|
You can of the Alaska Court of Appeals opinions.
|
|
NOTICE
The text of this opinion can be corrected before the
opinion is published in the Pacific Reporter. Readers
are encouraged to bring typographical or other formal
errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate
Courts:
303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501
Fax: (907) 264-0878
E-mail: corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| JOHN R. WALSH, | ) |
| ) Court of Appeals Nos. A-8805 & A-8965 | |
| Appellant, | ) Trial Court No. 4FA-03-3446 CR |
| ) | |
| v. | ) |
| ) O P I N I O N | |
| STATE OF ALASKA, | ) |
| ) | |
| Appellee. | ) No. 2048 April 28, 2006 |
| ) | |
Appeal from the Superior Court, Fourth Judi
cial District, Fairbanks, Richard D. Savell,
Judge.
Appearances: Karla Taylor-Welch, Assistant
Public Advocate, Fairbanks, and Joshua Fink,
Public Advocate, Anchorage, for the
Appellant. W. H. Hawley and Douglas Kossler,
Assistant Attorneys General, Office of
Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage,
and David W. M rquez, Attorney General,
Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer
and Stewart, Judges.
STEWART, Judge.
A jury convicted John R. Walsh of first-degree vehicle
theft, driving under the influence, refusal to submit to a
chemical test, leaving the scene of an accident, resisting
arrest, and driving while his license was suspended.1
Walsh argues that the superior court failed to address
his request to change his appointed attorney. But we conclude
that the superior court properly addressed the complaints Walsh
raised about his attorney before and during trial.
Superior Court Judge Richard D. Savell sentenced Walsh
to 10 years with 4 years and 310 days suspended, a net 5 years
and 55 days to serve. Walsh raises several objections to his
composite sentence including claims that Judge Savells findings
do not support the sentence. We reject the bulk of Walshs
arguments. But, as the State concedes, the sentence Judge Savell
imposed for leaving the scene of an accident, a net 120 days to
serve, is not authorized. The maximum allowable sentence for
this offense is 90 days of imprisonment.2 Judge Savell must
resentence Walsh on this count. Because Judge Savell will
resentence Walsh, he will have the opportunity to enter findings
that address Walshs remaining objections.
Background facts and proceedings
On September 13, 2003, Walsh took a Home Depot delivery
truck without permission from the Home Depot parking lot in
Fairbanks. Walsh drove onto the Mitchell Expressway, where he
collided with a pickup truck and kept going, causing several
vehicles to take evasive action.
Walsh drove to the Fred Meyer West parking lot, where
he collided with three parked cars. Walsh walked into the Fred
Meyer building.
Inside, Walsh put some items in a shopping cart while
snacking on food he had picked up in the deli and bakery
sections. Walsh left the store with the shopping cart,
staggering as he walked.
Outside the store, Alaska State Trooper Rachel Foster
approached Walsh, identified herself, and asked Walsh for his
name. Walsh introduced himself as Trooper Walsh.
Trooper Foster observed that Walsh smelled of alcohol,
had watery bloodshot eyes, and was not in control of his motor
functions. Trooper Foster attempted to take Walsh into custody,
but he kept flailing his arms around and kicking his legs. Even
though Foster told Walsh that he was under arrest, Walsh
continued to struggle. Other troopers arrived to assist, and
Walsh was handcuffed and transported to the trooper post for a
DUI investigation. Walsh declined to perform sobriety tests.
The troopers read Walsh the implied consent warning and gave him
an opportunity to submit to a breath test. He refused.
The grand jury charged Walsh with one count of first-
degree vehicle theft. The district attorney filed an information
charging six misdemeanor counts: driving under the influence;
refusal to submit to a chemical test; leaving the scene of an
accident; resisting or interfering with arrest; concealment of
merchandise;3 and driving while license canceled, suspended, or
revoked.
Walshs claim that his attorney should have been
replaced
The court appointed the Public Defender Agency to
represent Walsh. Walshs attorney calendared a change of plea
hearing on November 19, 2003, but at that hearing, Walsh stated
that he had not reached an agreement on the plea bargain that his
attorney had negotiated with the State. He said that he was told
that [he was] looking at three years here and if [he didnt] go
along with it then [he was] going to get five years. He further
stated that he wanted more time because there was just some minor
stuff in there that we didnt get finished with on time. The
court continued the hearing for two days, at which point Walsh
said he wanted to go to trial.
At calendar call on December 4, 2003, Walsh told Judge
Savell, Weve had a slight conflict of interest. Im asking for a
new counsel. Judge Savell told Walsh that he should discuss the
issue with his attorney and that if it was an ethical problem,
the attorney was obligated to inform the court.
The Court: You have the right to court-
appointed counsel. You do not have the right
to counsel of your choosing. If, by conflict
of interest, you mean theres something that
fits under the code of ethics, you [should]
bring that to your lawyers attention, and hes
obligated to bring it to my attention.
The case went to trial without Walsh or his attorney returning to
this issue.
On December 9, during the trial, Walsh personally moved
for a mistrial, complaining about some of his trial attorneys
tactics. Judge Savell did not grant a mistrial and told Walsh
that his complaints about the quality of his attorneys
performance would be addressed at another time and place.
Walsh argues that his conviction should be reversed
because Judge Savells responses to his complaints about his
attorney were insufficient. Walsh contends that, while case law
does not specifically hold that the court must examine the reason
behind a defendants request for new counsel, the need for inquiry
is implicit in that case law.
Walsh argues that a trial court must inquire when the
court learns that there has been a breakdown in the attorney-
client relationship. An indigent defendant with an appointed
attorney is not entitled to counsel of his or her choice.4 But
when there has been a breakdown in the attorney-client
relationship, a defendant may be entitled to a change in
representation.5 Case law implies that a court has an obligation
to inquire when presented with a substantial claim that an
appointed attorney must withdraw.6
But at calendar call, Walsh only contended that a
slight conflict existed between himself and his attorney. Judge
Savell responded reasonably to this report. He told Walsh to
discuss the issue with his attorney and advised him that the
attorney was obliged to bring any ethical issue to the courts
attention. Viewed objectively, Walshs calendar-call complaint
did not show a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship, a
disqualifying conflict of interest, or a failure in communication
that required further action by Judge Savell beyond the direction
he offered.
During the second day of trial, Walsh personally moved
for a mistrial. This time, Walsh provided more explicit
criticisms of his attorney.
Walsh: I need a mistrial declared in
this case for the following reasons. [My
attorney] projected guilt to the jury without
prior consent when he told them I was
shoplifting, which is false. He has never
discussed any trial strategy with me. The
alleged witness, Danielle Simmons that was
added to the states witness list without
argument from a lawyer is, to my knowledge,
not common practice. I also have never seen
Mrs. Simmons name as a witness in the case in
either the grand jury tapes, police reports,
or I didnt get anything else.
All due process was denied,
constitutional rights trampled. Furthermore,
theres been a conflict of interest with Mr.
Spiers and myself from the beginning stemming
from an prior case. He has filed no motions
on my behalf for suppression, evidentiary,
conflict or anything as I suggested
throughout my case, but rather has dismissed
me as a jailhouse lawyer.
I have never received all discovery or
exculpatory evidence in my case as requested
to my knowledge. Mr. Spiers has only seen me
twice for 15 minutes and threatened me with
six to 13 years if I didnt take his plea
deal.
Judge Savell denied Walshs motion for a mistrial. He responded
to Walshs complaints regarding his attorneys performance as
follows:
The Court: You have a lawyer in this
case. There are certain decisions that are
entrusted to lawyers under the law. The
lawyers make tactical and strategic decisions
during a trial, and there are certain
decisions that are only the defendants. If
and when you continue to have a complaint
about [your attorneys] performance, that will
be examined at another time and in another
place. ... I could explain all the reasons in
answer to all of your complaints but do not
feel this is the right time or place[.]
The State argues that this court should not treat the
statements Walsh made on the second day of trial as a second
request for new counsel because, instead of asking for a
substitution of counsel, Walsh moved for a mistrial. As the
State points out, this court normally does not address new
arguments or theories on appeal that were not raised in the
superior court.7 The State argues that Walsh is attempting to
raise a new claim on appeal that Judge Savell should have
appointed a new attorney based on Walshs mistrial motion.
But it is apparent from the content of Walshs complaint
that he was objecting to his attorneys performance. And, in
addition to denying Walshs mistrial motion, Judge Savell
addressed the substance of Walshs complaint about his attorney.
We therefore conclude that Walsh preserved this point on appeal.
There is substantial authority holding that a
defendants request to replace an attorney is untimely if it is
made just before or during trial.8 We have never been asked to
adopt or reject this line of cases. Indeed, in prior cases, we
have examined trial judges rulings on defendants complaints about
their attorneys and defendants requests for new counsel, even
when those requests were made on the eve of trial.9
But even assuming that Walshs complaint about his
attorneys performance and strategy should not have been rejected
on grounds of timeliness, we have nevertheless cautioned judges
to be hesitant about injecting themselves into the attorney-
client relationship when presented with complaints about a
defense attorneys performance. In Mute v. State,10 we stated
that
absent extraordinary circumstances, [the
trial judge] was rightfully hesitant to enter
into an extended examination of [the
attorneys] view of the case and his trial
strategy, or to otherwise insinuate herself
as referee in the attorney-client
relationship. [The judge] therefore did not
abuse her discretion when she denied Mutes
motion to discharge [his attorney].[11]
Here, Judge Savell responded to Walshs complaints about
the adequacy of his attorneys performance by telling Walsh that
these complaints could be addressed at a later time. Although
Judge Savell did not describe the details of this later
proceeding to Walsh, it is clear that if Walsh continued to
believe that his attorneys performance was not competent, Walsh
would be entitled to pursue an application for post-conviction
relief or a motion for a new trial.
Judge Savell did not abuse his discretion in dealing
with Walshs complaints in this fashion. Our prior decisions on
this issue clearly suggest that a trial judge who is confronted
by challenges to a defense attorneys performance on the eve of
trial, or during trial, should not interrupt the trial to conduct
an investigation of the defendants complaints. The only cases in
which a trial judge is required to take precautionary or curative
action are when there is reason to believe the attorney-client
relationship has deteriorated to the point where the attorney is
incapable of effective communication with the defendant or
objective decision-making about the case.12
Here, Walshs mistrial request did not present Judge
Savell with reason to believe that Walshs relationship with his
attorney had deteriorated to this point. Walshs criticisms of
his attorneys decisions and performance did not indicate that his
attorney was incapable of effective communication with Walsh or
that his attorney could not make objective decisions about the
case. Accordingly, Judge Savell did not abuse his discretion
when he declined to interrupt Walshs trial to investigate these
claims.
Walshs attack on the length of his sentence
Judge Savell sentenced Walsh to 10 years with 4 years
and 310 days suspended, a net 5 years and 55 days to serve.
Walsh raises several objections to his composite sentence. We
reject the bulk of Walshs arguments. But, as the State concedes,
the sentence Judge Savell imposed for leaving the scene of an
accident, 1 year with 245 days suspended, a net 120 days to
serve, is not authorized. The maximum allowable sentence for
this offense is 90 days of imprisonment.13 Judge Savell must
resentence Walsh on this count. Because Judge Savell will
resentence Walsh, he will have the opportunity to enter findings
that address Walshs remaining objections.
As a second felony offender, Walsh was subject to a 2-
year presumptive term for vehicle theft.14 The State proposed
three aggravating factors under AS 12.55.155(c): (c)(6), that
Walshs conduct created a risk of imminent physical injury to
three or more persons; (c)(8), that the defendants prior criminal
history includes conduct involving aggravated or repeated
instances of assaultive behavior; and (c)(21), that the defendant
has a criminal history of repeated instances of conduct violative
of criminal laws, whether punishable as felonies or misdemeanors,
similar in nature to the offense for which the defendant is being
sentenced. Walsh conceded those aggravators applied. At
sentencing, Judge Savell asked Walshs attorney, In this case, for
me to exceed a five-year sentence, I must find that that excess
is necessary to protect the public and tie that in with a finding
of dangerousness; isnt that right ... ?
Judge Savell was apparently referring to the Neal-
Mutschler rule, a sentencing rule announced by the Alaska Supreme
Court that provides a sentencing judge should not impose
consecutive sentences that total more than the maximum sentence
for the defendants most serious offense unless the sentencing
judge expressly finds that such a sentence is necessary to
protect the public.15 Moreover, while he acknowledged that Walsh
was an alcoholic with a criminal record (Walsh had a criminal
history of over forty-five prior criminal convictions), Judge
Savell expressed hope that Walsh could be rehabilitated. Judge
Savell imposed a composite 10-year term with 4 years and 310 days
suspended, a net 5 years and 55 days to serve.
Walsh argues that his sentence is excessive because
Judge Savell imposed this sentence without making the express
findings required by the Neal-Mutschler rule and the rule from
Farmer v. State.16 The State points out that Judge Savells
expressed awareness of the rule indicates that his failure to
make an express finding was an oversight.
Judge Savell began his sentencing remarks as follows:
Case law indicates that I must make certain findings if Im going
to impose a sentence that is greater than the maximum sentence
for the most serious crime of which an offender is committed
[sic]. In this case, for me to exceed a five-year sentence, I
must find that that excess is necessary to protect the public and
tie that in with a finding of dangerousness[.] He also explained
that he was required to protect the public and isolate Mr. Walsh
to the degree that is necessary.
Like the offenders in Powell v. State17 and Waters v.
State,18 cases in which we upheld a composite term exceeding the
maximum term for the defendants most serious offense despite the
lack of an express Neal-Mutschler finding, Walsh is a mature
offender with a long criminal record and a significant substance
abuse problem. Although the record in this case is sufficient to
support a composite term for Walsh in excess of the 5-year
maximum for vehicle theft, because we must remand the case for
resentencing, as we explain below, Judge Savell will have the
opportunity to enter an express Neal-Mutschler findings if he
elects to re-impose a composite term in excess of 5 years.
Walsh points out that Judge Savell did not enter
express findings to satisfy the Farmer rule. The State argues
that this requirement is not necessary because if a sentencing
judge satisfies the Neal-Mutschler rule, those findings
implicitly satisfy the Farmer rule. The States argument has
merit. But here, a Neal-Mutschler finding is not necessary to
satisfy Farmer. In Randall v. State,19 we held that, where the
sentencing judge was authorized to exceed the presumptive term
because he found aggravating factors, these aggravating factors
constituted the good cause required by Farmer to support a
composite sentence exceeding that presumptive term.20 Thus, the
aggravating factors conceded by Walsh constituted good cause for
exceeding the presumptive term for vehicle theft.
The State concedes that Judge Savell erred when he
imposed 1 year with 245 days suspended for leaving the scene of
an accident. The maximum penalty for this offense is 90 days
imprisonment.21
The State points out, however, that under Allain v.
State,22 the superior court is authorized to impose the same
composite term on remand.23 Judge Savell indicated in his
sentencing remarks that he knew where [he] want[ed] to go with
the composite sentence, apparently finding 10 years with 4 years
and 310 days suspended appropriate as a total sentence. Because
he fashioned a composite term appropriate for the totality of
Walshs conduct, the court may resentence him on remand to a term
that does not exceed the composite sentence originally imposed in
this case.24
Walshs arguments based on Blakely v. Washington
While this appeal was pending, Walsh filed a motion
under Alaska Criminal Rule 35(a), seeking correction of an
allegedly illegal sentence. This motion concerned the legality
of the sentence Walsh received for first-degree vehicle theft.
Walsh contended that his sentence was illegal under Blakely v.
Washington25 because (1) Walsh was subject to a 2-year presumptive
term of imprisonment for this offense, (2) Judge Savell relied on
various aggravators codified in AS 12.55.155(c) as authority to
impose a sentence exceeding this 2-year presumptive term, and (3)
Judge Savell decided these aggravators by himself, without
referring these matters to a jury.
Judge Savell denied Walshs Rule 35(a) motion, and Walsh
now raises this same argument on appeal in File No. A-8965.
The State argues that Judge Savell was entitled to deny
Walshs motion on purely procedural grounds. The State takes the
position that even if a sentence is imposed in violation of
Blakely, the sentence is not illegal and, thus, a defendant is
not entitled to raise a Blakely claim in a motion under Rule
35(a) to correct an illegal sentence.
The State acknowledges that, in Paige v. State,26 this
Court instructed the defendant to bring his Blakely claim as
either a Rule 35(a) motion or an application for post-conviction
relief.27 But, the State contends that this was an erroneous
dictum and the sole vehicle for raising a post-sentencing
Blakely claim is an application for post-conviction relief.
In Bishop v. Anchorage,28 this Court held that Criminal
Rule 35(a) employs the term illegal sentence in a narrow sense;
the term refers only to sentences that the judgment of conviction
did not authorize.29 We offered three examples of illegal
sentences: (1) a sentence that [is] contrary to the applicable
statute; (2) a written judgment not conforming to the oral
pronouncement of sentence; and (3) a sentence that is ambiguous
with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served.30
The State suggests that, because Walshs attack on his
vehicle theft sentence does not fall within any of these
categories, it is not an illegal sentence for purposes of
Criminal Rule 35(a). The State further argues that a Blakely
claim challenges the manner in which a defendants sentence is
imposed, rather than the legality of the sentence itself.31
We find the States arguments unconvincing. Although
our decision in Bishop lists three types of sentences that may be
challenged as illegal under Criminal Rule 35(a), this list is not
exhaustive. Instead, the guiding principle (as stated in Bishop)
is whether the defendant asserts that the court has imposed a
sentence [that] the judgment of conviction did not authorize.
Under Alaskas pre-2005 presumptive sentencing laws,
Judge Savell was not authorized to exceed the 2-year presumptive
term that applied to Walshs offense unless the State proved
aggravating factors or extraordinary circumstances.32 Blakely
stands for the proposition that when a sentencing judge has no
authority to exceed a specified sentencing ceiling unless
particular aggravating factors are proved, the defendant has a
right to demand a jury trial on those aggravating factors.33
Therefore, a sentence imposed in violation of Blakely
that is, a sentence greater than would be authorized by the jurys
verdict alone is an illegal sentence for purposes of Criminal
Rule 35(a). For this reason, Walsh was entitled to pursue his
Blakely claim under Criminal Rule 35(a).
We now turn to the merits of Walshs Blakely argument.
As we explained above, the State argued that three
aggravating factors applied to Walshs case, and Walsh conceded
all three of these factors.
The States proof of aggravators (c)(21) and (c)(8)
rested on Walshs uncontested prior criminal convictions. Under
these circumstances, both aggravators fell within the Blakely
exception for a defendants prior convictions. Thus, Judge Savell
was not obligated to submit these two aggravators to a jury.34
This leaves aggravator (c)(6) the allegation that
Walshs conduct placed three or more persons at risk of imminent
physical injury. It was plain error, under Blakely, for Judge
Savell not to submit this aggravator to a jury.
We nevertheless conclude that this error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.35 When Walshs underlying criminal case
was litigated, Walsh never disputed that the driver of the stolen
vehicle engaged in erratic and dangerous driving that put many
people at risk. Instead, Walsh contended that he had not been
that driver.
The jury convicted Walsh of vehicle theft, driving
under the influence, and driving with a suspended license. In
other words, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Walsh
had been driving the stolen vehicle.
Given the jurys verdicts, and given the way in which
Walsh litigated this case, we conclude that the error in failing
to submit aggravator (c)(6) to a jury was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Or, stated another way, given the jurys
finding that Walsh was the driver of the stolen vehicle, there is
no reasonable possibility that a jury would find in Walshs favor
on the question of whether his driving endangered three or more
persons.
Conclusion
For the reasons explained here, we AFFIRM Walshs
convictions and we reject most of his attacks on his sentences.
However, we VACATE the sentence that Walsh received for leaving
the scene of an accident, and we remand Walshs case to the
superior court for resentencing, consistent with this opinion.
We do not retain jurisdiction of this case.
_______________________________
1 AS 11.46.360(a)(1), AS 28.35.030(a)(1), AS 28.35.032(a), AS
28.35.050(b), AS 11.56.700(a)(1), and AS 28.15.291(a)(1),
respectively.
2 AS 28.35.050; AS 28.40.050(b).
3 AS 11.46.220(a)(1) & (c)(3).
4 See Coleman v. State, 621 P.2d 869, 878 (Alaska 1980).
5 See Moore v. State, 123 P.3d 1081, 1088 (Alaska App. 2005);
Love v. State, 630 P.2d 21, 25 (Alaska App. 1981). See also
United States v. Lott, 310 F.3d 1231, 1249 (10th Cir. 2002) .
6 See Coleman, 621 P.2d at 878-79 ([T]he denial of Colemans
motion for private appointed counsel ... was not error, given
[the superior court judges] examination of Coleman and his
appointed public defender regarding whether the attorney could
properly represent Coleman.); Moore, 123 P.3d at 1088-89; Mute v.
State, 954 P.2d 1384, 1385 (Alaska App. 1998).
7 See, e.g., Price v. Eastham, 128 P.3d 725, 731 (Alaska
2006); Conkey v. State, 113 P.3d 1235, 1237 n.6 (Alaska 2005);
Gates v. Tenakee Springs, 822 P.2d 455, 460 (Alaska 1991).
8 See United States v. Trujillo, 376 F.3d 593, 606-07 (6th
Cir. 2004) (motion for substitution of counsel made three days
before trial was untimely); United States v. Reevey, 364 F.3d
151, 157 (4th Cir. 2004) (request for new counsel made on the
first day of trial was untimely); United States v. Franklin, 321
F.3d 1231, 1238-39 (9th Cir. 2003) (defendants request for new
counsel made ten days before trial and attorneys motion to
withdraw made six days before trial were untimely); United States
v. Gonzalez, 800 F.2d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 1986) (motion made on
second day of trial was untimely); United States v. McClendon,
782 F.2d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 1986) (motion to substitute made on
first day of trial was untimely); Hudson v. Rushen, 686 F.2d 826,
831 (9th Cir. 1982) (motion to substitute made at the close of
the prosecutions case was untimely).
9 See, e.g., Mute, 954 P.2d at 1385.
10 954 P.2d 1384.
11 Id. at 1385-86.
12 Mute, 954 P.2d at 1385-86. See also Gardner v. State,
Alaska App. Memorandum Opinion and Judgment No. 5064 at 9-11
(March 29, 2006), 2006 WL 829758 at * 4-6 (Mannheimer, J.,
concurring); 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, and Nancy J.
King, Criminal Procedure 11.4(b), at 554 (2nd ed. 1999).
13 AS 28.35.050; AS 28.40.050(b).
14 AS 12.55.125(e)(1).
15 See Neal v. State, 628 P.2d 19, 21 (Alaska 1981); Mutschler
v. State, 560 P.2d 377, 381 (Alaska 1977).
16 746 P.2d 1300, 1301 (Alaska App. 1987) (when an offender is
sentenced for multiple crimes, the presumptive term for the most
serious offense is a benchmark that should not be exceeded
without a good reason).
17 88 P.3d 532 (Alaska App. 2004).
18 64 P.3d 169 (Alaska App. 2003).
19 44 P.3d 984 (Alaska App. 2002).
20 Id. at 985.
21 AS 28.40.050(b).
22 810 P.2d 1019 (Alaska App. 1991).
23 Id. at 1022.
24 Id.
25 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004).
26 115 P.3d 1244 (Alaska App. 2005).
27 Id. at 1248.
28 685 P.2d 103 (Alaska App. 1984).
29 Id. at 105.
30 Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
31 See id. at 105 n.3.
32 See Haag v. State, 117 P.3d 775, 782 (Alaska App. 2005).
33 Id. at 782 (internal citations omitted).
34 See Grohs v. State, 118 P.3d 1080, 1084 (Alaska App.
2005)(Alaska App. 2005) (holding that when aggravator (c)(21) is
based on a defendants uncontested prior convictions, the Blakely
exception for prior convictions applies, and the aggravator need
not be submitted to a jury); Milligrock v. State, 118 P.3d 11, 16
(same holding with respect to aggravator (c)(8)).
35 See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 633-34, 122 S.
Ct. 1781, 1786-87, 152 L. Ed. 2d 860 (2002), and Johnson v.
United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-68, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 1548-49,
137 L. Ed. 2d 718 (1997), both holding that a denial of the right
to jury trial does not require reversal of the defendants
conviction if the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
We discussed both of these cases in Ned v. State, 119 P.3d 438,
443-44 (Alaska App. 2005).
 |
| Case Law Statutes, Regs & Rules Constitutions Miscellaneous |
|
