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Valencia v. State (05/28/2004) ap-1935
Valencia v. State (05/28/2004) ap-1935
NOTICE
The text of this opinion can be corrected before the
opinion is published in the Pacific Reporter. Readers
are encouraged to bring typographical or other formal
errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate
Courts:
303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501
Fax: (907) 264-0878
E-mail: corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
GILBERT HENRY VALENCIA, )
) Court of Appeals No.
A-8527
Appellant, )
Trial Court No. 3KN-93-172 CR
)
v. )
) O P I N
I O N
STATE OF ALASKA, )
)
Appellee. )
[No. 1935 May 28, 2004]
)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judi
cial District, Kenai, Harold M. Brown, Judge.
Appearances: James Ottinger, Assistant
Public Defender, Kenai, and Barbara K. Brink,
Public Defender, Anchorage, for the
Appellant. Dean J. Guaneli, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, and Gregg D. Renkes,
Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer
and Stewart, Judges.
STEWART, Judge.
In December 2002, the superior court revoked Gilbert
Henry Valencias probation in case number 3KN-93-172 CR and
sentenced Valencia to jail. The superior court acknowledged
that, under our decision in Nygren v. State,1 Valencia should
receive credit against his sentence for the 437 days that he had
previously spent in a court-ordered residential alcohol treatment
program. However, Valencia argued that he should receive an
additional good time credit of 146 days (i.e., one-third of 437)
an amount equal to the good time credit to which he would have
been entitled had he spent the 437 days in prison instead of in
the treatment program.2 The superior court refused to give
Valencia this additional credit against his sentence, and
Valencia now appeals the superior courts decision.
Nygren holds that defendants should receive credit
against their sentence for the time spent in a court-ordered
residential treatment program, if the program is so restrictive
of the defendants liberty as to be functionally equivalent to
custody.3 The Nygren decision is silent on the question of
whether defendants should also receive a supplemental good time
credit if they obey the rules of the treatment program. But we
have since answered this question in the negative. In Parker v.
State,4 we stated that a defendant residing in a court-ordered
treatment program [would] not be eligible for ... early release
for accumulated good-time credit.5 Recently, in State v.
Judson,6 we addressed this issue again. We noted that defendants
who substitute time spent in residential treatment programs for
normal jail time [will] in some cases ... [spend] a longer period
[in] custody, because jail inmates get good time credit.2
Valencia does not expressly ask us to reconsider our
decisions in Parker and Judson. (Indeed, Valencia does not
mention these decisions in his brief.) However, we are convinced
that the rule stated in Parker and Judson is supported by
substantial reasons of policy.
By its terms, Alaskas good time credit statute, AS
33.20.010(a), applies only to prisoners who are serving sentences
in correctional facilities. The statute awards good time credit
to a prisoner who follows the rules of the correctional facility
in which the prisoner is confined. Moreover, the policy behind
the award of good time credit applies uniquely to a prison
situation.
As we recognized in Briggs v. Donnelly,3 the
legislative purpose of this statute is to reward prisoners for
good behavior during their terms of imprisonment ... [and to]
give [correctional officials] a means of enforcing discipline
within correctional facilities.4 The idea is to give prisoners
an incentive to remain on good behavior because prisoners know
that their stay in prison will be extended if they lose their
good time credit through misbehavior.
On the other hand, defendants who are serving their
sentences in court-ordered residential treatment programs already
have a different incentive for good behavior. If they violate
the rules of the treatment program, they can be expelled from the
program, and expulsion from the program means that they will have
to serve the remainder of their sentence in prison.
For these reasons, we conclude that the Alaska
Legislature validly restricted good time credit to prisoners who
are serving their sentences in prison. We therefore affirm what
we said in Parker and Judson: defendants who are serving their
sentences in court-ordered residential treatment programs do not
receive good time credit.
Conclusion
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.
_______________________________
1 658 P.2d 141 (Alaska App. 1983).
2 See AS 33.20.010(a) (stating (with three exceptions not
pertinent here) that a prisoner ... sentenced to a term of
imprisonment that exceeds three days is entitled to a deduction
of one-third of the term of imprisonment[,] rounded off to the
nearest day[,] if the prisoner follows the rules of the
correctional facility in which the prisoner is confined).
3 Nygren, 658 P.2d at 146.
4 714 P.2d 802 (Alaska App. 1986).
5 Id. at 806.
6 45 P.3d 329 (Alaska App. 2002).
2 Id. at 333.
3 828 P.2d 1207 (Alaska App. 1992).
4 Id. at 1209.
