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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| RAYME DEAN STEVENS, | ) |
| ) Court of Appeals No. A-9137 | |
| Appellant, | ) Trial Court No. 4NE-04-044 Cr |
| ) | |
| v. | ) |
| ) O P I N I O N | |
| STATE OF ALASKA, | ) |
| ) | |
| Appellee. | ) No. 2045 April 21, 2006 |
| ) | |
Appeal from the District Court, Fourth Judi
cial District, Nenana, Raymond M. Funk,
Judge.
Appearances: Lawrence F. Reger and Robert
John, Fairbanks, for the Appellant. Jill S.
Dolan, Assistant District Attorney, and
Jeffrey A. OBryant, District Attorney,
Fairbanks, and David W. M rquez, Attorney
General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer
and Stewart, Judges.
MANNHEIMER, Judge.
Rayme Dean Stevenss drivers license was revoked as a
result of his March 2004 conviction for driving under the
influence. Three months later, in June of that year, the Nenana
police observed Stevens driving a four-wheeler (i.e., a four-
wheeled all-terrain vehicle) on the streets of Nenana. Based on
this conduct, Stevens was charged with the offense of driving a
motor vehicle on a highway at a time when his license was
revoked, AS 28.15.291(a).
Stevens ultimately pleaded no contest to this charge,
but he reserved his right to argue on appeal that, even when a
persons drivers license has been revoked, AS 28.15.291(a) does
not prohibit that person from driving an all-terrain vehicle on a
highway.
When a persons drivers license is suspended or revoked,
does AS 28.15.291(a)(1) prohibit that person from
driving any motor vehicle on a highway, even if the
motor vehicle is of a type for which no license is
required?
AS 28.15.291(a)(1) states that it is illegal
for a person to drive[] a motor vehicle on a highway or
vehicular way or area at a time when that persons
drivers license ... or privilege to obtain a license
has been canceled, suspended, or revoked in this
[state] or another jurisdiction. In State v. Straetz,
758 P.2d 133 (Alaska App. 1988), this Court was
confronted with the following question: does this
statute forbid a person whose drivers license has been
suspended or revoked from driving a motor vehicle on a
highway even if the motor vehicle in question is of a
type for which no license is required?
The facts of Straetz were essentially the
same as the facts of the present case: the defendant
was found driving a three-wheeler on a city street in
Fairbanks at a time when his drivers license was
suspended.1 And the defendant in Straetz made the same
argument that Stevens makes in the present case; that
is, the defendant in Straetz argued that because he was
driving an off-road vehicle (albeit on a road), and
because Alaska law does not require a license to
operate an off-road vehicle, his conduct was not
prohibited by AS 28.15.291(a).
This Court rejected this argument:
While it is true that ... the driver of
a three-wheeler is not required to have a
drivers license, the express and unambiguous
terms of AS 28.15.291(a) prohibited Straetz
from driving any motor vehicle on a highway
once his operators license was suspended.
The prohibition did not hinge on the nature
of the motor vehicle, but rather on Straetzs
demonstrated danger as a driver, as evidenced
by his license suspension. Alaska Statute
28.15.291(a) creates no exception that would
allow a driver whose license has been
suspended to drive on a highway in a motor
vehicle that does not require a licensed
driver. The statute, on its face, applies to
all motor vehicles. ... We see nothing
irrational in the legislatures apparent
conclusion that a person whose license has
been suspended should be prohibited from
driving any motor vehicle on a highway, even
one for which an operators license would not
otherwise be required.
Straetz, 758 P.2d at 134-35 (emphasis added).
This Courts decision in Straetz
appears to be dispositive of Stevenss appeal.
Stevens argues, however, that the Alaska
Legislature has since impliedly amended
AS 28.15.291(a) in a manner that overturns
the construction of the statute that this
Court adopted in Straetz.
Stevens relies on a statute passed
in 2002, AS 28.15.021(5). This statute
declares that no drivers license is needed to
drive or operate an off-highway vehicle,
watercraft, aircraft, or other vehicle not
designed for highway use as specified by the
[D]epartment [of Public Safety] by
regulation.
Stevens argues that this statute is
not limited to the off-road operation of off-
highway vehicles. Instead, Stevens contends
that this statute exempts the operation of
off-highway vehicles from any licensing
requirement, even if a person is driving the
off-highway vehicle on a highway. According
to Stevens, the legislatures purpose in
enacting AS 28.15.021(5) was to permit all
persons, even young [and] inexperienced
children, ... to operate off-highway vehicles
on highways[,] regardless of whether they ...
have a license.
And, based on this interpretation
of AS 28.15.021(5), Stevens renews the
argument that we rejected in Straetz: the
argument that, since no drivers license is
required to operate an off-highway vehicle,
AS 28.15.291(a) should not be interpreted to
forbid people with suspended or revoked
licenses from driving off-highway vehicles on
a highway. Stevens argues that if the
legislature intended to allow young and
inexperienced children to drive off-highway
vehicles on city streets, the legislature
must also have intended to allow people whose
licenses are suspended or revoked to do the
same.
Why we reject Stevenss proposed interpretation of AS
28.15.021(5)
AS 28.15.021(5) began life as House Bill 397
(22nd Legislature). The House Transportation
Committees file on House Bill 397 provides the
background on this bill.
During the preparation of a Winter
Transportation Study of snowmobile use in Alaska,
various state officials became aware that operators of
snowmobiles and other off-road vehicles (as well as
operators of planes and boats) were required to possess
an Alaska drivers license to operate those vehicles.2
In 2002, the State issued a brochure announcing this
little-known fact. Before long, Rep. Vic Kohring, who
was then chairman of the House Transportation
Committee, introduced a bill to exempt off-road
vehicles from this license requirement.3
Initially, House Bill 397 only exempted
snowmobile operators from the licensing requirement.
But the substitute bill ultimately passed by the
legislature exempted all types of off-road motor
vehicles, including all-terrain vehicles.4 Rep.
Kohring, in a sponsor statement, explained the
rationale for this substitute measure:
For state government to require a person
to pass a test to drive a car appears to have
nothing in common with running a boat on a
lake or river, flying a plane, or riding an
ATV while hunting. Those who depend on
snowmobiles, boats, and ATVs for basic
transportation to work, hunt, and fish in
many parts of Alaska need to have their
rights protected.
But the legislature never intended
for this new drivers license exemption to
apply when off-road vehicles were driven on
public streets. In his sponsor statement,
Rep. Kohring declared that the new law ends a
state legal requirement for operators of all
types of off-road motor vehicles (boat,
plane, all-terrain vehicle, or snowmachines)
to have an automobile drivers license to
operate on public properties, other than on
roads. (Emphasis added)5 Similarly, a press
release issued by Rep. Kohring on February
19, 2002 (found in the House Transportation
Committee file) states: While the bill would
free drivers of off-road vehicles from having
to have a valid drivers license, licenses
would still be required to operate such
vehicles on public roads. A memorandum of
talking points dated February 21, 2002 (also
included in the Transportation Committee
file) states:
A drivers license is still required to
operate any type of motor vehicle,
snowmachines included, on roads. (Rationale:
if you are going to be on the roadway, you
need to know how driving rules and laws apply
in order to operate safely.)
And in an e-mail to a constituent (also found
in the Committee file), a member of Rep.
Kohrings staff (Mike Krieber) told the
constituent: Please note that the bill that
unanimously passed out of the Transportation
Committee will STILL require[] drivers
licenses to operate all types of motor
vehicles on the roadways and vehicular ways
(parking lots) and ONLY where such right-of-
way operations are approved by the local
government. (Emphasis in the original)
In line with these comments, Mr.
Krieber told the Transportation Committee (at
a hearing held on February 21, 2002) that the
proposed law would eliminate the drivers
license requirement for off-road vehicles
operated on any area other than a highway.6
Mr. Krieber then read the relevant statutory
definition of highway to the Committee
members: Highway means the entire width
between the boundary lines of every way that
is publicly maintained when a part of it is
open to the public for purposes of vehicular
travel, including but not limited to every
street ... [,] but not vehicular ways or
areas.7
The members of the Transportation
Committee discussed an amendment that would
have substituted roadway for highway, so that
off-road vehicles could be operated alongside
the highway that is, on the berm or the
shoulder without a drivers license.8
However, the final version of House Bill 397
did not include this amendment.9
This history shows that the
legislature, when it enacted AS 28.15.021(5),
intended to allow the non-licensed operation
of off-highway vehicles only when those
vehicles are being operated off-highway.
This statute was not intended to eliminate
the requirement of a drivers license for the
operation of off-highway vehicles on public
roads. Rather, it permits unlicensed drivers
to operate off-highway vehicles so long as
these vehicles are being operated off of a
highway.
Why we reject Stevenss argument that the enactment of
AS 28.15.021(5) impliedly overturned the construction
of AS 28.15.291(a) that this Court adopted in Straetz
The ultimate issue in the present appeal is
not, strictly speaking, the meaning of AS 28.15.021(5)
(the statute declaring that no drivers license is
required to operate an off-road vehicle unless the
vehicle is being operated on a highway). Rather, the
ultimate issue is whether Stevens is correct when he
argues that the legislature, by enacting this statute,
intended to overturn our decision in Straetz. We
reject Stevenss argument for two reasons.
First, as we just explained in the preceding
section of this opinion, Stevens is wrong about the
meaning of AS 28.15.021(5). This statute does not
exempt the operators of off-highway vehicles from
normal licensing requirements if these vehicles are
being operated on a highway.
Second, even if Stevens had been correct in
his interpretation of AS 28.15.021(5), this would not
demonstrate the legislatures intention to alter the
result in Straetz.
Stevenss argument is that, if the legislature
decided to allow people to operate off-highway vehicles
on the highways of this state without a drivers
license, then it necessarily follows that the
legislature must have wanted to extend this privilege
even to those people whose drivers licenses are
suspended or revoked. This assertion is a non
sequitur.
As this Court explained in Straetz, the
legislature could and did rationally conclude that
the offense of driving while ones license is suspended
or revoked does not hinge on whether a drivers license
is required for the particular motor vehicle being
driven on the highway. The prohibition [does] not
hinge on the nature of the motor vehicle, but rather on
[the defendants] demonstrated danger as a driver, as
evidenced by [the] license suspension [or revocation].
Straetz, 758 P.2d at 134-35.
For these two reasons, we conclude that the
legislatures enactment of AS 28.15.021(5) does not
demonstrate any intention to alter the meaning or scope
of AS 28.15.291(a) as interpreted by this Court in
Straetz.
Stevenss argument that, if AS 28.15.291(a) prohibits
drivers whose licenses are suspended or revoked from
operating off-highway vehicles on the highways of this
state, this statute violates the due process clause of
the Alaska Constitution
Stevens argues that even if AS 28.15.291(a)
continues to mean what this Court said it meant in
Straetz, this statute is irreconcilable with
AS 28.15.021(5), and thus a driver whose license is
suspended or revoked is placed in an irresolvable
quandary as to which of the two statutes governs the
drivers behavior. Because of this, Stevens continues,
any prosecution under AS 28.15.291(a) for the act of
driving an off-highway vehicle on a highway must be
dismissed because the defendant is being denied due
process of law.
See Gudmundson v. State, 822 P.2d 1328, 1333
(Alaska 1991), where the supreme court held that when
one statute imposes a duty in a certain situation, and
another statute imposes an irreconcilably different
duty in the same situation, it violates the guarantee
of due process of law to prosecute a person for failing
to abide by one of the two statutes.
The answer to Stevenss argument is that AS
28.15.291(a) and AS 28.15.021(5) are not
irreconcilable. The first statute prohibits a person
whose drivers license is suspended or revoked from
driving any motor vehicle on a highway. The second
statute allows people to drive off-highway vehicles
without a license so long as the vehicle is not being
operated on a highway.
Stevens next argues that AS 28.15.291(a) is
so ambiguous that reasonable people would not be able
to tell whether a driver whose license is suspended or
revoked is authorized to drive an off-highway vehicle
on a highway.
The short answer to Stevenss argument is our
decision in Straetz, where we construed the statute to
prohibit this conduct.
The longer answer to Stevenss argument is
found in our decision in DeNardo v. State, 819 P.2d 903
(Alaska App. 1991). In DeNardo, we explained that a
statute is not unconstitutionally vague or ambiguous
merely because reasonable people might disagree about
the meaning of the statute:
[T]he fact that people can, in good
faith, litigate the meaning of a statute does
not necessarily (or even usually) mean that
the statute is so indefinite as to be
unconstitutional. The question is whether
the statutes meaning is unresolvably confused
or ambiguous after it has been subjected to
legal analysis. If study of the statutes
wording, examination of its legislative
history, and reference to other relevant
statutes and case law makes the statutes
meaning clear, then the statute is
constitutional.
DeNardo, 819 P.2d at 908 (emphasis in the
original).
For these reasons, we reject
Stevenss assertion that AS 28.15.291(a)
violates his right to due process of law.
Stevenss argument that AS 28.15.291(a) violates the
equal protection clause of the Alaska Constitution
Stevens next argues that, if AS 28.15.291(a)
prohibits a person whose drivers license is suspended
or revoked from driving an off-highway vehicle on the
highways of this state, then the statute violates his
right to equal protection of the law.
Stevens acknowledges that the State may have
a legitimate interest in restricting the driving
activities of people whose licenses are suspended or
revoked, but he argues that this interest is not ... an
important one, and that it is clearly outweighed by a
citizens right to drive.
This argument is frivolous.
Stevens next argues that AS 28.15.291(a)
draws irrational classifications between criminal and
non-criminal behavior. He points out that, under AS
28.15.291(a), a person whose drivers license is
suspended or revoked is prohibited from operating any
motor vehicle on a highway, but the statute does not
restrict the same persons right to operate a boat or
aircraft, or to operate off-highway vehicles as long as
the operation of these vehicles does not take place on
a highway. Stevens contends that there is no rational
basis for this distinction.
We disagree. As we explained earlier in this
opinion, when we reviewed the legislative history of AS
28.15.021(5), the legislature decided that it made
little sense to require a person to obtain a drivers
license that is, require the person to demonstrate a
knowledge of the rules of the road, and to demonstrate
the ability to maneuver a motor vehicle on city streets
and state highways if the person had no intention of
driving a motor vehicle on city streets or state
highways. The legislature concluded that the rules and
practices of safe operation for boats, planes, and off-
highway vehicles (when operated off of a highway) were
different enough that it made little sense to require
the operators of these vehicles to demonstrate the
knowledge and skills needed to obtain a drivers
license.
But as we explained in Straetz, AS
28.15.291(a) is premised on the legislatures conclusion
that a person whose drivers license has been suspended
or revoked should not be allowed to operate any motor
vehicle on a highway because this person presents a
significant danger to other drivers and pedestrians,
regardless of the type of motor vehicle that the person
may be driving.
For these reasons, we conclude that it was
not irrational for the legislature, when deciding how
to restrict the driving activities of people whose
licenses have been suspended or revoked, to distinguish
between (a) the operation of motor vehicles in the air,
on the water, or off-road, and (b) the operation of
motor vehicles on the highway, where many more drivers,
bicyclists, and pedestrians are present.
Finally, Stevens argues that AS 28.15.291(a)
violates the equal protection clause because not all
drivers license suspensions are directly traceable to
behavior that indicates ones dangerousness as a driver.
See, for instance, AS 28.15.161(a)(3), which requires
cancellation of a persons drivers license if it is
discovered that the person failed to give ... correct
information in [their license] application, and
AS 28.15.181(a)(4), which requires revocation of a
persons drivers license if it is discovered that the
person knowingly made a false affidavit or statement
under oath to the [D]epartment [of Public Safety]
relating to motor vehicles.
It may be true that people whose licenses
have been canceled, suspended, or revoked for these or
like reasons are no more dangerous to the public than
any other driver. But when the legislature creates
classifications and draws distinctions, these
classifications and distinctions need not fit every
individual case perfectly. All that is required is a
reasonable and rational attempt to achieve the
statutory goal.10
The primary goal of AS 28.15.291(a) is to
protect motorists, bicyclists, and pedestrians from
dangerous drivers. The distinction codified in AS
28.15.291(a) the distinction between people whose
drivers licenses remain valid and people whose licenses
have been suspended or revoked is a reasonable and
rational attempt to achieve this goal, even though some
people whose licenses have been suspended or revoked
may pose no greater danger than other drivers.
Moreover, Stevens is not in a position to
argue that the net cast by the statute may be too
broad. Whatever might be said about the rationality of
applying AS 28.15.291(a) to people whose licenses have
been canceled for providing false information in their
license application, or for committing perjury when
transferring title to a motor vehicle, the same
argument does not apply to Stevenss case. Stevenss
license was revoked because he was convicted of driving
under the influence a circumstance that clearly
suggests his enhanced danger to the public. Thus, even
if we agreed with Stevens that AS 28.15.291(a) should
not apply to all types of license cancellations,
suspensions, and revocations, Stevenss license
revocation would still fall within the undisputably
lawful core of the statute.
For these reasons, we reject Stevenss equal
protection attack on AS 28.15.291(a).
Stevenss claim that he is entitled to an acquittal
because of his mistake of law defense
Stevenss final argument in this appeal is
that he is entitled to an acquittal because he acted
under a reasonable mistake concerning the law that
governed his conduct.
Alaska recognizes a mistake of law defense.
However, this defense is quite limited: it is
available only to people who act in reasonable reliance
on a formal interpretation of the law issued by the
chief enforcement officer or agency [entrusted with
enforcement of that law].11 Thus, the mistake of law
defense is not available to people who rely (even
reasonably) on a mistaken statement or interpretation
of the law received from a police officer or other
subordinate officer.12 And, of course, this defense is
not available to people who form their own mistaken
opinion about the law.13
Stevens does not base this mistake of law
claim on anything that a government official told him
about the law. Rather, Stevens relies solely on his
own subjective interpretation of the law an
interpretation that is premised on arguments that we
addressed earlier in this opinion: Stevenss proposed
interpretation of AS 28.15.021(5) (an interpretation
that he apparently arrived at by himself, or with the
aid of one of his attorneys), and the purported
contradiction between this statute (as Stevens
interpreted it) and AS 28.15.291(a).
Under these circumstances, a mistake of law
defense is not available to Stevens.
Conclusion
For the reasons explained here, the
interpretation of AS 28.15.291(a) that this Court
announced in Straetz remains the law of Alaska, and the
judgement of the district court is AFFIRMED.
_______________________________
1Straetz, 758 P.2d at 134.
2See, for example, (1) the minutes of the House
Transportation Committees hearing on HB 397 (February 21,
2002) (comments by Mike Krieber, staff to Rep. Vic Kohring,
who was a sponsor of the bill); (2) Sponsor Statement, HB
397 (undated); (3) Anchorage Daily News editorial, Safety
First (February 14, 2002); (4) Anchorage Daily News article,
What the ...? Snowmobilers need a drivers license (February
5, 2002); and (5) Alaska Department of Transportation &
Public Facilities, Winter Transportation Study (undated
draft).
3See Sponsor Statement, HB 397 (contained in the House
Transportation Committee File on HB 397).
4SLA 2002, ch. 140, 1.
5Sponsor Statement, HB 397.
6Minutes of the House Transportation Committee hearing on HB
397 (February 21, 2002). See also the statement of
Mary Marshburn (director of the Division of Motor
Vehicles) at the February 21, 2002 Transportation
Committee hearing, that once a vehicle enters the
roadway, it must comply with the rules of the road.
The operator can be cited for noncompliance with the
rules of the road, whether licensed or not. ... [Those]
things would not change if the bill passes.
7At that time, the definition of highway was found in
AS 28.40.100(11). Since then, AS 28.40.100(11) has
been renumbered as AS 28.40.100(12). See Revisors Note
to AS 28.40.100.
8See Minutes of the House Transportation Committee hearing
on HB 397 (February 21, 2002); see also Committee
Substitute for House Bill 397 (offered February 25,
2002) (in the House Transportation Committee file).
9SLA 2002, ch. 140, 1.
10McCracken v. State, 743 P.2d 382, 384 (Alaska App. 1987).
11Morgan v. State, 943 P.2d 1208, 1212 (Alaska App. 1997),
quoting Haggren v. State, 829 P.2d 842, 844 (Alaska App.
1992).
12Morgan, 943 P.2d at 1212; Haggren, 829 P.2d at 844.
13Busby v. State, 40 P.3d 807, 816-17 (Alaska App. 2002);
Morgan, 943 P.2d at 1212-13.
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