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Ridlington v. State (06/18/2004) ap-1939
Ridlington v. State (06/18/2004) ap-1939
NOTICE
The text of this opinion can be corrected before the
opinion is published in the Pacific Reporter. Readers
are encouraged to bring typographical or other formal
errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate
Courts:
303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501
Fax: (907) 264-0878
E-mail: corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
JEREMY A. RIDLINGTON, )
) Court of Appeals No.
A-8533
Appellant, )
Trial Court No. 4FA-02-2501 Cr
)
v. )
) O P I N
I O N
STATE OF ALASKA, )
)
Appellee. )
[No. 1939 June 18, 2004]
)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Fourth Judi
cial District, Fairbanks, Jane F. Kauvar,
Judge.
Appearances: William R. Satterberg Jr.,
Fairbanks, for the Appellant. Kenneth M.
Rosenstein, Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals,
Anchorage, and Gregg D. Renkes, Attorney
General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer
and Stewart, Judges.
MANNHEIMER, Judge.
In the early morning hours of July 23, 2002, Nenana
Police Chief Milton J. Haken arrested Jeremy A. Ridlington for
driving while intoxicated. Haken initially filed a misdemeanor
DWI complaint against Ridlington in the Nenana district court.
Later that same day, after Haken learned that Ridlington had two
prior DWI convictions, he filed a second complaint this one
charging Ridlington with felony DWI (i.e., driving while
intoxicated after having previously been convicted of DWI or
breath-test refusal at least twice).1
Two days after his arrest (i.e., on July 25),
Ridlington appeared for arraignment in front of Nenana Magistrate
Paul Verhagen. Ridlington was assisted by counsel, who appeared
telephonically.
Ridlington and his attorney were aware that two
complaints the misdemeanor DWI complaint and the felony DWI
complaint had been filed against Ridlington based on the same
conduct. Acting on the advice of his attorney, Ridlington
attempted to plead guilty to the misdemeanor charge anticipating
that his guilty plea to this lesser included charge would then
bar the State from pursuing the felony charge. But because the
felony charge was also pending, Magistrate Verhagen refused to
allow Ridlington to plead guilty to the lesser included
misdemeanor offense.
The following week, the State formally dismissed the
misdemeanor complaint and the grand jury indicted Ridlington for
felony DWI. After Ridlington was indicted, he attacked the
felony charge on double jeopardy grounds. Ridlington argued (1)
that the Nenana magistrate had had no authority to refuse to
accept his offered guilty plea to the misdemeanor, and (2) that
if he had been allowed to plead guilty to the misdemeanor, his
plea would have barred the State from pursuing the felony charge.
When the superior court rejected this argument, Ridlington
pleaded no contest to felony DWI, reserving his right to raise
this double jeopardy issue on appeal.2
In his brief to this Court, Ridlington renews his
contention that the magistrate had no right to refuse to allow
him to enter a guilty plea to the misdemeanor charge. But even
if this were so, Ridlington would not be prejudiced by the
magistrates action unless Ridlingtons second contention were also
true his contention that, had he succeeded in entering a guilty
plea to the misdemeanor charge, this would have barred the State
from pursuing the felony charge.
Ridlingtons second contention is, in fact, mistaken.
The State could still prosecute Ridlington for felony DWI even if
Ridlington had pleaded guilty on July 25 to the misdemeanor DWI
charge.
In Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 81
L.Ed.2d 425 (1984), the defendant pleaded guilty to some of the
charges in his indictment and then asserted that the double
jeopardy clause barred the government from pursuing the remaining
charges because the charges to which the defendant had pleaded
guilty were lesser included offenses of the remaining charges.3
The Supreme Court rejected the defendants argument:
Previously we have recognized that the
Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits prosecution
of a defendant for a greater offense when he
has already been tried and acquitted or
convicted on the lesser included offense.
See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct.
2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977). ...
We do not believe, however, that the
principles of finality and prevention of
prosecutorial overreaching applied in Brown
reach [the present] case. No interest of
respondent protected by the Double Jeopardy
Clause is implicated by continuing
prosecution on the remaining charges brought
in the indictment. Here respondent offered
only to resolve part of the charges against
him, while the State objected to disposing of
any of the counts against respondent without
a trial. Respondent has not been exposed to
conviction on the charges to which he pleaded
not guilty, nor has the State had the
opportunity to marshal its evidence and
resources more than once or to hone its
presentation of its case through a trial. The
acceptance of a guilty plea to lesser
included offenses while charges on the
greater offenses remain pending, moreover,
has none of the implications of an implied
acquittal which results from a verdict
convicting a defendant on lesser included
offenses rendered by a jury charged to
consider both greater and lesser included
offenses. [citations omitted] There simply
has been none of the governmental
overreaching that double jeopardy is supposed
to prevent. On the other hand, ending
prosecution now would deny the State its
right to one full and fair opportunity to
convict those who have violated its laws.
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509, 98
S.Ct. 824, 832, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978).
... Here respondents efforts were
directed to separate disposition of counts in
the same indictment where no more than one
trial of the offenses charged was ever
contemplated. Notwithstanding the trial
courts acceptance of respondents guilty
pleas, respondent should not be entitled to
use the Double Jeopardy Clause as a sword to
prevent the State from completing its
prosecution on the remaining charges.
Johnson, 467 U.S. at 501-02, 104 S.Ct. at 2542.
In Alley v. State, 704 P.2d 233, 235 (Alaska App.
1985), this Court endorsed this same resolution of the
issue as a matter of state constitutional law.
Ridlington acknowledges that Ohio v. Johnson and Alley
v. State are apparently counter to his contention in this appeal.
But he points out that, unlike the situations in Johnson and
Alley, the charges against him were not contained in the same
charging document, but rather were contained in separate charging
documents.
We do not view this as a material distinction. Both of
the complaints against Ridlington were filed before he made his
initial appearance in court. Ridlington and his attorney were
well aware of the two complaints; indeed, Ridlingtons motivation
for trying to plead guilty to the misdemeanor complaint was to
stop the State from pursuing the felony complaint that had
already been filed. Under these circumstances, the reasoning and
policies described by the Supreme Court in Ohio v. Johnson apply
with equal vigor to Ridlingtons case.
We note that at least two federal circuits have
concluded that Ohio v. Johnson applies to circumstances like
these situations in which the pending charges against the
defendant are contained in more than one charging document. See
Buchanan v. Angelone, 103 F.3d 344, 349-350 (4th Cir. 1996); and
Bally v. Kemna, 65 F.3d 104, 108-09 (8th Cir. 1995). See also
State v. Nickens (unpublished), 1993 WL 291731, *6 & n. 11 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1993).
Given our resolution of the double jeopardy issue, we
need not reach the question of whether a judicial officer has the
authority to refuse to accept an offered guilty plea on grounds
other than the possibility that the plea is not knowing and
intelligent.
The judgement of the superior court is AFFIRMED.
_______________________________
1 See AS 28.35.030(n).
2 See Cooksey v. State, 524 P.2d 1251, 1256-57 (Alaska 1974)
(approving this type of conditional plea).
3 Johnson, 467 U.S. at 500, 104 S.Ct. at 2541.
