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Valencia v. State (05/28/2004) ap-1935

Valencia v. State (05/28/2004) ap-1935

                             NOTICE
     The  text  of this opinion can be corrected before  the
     opinion  is published in the Pacific Reporter.  Readers
     are  encouraged to bring typographical or other  formal
     errors  to  the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate
     Courts:

             303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska  99501
                      Fax:  (907) 264-0878
       E-mail:  corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA


GILBERT HENRY VALENCIA,       )
                              )              Court of Appeals No.
A-8527
                                             Appellant,         )
Trial Court No. 3KN-93-172 CR
                              )
                  v.          )
                              )                           O P I N
I O N
STATE OF ALASKA,              )
                              )
                                             Appellee.          )
[No. 1935  May 28, 2004]
                              )


          Appeal  from the Superior Court,  Third  Judi
          cial District, Kenai, Harold M. Brown, Judge.

          Appearances:    James   Ottinger,   Assistant
          Public Defender, Kenai, and Barbara K. Brink,
          Public    Defender,   Anchorage,   for    the
          Appellant.  Dean J. Guaneli, Chief  Assistant
          Attorney   General,  and  Gregg  D.   Renkes,
          Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.

          Before:   Coats, Chief Judge, and  Mannheimer
          and Stewart, Judges.

          STEWART, Judge.


          In  December  2002, the superior court revoked  Gilbert

Henry  Valencias  probation  in case  number  3KN-93-172  CR  and

sentenced  Valencia  to  jail.  The superior  court  acknowledged

that,  under  our  decision in Nygren v. State,1 Valencia  should

receive credit against his sentence for the 437 days that he  had

previously spent in a court-ordered residential alcohol treatment

          program.  However, Valencia argued that he should receive an

additional good time credit of 146 days (i.e., one-third of  437)

an  amount  equal to the good time credit to which he would  have

been  entitled had he spent the 437 days in prison instead of  in

the  treatment  program.2  The superior  court  refused  to  give

Valencia  this  additional  credit  against  his  sentence,   and

Valencia now appeals the superior courts decision.

          Nygren  holds  that  defendants should  receive  credit

against  their  sentence for the time spent  in  a  court-ordered

residential  treatment program, if the program is so  restrictive

of  the  defendants liberty as to be functionally  equivalent  to

custody.3   The  Nygren decision is silent  on  the  question  of

whether  defendants should also receive a supplemental good  time

credit  if they obey the rules of the treatment program.  But  we

have since answered this question in the negative.  In Parker  v.

State,4   we  stated that a defendant residing in a court-ordered

treatment  program [would] not be eligible for ... early  release

for  accumulated  good-time  credit.5   Recently,  in  State   v.

Judson,6 we addressed this issue again.  We noted that defendants

who  substitute time spent in residential treatment programs  for

normal jail time [will] in some cases ... [spend] a longer period

[in] custody, because jail inmates get good time credit.2

          Valencia  does  not expressly ask us to reconsider  our

decisions  in  Parker  and Judson.  (Indeed,  Valencia  does  not

mention these decisions in his brief.)  However, we are convinced

that  the  rule  stated  in Parker and  Judson  is  supported  by

substantial reasons of policy.

          By  its  terms,  Alaskas good time credit  statute,  AS

33.20.010(a), applies only to prisoners who are serving sentences

in  correctional facilities.  The statute awards good time credit

to  a prisoner who follows the rules of the correctional facility

in  which the prisoner is confined.  Moreover, the policy  behind

the  award  of  good  time credit applies uniquely  to  a  prison

situation.

          As   we   recognized  in  Briggs  v.   Donnelly,3   the

          legislative purpose of this statute is to reward prisoners for

good  behavior during their terms of imprisonment  ...  [and  to]

give  [correctional  officials] a means of  enforcing  discipline

within  correctional facilities.4  The idea is to give  prisoners

an  incentive to remain on good behavior  because prisoners  know

that  their  stay in prison will be extended if they  lose  their

good time credit through misbehavior.

          On  the  other  hand, defendants who are serving  their

sentences in court-ordered residential treatment programs already

have  a  different incentive for good behavior.  If they  violate

the rules of the treatment program, they can be expelled from the

program, and expulsion from the program means that they will have

to serve the remainder of their sentence in prison.

          For   these  reasons,  we  conclude  that  the   Alaska

Legislature validly restricted good time credit to prisoners  who

are  serving their sentences in prison.  We therefore affirm what

we  said in Parker and Judson:  defendants who are serving  their

sentences in court-ordered residential treatment programs do  not

receive good time credit.



          Conclusion

          The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.



_______________________________
     1 658 P.2d 141 (Alaska App. 1983).

2  See  AS  33.20.010(a)  (stating  (with  three  exceptions  not
pertinent  here)  that  a prisoner ... sentenced  to  a  term  of
imprisonment that exceeds three days is entitled to  a  deduction
of  one-third of the term of imprisonment[,] rounded off  to  the
nearest  day[,]  if  the  prisoner  follows  the  rules  of   the
correctional facility in which the prisoner is confined).

     3 Nygren, 658 P.2d at 146.

     4 714 P.2d 802 (Alaska App. 1986).

     5 Id. at 806.

     6 45 P.3d 329 (Alaska App. 2002).

     2 Id. at 333.

     3 828 P.2d 1207 (Alaska App. 1992).

     4 Id. at 1209.