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Wells v. State (12/10/2004) ap-1963
Wells v. State (12/10/2004) ap-1963
NOTICE
The text of this opinion can be corrected before the
opinion is published in the Pacific Reporter. Readers
are encouraged to bring typographical or other formal
errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate
Courts:
303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501
Fax: (907) 264-0878
E-mail: corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
RALPH N. WELLS, )
) Court of Appeals Nos. A-
8645 & A-8661
Appellant, ) Trial
Court Nos. 4FA-S02-3818 Cr & )
4FA-S00-1788 Cr
v. )
) O P I N I O N
STATE OF ALASKA, )
)
Appellee. )
[No. 1963 December 10, 2004]
)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Fourth Judi
cial District, Fairbanks, Mark I. Wood and
Charles R. Pengilly, Judges.
Appearances: Robert S. Noreen, Law Office
of Robert S. Noreen, Fairbanks, for the
Appellant. Kenneth M. Rosenstein, Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Special
Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and
Gregg D. Renkes, Attorney General, Juneau,
for the Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer
and Stewart, Judges.
STEWART, Judge.
MANNHEIMER, Judge, concurring.
Ralph N. Wells lived in Salcha with Tina Woellert and
her nine-month-old son, G.W. While Wells was caring for G.W.,
G.W. sustained numerous bruises on his head. A jury convicted
Wells of third-degree assault (for recklessly causing G.W.
physical injury that reasonably required medical treatment when
Wells was 18 or older and G.W. was under 10 years of age).1
Based on this conviction, the superior court revoked Wellss
probation on a prior conviction for removal of identification
marks.2
Wells argues that there was insufficient evidence to
conclude that Wells had recklessly caused G.W.s injuries.
Second, Wells argues that there was insufficient evidence that
G.W.s injuries reasonably required medical treatment. Wells
argues that because there was insufficient evidence to support
his conviction, the superior court erred when it revoked his
probation.
Wellss first argument fails because the State
presented circumstantial evidence that G.W. was in Wellss care
when he was injured, that Wells persuaded Woellert not to take
G.W. to the hospital the day he was injured, and that Wellss
explanation of how G.W. was injured was contradicted by the
medical evidence. However, we accept Wellss second argument
because the term medical treatment in AS 11.41.220(a)(1)(C)(i) is
susceptible of more than one meaning, and under the meaning most
favorable to Wells, the medical care that G.W. received was not
treatment. Accordingly, we must reverse Wellss third-degree
assault conviction. Because we reverse Wellss conviction, the
superior court must reconsider its decision to revoke Wellss
probation.
Background facts and proceedings
On September 22, 2002, Wells called Woellert at her
workplace and reported that G.W. had piled blankets and toys
inside his crib to crawl out and had fallen out of the crib.
Although Woellert thought that G.W. should go to the hospital,
Wells convinced her that was unnecessary. Wells called Woellert
back and told her that he had phoned a doctor at the hospital,
and was told by the doctor that if G.W. was acting normally, it
was not necessary to take him to the hospital. Wells also
reported that the doctor recommended that he keep G.W. awake for
two hours, in case G.W. had a concussion, and that if G.W. fell
asleep and stopped breathing, to administer CPR. When Woellert
saw G.W. after work, she noticed lots of bruises on his head.
Woellert took G.W. to Fairbanks Memorial Hospital the
next day. Dr. Sean Wormuth, an emergency room physician,
examined G.W. Dr. Wormuth found numerous bruises on G.W.s
scalp, face, and ears. Dr. Wormuth ordered a CT scan of G.W.s
head to check for any brain injury. In addition, Wormuth ordered
lab tests to determine whether G.W.s blood was clotting normally,
or whether a bleeding disorder was causing the bruising. Dr.
Wormuth contacted Dr. James Foote, another physician, to ensure
that he would examine G.W. later to determine whether G.W. was
healing properly. Foote examined G.W. two days later.
Was there sufficient evidence that Wells assaulted
G.W.?
Wells argues that there was insufficient evidence to
support the jurys finding that Wells had recklessly caused G.W.s
injuries. Viewing the evidence presented at trial in the light
most favorable to upholding the verdict, the evidence is
sufficient to support a conviction if fair-minded jurors could
find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.3
The State presented evidence that G.W. sustained the
head injuries while in Wellss care. Woellert testified that she
had not seen G.W. the morning of the incident, but that he was
not bruised when she put him to bed the night before. Woellert
also testified that Wells had claimed that G.W. piled blankets
and toys inside his crib to climb out and had fallen out of the
crib. In addition, Woellert testified that, on the day G.W. was
injured, Wells persuaded her not to take G.W. to the hospital.
Dr. Wormuth and Dr. Foote testified that G.W. was
incapable of piling his belongings up in the crib to climb out,
as Wells had claimed. Both doctors also testified that G.W.s
injuries were inconsistent with a fall from his crib. Dr.
Wormuth explained that a fall from the crib could not have caused
G.W.s injuries because G.W. had bruises on every surface of his
head. In contrast, a fall would injure only one side of the
skull at a single point of impact. Also, because G.W.s bruises
were in differing stages of healing, he could not have sustained
them in a single fall. Finally, Dr. Foote testified that G.W.
could not have caused his head injuries by banging his head
against his crib because he could not have generated enough force
to cause injuries as severe as those he had sustained. Because
the State presented sufficient circumstantial evidence that could
have convinced a reasonable juror that Wells recklessly caused
G.W.s injuries, Wellss argument fails.
Did G.W.s injuries reasonably require medical
treatment?
Wells argues that there was insufficient evidence to
support the jurys finding that G.W.s injuries reasonably required
medical treatment. Wells argues that because both Dr. Wormuth
and Dr. Foote testified that they had determined G.W.s bruises
would heal naturally, medical treatment was not reasonably
required.
If the answer to this question only required us to
consider the sufficiency of the evidence presented, the answer is
obvious because Dr. Wormouth testified that G.W.s injuries
required medical treatment.
But Wells actually raises a question that he did not
present to the superior court. Wells moved for a judgment of
acquittal after the State rested its case, but mentioned nothing
concerning the failure to prove medical treatment. The jury
instructions provided no definition of medical treatment. Wells
did not object to the instructions, nor did he ask that the court
define medical treatment.
During final argument, Wells contended that G.W. did
not reasonably require medical treatment because the childs
injuries healed on their own, implying that medical treatment
requires some form of remedy or active intervention. In
rebuttal, the prosecutor discussed medical treatment.
Prosecutor: Medical treatment, what
does medical treatment mean? Medical
treatment means something different between
lay people and doctors. When lay people
think of medical treatment, they think of a
cast. They think of a bandage. When a
doctor thinks of medical treatment, its
broader than that. What did the doctors
testify about what medical treatment meant
to them? Medical treatment meant seeing the
injury, analyzing the injury, diagnosis, x-
rays, CAT scans, and then if any further
treatment was necessary, then further
treatment. CAT scans and x-rays, those
things are medical treatment. Thats whats
meant by medical treatment. Did this baby
need to go to the doctor? Yes. Did this
baby need to be seen by a doctor, analyzed?
Yes. Treated by a doctor? Yes. Thats
medical treatment. Just because the
injuries heal without casts or surgery
doesnt mean [that] its not medical
treatment.
Wells did not object to the prosecutors discussion of
medical treatment (nor has he claimed in this appeal that the
prosecutors argument misled the jury). Wells did not ask the
court to provide any contrary or clarifying instruction to the
jury on medical treatment before it retired to deliberate.
Immediately after the jury convicted Wells and was
excused, Wells again moved for a judgment of acquittal, but did
not assert that there was any deficiency regarding medical
treatment. If the jury needed a definition of medical treatment,
Wells could have requested an instruction. Because Wells made no
objection to the instructions at trial, we review this question
for plain error.
The evidence shows that the course of care that G.W.
received was intended to promote G.W.s physical health. When Dr.
Wormuth saw G.W. in the emergency room, G.W. had numerous bruises
on his scalp, face, and ears. Dr. Wormuth concluded that testing
was warranted to examine whether there was any hemorrhaging in
G.W.s brain. G.W. was sedated intravenously to immobilize him
for a CAT scan. Dr. Wormuth also ordered blood testing to check
if G.W. had a blood disorder that exacerbated the bruising.
Later, when Dr. Wormuth contacted Dr. Foote, the two physicians
decided that G.W. was stable enough that he did not have to be
admitted to the hospital. Instead, they scheduled a follow up
with Dr. Foote in two days to make sure that G.W. was
progressing.
Obviously, G.W. received more than first aid for his
injuries. Dr. Wormuth concluded that G.W.s injuries were of such
magnitude that he needed to examine G.W. for internal bleeding
and also make sure that his progress was monitored after he left
the hospital.
Alaska Statute 11.41.220(a)(1)(C)(i) provides that a
person commits third-degree assault if the person recklessly
while being 18 years of age or older ... causes physical injury
to a child under 10 years of age and the injury reasonably
requires medical treatment[.] The legislature did not
specifically define medical treatment. Wells contends that to
prove medical treatment, the State must prove that the victim
needs something more than medical attention.
In S.R.D. v. State,4 a decision issued before the
enactment of AS 11.41.220(a)(1)(C)(i), one of the appellants was
convicted of three counts of criminal nonsupport. That appellant
claimed that the evidence was insufficient to establish criminal
nonsupport because the children did not require any medical
treatment. However, the criminal nonsupport statute penalizes a
parents failure to provide a child with necessary medical
attention.5 And we agreed with the States argument that medical
attention expressed a broader concept than medical treatment.6
We agree with the state that attention must
be construed more broadly than treatment.
It is conceivable that children may suffer
injuries sufficiently threatening to require
a medical examination, even if that
examination ultimately discloses no need for
treatment.
In the present case, evidence
concerning A.D.s and S.E.D.s injuries and
the manner in which those injuries were
inflicted was sufficient, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the state, to permit
a reasonable juror to infer that, even
though no treatment was required, medical
attention was actually necessary to rule out
the possibility of life-threatening or
potentially disabling conditions.[7]
When the legislature uses a word or phrase but does
not define it, a court should normally assume that the
legislature intended the word or phrase to have its common,
ordinary meaning.8 The legislature has enacted other statutes
that addressed the medical process. For example, in AS
18.20.130(3), the legislature provided that hospital means an
institution or establishment, public or private, devoted
primarily to providing diagnosis, treatment, or care (emphasis
added). And in AS 25.20.025(a)(4), the legislature declared that
all minors (even those who are unemancipated and who are still
living with a parent or guardian) have the legal authority to
consent to a broad range of medical services and treatments
associated with sexual activity (except abortion), including
diagnosis, prevention or treatment of pregnancy, and ...
diagnosis and treatment of venereal disease (emphasis added).
Additionally, in AS 47.17.290(7), the legislature provided that
institution means a private or public hospital or other facility
providing medical diagnosis, treatment, or care (emphasis added).
Our supreme court recognized a similar distinction in
the Rules of Evidence. Alaska Rule of Evidence 504(b) provides in
part: A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to
prevent any other person from disclosing confidential
communications made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of
the patients physical, mental or emotional conditions (emphasis
added). And Evidence Rule 803(4) provides:
Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis
or Treatment. Statements made for purposes
of medical diagnosis or treatment and
describing medical history, or past or
present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or
the inception or general character of the
cause or external source thereof insofar as
reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or
treatment.
(Emphasis added.)
In case law, our supreme court has also used the terms
diagnosis and treatment as expressing different steps in the
medical process. For example, in Bradbury v. Chugach Electric
Assn,9 the court stated: Two physicians, Dr. Kenneth Flora and
Dr. David Nelson, testified on behalf of Chugach Electric. Dr.
Flora is a hepatologist whose subspecialty is the diagnosis and
treatment of chronic liver disease.10
When the scope of a criminal statute is unclear,
courts should normally construe the statute against the
government that is, construe it so as to limit the scope of
criminal liability.11 And when a word or phrase has been
construed in a particular way as we construed the word treatment
in S.R.D. v. State courts are to presume that later-enacted
statutes carry forward the existing judicial construction of that
word or phrase.
At best, the construction of medical treatment in the
statute that is endorsed by the State, and the construction that
was advocated by the prosecutor in summation to the jury, is only
arguable. We therefore must interpret the statute against the
government.12 Accordingly, we conclude that we must reverse
Wellss conviction.
If the State elects not to re-prosecute Wells for
third-degree assault, the superior court may enter judgment
against Wells for fourth-degree assault13 because the jurys
verdict necessarily found that Wells had recklessly caused
physical injury to the victim.14
Why we vacate the superior courts revocation of Wellss
probation
The superior court revoked Wellss probation in his
conviction for removal of identification marks because he was
convicted of third-degree assault in this case. Because we
reversed Wellss third-degree assault conviction, we vacate the
probation revocation.
However, as we discussed above, the jury necessarily
found that Wells recklessly caused physical injury to G.W. That
jury finding is sufficient to support a conviction for fourth-
degree assault. In addition, this jury finding would be
sufficient for the superior court to exercise its discretion to
revoke Wellss probation. Accordingly, we direct the superior
court to reconsider the petition to revoke Wellss probation.
Conclusion
The judgment of the superior court is REVERSED.
MANNHEIMER, Judge, concurring.
Under AS 11.41.220(a)(1)(C)(i), a person commits the
crime of third-degree assault (a class C felony) if they
recklessly cause physical injury to a child under the age of 10,
and if this injury reasonably requires medical treatment. Our
task in this appeal is to determine what the legislature meant by
the phrase medical treatment.
The legislative history of AS 11.41.220(a)(1)(C)
AS 11.41.220(a)(1)(C) began life as House
Bill 396 in the Seventeenth Legislature (1991-92). As
originally proposed, Section 4 of HB 396 would have
added a provision to the third-degree assault statute
to make a person guilty of that felony if they
violate[d] AS 11.41.230(a)(1) or [(a)](2) i.e., if
they committed fourth-degree assault by recklessly
causing physical injury to another person, or by
negligently causing physical injury to another person
by means of a dangerous instrument and if the victim
of the offense [was] under the age of 10.
This proposed change was criticized by the
Alaska Action Trust (the lobbying arm of the Alaska
Association of Trial Lawyers).1 In a position paper on
House Bill 396, the Trust argued that the proposed
change to the third-degree assault statute was too
broad and should not be adopted. The Trust wrote:
Apparently, the Legislatures
[purpose] is to make it a felony
rather than a misdemeanor to
repeatedly or severely beat a
child. While we agree that it may
well be appropriate to make
repeated or severe beatings of a
child a felony, the proposed
amendment would make it a felony
even to cause pain to a child
without actual injury[,] or to
bruise a child. That lesser
conduct should not be punishable
by a felony conviction.
[The] proposed amendment ... would make
a ... felon of a person who one time
recklessly cause[d] physical injury to a
child under the age of 10 ... . The
difficulty with the proposed revision is that
physical injury is very broadly defined as a
physical pain or [any] impairment of a
physical condition. AS 11.81.900(b)[(45)].
Therefore, if this amendment becomes law, any
person can be ... convicted [of a] felon[y]
for recklessly causing pain to a child, even
when the child suffers no actual injury
whatsoever[,] or [for] negligen[tly]
caus[ing] pain to a child by means of a
dangerous instrument.
Even the most caring and loving person
who is around a child might sometimes
recklessly cause ... pain to that child.
A person who angrily briefly touches a
child[,] causing pain but no actual injury[,]
would become a ... felon. [Moreover,] under
Alaska law, an automobile is a dangerous
instrument. Even the most caring and loving
person ... might negligently cause pain to a
child by causing an automobile accident[,
even though] there was no ... injury
whatsoever to the child because the child
was buckled in a seat belt ... . A person
who slammed a childs finger in a car door
would become a ... felon under this law.
A relatively minor lapse by an ordinarily
caring parent or other person should not
cause the person to suffer a felony
conviction.
Accordingly, the Trust proposed that the new
offense be limited to physical injury that
requires medical treatment.
Apparently responding to the
Trusts recommendation, the House Judiciary
Committee re-wrote Section 4 of House Bill
396 to make the proposed offense recklessly
... caus[ing] physical injury to a child
under 10 years of age [if] the injury
reasonably requires medical treatment. CSHB
396 (Jud), 4.
In its Sectional Analysis of the
bill, the Judiciary Committee described the
purpose of Section 4:
[This] section elevates what is
currently classified as fourth[-]degree
assault to third[-]degree assault if an
offender is 18 years of age or older and
[either] repeatedly assaults a child under
the age of 10, or assaults a child under 10
and the assault requires medical treatment.
This amendment is in response to several
recent Anchorage cases[,] including one in
which an infant had 56 different bruises on
its body caused by a series of beatings
committed over a three[-]week time period[,]
and one in which a 5[-]year[-]old child was
intentionally burned by being placed in a
bath of scalding water. Because there was
not a substantial risk that either child
would die[,] and [because] neither child was
permanently disfigured, [neither injury
qualified as serious physical injury as
defined in AS 11.81.900(b)(55), and thus] the
offenders could only be charged with
misdemeanors [i.e., fourth-degree assault].
[This section makes such conduct] third[-
]degree assault[,] a class C felony.
But neither the bill itself nor the Judiciary
Committees accompanying analysis offered a
definition of medical treatment.
The problem presented in this appeal: ascertaining the
meaning of treatment in AS 11.41.220(a)(1)(C)
The State prosecuted Wells under this new
provision of the third-degree assault statute,
alleging that Wells had recklessly caused head
injuries to a nine-month-old infant and that these
injuries had reasonably required medical
treatment.
Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, Wells inflicted multiple
injuries on a nine-month-old infant over a period of
two weeks, resulting in numerous bruises to the infants
face, scalp, and ears. When the childs mother brought
him to the hospital, doctors were concerned that the
child might have significant internal injuries, so they
performed blood tests and a CAT scan as diagnostic
measures. Fortunately, the child had no significant
injuries; the doctors concluded that the child was
medically stable and that the childs bruises would heal
on their own.
The State and Wells disagree as to whether
this medical examination and diagnostic testing
constituted treatment.
The State argues that, because the
legislature failed to provide a definition of
treatment, we should interpret the statute using the
common definition of that term. The State relies on
the first sentence of AS 01.10.040(a), which states:
Words and phrases [in statutes] shall be construed ...
according to their common and approved usage.2
According to the State, the common or
dictionary meaning of treatment includes medical
examinations and diagnostic testing. But as can be
seen from the four dictionary definitions quoted by the
State in its brief, various dictionaries have differing
definitions of treatment. Some dictionaries define the
word broadly enough to include diagnostic efforts, but
other dictionaries appear to limit the word to actions
taken to treat or cure a medical condition after it has
been diagnosed.3
In short, the States brief overstates the
matter when it declares, These definitions make clear
that treatment includes not only ... remedial care, but
also diagnostic care. Rather, these definitions are
ambiguous concerning the issue raised in this appeal.
Moreover, AS 01.10.040(a) does not direct us
to always adopt the common usage of words or phrases.
The statute has a second sentence: Technical words and
phrases[,] and those which have acquired a peculiar and
appropriate meaning, whether by legislative definition
or otherwise, shall be construed according to [that]
peculiar and appropriate meaning.
Medical literature draws a distinction
between, on the one hand, examination and testing for
purposes of diagnosis and, on the other, treatment. By
searching the internet, one can find literally
thousands of books and articles whose titles refer to
diagnosis and treatment thus indicating a distinction
between diagnosis (efforts to determine the nature and
extent of a medical condition) and treatment (efforts
to cure or ameliorate a medical condition).
Our own supreme court appears to have used
the terms diagnosis and treatment in this same way.
For example, in Bradbury v. Chugach Electric Assn,
71 P.3d 901, 905 (Alaska 2003), the court stated: Two
physicians, Dr. Kenneth Flora and Dr. David Nelson,
testified on behalf of Chugach Electric. Dr. Flora is
a hepatologist whose subspecialty is the diagnosis and
treatment of chronic liver disease.
Moreover, the Alaska Legislature has enacted
statutes that use the word treatment as meaning
something distinct from diagnosis. See
AS 18.20.130(3), which defines the word hospital as an
institution or establishment, public or private,
devoted primarily to providing diagnosis, treatment, or
care. (Emphasis added) And AS 25.20.025(a)(4)
declares that all minors (even those who are
unemancipated and who are still living with a parent or
guardian) have the legal authority to consent to a
broad range of medical services and treatments
associated with sexual activity (except abortion),
including diagnosis, prevention or treatment of
pregnancy, and ... diagnosis and treatment of venereal
disease. (Emphasis added)
This same distinction is found in Alaska
Evidence Rule 504(b), which states that [a] patient has
a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any
other person from disclosing confidential
communications made for the purpose of diagnosis or
treatment of the patients physical, mental or emotional
conditions ... . (Emphasis added)
Finally, this Courts decision in S.R.D. v.
State, 820 P.2d 1088 (Alaska App. 1991), hinges on the
distinction between diagnostic efforts and treatment.
In S.R.D., a mother was convicted of criminal non-
support, AS 11.51.120(a), for failing to provide her
children with necessary medical attention after the
children were injured by acts of physical abuse
perpetrated by her husband. In each instance,
[medical] examinations revealed injuries resulting from
[the] abuse, but the injuries did not require actual
treatment.4
On appeal, the mother claimed that the
evidence did not establish her guilt of criminal non-
support because neither child was found to require any
medical treatment.5 This Court rejected the mothers
argument because the criminal non-support statute does
not speak of a parents failure to obtain treatment for
their child, but rather a parents failure to obtain
necessary ... medical attention. See AS 11.51.120(b).
We held that medical attention was a broader concept
than treatment because it also included medical
examinations for diagnostic purposes:
We agree with the state that attention must
be construed more broadly than treatment. It
is conceivable that children may suffer
injuries sufficiently threatening to require
a medical examination, even if that
examination ultimately discloses no need for
treatment.
In the present case, evidence
concerning [the childrens] injuries and the
manner in which those injuries were inflicted
was sufficient, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the state, to permit a
reasonable juror to infer that, even though
no treatment was required, medical attention
was actually necessary to rule out the
possibility of life-threatening or
potentially disabling conditions. The trial
court did not err in declining to enter a
judgment of acquittal as to these two counts.
S.R.D., 820 P.2d at 1090-91.
Based on the foregoing, I conclude
that we must reject the States proposed
definition of treatment and instead adopt the
narrower definition reflected in these
statutes, court rules, and court decisions.
First, because the third-degree
assault statute uses the phrase medical
treatment, we are searching for the meaning
of treatment not in its general context, but
rather in its medical context. And in that
medical context, both the Alaska Legislature
(in statutes) and the Alaska judiciary (in
court rules and in court decisions) have used
treatment in a narrow sense as meaning
something distinct from diagnostic efforts.
When a word or phrase has previously been
legislatively defined or judicially construed
in a particular way, we are to presume (in
the absence of evidence to the contrary) that
later-enacted statutes carry forward the
existing meaning of that word or phrase.6
Second, to the extent that the
meaning of treatment remains ambiguous, we
must interpret it in favor of the defendant
and against the State. When the scope of a
criminal statute remains unclear or ambiguous
after it has been subjected to legal
analysis, we are bound to construe the
statute against the government that is,
construe it so as to limit the scope of
criminal liability.7
At Wellss trial, the judge gave
the jury no instruction concerning the
meaning of treatment, and the prosecutor
argued to the jury that treatment included
the examination and diagnostic testing in
this case. This argument, as a matter of
law, was incorrect. I therefore agree with
my colleagues that Wellss conviction for
third-degree assault must be reversed.
_______________________________
1 AS 11.41.220(a)(1)(C)(i).
2 AS 11.46.260(a).
3 See Dorman v. State, 622 P.2d 448, 453 (Alaska 1981).
4 820 P.2d 1088 (Alaska App. 1991).
5 AS 11.51.120(b).
6 S.R.D., 820 P.2d at 1090.
7 Id. at 1090-91.
8 See AS 01.10.040; Lynch v. McCann, 478 P.2d 835, 837
(Alaska 1970); Lambert v. State, 694 P.2d 791, 793 (Alaska App.
1985).
9 71 P.3d 901 (Alaska 2003).
10 Id. at 905.
11 See State v. ABC Towing, 954 P.2d 575, 579 (Alaska App.
1998); Magnuson v. State, 843 P.2d 1251, 1253 (Alaska App. 1992).
12 See Brookins v. State, 600 P.2d 12, 17 (Alaska 1979);
Whitesides v. State, 88 P.3d 147, 151 (Alaska App. 2004); State
v. Andrews, 707 P.2d 900, 907 (Alaska App. 1985); State v.
Rastopsoff, 659 P.2d 630, 640 (Alaska App. 1983).
13 AS 11.41.230(a)(1).
14 See Nathaniel v. State, 668 P.2d 851, 857 n.4 (Alaska
App.1983); Nix v. State, 624 P.2d 823, 824-25 (Alaska App. 1981).
1 See
www.alaskatriallawyers.org/ak/index.cfm?event=showPage&pg=About
for a brief history of the organization.
2 See Lynch v. McCann, 478 P.2d 835, 837 (Alaska 1970);
Lambert v. State, 694 P.2d 791, 793 (Alaska App. 1985) (when
the legislature uses a word or phrase without defining it, a
court should normally assume that the legislature intended
the word or phrase to have its common, ordinary meaning).
3 Compare Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.
2003), p. 1333 (car[ing] for or deal[ing] with [a health
problem] medically or surgically); Websters New World
College Dictionary (4th ed. 2000), p. 1525 (medical,
surgical, or cosmetic care, esp[ecially] a systematic course
of this); Oxford American Dictionary (2003), p. 1626
(application of medical care or attention to a patient);
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th
ed. 2000), p. 1838 (administration or application of
remedies to a patient for a disease or injury; medicinal or
surgical management; therapy).
4 S.R.D., 820 P.2d at 1090.
5 Id.
6 Gillispie v. Beta Construction Co., 842 P.2d 1272, 1273
(Alaska 1992); see City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375
P.2d 201, 207-08 (Alaska 1962); Patterson v. State, 708
P.2d 712, 716 (Alaska App. 1985); and see Hart v.
State, 702 P.2d 651, 659 (Alaska App. 1985).
7 See Brookins v. State, 600 P.2d 12, 17 (Alaska 1979);
State v. ABC Towing, 954 P.2d 575, 579 (Alaska App.
1998); Magnuson v. State, 843 P.2d 1251, 1253 (Alaska
App. 1992).
