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Reichel v. State (11/12/2004) ap-1955

Reichel v. State (11/12/2004) ap-1955

                             NOTICE
     The  text  of this opinion can be corrected before  the
     opinion  is published in the Pacific Reporter.  Readers
     are  encouraged to bring typographical or other  formal
     errors  to  the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate
     Courts:

             303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska  99501
                      Fax:  (907) 264-0878
       E-mail:  corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA


STEVEN D. REICHEL,            )
                              )              Court of Appeals No.
A-8555
                                             Appellant,         )
Trial Court No. 3HO-02-060 Cr
                              )
                  v.          )
                              )                       O  P  I   N
I  O  N
STATE OF ALASKA,              )
                              )
                                             Appellee.          )
[No. 1955    November 12, 2004]
                              )


          Appeal  from the Superior Court,  Third  Judi
          cial   District,  Homer,  Jonathan  H.  Link,
          Judge.

          Appearances:    Brant  G.  McGee,   Assistant
          Public Defender, and Barbara K. Brink, Public
          Defender,   Anchorage,  for  the   Appellant.
          Timothy   W.   Terrell,  Assistant   Attorney
          General,  Office of Special Prosecutions  and
          Appeals,  Anchorage,  and  Gregg  D.  Renkes,
          Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.

          Before:   Coats, Chief Judge, and  Mannheimer
          and Stewart, Judges.

          MANNHEIMER, Judge.


          In  this  appeal,  we are asked to decide  whether  the

police  can  conduct  an  investigative  stop  if  they  have   a

reasonable suspicion that a person is violating the conditions of

their  parole.  The defendant asserts that Alaska  law  does  not

permit such an investigative stop unless the police are acting at

the direction of a parole officer.  The State asserts that Alaska

law permits a stop to investigate a potential parole violation if

the  conduct involved in the parole violation meets the  Coleman-

Ebona  test governing other investigative stops  that is, if  the

conduct  involved  in  the parole violation creates  an  imminent

public  danger, or if it involves recent serious harm to  persons

or  property.   We conclude that we need not resolve  this  legal

dispute because, even under the States interpretation of the law,

the facts of this case did not justify the investigative stop.



     Underlying facts
     

               On the evening of October 28, 2001, Steven D.

     Reichel  was socializing at Alices Champagne Palace,  a

     bar  and  restaurant in Homer.  Reichel was  on  parole

     from  a  felony DWI conviction, and Reichels conditions

     of  parole forbade him from consuming alcohol and  from

     being on premises where alcoholic beverages are sold.

               Homer  Police Sergeant William Hutt was among

     a  group  of  police officers who went to  Alices  that

     evening  to  perform a bar check.  Hutt was  personally

     acquainted  with  Reichel from  previous  contacts  and

     arrests,  including  two or three arrests  for  earlier

     probation  violations.   Shortly  after  Hutt   spotted

     Reichel, Reichel got up and left the bar.

               Hutt  suspected  that Reichel  was  still  on

     probation,  and  that  Reichel was therefore  forbidden

     from  going  to  bars, so Hutt and his fellow  officers

     followed  Reichel  outside.  At  the  same  time,  Hutt

     called  his  dispatcher to request a records  check  on

     Reichel.  The police dispatcher confirmed that  Reichel

     was  not  supposed to consume alcohol or be on premises

     where alcohol is served.

               (Hutts  suspicions were essentially  correct,

     with  the  exception  that Reichel  was  no  longer  on

     probation;  rather,  he was on parole.   It  was  true,

     however,  that Reichels parole conditions  forbade  him

     from going to bars.)

          Hutt  and his fellow officers stopped Reichel

outside  the  bar, and the officers held Reichel  while

they  attempted  to contact his parole officer  to  ask

what  to  do.   Within  twenty  minutes,  the  officers

succeeded in speaking with Reichels parole officer; the

parole  officer directed the officers to arrest Reichel

for  the parole violation.  During a search of Reichels

person  incident to this arrest, the police  discovered

cocaine  in his pocket.  This discovery ultimately  led

to  Reichels  conviction  for fourth-degree  controlled

substances misconduct.1

          In  this  appeal, Reichel contends  that  the

police acted unlawfully when they stopped him and  held

him outside the bar.  Reichel concedes that he violated

the conditions of his parole by going into the bar, but

Reichel argues that this violation of parole was not  a

sufficient justification for an investigative stop.



Reichels main arguments


          Reichel argues that the investigative stop in

his case was illegal for two reasons.

          First,  based  on the Alaska  Supreme  Courts

decision in Roman v. State,2 Reichel argues that police

officers  have  no  authority  to  conduct  a  stop  to

investigate  a  potential parole violation  unless  the

officers  are  acting  at the  direction  of  a  parole

officer.

          Second,  Reichel  argues in  the  alternative

that,   even   if  police  officers  have   independent

authority  to conduct an investigative stop  when  they

have a reasonable suspicion that a parolee has violated

the  conditions of parole, the investigative stop  must

still conform to the Coleman-Ebona rule.

          Under  Alaska law, police officers  authority

to  conduct investigative stops is more restricted than

under  federal law.  In Coleman v. State3 and Ebona  v.

State,4 our supreme court held that police officers can

conduct  an  investigative  stop  only  if  they   have

reasonable suspicion that imminent public danger exists

or  [that]  serious  harm to persons  or  property  has

recently occurred.5

          Reichel  argues  that  even  if  the   police

reasonably  suspected  that Reichel  had  violated  his

conditions of parole by going to a bar and by  drinking

alcoholic  beverages,  the  police  had  no  basis  for

concluding  that Reichels unlawful conduct  had  harmed

any  person  or property, nor any basis for  concluding

that   Reichels  conduct  created  an  imminent  public

danger.   Thus, Reichel contends, the officers exceeded

their  authority  under Coleman  and  Ebona  when  they

stopped him outside the bar.



The  States  argument that there was  no  investigative
stop


          The   States   first  response  to   Reichels

argument  is that no investigative stop occurred   that

the  police merely approached Reichel outside  the  bar

and asked if they could speak to him.  The State argues

that   this  was  merely  a  generalized  request   for

information rather than an investigative stop.

          Alaska  law recognizes the difference between

investigative  stops  (which  constitute  seizures  for

constitutional purposes) and police-citizen contacts in

which the police are merely seeking information without

engaging  in a show of authority.6  Whether the  police

engaged  in an investigative stop or merely  a  contact

hinges on the facts of each particular case.7

          In  Reichels case, the superior court clearly

          viewed the encounter between Reichel and the police

officers as an investigative stop  a stop that  ripened

into  an  arrest after the officers spoke with Reichels

parole  officer.  Even if the facts of  that  encounter

might  reasonably  be construed to support  the  States

contention  that no stop occurred, the  superior  court

did not view the facts that way.

          Of  course, we are not bound by the  superior

courts  legal  conclusion.  If the facts of  this  case

even when viewed in the light most favorable to Reichel

showed  that no investigative stop occurred,  we  would

have  the  authority  to  affirm  the  superior  courts

decision on this alternative ground.8  But here,  based

on  the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing,

the  superior court could reasonably conclude  that  an

investigative  stop  occurred.  We  therefore  have  no

authority  to re-evaluate that testimony and reach  our

own independent decision on this issue.



The  States  argument that the investigative  stop  was
justified  by a reasonable suspicion that  Reichel  was
about to drive while intoxicated


          The  State next argues that the investigative

stop  was justified under the Coleman-Ebona rule.   The

State  points  out that Reichel was on  parole  from  a

conviction  for felony driving while intoxicated.   The

State   argues  that,  because  of  Reichels   criminal

history, and because the police found Reichel in a  bar

(and observed Reichel leave the bar soon after Sergeant

Hutt  spotted  him),  the  officers  had  a  reasonable

suspicion  that Reichel had been drinking and  that  he

therefore  posed  an  imminent  danger  to  the  public

safety.

          (This  was  not the legal theory advanced  by

Sergeant Hutt when he explained his reason for stopping

          Reichel, nor is it the legal theory that the superior

court  adopted  when it upheld the investigative  stop.

However,  as  explained above,  we  are  authorized  to

affirm  the  superior  courts  decision  on  any  basis

revealed by the record.)

          In support of this argument, the State relies

on our decision in Smith v. State, 756 P.2d 913 (Alaska

App.  1988).   In Smith, a police officer observed  the

defendant  driving a motor vehicle; a  locate  bulletin

had been issued for this vehicle because the registered

owner  of  the  vehicle had had their  drivers  license

suspended.9   The officer stopped the vehicle  to  find

out  if the person he observed driving the vehicle  was

indeed  the  registered owner whose  license  had  been

suspended.10   It  turned out that Smith  was  not  the

registered  owner  but, by coincidence, Smiths  drivers

license  was  also  suspended, so the officer  arrested

her.11

          On  appeal,  Smith  argued that  the  officer

violated  the  Coleman-Ebona rule when he  stopped  the

vehicle.  Smith contended that even if the officer  had

reasonable  suspicion to believe that she  was  driving

with a suspended license, this offense did not pose the

imminent public danger required by Coleman and Ebona.12

We rejected this argument:

     
     Drivers licenses may be suspended for  a
variety of reasons that are generally related
to  public  safety.   ...   It  may  well  be
correct,  as  Smith  argues,  that  in   many
situations licenses are suspended for reasons
having  to  do  with a drivers  inability  to
establish financial responsibility.  [And  we
agree that] there is little reason to suppose
that   a   driver  whose  license  has   been
suspended  for  failing to provide  proof  of
insurance poses any imminent public danger.

     Yet  in  many other situations, licenses
are suspended precisely because a driver has,
     through past driving conduct or offenses,
demonstrated  an  actual inability  to  drive
safely.   When a driver in this  category  is
behind the wheel, there is a legitimate basis
for  concluding  that there may  be  imminent
danger   to   other   motorists.    In   most
situations that  as in the present  case   an
officer who has a reasonable suspicion that a
motorist   is  committing  the   offense   of
[driving  with a suspended license] will  not
know  the  underlying basis for  the  license
suspension.   We believe that  the  level  of
danger in such instances is sufficiently high
to permit a traffic stop.

Smith, 756 P.2d at 915-16.

The State argues that Reichels case is analogous to the

Smith  case  because the officers reasonably  suspected

Reichel of drinking in the bar, and because Reichel had

a  history  of  engaging  in dangerous  conduct  (i.e.,

intoxicated   driving)  when  he   consumed   alcoholic

beverages.   But  one aspect of Reichels  case  differs

from  the  facts of Smith:  the testimony presented  at

the   evidentiary  hearing  gives  no  indication  that

Reichel  had driven to the bar or that Reichel intended

to drive when he left the bar.

          Because  the  State did not rely on this impending  DWI

theory when Reichels case was litigated below, the superior court

made  no  finding  on  the issue of whether the  police  had  any

indication that Reichel was about to drive when he left the  bar.

However,  the testimony presented to the superior court  strongly

suggests that Reichel did not intend to drive.  Reichel took  the

stand  and testified that he called a taxicab before he left  the

bar, and that when he walked out of the bar he intended to depart

in  this cab.  Reichel stated that he was about ten feet from the

cab  when the officers stopped him.  Sergeant Hutt testified that

he  believe[d]  there was a cab there when the  officers  stopped

Reichel,  although Hutt disclaimed knowledge of Reichels  precise

intentions with respect to this cab.

          The   State  argues  that  an  investigative  stop  was

justified  even  if  there  was  no affirmative  indication  that

Reichel  intended  to  drive.  The State suggests  that  even  if

Reichel  intended  to  leave  in a taxicab,  the  officers  [who]

followed Reichel out of the bar ... had no way of knowing that he

would  ... take a cab.  The State further suggests that  even  if

Reichel had taken a cab, it is still possible that he would  have

driven  [another vehicle] once he reached a location  ...  safely

away from the officers.

          But  an  investigative stop can not be  grounded  on  a

police  officers lack of knowledge as to whether a  person  might

commit  an  offense, or an officers speculation about  a  persons

proclivity to commit a future offense.  Rather, it is the  States

burden  to  show  that the officers who performed  the  stop  had

affirmative  reasons  to believe that an offense  had  just  been

committed or was about to be committed.

          In  Reichels  case,  before  the  officers  could  stop

Reichel   on   suspicion  that  he  was  about  to  drive   while

intoxicated, the officers had to have some affirmative reason  to

believe  (1) that Reichel was indeed intoxicated (as  opposed  to

having  simply  consumed  an alcoholic beverage),  and  (2)  that

Reichel was about to drive.  The record is silent on the issue of

whether  Reichel gave the officers any reason to believe that  he

was  intoxicated, and the record supports Reichels assertion that

he did not intend to drive.

          The   State   argues  that,  even  without  affirmative

evidence  that  Reichel was intoxicated or that  he  intended  to

drive,  the  police were entitled to stop Reichel simply  because

they  had reason to believe that he had been drinking and because

they knew that he had previously been convicted for driving while

intoxicated.   The  State contends that, under these  facts,  the

police  could  reasonably  fear that Reichel  might  drive  while

intoxicated in the near future.

          But  under the States theory, the police would have the

authority to conduct an investigative stop of any person  with  a

prior conviction for driving while intoxicated based merely  upon

a  reasonable suspicion that the person had consumed some  amount

of  alcohol at a social gathering.  Moreover, applying the States

theory  to the situation presented in Smith (i.e., situations  in

which  the  police have reason to believe that a persons  drivers

license  has been suspended), the police would have the authority

to  conduct an investigative stop of anyone whose drivers license

was  suspended if the police saw that person walking  through  or

toward  the  parking lot of a shopping mall.  This  would  be  an

unwarranted  and unconstitutional  expansion of police  authority

to conduct investigative stops.

          For  these  reasons, we conclude that the investigative

stop  in  this  case was not supported by a reasonable  suspicion

that Reichel was about to drive while intoxicated.



     The  States  argument that the investigative  stop  was
     justified   because  the  officers  had  a   reasonable
     suspicion that Reichel had just violated the conditions
     of his parole
     

               This  brings us to the States third argument:

     the  argument that the investigative stop was justified

     because  the  officers had a reasonable suspicion  that

     Reichel had just violated the conditions of his release

     (by  going into the bar).  This is one of the  theories

     adopted  by  the superior court when the  court  denied

     Reichels motion to suppress.

          Under  its  violation of  parole  theory  for

upholding the stop, the State argues that the  Coleman-

Ebona  rule should be construed to allow the police  to

conduct investigative stops, not only when the officers

reasonably   suspect   recent  or  impending   criminal

conduct, but also when they reasonably suspect a recent

or  impending violation of probation or parole, so long

as  this violation involve[s] conduct serious enough to

satisfy  the  Coleman standard  i.e., so  long  as  the

conduct  creates  an  imminent  public  danger  or   it

involves [recent] serious harm to persons or property.

          Reichel contends that the States argument  is

foreclosed  by  the Alaska Supreme Courts  decision  in

Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1977).  In Roman,

the   supreme  court  held  (as  a  matter  of   Alaska

constitutional law) that prisoners released  on  parole

have  the  same protections against government searches

and   seizures   as  other  citizens,   except   [when]

reasonably conducted searches and seizures are required

by  the legitimate demands of correctional authorities,

and  when  the  authority to conduct such searches  and

seizures  [is  expressly] set forth [in  the  parolees]

conditions of parole by the Parole Board.13

          The  defendant  in  Roman  had  been  granted

parole  release  from his sentence  for  possession  of

heroin.14   Roman  later  violated  his  conditions  of

release,  but  (following a hearing) the  Parole  Board

decided  not  to  revoke his parole.   Instead,  Romans

parole   officer  drafted  a  series  of   supplemental

conditions  of parole to govern Romans conduct  in  the

future.15   One of these conditions required  Roman  to

[s]ubmit  [his] person, vehicle and dwelling to  search

for contraband on demand by any parole officer or peace

officer.16

          The  supreme  court  held  that  this  parole

condition  was unconstitutional to the extent  that  it

purported   to   grant   police  officers   independent

authority to require Roman to submit to a search:

     
     The right to perform such searches is limited
     to  parole officers and peace officers acting
     under    their   direction.     ...     [T]he
     authorization for searches [in  Romans  case]
     was too broad [because it subjected] Roman to
     searches other than by or at the direction of
     parole officers.
     
Roman, 570 P.2d at 1243 & n. 26.  The supreme court added that,

[i]n  the future, we believe that [any] conditions of parole

authorizing searches should be specified by the Parole Board

and  [should] not [be] left to the discretion of  individual

parole officers.17

     These  two  aspects  of  the  Roman  decision  are  now

codified  in AS 33.16.150.  This statute governs the  Parole

Boards   authority  to  impose  conditions  of  release   on

prisoners  who are paroled.  Subsection (a) of  the  statute

lists  twelve conditions of release that must be imposed  on

all  parolees.  Subsection (b) of the statute then lists  an

additional  eleven  conditions of release  that  the  Parole

Board  may,  in  its  discretion,  impose  on  a  particular

parolee.   Under  subsection (b)(3), the  Parole  Board  may

require a parolee to

     
     submit to reasonable searches and seizures by
     a  parole  officer, or [by] a  peace  officer
     acting   under  the  direction  of  a  parole
     officer[.]
     
Thus,  subsection  (b)(3)  echoes  the  holding  in  Roman    the

constitutional ruling that, except when acting at  the  direction

of  a parole officer, police officers may not subject parolees to

searches  or seizures that would be unconstitutional if performed

on the person or property of other citizens.

          Based on Roman, Reichel argues that police officers can

not  detain a parolee to investigate a suspected parole violation

unless either (1) the suspected parole violation involves conduct

that  would constitute an independent crime, or (2) the  officers

are  acting at the direction of a parole officer.  Thus,  Reichel

reasons, the investigative stop in his case was unconstitutional.

          We  conclude  that  we  need not resolve  these  issues

concerning  the  interplay between the  Roman  decision  and  the

Coleman-Ebona rule.  As explained above, the State does not argue

that  police  officers are authorized to conduct an investigative

stop  whenever  they have a reasonable suspicion  that  a  parole

violation  is occurring or has just occurred.  Rather, the  State

          takes the position that police officers are entitled to conduct

an  investigative  stop if they have a reasonable  suspicion  (1)

that  a  parole violation is occurring or has just occurred,  and

(2)  that the conduct involved in this violation of parole  meets

the  Coleman-Ebona test  i.e., that the parole violation  creates

an imminent public danger or it involves [recent] serious harm to

persons or property.

          As  we  explained  earlier in  this  opinion  (when  we

rejected  the  States argument that the police had  a  reasonable

suspicion that Reichel was about to drive while intoxicated), the

facts  known  to  the police when they stopped  Reichel  did  not

provide  reason to believe that an imminent public danger existed

or  that  serious harm to persons or property had just  occurred.

The officers knew that Reichel had just been inside the bar. They

might   reasonably  have  suspected  that  Reichel  had  consumed

alcoholic  beverages  while  in the  bar.   And  they  reasonably

suspected  that Reichels conditions of release forbade  him  from

engaging  in  these  activities.   But  these  facts,   even   in

combination, do not amount to a reasonable suspicion that Reichel

posed an imminent danger to the public.

          Thus,  even under the States interpretation of the  law

that  is,  even assuming that the Coleman-Ebona rule  allows  the

police   to  conduct  investigative  stops  based  on  reasonable

suspicion  of a serious parole violation  the facts  of  Reichels

case  would not support the investigative stop.  For this reason,

we  conclude  that the parties various arguments  concerning  the

proper  interpretation  of Roman and the Coleman-Ebona  rule  are

moot.



     The superior courts alternative rationale for upholding
     the investigative stop
     

               In  addition  to the theories  that  we  have

     already  discussed, the superior court ruled  that  the

     investigative  stop  was  justified  because   Reichels

     conditions of parole required him to submit to a breath

     test  or to a search for controlled substances  at  the

     request or direction of any police officer.  On appeal,

     the  State  does  not  defend this  rationale  for  the

     investigative  stop.  As we explained in the  preceding

     section  of  this  opinion, the Alaska  Supreme  Courts

     decision  in Roman v. State holds that these conditions

     of Reichels parole are unconstitutional.

     

     Conclusion
     

               Reichels suppression motion should have  been

     granted.   Accordingly, the judgement of  the  superior

     court is REVERSED.

     

_______________________________
1 AS 11.71.040(a)(3)(A).

2 570 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1977).

3 553 P.2d 40, 46 (Alaska 1976).

4 577 P.2d 698, 700 (Alaska 1978).

5 Coleman, 553 P.2d at 46.

6 See Howard v. State, 664 P.2d 603, 608 (Alaska App. 1983).

7  See  Martin  v. State, 797 P.2d 1209, 1214  (Alaska  App.
1990).

8  An appellate court is authorized to affirm a lower courts
decision  on  any legal ground revealed by the record.   See
Rutherford  v.  State, 605 P.2d 16, 21 n. 12 (Alaska  1979);
Ransom v. Haner, 362 P.2d 282, 285 (Alaska 1961); Millman v.
State, 841 P.2d 190, 195 (Alaska App. 1992).

9 Smith, 756 P.2d at 914.

10   Id. at 914-15.

11   Id. at 915.

12   Id.

13   Roman, 570 P.2d at 1237.

14   Id.

15   Id.

16   Id.

17   Id. at 1243-44.