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Clark v. Municipality of Anchorage (05/13/2005) ap-1983
Clark v. Municipality of Anchorage (05/13/2005) ap-1983
NOTICE
Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal
precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and
Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court
of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3).
Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited
as binding precedent for any proposition of law.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
SCOTT R. CLARK, )
) Court of Appeals No. A-
8674
Appellant, )
Trial Court No. 3AN-03-2209 Cr
)
v. )
) O P I N I O N
MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, )
)
Appellee. )
)
[No. 1983 May 13, 2005]
Appeal from the District Court, Third Judi
cial District, Anchorage, James N. Wanamaker
and Stephanie Rhoades, Judges.
Appearances: Michael B. Logue, Gorton &
Logue, Anchorage, for Appellant. John E.
McConnaughy III, Assistant Municipal
Prosecutor, and Frederick H. Boness,
Municipal Attorney, Anchorage, for Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer
and Stewart, Judges.
STEWART, Judge.
MANNHEIMER, Judge, concurring.
Scott R. Clark was convicted of operating a motor
vehicle without a current liability insurance policy in violation
of Anchorage Municipal Code (AMC) 09.28.030. That ordinance
provides that an owner or operator of a motor vehicle must have a
current motor vehicle liability policy, or other security that
complies with Alaska Statutes Title 28, when operating the
vehicle within the municipality.
Clark raises several constitutional arguments relating
to his conviction. Clark claims that the district court should
have suppressed his admission that he had no insurance because he
was not given Miranda warnings.1 Clark also contends that the
district court should have excluded his admission because the
prosecution had not independently shown the corpus delicti of the
offense. Finally, Clark claims that there was insufficient
evidence to support his conviction for operating a motor vehicle
without a current liability insurance policy. For the reasons
explained below, we reject Clarks claims and affirm his
conviction.
Facts and proceedings
On February 19, 2003, Anchorage Police Officers
Genevieve M. Haskins and Pablo Jose Paiz stopped a vehicle
because the registration on its rear license plate had expired
and because the vehicle had a broken taillight. Clark was the
driver. Haskins asked Clark for his drivers license, vehicle
registration, and proof of insurance. Clark provided his drivers
license and his vehicle registration, but did not provide proof
of insurance. Clark told Haskins that he did not have insurance.
Haskins cited Clark for violating AMC 09.28.030.
Clark moved to dismiss the case, or alternatively, to
suppress statements he had made concerning the status of his
insurance on the ground that the stop was illegal. Clark also
claimed that because the officers request for his drivers
license, registration, and proof of insurance amounted to
custodial questioning, his rights to remain silent and to contact
an attorney were violated.
District Court Judge James N. Wanamaker held an
evidentiary hearing. After Officer Paiz testified, Clark
withdrew his claim that the stop was illegal. However, Clark
still argued that his admission that he had no insurance should
be suppressed. Rather than arguing that Clarks admission was
the product of custodial questioning, Clarks attorney argued that
suppression was required because the ordinance basically forces
my client to implicate himself in a crime, violating his right to
remain silent, and his right against self-incrimination.
Judge Wanamaker found that the traffic stop was
ordinary, and ruled that Miranda warnings were not required. He
denied Clarks motion to dismiss the case or to suppress his
statement that he had no insurance. Judge Wanamaker did not
explicitly discuss Clarks claim that he was forced to implicate
himself in violation of his right against self-incrimination.
At trial, Clark objected on corpus delicti grounds to
the introduction of his statement that he had no insurance.
District Court Judge Stephanie Rhoades overruled this objection,
finding that there was sufficient corroborating evidence
supporting the introduction of Clarks statement.
The jury convicted Clark of operating a vehicle
without insurance. Clark appeals, challenging the
constitutionality of the ordinance, Judge Wanamakers suppression
decision, and Judge Rhoadess corpus delicti ruling. Clark also
claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his
conviction.
Discussion
Is AMC 09.28.030 unconstitutional?
Under AMC 09.28.030(A), [t]he owner or operator of a
motor vehicle shall have a current motor vehicle liability
policy, or other security that complies with Alaska Statutes
Title 28, when operating the vehicle within the municipality.
Anchorage Municipal Code 09.28.030(B) makes it unlawful (1) for
any person to operate a motor vehicle without proof of the
insurance or security required in 09.28.030(A), (2) for any
person to fail to produce proof of this insurance or security to
a police officer upon demand, or (3) for any person to operate a
motor vehicle without the required insurance or security.
Clark claims that this ordinance, on its face,
violates his [s]tate and [f]ederal [c]onstitutional protections
of his rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure,
remain silent and against compulsory self-incrimination. Clark
argues that the ordinances requirement that motorists produce
proof of insurance unlawfully compels motorists to incriminate
themselves, to speak against their will, and violates their right
to refuse to submit to a search.
We reject these claims. Nothing on the face of the
ordinance unlawfully compels motorists to incriminate themselves,
to speak against their will, or to consent to a search. Clark
provides no authority supporting his claim that the Municipality
cannot require motorists, when operating a motor vehicle within
the municipality, to carry proof of the required motor vehicle
insurance and to present this proof when lawfully contacted by
police during a traffic stop. When a police officer stops a
motorist for a traffic violation, the officer may ask the
motorist to produce routine driving documents.2 Clark does not
address case law from other jurisdictions consistently
recognizing that proof of insurance, a drivers license, and a
vehicle registration are routine driving documents.3
In addition, routine traffic stops generally do not
implicate the constitutional right to remain silent,4 and Clark
has not explained what legitimate privacy interest he has in a
document that shows that he has the required insurance.5
Clark argues that under Elson v. State,6 the
Municipality cannot comment on his refusal to consent to a legal
search. But Clark has not shown that he had a Fourth Amendment
right to refuse to produce proof of insurance. As we pointed out
when we discussed Elson in Srala v. Anchorage,7 if a driver
arrested for driving while intoxicated does not have a Fourth
Amendment right to refuse a breath or blood test, then the
governments comment on the refusal of an offered blood test does
not chill the exercise of [f]ourth [a]mendment rights.8
In short, nothing in Clarks briefing supports his
claim that the ordinance he challenges violates motorists
constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable search and
seizure, remain silent and against compulsory self-incrimination.
Was there a Miranda violation?
Clark renews his claim that the police violated
Miranda when they asked him to produce proof of insurance. He
argues that when the police contacted him during the traffic
stop, he was in custody for Miranda purposes. But at the
conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, Judge Wanamaker found that
there was no indication that Clark was in custody when he spoke
with Officer Haskins. Clark has not shown that these findings
were clearly erroneous.9
Clark claims that at trial, Officer Paiz testified
that Clark was not free to go when he was stopped because
[c]itations were going to be issued for various violations. But
issuing citations during a traffic stop for various violations is
part of a routine traffic stop. This testimony does not
establish custody for Miranda purposes. Clark presented no
reason at trial, nor does he on appeal, for excluding the
statement he made to Officer Haskins when, immediately after
stopping him, Officer Haskins asked him for his drivers license,
his vehicles registration, and proof of insurance. Based on our
review of the evidence presented at the pre-trial hearing, we
agree with Judge Wanamakers conclusion that Haskinss interaction
with Clark was an ordinary traffic stop, and that Clark was not
in custody for Miranda purposes.
Was the corpus delicti rule violated?
Clark claims that the corpus delicti rule was violated
when Judge Rhoades allowed the prosecutor to introduce Clarks
statement that he had no insurance. Judge Rhoades found that
there was sufficient independent corroborating evidence to
satisfy the corpus delicti rule. The evidence that Judge Rhoades
found to independently corroborate Clarks admission was that
Clark, when asked, was able to produce his drivers license and
vehicle registration, but was unable to produce proof of
insurance.
In Alaska, the reason for the corpus delicti rule is
to ensure that there is substantial independent evidence that
tends to establish the trustworthiness of a defendants admission
or confession.10 As explained in Drumbarger v. State,11 to
establish corpus delicti, ... the [S]tate need not independently
prove all of the elements of the crime. Rather, it need only
introduce substantial independent evidence which would tend to
establish the trustworthiness of the statement.12 In this case,
Haskinss observations that Clark did produce his license and his
registration when asked, but could not produce his proof of
insurance, is circumstantial evidence that he did not have either
proof of insurance, or motor vehicle liability insurance. This
circumstantial evidence was sufficient to independently
corroborate Clarks admission that he had no insurance.
Clark argues that his conduct that is, his inability
to produce proof of insurance was itself a statement, and thus
could not be used to corroborate his admission. But state law13
and the municipal code provision in question here both impose a
duty on all drivers to present proof of insurance to a police
officer on demand. We therefore agree with Judge Rhoades that
Clarks failure to act in compliance with his statutory duty to
act satisfied the corpus delicti rule because it tended to
establish the trustworthiness of his statement that he did not
have insurance.
Was there insufficient evidence to support Clarks
conviction?
Clarks claim that there was insufficient evidence to
support his conviction arises from his claim that Judge Rhoades
erred by allowing the State to introduce Clarks statement that he
had no insurance. But we have just held that this evidence was
properly introduced. Hence, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to upholding the conviction,14 there was
sufficient evidence that Clark was operating a vehicle without
insurance.
Conclusion
The decisions of the district court are AFFIRMED.
MANNHEIMER, Judge, concurring.
The corpus delicti issue that Clark raises in this
appeal is not as meritless as the majority opinion suggests.
Several courts have struggled with the doctrine of corpus delicti
in the context of a motorists failure to be licensed or to be
properly insured: See State v. Villa, 880 P.2d 706, 707-08
(Ariz. App. 1994); People v. Lara, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 886, 895-96
(Cal. App. 1994); People v. Servin, unpublished, 2004 WL 1638163
at *1 (Cal. App. 2004); People v. Leandro D., unpublished, 2004
WL 516699 at *3-*4 (Cal. App. 2004); State v. Ferris,
unpublished, 2001 WL 243424 at *6-*7 (Ohio App. 2001);
Commonwealth v. Herb, 852 A.2d 356, 363-65 (Pa. App. 2004); Davis
v. Commonwealth, 440 S.E.2d 426, 430-31 (Va. App. 1994).
However, Clark does not cite any of these cases, or
any similar ones. Rather, Clarks particular corpus delicti
argument rests solely on the assertion that his act of failing to
produce proof of vehicle insurance was not corroborative conduct,
but was simply an additional statement as that term is defined
(for purposes of the hearsay rule) in Alaska Evidence Rule
801(a)(2). In other words, Clark contends that, by failing to
produce an insurance document, he intended to make a non-verbal
assertion of fact: the assertion that he had no insurance. And,
based on this contention that his failure to produce proof of
insurance must be deemed a statement, Clark argues that the
governments proof rested solely on his out-of-court statements.
There is no merit to Clarks contention that his
failure to produce an insurance document should be deemed a non-
verbal assertion of fact. One might easily infer, from Clarks
failure to produce an insurance document upon request, that he
had no such document, and hence no insurance. But these are
merely inferences to be drawn from his conduct. There is no
suggestion in the record that Clark intended his conduct to be
understood as an assertion of fact. Under Evidence Rule
801(a)(2), it is this intention or lack of it that determines
whether non-verbal conduct is a statement for hearsay purposes.
Thus, the trial judge could properly reject Clarks contention
that his failure to produce proof of insurance was a statement.
Because Clarks particular corpus delicti argument is
meritless, and because he has failed to argue the issue in any
other fashion, I agree with my colleagues that we should affirm
the district courts ruling on this issue.
_______________________________
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16
L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
2 United States v. Maldonado, 356 F.3d 130, 134 (1st Cir.
2001).
3 See, e.g., Chang v. State, 608 S.E.2d 283, 285 (Ga. App.
2004) ([I]t does not unreasonably expand the scope or duration of
a valid traffic stop for an officer to prolong the stop to
immediately investigate and determine if the driver is entitled
to continue to operate the vehicle by checking the status of the
drivers license, insurance, and vehicle registration[.]) (quoting
State v. Williams, 590 S.E.2d 151,154 (Ga. App. (2003)); State v.
Prince, 101 P.3d 332, 336 (N.M. App. 2004) (During a traffic
stop, the officer may conduct a de minimis investigatory
detention to inquire about license, registration, and insurance,
and to run a wants and warrants check.); Maysonet v. State, 91
S.W.3d 365, 373 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (during a traffic stop, an
officer is permitted to ask the driver for their license, proof
of registration, and insurance, and may also inquire as to the
motorist's destination and the purpose of the trip); State v.
Hoang, 6 P.3d 602, 606 (Wash. App. 2000) (officer asked only the
questions that would be asked on a routine traffic stop: Do you
have a drivers license? May I see the vehicle registration? May I
see the certificate of insurance?); Campbell v. State, 97 P.3d
781, 785 (Wyo. 2004) (During a routine traffic stop, a law
enforcement officer may request the drivers proof of insurance,
operating license, and vehicle registration, run a computer
check, and issue a citation or warning.).
4 See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40, 104
S.Ct. 3138, 3150, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (holding that Miranda
does not apply when a motorist is subjected to roadside
questioning during a routine traffic stop); Blake v. State, 763
P.2d 511, 514-15 (Alaska App. 1988) (holding that police officers
are not required to give Miranda warnings during an investigative
stop unless and until the initial stop ripens into custody).
5 See, e.g., Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793, 797 (Alaska 1973)
(adopting for Alaska the test set out in Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 516, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967));
Pearce v. State, 45 P.3d 679, 682 (Alaska App. 2002) (Before a
person can complain of a search or seizure conducted by the
government, the person must establish that they had a protected
privacy interest in whatever was searched or seized.).
6 659 P.2d 1195 (Alaska 1983).
7 765 P.2d 103 (Alaska App. 1988).
8 Id. at 105.
9 See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439-40, 104 S.Ct. at 3150
(Miranda does not apply when a motorist is subjected to roadside
questioning during a routine traffic stop); Blake, 763 P.2d at
514-15 (police officers not required to give Miranda warnings
during an investigative stop unless and until the initial stop
ripens into custody).
10 Armstrong v. State, 502 P.2d 440, 447 (Alaska 1972)
(citation omitted).
11 716 P.2d 6 (Alaska App. 1986).
12 Id. at 12 (quoting Armstrong, 502 P.2d at 447).
13 AS 28.22.019.
14 See Dorman v. State, 622 P.2d 448, 453 (Alaska 1981).
