P.2d 1067, 1072 (Alaska App. 1994)
(likening the delinquency restitution provision to the
statute governing restitution for adult offenders); J.M. v.
State, 786 P.2d 923, 923 (Alaska App. 1990) (noting that it
was appropriate to refer to the adult criminal statutes when
interpreting suitable restitution under the delinquency
law).
5 IJA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards, Standards Relating to
Disposition, 3.2(B)(1)(f).
6 Petersen v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 803 P.2d 406,
411 (Alaska 1990); Hitt v. J.B. Coghill, Inc., 641 P.2d 211,
213 n. 4 (Alaska 1982).
7 IJA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards, Standards Relating to
Disposition, 3.2(B)(1)(a).
8 SLA 1996, ch. 59, 46.
9 See the Sponsor Statement for 2004 HB 357, available at:
http://www.akrepublicans.org/samuels/23/spst/samu_hb357.php .
10See the Minutes of the House Judiciary Committee for January
30, 2004, available at:
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_single_minute.asp?ses
sion=23-
&beg_line=00655&end_line=01132&time=1310&date=20040130&co
mm=JUD&house=H.
11Minutes of the House Judiciary Committee for February 9,
2004 (discussion between Sara Neilson, staff to
Representative Ralph Samuels, and Representative Max
Gruenberg), available at:
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_single_minute.asp?ses
sion=23-
&beg_line=01411&end_line=01743&time=1304&date=20040209&co
mm=JUD&house=H.
12See the Alaska Department of Revenues Permanent Fund
Dividend home page, https://www.pfd.state.ak.us/.
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