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opinion is published in the Pacific Reporter. Readers
are encouraged to bring typographical or other formal
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303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| STATE OF ALASKA, | ) | |
| ) Court of Appeals No. A-8851 Petitioner, | ) Trial Court No. 3AN-01-5461 CR | |
| ) | ||
| v. | ) | |
| ) O P I N I O N | ||
| ANTONIO M. GARRISON, | ) | |
| ) | ||
| Respondent. | ) [No. 2030 February 3, 2006] | |
| ) | ||
Petition for Review from the Superior Court,
Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Michael
L. Wolverton, Judge.
Appearances: Kenneth M. Rosenstein,
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special
Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and
David W. M rquez, Attorney General, Juneau,
for the Petitioner. Andrew J. Lambert,
Kalamarides & Lambert, Anchorage, for the
Respondent.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer
and Stewart, Judges.
STEWART, Judge.
During interviews with the police, Antonio M. Garrison
admitted that he removed a handgun from the scene of a homicide
but consistently denied that he had any responsibility for this
homicide. The grand jury returned an indictment charging
Garrison with several crimes: felon in possession of a
concealable firearm (Garrison had a prior felony conviction); two
counts of tampering with physical evidence; first-degree murder;
first-degree robbery; first-degree theft; and first-degree
vehicle theft.1
Garrison moved to suppress his statements to the police
in which he admitted removing the handgun, claiming a violation
of his constitutional rights. The superior court suppressed
Garrisons statements, finding that the police rendered Garrisons
statements involuntary when they threatened him with harsher
treatment. The superior court also concluded that Garrisons
right to counsel had attached and was violated.
Because no adversary proceedings had commenced when
Garrison made his statements, the superior court erred in
concluding that Garrisons right to counsel had attached and was
violated. Furthermore, because the police did not subject
Garrison to custodial interrogation when he made the disputed
statements, the superior court erred in ruling that Garrisons
Fifth Amendment right to counsel was violated.
Moreover, we conclude that the detectives statements
Garrison relied on to support his claim that the police
threatened harsher treatment are not threatening statements under
article I, section 9 of the Alaska Constitution. Even if we
analyze the case assuming the statements are threatening as a
matter of law, Garrison admitted that he removed the gun before
the detectives made the statements that Garrison identifies as
threats of harsher treatment. Thus, even if Garrisons will was
overborne by the detectives later in the interview, Garrison had
already made the damaging admissions before the police statements
that Garrison relied on to claim that his admissions were
involuntary. Finally, examining the totality of the
circumstances, we conclude that Garrisons will was not overborne
by the detectives statements.
We conclude that the superior court erred in
suppressing Garrisons admissions. Accordingly, we reverse the
superior courts ruling and remand for further proceedings on the
indictment.
Background facts and proceedings
On November 1, 2000, Paul Clinton was found shot to
death in his place of business. Anchorage Police Detective
Donald Krohn first interviewed Garrison on November 2, after the
police discovered that Garrison had done business with Clinton on
the day of his death. Garrison was given full Miranda2 warnings,
and Garrison denied any involvement in the homicide. Detective
Krohn contacted Garrison a second time on November 4 at Garrisons
residence. Krohn did not give Garrison Miranda warnings at this
second interview; Garrison again denied involvement in the
homicide. On November 7, Garrison retained an attorney, Chad
Holt.
On December 11, the detectives contacted Garrison to
arrange for another interview; Garrison agreed. On December 12,
Garrison met Detectives Krohn and Timothy Landeis but told the
detectives that Holt advised him not to talk with the police.
This was the first time the detectives learned that Garrison had
retained an attorney.
Sometime later, Detective Landeis called Holt and left
a message with specific questions he wanted to ask Garrison.
Holt returned the call, leaving a message for Detective Landeis
indicating that Garrison would not make any statements.
In January 2001, the police recovered a handgun that
had been pawned by Garrisons sister. The police suspected that
this gun might have been used to shoot Clinton. They had the gun
tested. The testing showed that it was possible that the gun was
the murder weapon, but the testing was not conclusive.
On January 18, 2001, Krohn and Detective Nick
Vanderveur went to Garrisons house and were let in by his wife.
The detectives did not give Garrison a Miranda warning before the
interview started. The detectives told Garrison about the gun
they retrieved from a pawnshop that his sister had pawned, and
they told Garrison they had tested the gun (without telling him
that the testing was not conclusive).
Garrison claimed that he had sold the gun to Clinton
the day before Clinton was killed. Garrison said that he went to
Clintons office on November 1, discovered that he was dead, saw
the gun lying near Clintons body, and took the gun in a panic and
left. Garrison explained that he took the gun because he was on
probation and did not want the gun linked to him. Garrison again
denied killing Clinton.
The detectives told Garrison where they were in the
investigation. They informed Garrison that they would present
the case they had to the district attorney, and they told
Garrison that the evidence appeared to support a case of
intentional murder, unless Garrison had something more he wanted
to share with them. Detective Krohn told Garrison: [If] [y]ou
dont talk to us, you dont tell us the story[, then] we have [just
the] one story. And we go straight to the DA with it, Detective
Vanderveur added. Detective Vanderveur then told Garrison ...
were out on a limb ... we dont always ... do this for people.
The detectives asked Garrison if he would agree to a
polygraph examination. Garrison agreed and drove himself to the
police station. Before the examination, Garrison waived his
Miranda rights. After the polygraph, Garrison was interviewed
again by Detectives Krohn and Landeis and then left the station.
The grand jury indicted Garrison on July 13, 2001,
charging him with two counts of tampering with physical evidence
and one count of felon in possession of a firearm, first-degree
murder, first-degree robbery, first-degree theft, and first-
degree vehicle theft. Garrison moved to suppress his January 18,
2001 statements, arguing he was in custody on January 18 and,
therefore, should have been given a Miranda warning. He also
argued that his statements on January 18 were involuntary under
the Fifth Amendment and, because his right to counsel had
attached and been violated, were taken in violation of the Sixth
Amendment.
Superior Court Judge Michael L. Wolverton granted
Garrisons motion. Judge Wolverton found that Garrison was not in
custody at any point on January 18, 2001. Nevertheless, Judge
Wolverton found that Detective Landeis knew Garrison had retained
Holt as his attorney and knew that Holt advised Garrison not to
talk to police. Judge Wolverton further found that the detectives
threatened Garrison with harsher punishment if he did not talk to
them, thereby making his admissions of tampering with evidence
and illegal possession of the gun involuntary. The State
petitioned for review of Judge Wolvertons ruling on the motion to
suppress, and we granted review.
Because adversary criminal proceedings had not begun
when Garrison admitted his criminal activity, Garrisons
Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached
The State argues that the superior court erred when it
concluded that Garrisons Sixth Amendment right to counsel was
violated on January 18. The State points out that in Thiel v.
State,3 we ruled that the right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment attaches only upon the commencement of adversary
criminal proceedings and not during purely investigative stages
of a case.4 The State asserts that adversary proceedings did not
commence until July 13, 2001, the day Garrison was first formally
charged by grand jury indictment. Accordingly, the State argues
that Garrisons right to counsel had not yet attached on January
18, 2001. In addition, the State argues that the polices
knowledge that Garrison had a lawyer and the lawyer told the
police that Garrison did not wish to talk, did not bar the
detectives from contacting and interviewing Garrison on January
18.
Garrison argues his right to counsel had attached at
the January 18 interview. He maintains that his right to counsel
is also guaranteed under article I, section 11 of the Alaska
Constitution, which provides, in part, In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall have the right ... to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense.
Garrison argues that Alaska case law suggests that the
right to counsel attaches not only when adversary proceedings
begin but also when police actively interfere or impair [an
existing] attorney-client relationship.
In Thiel, we held that article I, section 11 of the
Alaska Constitution mirrored the Sixth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution in providing a right to counsel only in criminal
proceedings where there is commencement of a specified
adversarial proceeding that trigger[s] the right to counsel.5 We
acknowledged that the scope of Alaskas constitutional protection
had enlarged beyond the federal minimum, but we did not find that
the need for some form of adversary proceeding can be dispensed
with altogether or that Alaskas right to counsel attaches in the
abstract to all attorney-client relationships.6 In Thiel, we
relied on Loveless v. State,7 a case in which the Alaska Supreme
Court held that the right to counsel has been extended to
investigatory proceedings but only when conducted in an adversary
context.8
Garrison asks this court to extend the right to counsel
to situations where police interfere with an existing attorney-
client relationship, even when no adversary proceeding has yet
commenced. For support, Garrison cites Blue v. State,9 Thiel v.
State, and Carr v. State,10 three cases that dealt with the right
to counsel under the Alaska Constitution.
In Blue, the Alaska Supreme Court held that a suspect
who is in custody is entitled to have counsel present at a pre-
indictment lineup unless exigent circumstances exist so that
providing counsel would unduly interfere with a prompt and
purposeful investigation.11 Blue is not directly controlling here
because, unlike the defendant in Blue who was in custody during
the police interview, Judge Wolverton found Garrison was not in
custody during the January 18 interview at his home.
Our remarks in Thiel and Carr might be subject to
broader interpretation. In Thiel, we declined to extend the
right to counsel under the Alaska Constitution to instances where
adversarial proceedings had not begun but noted that police
conduct involving ... actual interference [with an attorney-
client relationship] might well raise serious issues of
fundamental fairness ... .12 And in Carr, we announced that the
right to counsel may be offended before formal charges in
situations where the attorney-client relationship has been
impaired.13
Objectively, the transcripts of the interviews do not
show that the detectives actively discouraged Garrison from
contacting Holt. The police even reminded Garrison of his right
to an attorney and suggested that the attorney would likely
repeat the advice not to discuss the case with the police. The
record does not support a conclusion that the detectives
improperly interfered with Garrisons attorney-client
relationship.
We are not limited by the scope of the Sixth Amendment
when we construe the right-to-counsel provision of the Alaska
Constitution.14 But in Thiel, a case that parallels Garrisons
situation, we concluded that right to counsel under article I,
section 11 of the Alaska Constitution was coextensive with the
right under the Sixth Amendment.15
Finally, Garrison urges this court to uphold Judge
Wolverton by applying the holding of the New York Court of
Appeals in People v. Skinner16 to the facts of this case. Skinner
announced a rule of law that, where a defendant is known to have
invoked the right to and obtained the services of counsel on the
matter about which the person is questioned, the State may not
use statements elicited from that person in the absence of a
waiver of counsel made in the presence of the attorney.17
In Skinner, the defendant retained an attorney who
instructed police not to question the defendant unless the
attorney was present.18 Almost two years later, police contacted
the defendant and, after reading him Miranda warnings, conducted
an interview in which the defendant made damaging admissions.19
Even though no formal proceedings against the defendant had
commenced, the New York Court of Appeals found that the
defendants right to counsel under the New York Constitution was
violated:20
In retaining an attorney specifically in
response to repeated police-initiated
contacts, [the] defendant unequivocally
indicated that he felt himself unable to
deal with the authorities without legal
assistance. In a real sense, he had
activated his constitutional right to
interpose an attorney between himself and
the overwhelming power of the State. ...
That right is rendered illusory if the
States agents are permitted to subject an
individual represented by counsel to
questioning in a noncustodial setting. The
effects of a waiver of counsel are no less
real in that setting; waiver of the right to
counsel once invoked should be no less
ineffective than when made by a person in
custody.21
The holding in Skinner is based on New Yorks Donovan-Arthur-
Hobson rule, which prohibits virtually all police interrogation
once a defense attorney is retained, regardless of whether
judicial proceedings have commenced.22 In People v. Hobson,23 the
New York Court of Appeals defended this approach as a more
robust constitutional protection against involuntary waiver of
counsel, stating that the rule breathes life into the
requirement that a waiver of a constitutional right must be
competent, intelligent and voluntary.24 Further, the court found
the rule served to protect the individual, often ignorant and
uneducated, and always in fear, when faced with the coercive
police power of the State.25 Professor Yale Kamisar has
observed, however, that this rule actually favors the
professional criminal, as it is this individual who is most
likely to have already obtained counsel in advance of or during
a police investigation.26 Other jurisdictions that have been
urged to follow Skinner have declined.27
We decline to follow the approach of the New York
Court of Appeals in Skinner. Instead, we adhere to Thiel.
Because Garrison had not been formally charged with a crime, we
conclude that Garrisons right to counsel under either the Sixth
Amendment or the Alaska Constitution had not attached when the
police interviewed him on January 18. Therefore, the superior
court erred when it concluded that the police interviews on
January 18 violated Garrisons right to counsel either under the
Sixth Amendment or article I, section 11 of the Alaska
Constitution.
Because Garrison was not subjected to custodial
interrogation on January 18 at his home, his Fifth
Amendment right to counsel was not violated
Garrison argues that he made an equivocal reference to
an attorney during the January 18 interview at his home when he
said the attorney freaks me out more than you do. All I did was
get advice ... . Garrison asserts that, at that point, the
detectives were required to narrow the scope of their
questioning to ascertaining whether or not Garrison was evoking
his rights.
The State argues that Garrisons right to counsel under
the Fifth Amendment was not violated because he was not in
custody when he was questioned and, therefore, was not entitled
to the protections required by Miranda.
In Eben v. State,28 the Alaska Supreme Court announced
that [b]oth custody and interrogation must be involved in the
procurement of an inculpatory statement by law enforcement
officials before the standards enunciated in Miranda are
applicable.29
Judge Wolverton found that Garrison was not in custody
at any time on January 18. Garrison does not dispute this
finding with regards to the interview conducted in his home.
Because Garrison was not in custody at the time he was
interviewed in his home, under Eben, he was not subjected to
custodial interrogation. Therefore, his Fifth Amendment right
to counsel, under Miranda, was not violated.30
In Alaska, police have a duty in some circumstances to
narrow questioning to determine whether a suspect is invoking
Fifth Amendment rights.31 But this duty applies when the police
subject a suspect to custodial interrogation, and we have
already noted that Judge Wolverton found that Garrison was not
in custody.32
To the extent that Garrison argues that the police had
to stop and clarify Garrisons reference to an attorney, that
argument has no merit because Garrison was not in custody, and
the requirement, under Edwards v. Arizona,33 that the police stop
an interview when a defendant makes an equivocal request for
counsel applies to custodial interrogations.34
Police are bound by the restrictions placed on them by
the Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-incrimination when
they conduct a custodial interrogation. Because Garrison was
not in custody during the interview in his home and, therefore,
not subject to a custodial interrogation, the superior court
erred to the extent it found that Garrisons Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination was violated.
The superior court erred in finding that the police
threatened harsher treatment if Garrison did not speak
to them about the crime
The voluntary nature of a confession is a mixed
question of fact and law.35 In Beavers v. State,36 the Alaska
Supreme Court outlined a three-part inquiry for ascertaining the
voluntariness of a confession: the appellate court will review
the trial courts findings regarding the external,
phenomenological facts surrounding the confession for clear
error and then will determine independently the accuseds mental
state and the legal significance of that mental state after an
examination of the entire record and the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the confession.37
In his motion to suppress, Garrison argued that the
detectives induced statements from him during the January 18
interview at his home with offers of leniency, promising
Garrison he would not be arrested that day regardless of what he
told the detectives. In addition, Garrison asserts, the
detectives implied Garrison should say he accidentally shot
Clinton as the detectives thought the D.A. would understand that
... and that it would be hard to sell the D.A. the story that
Garrison was not involved in Clintons murder. Garrison points
out that the detectives used phrases such as please tell me
now. Dont make me come back later because if I have to come
back later ... and Please dont make me prove this [because] if
they make me prove this its gonna turn out a whole lot different
than probably what it really was or what you think it was.
Garrison further notes that Detective Krohn testified at the
suppression hearing that the detectives were trying to get
Garrison to talk by telling him it would be worse for him if he
did not.
Garrison argues that, because his inculpatory
statements were made in response to these statements, they were
presumptively involuntary and should be suppressed. The State
argues that nothing in the detectives statements that Garrison
relies on suggests Garrison would receive any punishment for
refusing to talk to the detectives.
In Beavers, the Alaska Supreme Court held that
[t]hreat-induced confessions should be considered presumptively
involuntary absent evidence affirmatively indicating that the
suspects will was not overcome by the threats.38 The police told
Beavers that he might be hammered subjected to harsher
treatment during a non-custodial interview after which Beavers
confessed to participation in a robbery.39 The court concluded
that Beavers confession was involuntary because the interviewing
troopers threat that he would be hammered if he attempted to
hide his involvement in the robberies conveyed an unmistakable
message that Beavers would be punished for exercising his
constitutional right to silence.40
Here, Judge Wolverton found, relying on Beavers, that
Garrisons admission that he moved the gun from the murder scene
was presumptively involuntary because of threats of harsher
treatment made by the detectives. Judge Wolverton ruled on the
motion to suppress from the bench and did not specify which
statements by the detectives he based his decision on.
An examination of the record shows that there are
numerous instances during the January 18 interview where the
detectives seemingly took a confrontational tone. For the
purposes of determining whether Garrisons admissions were
involuntary, however, the relevant statements to consider are
those the detectives made before Garrison admitted that he
removed the handgun from the scene of the homicide.41
All of the detectives statements Garrison referred to
in the superior court and in this court were made after Garrison
already admitted that he took the handgun. A finding that
police threats provoked an involuntary confession logically
requires a finding that the threats preceded the confession.
Because Garrisons admissions occurred before the detectives made
the statements Garrison identifies as threatening, the superior
court erred in finding Garrisons statements were involuntary.
While Detective Krohn testified at the evidentiary
hearing that he hoped to sway Garrison to talk during the
January 18 interview, we review the objective events that occur
in the interview. An officers subjective aims do not control
our analysis. Before Garrisons initial admissions, the
detectives had only asked Garrison whether his family should
leave the room for the interview and told Garrison the results
of their continued investigation, including the fact that they
had recovered a handgun pawned by his sister and subjected it to
testing. Detective Krohn said And I what Im asking you is to
tell me what happened so that I can tell the district attorney.
Otherwise, it looks like plain-out murder. Garrison then
reaffirmed that he was not involved in Clintons homicide but
said that he discovered Clintons body and took the gun that
Garrison had sold him earlier. He claimed that he took the gun
because he was on probation and did not want to be tied to the
gun. From our review of the circumstances of the interview, we
conclude that none of the detectives statements before Garrisons
admissions constituted threats of harsher treatment under
Beavers. The detectives explained to Garrison that the evidence
they had developed suggested that the homicide appeared to be
murder and that, absent some mitigating information from
Garrison, they would present the existing evidence they had to
the district attorney. These statements do not suggest that
Garrison would be subjected to harsher than normal treatment
unless he admitted his involvement in the homicide.42 Rather,
the detectives offered Garrison a chance to provide additional
information that might tend to exculpate him or mitigate his
conduct.
We next consider Garrisons claim that the detectives
statements later in the interview were threatening. Viewed
objectively, the statements do not tell Garrison that he would
receive harsher treatment unless he admitted involvement in
Clintons homicide. Viewed in isolation, one of Detective Krohns
statements, made very close to the end of the interview at
Garrisons home, could be described, arguably, as threatening:
Please dont make me prove this [because] if they make me prove
this its gonna turn out a whole lot different than probably what
it really was or what you think it was. Now damn it, if this
was an accident tell us now. Dont let me find out later it was
murder for the money. But Krohn did not explicitly threaten any
harsher treatment for Garrison if Garrison did not admit
involvement in the homicide. And, viewed in the context of the
detectives other statements, it is a repetition, admittedly in
stronger language, of the detectives assertion that Garrison
might be better served if he advanced exculpatory or mitigating
information sooner. Viewing the interviews on the 18th
collectively, we conclude that the detectives statements are not
threats under Beavers.
The State next argues that Garrisons statements were
improperly suppressed because Garrisons will was not overborne.43
The State asserts that Garrisons unwavering adherence to his
story effectively rebuts any presumption of coercion and
establishes that the detectives did not overbear his free will.
The State argues that Garrison was merely engag[ing] in a
calculated effort to assuage police suspicions and to make it
appear that he was reluctantly but honestly cooperating with
their investigative efforts.44
The determination of whether a statement is
involuntary rests in large measure on the subjective effect of
the police conduct on the suspects will.45 Statements may be
deemed involuntary if officers, through threats, undermine a
suspects will to resist and elicit a confession that would
otherwise not be freely given.46 In Edwards v. State,47 the
suspect argued his statement to officers was involuntary
because the police officers threatened him with immediate arrest
on a murder charge if he failed to talk to them.48 We found
that, despite the threat, the statements were not involuntary:
The main impediment to such a finding [that the statements were
involuntary] is that Edwards, despite police pressure to talk,
said nothing to directly inculpate himself in [the crime].49 The
holding in Edwards was affirmed in Malloy v. State,50 where we
again found the suspects statement was voluntary, despite
officer threats, primarily because the suspect said nothing to
directly inculpate herself.51
Nevertheless, Judge Wolverton ruled that Garrison did
make inculpatory statements: Im further persuaded ... that,
contrary to Edwards and Malloy, the ultimate result was that Mr.
Garrison admitted two felonies: [evidence] tampering and felon
in possession. But Garrison consistently denied that he was
responsible for Clintons death the focus of the investigation
and the interviews. Even though his statements directly
inculpated him in the offenses of tampering with evidence and
felon in possession of a concealable firearm, the obvious
purpose of these statements was to explain how Garrisons sister
came to be in possession of the gun in a way that did not
implicate Garrison in Clintons death.
As we noted above, Garrisons admissions preceded any
statements identified by Garrison as coercive or threatening.52
The timing of Garrisons admissions, before any arguably
threatening or coercive statements were made by the detectives,
and the exculpatory nature of the admissions with respect to the
homicide, establishes that Garrisons will was not overborne.53
The superior court erred in ruling that Garrisons
statements were involuntary.
Garrisons claim that he was in custody during the
interviews at the police station
At the suppression hearing, Judge Wolverton found that
Garrison was not in custody at any time on January 18, 2001.
Garrison challenges this finding as to the interviews at the
Anchorage Police Department that followed the interview at his
home.
But this contention appears to be moot because the
police advised Garrison of his Miranda rights at the police
station before the polygraph examination. The record shows that
Garrison said that he understood his rights, and with those
rights in mind, he waived his rights and agreed to talk with the
police. Even if Judge Wolverton erred when he concluded that
Garrison was not in custody, (and we are not convinced that this
conclusion is erroneous) the police advised Garrison of his
Miranda rights at the police station, and Garrison waived those
rights.
Conclusion
We REVERSE the superior courts order granting
Garrisons motion to suppress his statements. We remand the case
to the superior court for further proceedings on the indictment.
_______________________________
1 AS 11.61.200(a)(1); AS 11.56.610(a)(1) & (4); AS
11.41.100(a)(1); AS 11.41.500(a)(1); AS 11.46.120; AS
11.46.360(a)(1), respectively.
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed.
2d 694 (1966).
3 762 P.2d 478 (Alaska App. 1988).
4 Id. at 481.
5 Id. at 482-83. See also Eben v. State, 599 P.2d 700, 706
(Alaska 1979) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689, 92
S. Ct. 1877, 1882, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411, 417 (1972)) (Ebens sixth
amendment rights were not implicated ... because no adversary
judicial criminal proceedings whether by way of formal charge,
preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment had
been initiated against him.).
6 Thiel, 762 P.2d at 482 (citing Flores v. Flores, 598 P.2d
893 (Alaska 1979) (conferring the right to counsel to a parent in
a child custody case when the other parent was represented by
state counsel); Reynolds v. Kimmons, 569 P.2d 799 (Alaska 1977)
(conferring the right to counsel to a defendant in a paternity
suit when the plaintiff was represented by state counsel); Blue
v. State, 558 P.2d 636 (Alaska 1977) (finding a defendant subject
to a pre-indictment lineup while in custody was entitled to
representation); Otton v. Zaborac, 525 P.2d 537 (Alaska 1974)
(extending the right to counsel to civil contempt proceedings
involving failure to make child support payments); Alexander v.
Anchorage, 490 P.2d 910 (Alaska 1971) (extending the right to
counsel to all criminal prosecutions involving the possibility of
incarceration); Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d 340 (Alaska 1969)
(extending the right to counsel to a prisoner from whom the
police sought to obtain a post-indictment handwriting exemplar)).
7 592 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1979).
8 Id. at 1210 (citing Blue v. State, 558 P.2d 636 (Alaska
1977); Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d 340 (Alaska 1969)).
9 558 P.2d 636 (Alaska 1977).
10 840 P.2d 1000 (Alaska App. 1992).
11 Blue, 558 P.2d at 642 (citations omitted).
12 Thiel, 762 P.2d at 483.
13 Carr, 840 P.2d at 1005.
14 Blue, 558 P.2d at 641. See also Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d
340, 342 (Alaska 1969) (We are not bound in expounding the Alaska
Constitutions Declaration of Rights by the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, past or future, which expound
identical or closely similar provisions of the United States
Constitution.).
15 Thiel, 762 P.2d at 482.
16 417 N.E.2d 501 (N.Y. 1980).
17 Skinner, 417 N.E. 2d at 505.
18 Id. at 502.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 503.
21 Id. at 505.
22 Yale Kamisar, Police Interrogations and Confessions 213
(1980) (citing People v. Hobson, 348 N.E.2d 894 (N.Y. 1976);
People v. Arthur, 239 N.E.2d 537 (N.Y. 1968); People v. Donovan,
193 N.E.2d 628 (N.Y. 1963)).
23 348 N.E.2d 894 (N.Y. 1976).
24 Id. at 898.
25 Id.
26 Kamisar, supra, at 221.
27 See State v. Luton, 927 P.2d 844, 852 (Haw. 1996); State v.
Scarborough, 470 A.2d 909, 914 (N.H. 1983); State v. Smart, 622
A.2d 1197, 1213 (N.H. 1993); Lara v. State, 740 S.W.2d 823, 835
(Tex. App. 1987).
28 599 P.2d 700 (Alaska 1979).
29 Id. at 707 (emphasis in the original).
30 See id.
31 See Hampel v. State, 706 P.2d 1173, 1180 (Alaska App. 1985)
(Whenever even an equivocal request for an attorney is made by a
suspect during custodial interrogation, the scope of that
interrogation is immediately narrowed to ... clarifying that
request until it is clarified.) (emphasis in the original). See
also Giacomazzi v. State, 633 P.2d 218, 222 (Alaska 1981)
(finding that officers may clarify whether a statement is a
request for counsel or an invocation of the right to remain
silent); Davis v. U.S., 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2355,
129 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1994) (finding officers are not required to
cease questioning immediately upon an ambiguous or equivocal
reference to an attorney).
32 See Hampel, 706 P.2d at 1180.
33 451 U.S. 477, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981).
34 Id. at 484-85, 101 S. Ct. at 1884-85.
35 Beavers v. State, 998 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Alaska 2000).
36 998 P.2d 1040 (Alaska 2000).
37 Id. at 1044.
38 Id. at 1048.
39 Id. at 1042.
40 Id. at 1048.
41 See id. at 1046 (finding confessions resulting from threats
are presumptively involuntary).
42 See id.
43 See id. 998 P.2d at 1048 (Threat-induced confessions should
be considered presumptively involuntary absent evidence
affirmatively indicating that the suspects will was not overcome
by the threats.).
44 Edwards v. State, 842 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Alaska App. 1992).
45 Id. at 1285.
46 Malloy v. State, 1 P.3d 1266, 1276 (Alaska App. 2000);
Edwards, 842 P.2d at 1285.
47 842 P.2d 1281 (Alaska App. 1992).
48 Id. at 1285.
49 Id.
50 1 P.3d 1266 (Alaska App. 2000).
51 Id. at 1276.
52 See id. (Statements are involuntary if the police, through
promises or threats, undermine a suspects will to resist and
elicit a confession that is not freely given.).
53 See Beavers, 998 P.2d at 1048.
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