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Jackson v. State (02/20/2004) ap-1918
Jackson v. State (02/20/2004) ap-1918
NOTICE
The text of this opinion can be corrected before the
opinion is published in the Pacific Reporter. Readers
are encouraged to bring typographical or other formal
errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate
Courts:
303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501
Fax: (907) 264-0878
E-mail: corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
WILLIAM J. JACKSON, )
) Court of Appeals No.
A-8306
Appellant, )
Trial Court No. 3AN-01-707 Cr
)
v. )
) O P I N
I O N
STATE OF ALASKA, )
)
Appellee. )
[No. 1918 February 20, 2004]
)
Appeal from the District Court, Third Judi
cial District, Anchorage, Natalie K. Finn,
Judge.
Appearances: Kit Karjala, Assistant Public
Defender, and Barbara K. Brink, Public
Defender, Anchorage, for Appellant. John R.
Bandle, Assistant District Attorney, Leonard
M. Linton, Jr., District Attorney, Anchorage,
and Gregg D. Renkes, Attorney General,
Juneau, for Appellee.
Before: Mannheimer and Stewart, Judges, and
Andrews, Senior Superior Court Judge.*
[Coats, Chief Judge, not participating.]
MANNHEIMER, Judge.
In early 2001, William J. Jackson was charged with
driving while his license was suspended. At his arraignment, the
district court set two future court dates for Jackson: a pre-
trial conference scheduled for March 21st, and a trial call
scheduled for April 13th. Jackson failed to appear in court on
these dates, and he was subsequently charged with two counts of
misdemeanor failure to appear.1
At his trial, Jackson conceded that he had been
notified of the two court dates. However, he asserted that he
incorrectly recalled the date of his first court appearance
(the pre-trial conference), and then, when he realized that he
had missed his pre-trial conference, he did not understand that
he was still obliged to appear for the trial call on April 13th.
Jackson testified that he assumed that both hearings would be
rescheduled, and that someone would notify him of the new dates.
Jacksons attorney asked the trial judge to instruct the
jury that the State was obliged to prove that Jacksons culpable
mental state (his conscious choice not to appear in court)
coexisted simultaneously with his physical acts of failing to
appear. That is, the defense attorney wanted the jury instructed
that Jackson could not be found guilty unless the State proved
that, on the very dates that Jackson was scheduled to appear in
court (i.e., March 21 and April 13, 2001), Jackson consciously
considered his obligation to appear in court and decided to
ignore it.2
The trial judge (District Court Judge Natalie K. Finn)
refused to give this proposed instruction, and Jackson now argues
that this was error. He contends that, in the absence of the
requested instruction, the jury may have convicted him based
solely on his concession that he had received notice of his two
court dates, without finding a concurrence of ... guilty act and
... guilty mind.
But even though Judge Finn declined to give Jacksons
proposed instruction, she did not ignore these matters of law
when she instructed the jury. Judge Finn informed the jurors
that Jackson could be convicted of failure to appear only if he
acted knowingly, and she gave the jurors the statutory definition
of this culpable mental state.3 Moreover, Judge Finn also
instructed the jurors that Jackson could be convicted of failure
to appear only if the State proved a joint operation of [the] act
or conduct and [the] culpable mental state.
Under these instructions, Judge Finn allowed Jacksons
attorney to argue to the jury that Jackson should be acquitted if
the jury believed that there was a reasonable possibility that
Jackson made an honest mistake about the first court date, and
then, having missed that first court date, Jackson did not
understand his continuing obligation to appear for the second
date. Nevertheless, Jackson asserts that the jury instructions
and thus the jurys verdicts were flawed.
Jacksons appeal presents the question of what,
precisely, is meant by the joint operation of conduct and
culpable mental state when a defendant is charged with failure to
appear. As explained above, Jackson contends that the State was
obliged to prove that Jackson made two conscious decisions not to
appear in court, and that these conscious decisions occurred on
the very days of his two scheduled court appearances (March 21
and April 13, 2001). But this is not the law.
The joint operation requirement the requisite
concurrence of the defendants culpable mental state with the
defendants act or omission is satisfied if the defendants
culpable mental state actuates the prohibited conduct, even
though there may not be strict simultaneity between the two.4 As
explained in Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law
(3rd ed. 1982), p. 933,
One error to be avoided is the false
notion that [the] concurrence [of culpable
mental state and prohibited conduct] means
... mere coincidence[.] [T]he actual
requirement is that the two elements of crime
must be brought together in the sense of a
causal relation between the mens rea and the
actus reus. Stated in other words, the actus
reus must be attributable to the mens rea,
and if this relation is clearly shown[,] it
is unimportant that the two were not present
at the same time, whereas [temporal]
coexistence is not sufficient if the causal
relationship is lacking.
Thus, Jackson would be guilty of
knowingly failing to appear if he decided
early on that he would not attend his
scheduled court appearances, and he then
dismissed the matter from his mind. Jacksons
conscious decision not to attend court,
combined with his subsequent failure to
appear on the two specified days, would
constitute a sufficient concurrence of
culpable mental state and prohibited act or
omission even if it were true that, on the
two scheduled days, Jackson gave no conscious
thought to his court appearances.
Jacksons proposed instruction would
have required the jury to find simultaneity
of culpable mental state and prohibited
conduct when, in fact, this was not required.
Accordingly, Judge Finn properly rejected the
proposed instruction.
Jackson also argues that the jury
may have convicted him based solely on the
undisputed evidence that he was informed (at
his arraignment) of his two future court
dates. But we do not read the jury
instructions to allow this.
As explained above, the jury was
told that Jackson could not be convicted
unless the jurors were convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that Jacksons conduct (i.e.,
his failure to appear) was knowing, and they
were further told that Jackson could not be
convicted unless the jurors found a joint
operation of culpable mental state and
prohibited conduct. Jackson presented the
defense that he made an honest mistake as to
the date of his first scheduled court
appearance and that, after he realized that
he had missed this first court appearance, he
honestly believed that his second court
appearance would be canceled and that he
would be notified of new court dates. If the
jury had accepted these assertions, they
would not have found that Jacksons non-
appearance was knowing as defined in the
instructions.
Finally, Jackson contends that the
prosecutor, in a portion of the States
summation, invited the jurors to find that
Jackson acted knowingly based solely on the
fact that Jackson was informed of his two
court dates. But the prosecutor did not
argue that Jacksons asserted defense of
mistake was legally irrelevant so long as the
jurors found that Jackson had received
advance notice of the two court dates.
Rather, the prosecutor argued that the jurors
should consider all of the circumstances
before deciding whether to credit Jacksons
asserted defense of mistake:
Prosecutor: State of mind. You dont
have to rely on [Jacksons testimony on this
subject]. Youll receive a jury instruction
[on this point]. You know who determines his
state of mind? You do. The jury decides
[whether] what ... he [was] saying [is]
true[.] ...
[Quoting from a jury instruction:]
State of mind may be proved by circumstantial
evidence. It rarely can be established by
any other means. ... [T]here can be no
eyewitness to the state of mind with which
the acts were done or omitted. You cant read
minds. ... But what a defendant does or
fails to do may indicate his state [of] mind
or lack thereof. So you get to look and
weigh ... his actions.
[Again quoting from a jury instruction:]
In determining issues of state of mind, the
jury is entitled to consider any statements
made, acts done, or omitted by the accused,
and all facts and circumstances in evidence
which may aid determination of the defendants
state of mind you get to determine that.
Was he telling the truth, or are his excuses
reasonable? Did he know? You get to decide
that, okay?
We have considered and rejected all
of Jacksons claims of error. Accordingly,
the judgement of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
_______________________________
* Sitting by assignment made pursuant to Article IV, Section
11 of the Alaska Constitution and Administrative Rule 23(a).
1 AS 12.30.060.
2 Jacksons proposed instruction read:
I have instructed you that the required [culpable]
mental state in this case is knowingly. I have also
instructed you that the State must prove that the
alleged crimes occurred on or about March 21, 2001, and
April 13, 2001. Therefore, the State must prove to you
beyond a reasonable doubt that not only did Mr. Jackson
fail to appear for required court hearings on or about
March 21, 2001 and April 13, 2001, but that he knew[,]
on or about those dates of March 21, 2001 and April 13,
2001, that he was failing to appear. ... In other
words, the required [culpable] mental [state] and the
alleged conduct must occur simultaneously.
3 AS 11.81.900(a)(2).
4 See Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law (2nd ed.
2003), 6.3(a), Vol. 1, p. 451.
