Touch N' Go®, the DeskTop In-and-Out Board makes your office run smoother. Visit
Touch N' Go's Website to see how.
Rodgers v. State (04/22/2005) ap-1981
Rodgers v. State (04/22/2005) ap-1981
NOTICE
The text of this opinion can be corrected before the
opinion is published in the Pacific Reporter. Readers
are encouraged to bring typographical or other formal
errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate
Courts:
303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501
Fax: (907) 264-0878
E-mail: corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
KEMONE D. RODGERS, )
) Court of Appeals No.
A-8841
Appellant, )
Trial Court No. 4FA-03-3600 Cr
)
v. )
) O P I N
I O N
STATE OF ALASKA, )
)
Appellee. )
[No. 1981 April 22, 2005]
)
Appeal from the District Court, Fourth Judi
cial District, Fairbanks, Winston S. Burbank,
Judge.
Appearances: Bethany P. Spalding, Assistant
Public Defender, Fairbanks, and Barbara K.
Brink, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the
Appellant. Jill S. Kinsley, Assistant
District Attorney, Jeffrey A. OBryant,
District Attorney, Fairbanks, and Gregg D.
Renkes, Attorney General, Juneau, for the
Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer
and Stewart, Judges.
MANNHEIMER, Judge.
A Fairbanks police officer believed that he saw Kemone
D. Rodgers run a stop sign, so the officer stopped Rodgers to
issue him a citation. This traffic stop ultimately led to
Rodgerss convictions for driving under the influence and breath-
test refusal. In this appeal, Rodgers argues that the traffic
stop was unlawful and that all the ensuing evidence against him
should be suppressed.
When this issue was litigated in the district court,
District Court Judge Winston S. Burbank concluded that Rodgers
had, in fact, stopped for the stop sign, and that the officer was
mistaken in believing that Rodgers failed to stop. At the same
time, however, Judge Burbank found that the officer acted in the
good-faith belief that Rodgers ran the stop sign, and the judge
further concluded that the officers belief, although erroneous,
was reasonable under the circumstances. For these reasons, Judge
Burbank ruled that the officer was justified in stopping Rodgers
for a traffic violation.
On appeal, the State argues we should interpret this
quoted language as equivalent to a ruling that the officer had
reasonable suspicion to stop Rodgerss car. But under the
circumstances of this case, reasonable suspicion is not enough to
justify the traffic stop.
In Alaska, investigative stops are governed by the test
announced by our supreme court in Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40
(Alaska 1976). Under the Coleman test, the police are not
allowed to conduct an investigative stop whenever they have
reasonable suspicion that someone has broken the law. Rather, an
investigative stop must be supported by reasonable suspicion that
imminent public danger exists or [that] serious harm to persons
or property has recently occurred.1
Even assuming that the officer had a good-faith and
reasonable belief that Rodgers had just run the stop sign, the
State never argued and the district court never found that the
remainder of the Coleman test was satisfied. That is, the State
never argued that Rodgerss act of running the stop sign provided
reasonable suspicion of the existence of an imminent public
danger, or reasonable suspicion that serious harm to persons or
property had recently occurred. The States failure to prove this
component of the Coleman test means that the traffic stop was
improper if the officer had only reasonable suspicion that
Rodgers ran the stop sign.2
However, if the officer had probable cause to believe
that he had just observed Rodgers run the stop sign, the ensuing
traffic stop would be legal. Because we can not tell whether
Judge Burbank employed a probable cause analysis when he made his
ruling, we must remand Rodgerss case to the district court.
Judge Burbank shall determine whether the traffic stop
was supported by probable cause to believe that Rodgers had just
run the stop sign. The judge shall make findings on this issue,
and he shall transmit those findings to this Court within 60
days. The parties shall then have 30 days to file simultaneous
memoranda addressing Judge Burbanks findings.
After we have received Judge Burbanks findings and the
supplemental memoranda of the parties, we shall resume our
consideration of this case.
_______________________________
1Coleman, 553 P.2d at 46.
2See State v. Moran, 667 P.2d 734, 735 (Alaska App. 1983).
