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State v. Jack (4/11/2003) ap-1866
State v. Jack (4/11/2003) ap-1866
NOTICE
The text of this opinion can be corrected before the
opinion is published in the Pacific Reporter. Readers
are encouraged to bring typographical or other formal
errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate
Courts:
303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501
Fax: (907) 264-0878
E-mail: corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
STATE OF ALASKA, )
) Court of Appeals No.
A-8062
Petitioner, )
Trial Court No. 1KE-S01-551 CR
)
v. ) O P I
N I O N
)
VERNON G. JACK, V, )
)
Respondent. )
[No. 1866 April 11, 2003]
)
Appeal from the Superior Court, First Judi
cial District, Ketchikan, Larry R. Weeks,
Judge.
Appearances: W. H. Hawley, Jr., Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Special
Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and
Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney General, Juneau,
for Petitioner. Margi A. Mock, Assistant
Public Defender, and Barbara K. Brink, Public
Defender, Anchorage, for Respondent.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer
and Stewart, Judges.
STEWART, Judge.
COATS, Chief Judge, concurring.
MANNHEIMER, Judge, concurring.
On May 12, 2001, the Alaska state ferry Matanuska was
navigating the Inside Passage on a voyage from Bellingham,
Washington, to Southeast Alaska. According to the grand jurys
indictment, while the Matanuska cruised through Canadian
territorial waters, Vernon G. Jack, V, engaged in sexual contact
and sexual penetration with S.N.F. and physically assaulted her.
An Alaska State Trooper who happened to be aboard the Matanuska
investigated Jacks conduct and arrested him. The grand jury in
Ketchikan charged Jack with one count of first-degree sexual
assault, one count of second-degree sexual assault, and four
counts of fourth-degree assault for his misconduct aboard the
Matanuska while it was in Canadian territorial waters.1
Superior Court Judge Larry R. Weeks granted Jacks
motion to dismiss the indictment based on the States lack of
jurisdiction to prosecute Jack. We granted the States petition
for review. Because we conclude that the States criminal
jurisdiction did not extend to Canadian territorial waters, we
affirm the superior court.
Under common law, a state has jurisdiction to prosecute
those crimes occurring within its territorial limits.2 And a
state, by statute, may extend its jurisdiction to enforce
violations of its substantive criminal law when a persons conduct
occurring outside the territorial limits of the state affects an
in-state interest.3
We discussed Alaskas statutory extension of criminal
jurisdiction under AS 12.05.010 in Wheat v. State.4 That statute
provides:
When the commission of a crime commenced
outside the state is consummated inside the
state, the defendant is liable to punishment
in this state even though out of the state at
the time of the commission of the crime
charged, if the defendant consummated the
crime through the intervention of an innocent
or guilty agent, or by other means proceeding
directly from the defendant.
Wheat kept his daughter in Arizona after his visitation under an
Alaska child custody order ended.5 The State charged Wheat with
second-degree custodial interference.6 Wheat argued that Alaska
could not prosecute him for this crime because his conduct
occurred outside the State of Alaska.7 We reasoned that the
results of Wheats crime, withholding his child from her lawful
custodian who resided in Alaska, occurred in Alaska.8 Therefore,
we concluded that the crime was consummated in Alaska and that
the State properly prosecuted Wheat.9
In this case, the State has made no claim that Alaska
has jurisdiction to prosecute Jack under AS 12.05.010 because
Jacks misconduct and the results of his misconduct all occurred
in Canadian territorial waters. Thus, the State must have
another basis for prosecuting Jack for a violation of Alaska
criminal law.
The State claims it has this power under AS 44.03.010.
Alaska Statute 44.03.010 provides:
The jurisdiction of the state extends to
water offshore from the coast of the state as
follows:
(1) the marginal sea to its outermost
limits as those limits are from time to time
defined or recognized by the United States of
America by international treaty or otherwise;
(2) the high seas to the extent that
jurisdiction is claimed by the United States
of America, or to the extent recognized by
the usages and customs of international law
or by agreement to which the United States of
America or the state is a party;
(3) submerged land including the
subsurface of submerged land, lying under the
water mentioned in this section.
We considered this statute in Corbin v. State,10 where
a jury had convicted Corbin of stealing crab pots in the crab
fishery more than sixteen miles offshore of Alaska.11 Corbin
argued that the State had no jurisdiction to prosecute him for
this theft because the federal government had exclusive
jurisdiction in offshore waters beyond three miles and had
preempted state regulation of offshore theft by enacting a theft
statute that applied in the special maritime jurisdiction of the
United States.12 For purposes of his case, Corbin conceded that,
on its face, AS 44.03.010 extended Alaska criminal jurisdiction
to offshore waters.13
In Corbin, we relied in part on the Alaska Supreme
Courts decision State v. Bundrant.14 The Bundrant court ruled
that the federal government had not preempted state regulation of
the crab fishery offshore of Alaska, and that Alaska could
therefore extend its jurisdiction beyond its territorial boundary
in order to effect conservation of the fishery within state
waters.15 The court concluded that a sufficiently close
connection to legitimate state interests [had] been established
to validate the states limited efforts to regulate this
resource.16 In Corbin, we applied Bundrant and concluded that
the enforcement of the Alaska theft statute to a crab-pot theft
occurring in offshore waters was so closely tied to the
regulation of the crabbing industry that state jurisdiction in
this case is justified.17 However, in Corbins case, we did not
rule whether AS 44.03.010 extended Alaskas jurisdiction into
Canadian territorial waters.
Alaska Statute 44.03.010 provides generally that the
jurisdiction of the State extends to waters offshore from the
coast of the state and describes specifically the area claimed by
the state. To properly interpret whether AS 44.03.010 grants
Alaska jurisdiction over Canadian territorial waters we must
discuss a coastal states authority over offshore waters.
In United States v. California,18 the Supreme Court
held that a coastal state had no authority over submerged lands
in the territorial or marginal sea beyond the mean low water
mark.19 In 1953, Congress responded by enacting the Submerged
Lands Act, which recognized, confirmed, established, and vested
in and assigned to the respective States title to submerged lands
under the marginal sea.20 During the same session, Congress also
passed the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA).21 Section
1332 of the OCSLA reads in part:
(a) It is hereby declared to be the policy of
the United States that (1) the subsoil and
seabed of the outer Continental Shelf
appertain to the United States and are
subject to its jurisdiction, control, and
power of disposition as provided in this
subchapter;
(2) this subchapter shall be construed in
such manner that the character of the waters
above the outer Continental Shelf as high
seas and the right to navigation and fishing
therein shall not be affected[.]
Under international law, the United States has
authority over the sea adjacent to its coastline.22 In Section 2
of the Alaska Statehood Act, Congress provided that the State of
Alaska included all of the territory, together with the
territorial waters appurtenant thereto[.]23 This grant is
mirrored by Article 12, Section 1 of the Alaska Constitution,
which provides that the boundaries of the State include the
territorial waters appurtenant thereto[.]24 As the Alaska
Supreme Court observed in Metlakatla v. Egan,25 the legislature
passed AS 44.03.010 to extend Alaskas seaward boundaries to
include the marginal sea, the high seas, and the submerged lands
to the extent permitted by the federal government.26
Again, AS 44.03.010 provides that the jurisdiction of
the state extends to waters offshore of the coast of the state
and then specifies the three categories included: (1) the
marginal sea, (2) the high seas to the extent claimed by the
United States or recognized by international law, and (3) the
submerged land under the first two defined categories.
Jurisdiction would not be possible in this case under clause (1)
because, as the superior court found, Jacks misconduct occurred
entirely in Canadian territorial waters.
The State argues that Alaska has jurisdiction under
clause (2) because the State interprets high seas in clause (2)
to include all the ocean offshore of Alaska up to the low-water
mark of all countries. But this interpretation is far too broad,
and ignores the statutes initial limitation to waters offshore
the coast. The State provides no authority that would support a
conclusion that the United States is empowered to regulate
foreign territorial waters under either its power to regulate
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high seas,27 or the
federal governments special admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction.28
Under its admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, the
United States may define and punish crimes committed by its
citizens on U.S.-flagged vessels (such as the Matanuska)
operating in foreign territorial waters.29 Based on this special
jurisdiction, the State argues that Alaska has jurisdiction under
AS 44.03.010 to prosecute Jacks misconduct committed on an
Alaskan vessel in Canadian territorial waters. However, the
United States authority over its flagged vessels while they are
in foreign territorial waters is not exclusive the coastal state
has a concurrent interest in regulating the conduct aboard
vessels within its territorial waters.30 In other words, the
fact that the United States has criminal jurisdiction over its
flagged vessels does not preclude Canada from exercising its own
jurisdiction when conduct aboard the vessel affects Canadas
peace, dignity or tranquility.31 And even if the United States
had jurisdiction over the vessel while it was in Canadas
territorial waters, it does not follow that Alaska has the same
jurisdiction, because nothing in AS 44.03.010 indicates that the
legislature intended to assert jurisdiction over an Alaskan
vessel operating outside the territorial waters specifically
described in the statute.
We conclude that AS 44.03.010 does not extend state
criminal jurisdiction into Canadian territorial waters.
Conclusion
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.
COATS, Chief Judge, concurring.
This case was very difficult for me because it seems
obvious that the State should have jurisdiction. Jack concedes
that the State has a sufficient interest in this case to allow
the exercise of state jurisdiction. The alleged assault and
sexual assault took place on an Alaska state ferry and the
assaults were committed against an Alaskan resident. Jacks claim
is that the legislature did not authorize the exercise of state
jurisdiction.
Whether the legislature intended to extend its
potential jurisdiction over this case is governed by AS
44.03.010(2). That statute reads as follows:
The jurisdiction of the state extends to
water offshore from the coast of the state
as follows:
. . . .
(2) The high seas to the extent that
jurisdiction is claimed by the United States
of America or to the extent recognized by
the usages and customs of international law
or by agreement to which the United States
of America or the state is a party.
The State argues that we should give this language a
broad interpretation, which would allow the State to exercise
jurisdiction anywhere on the high seas where the United States of
America could exercise jurisdiction if the State of Alaska has
demonstrated a sufficient interest to overcome constitutional
objections. Under this interpretation of the statute, the
legislature in AS 44.03.010(2) expressed its desire to extend its
criminal jurisdiction to all offenses that occur offshore from
the coast of the state. The only limitation would be that the
State could not exercise jurisdiction where the United States of
America would not have jurisdiction or where the offense would
have insufficient contacts with the state so that it would be
unconstitutional for the state to exercise jurisdiction.
The language of AS 44.03.010(2) could support such an
interpretation. Subsection two extends jurisdiction to the high
seas to the extent that jurisdiction is claimed by the United
States of America . . . . There is support for the argument that
the high seas, as understood at the time the statute was passed,
begin where territorial waters end.1 Indeed, this definition is
consistent with the definition used by the 1958 Geneva Convention
on the High Seas, which defined the high seas as all parts of the
sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in the
internal waters of a State and was the first international
convention to define the high seas.2 Moreover, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals has recently reached a similar
conclusion regarding the definition of the high seas.3 In an
appeal from the consolidated cases surrounding the TWA Flight 800
crash, the Second Circuit had to determine the congressional
meaning of high seas as the term was used in the Death on the
High Seas Act.4 After an exhaustive examination of the relevant
cases, the court held that, based on the weight of early
decisions that addressed the definition, the high seas were those
waters beyond the territorial waters of the United States.5
Therefore, the definition of high seas within AS 44.03.010(2)
could arguably support extending Alaskas jurisdiction
extraterritorially.
Furthermore, subsection two extends state jurisdiction
to the extent that jurisdiction is claimed by the United States
of America or to the extent recognized by usages and customs of
international law or by agreement to which the United States of
America or the state is a party . . . . Arguably this section of
the statute could incorporate by reference the jurisdiction of
the United States over its flag ships. The United States governs
its flag ships through the federal special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction statute. This jurisdiction is defined
under 18 U.S.C. 7 and includes:
The high seas, any other waters within
the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of
the United States and out of the
jurisdiction of any particular State, and
any vessel belonging in whole or in part to
the United States or any citizen thereof, or
to any corporation created by or under the
laws of the United States, or of any State,
Territory, District, or possession thereof,
when such vessel is within the admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction of the United States
and out of the jurisdiction of any
particular State.[6]
This statute is the jurisdictional basis for a number of other
statutes that invoke the special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States. For example, when a sexual
assault against a minor occurs on the high seas, 18 U.S.C. 2243,
2244 are applicable, with each section invoking 7s special
maritime jurisdiction.
Federal courts in a number of circumstances have
extended United States jurisdiction into foreign territorial
waters.7 Further, there is no constitutional bar to the
extraterritorial application of United States penal laws.8
Whether Alaska could exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the
United States would be an issue of federal exclusivity an issue
of domestic rather than international law.9 Therefore, the court
could interpret the language in AS 44.03.010(2) to incorporate by
reference the United Statess jurisdiction over its flag ships.
Interpreted in this way, subsection two would give the State
jurisdiction over an Alaska state ferry.
It also seems logical that the State of Alaska would
want to extend its jurisdiction extensively to waters far from
its coast. As the decisions in State v. Bundrant10 and Corbin v.
State11 make clear, Alaska has substantial interests outside its
territorial waters. Alaska has an extensive coastline, and
activities far from the Alaska coast have a substantial impact on
the fishing industry and other Alaska interests.
This is not a recent development, and therefore, in
interpreting any statute, it seems reasonable to conclude that
the legislature was aware of Alaskas substantial offshore
interests and would want to make sure that Alaska could enforce
its jurisdiction to the maximum extent possible. The Alaska
Ferry System, connecting Alaska by a marine highway to the lower
forty-eight states, is simply a more recent example of Alaskas
interests and the States need to extend its jurisdiction to
waters offshore of the Alaska coast.
The federal government has limited resources. It
might not have an interest in prosecuting any but the most major
crimes that occur aboard the Alaska Ferry System. If the State
of Alaska does not have jurisdiction in this case, a serious
assault might go unremedied.12 The present case is but one
example of a kind of case that occurs outside of Alaskas
territorial waters where Alaska has a substantial interest in
extending jurisdiction. The facts of Corbin present another
example.
Corbin involved the theft of crab pots outside of
Alaska territorial waters.13 As Jack points out, Corbin is of
limited legal value in this case because in Corbin the defendant
did not even think to contest Alaskas jurisdiction sixteen miles
from the nearest point of land.14 But Corbin does illustrate the
type of relatively small offense that can occur outside of
Alaskas territorial waters in which Alaska has a substantial
interest. If Alaska could not prosecute such crimes, it appears
likely that the federal government might have little interest in
prosecuting relatively minor offenses. Many activities vital to
Alaska have historically occurred outside of Alaskas territorial
waters and continue to occur. Therefore, it seems reasonable
that the Alaska Legislature would want to extend Alaskas
jurisdiction to these activities.
Therefore, there are substantial grounds to support
the States contention that AS 44.03.010(2) provides the State
with jurisdiction over this case. The argument that it does not
is already set out by Judges Stewart and Mannheimer, and I will
not repeat those arguments. But for me, the argument that the
legislature intended to extend state jurisdiction offshore from
the coast of Alaska to the maximum extent possible breaks down
because there does not appear to be any precedent for this
interpretation. Many states in the United States border the
ocean. And activities that occur far from these states
coastlines could have a substantial impact on these states. But
we have been unable to find any statute or authority by which a
state has attempted to exert jurisdiction as broadly as the State
claims that the State of Alaska intended to exert its
jurisdiction in AS 44.03.010(2). And, in fact, where coastal
states have exerted jurisdiction over crimes that occurred on the
high seas, the states have asserted this jurisdiction based on
specific narrow statutes addressing particular conduct.
For instance, in Bundrant, the Alaska Supreme Court
relied on a specific statute that granted the State jurisdiction
to regulate the crabbing industry outside Alaskas territorial
waters.15 Similarly, in Skiriotes v. Florida,16 the United
States Supreme Court upheld Floridas enforcement of a statute
that prohibited the use of diving equipment to take sponges from
the Gulf of Mexico off the coast of Florida.17 And, in Florida
v. Stepansky,18 the Supreme Court of Florida held that Florida
could prosecute a burglary and attempted sexual battery that
occurred approximately 100 nautical miles from the coast of
Florida. But the prosecution of Stepansky was upheld under a
narrow Florida statute that applied to voyages on which over half
of the revenue passengers on board the ship originally embarked
and planned to finally disembark in [Florida].19
The fact that other states with offshore interests
similar to Alaskas do not appear to have broad statutes asserting
extensive jurisdiction causes me to conclude that the Alaska
Legislature did not intend for AS 44.03.010(2) to be interpreted
as broadly as the State suggests. It appears that, after
examining how other states assert jurisdiction offshore from
their coastlines, such an assertion of jurisdiction would be
unprecedented. If the legislature intended such a broad and
unprecedented assertion of jurisdiction, I am confident that some
legislative history would exist that would clarify the
legislatures intent. I therefore conclude that AS 44.03.010(2)
must be interpreted, as the lead opinion suggests, to exclude the
exercise of the States jurisdiction in this case.
MANNHEIMER, Judge, concurring.
The issue in this case is whether Alaska has criminal
jurisdiction over an assault that allegedly occurred in May 2001
on a state ferry as it navigated the territorial sea of Canada
that is, as it passed through the twelve-mile-wide band of ocean
that lies off the western coast of Canada.
In 2002, the Alaska legislature enacted AS 12.05.020,
a statute that asserts Alaskas authority to prosecute any
criminal offense committed on ... a ferry or other watercraft
owned or operated by the state, even if the ... ferry ... or
watercraft is in ... water outside the state when the offense is
alleged to have occurred.1 But the offense in the present case
is alleged to have occurred in May 2001, and the State does not
assert that the 2002 statute applies here.
Instead, the State relies on AS 44.03.010(2), a
statute passed in 1959during our first year of statehood.2 This
statute declares that the jurisdiction of the State of Alaska
extends to water offshore from the coast of [this] state ... [in]
the high seas to the extent that jurisdiction is claimed by the
United States of America, or to the extent recognized by the
usages and customs of international law or by agreement to which
the United States of America or [this] state is a party.
I agree with my colleagues that this statute does not
establish Alaskas authority to enforce its criminal laws in the
territorial waters of Canada. In fact, as I interpret AS
44.03.010(2), it does not even assert jurisdiction over crimes
committed outside the territory of Alaska. I therefore conclude
that, before the enactment of AS 12.05.020 in 2002, Alaska did
not assert criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed in
Canadas territorial sea. (And I express no opinion concerning
the effect of AS 12.05.020.)
I am writing separately because I reach this
conclusion for reasons somewhat different from the ones described
in Judge Stewarts lead opinion and Judge Coatss concurring
opinion.
Summary of my position
Under international law, there are several
rationales that a nation might properly rely on when
asserting extra-territorial jurisdiction over
particular people or activities that is, when that
nation seeks to enforce its civil or criminal laws
within the geographic territory of another nation. For
example, under admiralty law, a nation has the right to
enforce its laws onboard any ship flying that nations
flag, regardless of the geographic location of the
ship. But all of the rationales for a nations
assertion of extra-territorial jurisdiction depend on
the nations acknowledged interest in the specific
people or activities to be regulated.
In contrast, no nation can assert
territorial jurisdiction within the boundaries of
another nation. That is, no nation has the right to
enforce its entire body of civil and criminal law
against all people and activities within a geographic
area that lies within the recognized borders of another
nation.
For reasons explained in more detail below,
I conclude that AS 44.03.010 was intended to be an
assertion of Alaskas territorial jurisdiction. The
statute does not seek to regulate particular people or
activities based on their relationship to this state.
Rather, the statute asserts Alaskas right to enforce
all of its laws within a geographic area. But under
international law, no nation can assert territorial
jurisdiction over a geographic area that lies within
the territory of another nation. Thus, AS 44.03.010
can not properly be interpreted as an assertion of
Alaskas jurisdiction over the territorial waters of
Canada.
I therefore agree with my colleagues that we
must uphold the superior courts decision in this case:
the criminal complaint against Jack must be dismissed
because Alaska had no authority to enforce its criminal
laws within Canadas territorial sea.
The traditional categorization of pelagic waters under
international law
The pelagic waters of the earth have
traditionally been divided into three legal categories:
the inland waters of coastal nations, the territorial
or marginal seas of coastal nations, and the high seas
i.e., all areas of the oceans that are not within any
nations inland waters or territorial sea. See United
States v. Louisiana (the Louisiana Boundary Case), 394
U.S. 11, 21-23; 89 S.Ct. 773, 780-81; 22 L.Ed.2d 44
(1969).
A nations inland waters comprise any
portions of the ocean that are mostly enclosed by that
nations land for instance, the waters of a narrow-
mouthed bay, or a sound or sea passage bounded by a
string of barrier islands. Inland waters are
considered as much a part of the nations territory as
its land; the nation exercises complete sovereignty
over inland waters, to the exclusion of all other
sovereigns.3
A nations territorial sea is the band of
ocean within a certain fixed distance seaward from the
low-tide line along the nations coast (or, in some
instances, the low-tide line on the seaward side of its
barrier islands).4 Within this territorial sea, a
nation exercises normal sovereignty with one major
exception: it can not forbid passage to peaceful
vessels of other nations (known as the right of
innocent passage).5
The width of the territorial sea was
traditionally three miles6, but it is now of varying
width because many countries claim more than three
miles. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS) declares the right of coastal
nations to assert jurisdiction over a territorial sea
of up to twelve miles width.7 Although neither the
United States nor Canada has ratified this treaty8, the
treaty is generally regarded as an accurate expression
of the law of nations9, and both the United States and
Canada now claim a twelve-mile territorial sea.10
All ocean waters outside any nations
territorial sea were traditionally considered the high
seas a geographic area where no nation could lawfully
assert territorial sovereignty. This is not to say
that nations had absolutely no power to enforce their
laws on the high seas. International law recognized a
nations right to assert jurisdiction over specified
people, objects, or activities on the high seas for
particular purposes. For instance, under admiralty
law, a nation can assert sovereignty over the ships
flying that nations flag, wherever those ships might be
located on the planet.
But no nation could assert territorial
jurisdiction over the high seas. That is, no nation
could enact laws to regulate a geographic region of the
high seas, nor could a nation enforce its body of laws
within a geographic region of the high seas.
This tripartite division of the ocean is no
longer as straightforward as it once was. Article 33
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
recognizes the right of nations to declare a contiguous
zone not exceeding twenty-four miles beyond their coast
(i.e., a zone that extends an additional twelve miles
beyond the twelve-mile territorial sea allowed by the
treaty). Within this zone, a coastal nation exercises
limited sovereignty: the control necessary to ...
prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal,
immigration[,] or sanitary laws and regulations within
its territory or territorial sea [and] punish
infringement of the above laws and regulations
committed within its territory or territorial sea.
(Again, although neither the United States
nor Canada has ratified UNCLOS, both nations have
claimed a contiguous zone of twenty-four miles that
is, a zone extending twelve miles beyond their twelve-
mile territorial seas).11
Moreover, international law now recognizes a
countrys right to assert economic sovereignty over the
ocean up to 200 miles from its shores. Under Articles
56-57 of UNCLOS, a coastal nation may establish an
exclusive economic zone (an EEZ) extending up to 200
miles into the ocean. Within this zone, the coastal
nation has: sovereign rights for the purpose of
exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the
natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the
waters superjacent to the sea-bed [as well as] the sea-
bed and its subsoil.12 Within a coastal nations EEZ,
the nation is also sovereign for purposes of the
economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such
as the production of energy from the water, currents[,]
and winds, as well as the protection and preservation
of the marine environment.13
(Again, both the United States and Canada
claim 200-mile exclusive economic zones.14)
The creation of exclusive economic zones in
the ocean has required a modified definition of high
seas. Currently, under Article 86 of UNCLOS, the term
high seas means those areas of the ocean that are
outside any nations inland waters, territorial sea, or
exclusive economic zone. But the designation high seas
continues to mean the same thing a geographic area
beyond any nations territorial jurisdiction. Article
89 of UNCLOS declares, No State may validly purport to
subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty.
The maritime boundary between the United States and
Canada in the North Pacific
As described above, both the United States
and Canada claim a twelve-mile territorial sea, an
additional twelve-mile contiguous zone, and a 200-mile
exclusive economic zone. A question naturally arises
with regard to regions such as Puget Sound and Dixon
Entrance, where the coasts of the two nations are
adjacent and face each other. This question is
answered by Articles 15 and 74 of UNCLOS. Article 15
declares:
Where the coasts of two
States are opposite or adjacent to
each other, neither of the two
States is entitled, failing
agreement between them to the
contrary, to extend its
territorial sea beyond the median
line every point of which is
equidistant from the nearest
points on the baselines from which
the breadth of the territorial
seas of each of the two States is
measured. The above provision does
not apply, however, where it is
necessary by reason of historic
title or other special
circumstances to delimit the
territorial seas of the two States
in a way which is at variance
therewith.
Similarly, under Article 74 of UNCLOS, when adjacent
nations share a sea border, they are to equitably
define their respective exclusive economic zones.
To put geographic reality to the rules
enunciated in Articles 15 and 74 of UNCLOS, the United
States and Canada have established an International
Boundary Commission to define the exact lines in the
ocean that divide our two countries. The descriptions
of these lines given in terms of reference points that
are defined to the hundredth of a second of latitude
and longitude are available at the International
Boundary Commissions web site:
www.internationalboundarycommission.org/ibcprod.
htm#coord (last visited March 24, 2003).
A chart and a data table describing the
boundaries of the Alaska region of the United States
exclusive economic zone are available at the web site
of the Office of Coast Survey (an agency of the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration):
http://chartmaker.ncd.noaa.gov/csdl/eez.htm (last
revised December 9, 2002).
According to this Coast Survey data table,
the border of the United States EEZ heads west through
the middle of Dixon Entrance (approximately Latitude 54
30 North), and then it proceeds mostly due west across
the Gulf of Alaska. At Longitude 138 46 West (over 300
miles west of Queen Charlotte Island), it reaches its
southernmost point: Latitude 53 28 North. From there,
it angles northward as it continues west, reaching a
latitude of 56 34 North before angling south again as
it approaches the Kenai Peninsula and Kodiak Island.
What does AS 44.03.010 mean?
AS 44.03.010 declares that the jurisdiction
of the [State of Alaska] extends to water offshore from
the coast of [this] state as described in the three
subsections of the statute:
Subsection (1) of the statute asserts
Alaskas jurisdiction over the marginal sea to its
outermost limits[,] as those limits are from time to
time defined or recognized by the United States of
America by international treaty or otherwise. As
explained above, the United States now claims a
marginal sea that is, a territorial sea of twelve
miles width.
Subsection (2) of the statute asserts
Alaskas jurisdiction over the high seas to the extent
that jurisdiction is claimed by the United States of
America, or to the extent recognized by the usages and
customs of international law or by agreement to which
the United States of America or [this] state is a
party.
Finally, subsection (3) of the statute
asserts Alaskas jurisdiction over [all] submerged
land[,] including the subsurface of submerged land,
lying under the water mentioned in [subsections (1) and
(2)].
AS 44.03.010 obviously raises several issues
of international law, as well as issues of federal
supremacy and pre-emption. But in the present case,
the pertinent question is whether this statute asserts
Alaskas authority to enforce its criminal laws within
the territorial sea of Canada. The State argues that
subsection (2) of the statute the subsection dealing
with the high seas constitutes just such an assertion
of jurisdiction.
There is Alaska case law to support the
proposition that a state can enforce its criminal
jurisdiction outside its territorial waters if the
state can show a significant state interest, and if the
states exercise of this jurisdiction does not conflict
with federal jurisdiction. See State v. Bundrant15 and
Corbin v. State16, which both involved Alaskas right to
enforce its laws within ocean areas lying outside the
United States territorial sea.
But aside from potential conflicts with
federal sovereignty, a states assertion of jurisdiction
outside its territorial waters must not conflict with
international law and the sovereign rights of another
nation. Neither Bundrant nor Corbin addressed this
issue, because neither case involved an attempt to
enforce Alaska law in a geographic area lying within
the territorial sea of another nation. But that is the
issue in this case: whether Alaska can exercise
jurisdiction over crimes alleged to have occurred in
Canadian territorial waters.
There are two potential legal theories that
might justify Alaskas assertion of jurisdiction over
such crimes. The first is an admiralty theory: the
State of Alaska owns and operates the ferry on which
the crime allegedly occurred, so the State could assert
the right to enforce its laws on the ferry regardless
of where the ferry might be located. The second is a
citizenship or residency theory: the State could
assert jurisdiction because the victim of the alleged
crime is an Alaska resident.
The admiralty theory of jurisdiction might
be questioned because Alaska does not flag ships the
way that the United States and other nations do.
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has
stated that state regulation [in the area of admiralty]
is permissible, absent a clear conflict with the
federal law.17 Thus, as the Ninth Circuit has
recognized, [the] states may supplement federal
admiralty law as applied to matters of local concern,
so long as state law does not actually conflict with
federal law or interfere with the uniform working of
the maritime legal system.18
Given this construction of federal admiralty
law, one could argue that the State of Alaska is
empowered to assert criminal jurisdiction over people
and activities onboard ships that bear a special
relation to Alaska such as the ships described in our
new statute, AS 12.05.020 (i.e., ferries and other
watercraft owned and operated by the State of Alaska).
The second potential theory of jurisdiction
jurisdiction based on the residency of the crime victim
also finds support in the law. See State v. Stepansky,
761 So.2d 1027 (Fla. 2000), a case in which the Florida
Supreme Court upheld that states authority to prosecute
a burglary and attempted sexual assault committed
aboard a Liberian-flagged cruise ship that was located
approximately 100 nautical miles from the Florida
coast. The prosecution was found to be proper under
Florida Statute 910.006, which asserts that states
special maritime criminal jurisdiction over any crime
committed on board a ship when (among other things) the
suspect is a citizen or resident of Florida, the victim
is a resident of Florida, or the crime occurred during
a voyage on which over half of the paid passengers on
board the ship originally embarked and plan to finally
disembark in Florida.
Thus, there are at least two recognized
theories of law that might justify the legislatures
recent enactment of AS 12.05.020, the statute that
asserts Alaskas jurisdiction to prosecute crimes
committed onboard state ferries. But the question in
this case is whether our pre-existing statute,
AS 44.03.010, likewise asserts Alaskas jurisdiction
over crimes committed onboard ocean-going vessels in
the waters of other countries.
The language of AS 44.03.010, as well as the
language of the other statutes that comprise AS 44.03,
all indicate that AS 44.03.010 was not intended to be
an assertion of special jurisdiction i.e., not
intended to be an assertion of jurisdiction based on a
vessels particular relationship to the State of Alaska,
or based on the effect that a particular criminal act
might have on the residents of this state. Rather,
AS 44.03.010 was intended to be a straightforward
assertion of territorial jurisdiction i.e., an
assertion of the States jurisdiction to enforce its
entire body of law within particular geographic areas.
The first subsection of AS 44.03.010 is
clearly an assertion of territorial jurisdiction.
Subsection (1) declares that the State of Alaska
asserts jurisdiction over the marginal sea i.e., the
territorial sea lying off the coast of Alaska. As
explained above, both international law and federal law
define the territorial sea as a geographic area. It is
the band of ocean extending twelve miles from Alaskas
coast, but expressly excluding the territorial sea of
Canada.
(There is apparently some dispute as to
whether AS 44.03.010(1) asserts jurisdiction over the
territorial sea as it currently is defined (i.e.,
twelve miles wide) or as it was defined when the
statute was enacted (i.e., three miles wide). There is
a group of cases currently pending before this Court
State v. Dupier et al., File Nos. A-8270, 8272, and
8273 in which the States brief asserts that Alaskas
jurisdiction over the territorial sea extends only
three miles from our coast. I leave this issue for
another day.)
The second subsection of AS 44.03.010 is
admittedly more ambiguous. Subsection (2) asserts
Alaskas jurisdiction over the high seas to the extent
that jurisdiction is claimed by the United States of
America, or to the extent recognized by the usages and
customs of international law or by agreement to which
the United States of America or [this] state is a
party.
The State would have us interpret this
language as an assertion of special (as opposed to
territorial) jurisdiction. In the States view, the
Alaska Legislature enacted this subsection for the
purpose of asserting the State of Alaskas jurisdiction
over any person or occurrence on the high seas if the
United States could claim jurisdiction over that person
or occurrence under any provision of federal law, or
under the usages and customs of international law.
But this interpretation of Subsection (2)
makes no sense in light of Subsection (3). Subsection
(3) of the statute asserts Alaskas jurisdiction over
[all] submerged land[,] including the subsurface of
submerged land, lying under the water mentioned in
[Subsections (1) and (2)]. This claim of sovereignty
over submerged land and its subsoil only makes sense if
Subsection (2), like Subsection (1), was intended to
refer to a particular geographic area of the world. It
seems wildly unlikely that the Alaska Legislature meant
to assert Alaskas sovereignty over whatever submerged
land happens to lie beneath an ocean-going vessel that
carries Alaskan passengers or that operates out of an
Alaska port. Moreover, such a claim would be
completely contrary to international law.
The States suggested interpretation of AS
44.03.010(2) is further undercut by the language of its
sibling provision, AS 44.03.020. In this statute, the
State of Alaska claims not only jurisdiction but
ownership of the water and submerged land described in
AS 44.03.010 (unless some other person or entity has a
superseding deed). Again, if this statute was intended
to assert ownership over whatever submerged land
happens to lie beneath an ocean-going vessel that
carries Alaskan passengers or that operates out of an
Alaska port, such a claim would be inconsistent with
admiralty law and inconsistent with other doctrines of
special jurisdiction (such as jurisdiction based on
citizenship or residency). The statutes claim of
ownership makes sense only if AS 44.03.010 was intended
to be an assertion of territorial jurisdiction over a
geographic area.
This conclusion is additionally bolstered by
the language of another sibling provision,
AS 44.03.030(1). This statute declares that the
jurisdiction claimed in AS 44.03.010 is not intended to
limit or restrict ... the jurisdiction of [Alaska] over
a person or subject inside or outside [this] state that
is exercisable by reason of citizenship, residence, or
other reason recognized by law. But if the
jurisdiction claimed in AS 44.03.010 is not intended to
restrict or limit the jurisdiction that Alaska might
claim because of citizenship, residence, or admiralty,
it necessarily follows that AS 44.03.010 does not
itself constitute a claim of jurisdiction based on
citizenship, residence, or admiralty. Rather, it is a
claim of territorial jurisdiction.
Thus, AS 44.03.010(2) is an assertion of
territorial jurisdiction, not an assertion of admiralty
jurisdiction or other special jurisdiction. In effect,
AS 44.03.010(2) constitutes the State of Alaskas effort
to piggyback and obtain the benefit of any federal
assertion of territorial jurisdiction over a geographic
region of the high seas (as that term was understood in
1959).19
But it is clear that the United States does
not assert territorial jurisdiction over Canadas
territorial sea. Thus, AS 44.03.010(2) does not assert
the State of Alaskas jurisdiction to prosecute a sexual
assault committed in Canadian territorial waters, even
if the sexual assault is committed against an Alaska
resident on a state-operated ferry.
Conclusion
As I indicated before, I intend to express
no opinion concerning the legality and effect of AS
12.05.020, the new statute that expressly asserts
Alaskas jurisdiction to prosecute all crimes committed
on state-operated ferries, regardless of their
geographic location. However, I do conclude that
AS 44.03.010 does not constitute an assertion of
jurisdiction over such crimes.
Because the State of Alaska relies solely on
AS 44.03.010(2) as the jurisdictional basis for its
prosecution of Jack in the present case, I agree with
my colleagues that the State of Alaska has failed to
show jurisdiction over this alleged crime, and the
superior court properly dismissed this prosecution.
_______________________________
1 AS 11.41.410(a)(1), AS 11.41.420(a)(1), and AS
11.41.230(a), respectively.
2 See Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law at
38-45 (3rd ed. 1982); 1 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr.,
Substantive Criminal Law 2.7 at 160-63, 2.9(a) at 180-86 (1986).
3 See Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law at 41-42; LaFave &
Scott, Substantive Criminal Law 2.9(b) at 186-90.
4 734 P.2d 1007 (Alaska App. 1987).
5 Id. at 1007-08.
6 AS 11.41.330(a).
7 See Wheat, 734 P.2d at 1007-08.
8 Id. at 1010-11.
9 Id. at 1011-12.
10 672 P.2d 156 (Alaska App. 1983).
11 Id. at 157.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 546 P.2d 530 (Alaska), appeal dismissed sub nom, Uri v.
Alaska, 429 U.S. 806, 97 S.Ct. 40, 50 L.Ed.2d 66 (1976).
15 Id. at 544-48, 552-54.
16 Id. at 554.
17 Corbin, 672 P.2d at 158.
18 332 U.S. 19, 67 S.Ct. 1658, 91 L.Ed. 1889 (1947).
19 Id. at 39, 67 S.Ct. at 1668.
20 43 U.S.C. 1311(a).
21 43 U.S.C. 1331-43.
22 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law 511
(1987).
23 Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (1958).
24 Alaska Const. art. 12, 1.
25 362 P.2d 901 (Alaska 1961), vacated on other grounds,
369 U.S. 45, 82 S.Ct. 552, 7 L.Ed.2d 562, affd, Kake v. Egan, 369
U.S. 60, 82 S.Ct. 562, 7 L.Ed. 2d 573 (1962).
26 Id. at 926.
27 U.S. Constitution, art. I, 8, cl. 10.
28 U.S. Constitution, art. III, 2, cl. 1.
29 See United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249, 266, 14
S.Ct. 109, 116, 37 L.Ed. 1071 (1893); United States v. Flores,
289 U.S. 137, 153, 53 S.Ct. 580, 584, 77 L.Ed. 1086 (1933).
30 See Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law 502(2),
512; see also Wildenhuss Case, 120 U.S. 1, 12, 7 S.Ct. 385, 387,
30 L.Ed. 565 (1887).
31 Rodgers, 150 U.S. at 261, 14 S.Ct. at 113.
1 See, e.g., Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501, 511, 47
S.Ct. 735, 739, 71 L.Ed. 1171 (1927) (stating that the high seas
are common to all nations and foreign to none); Cunard S.S. Co.
v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 123, 43 S.Ct. 504, 507, 67 L.Ed. 894
(1923) (stating that on the high seas there is no territorial
sovereign); Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347,
355, 29 S.Ct. 511, 512, 53 L.Ed. 826 (1909) (defining high seas
as a region subject to no sovereign); Deslions v. La Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 210 U.S. 95, 115, 28 S.Ct. 664, 670, 52
L.Ed. 973 (1908) (using the definition of the high seas from The
Scotland court); Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. Gilmore, 207 U.S. 398,
403, 28 S.Ct. 133, 134, 52 L.Ed. 264 (1907) (defining high seas
as an area outside the territory, in a place belonging to no
other sovereign); The Scotland, 105 U.S. 24, 29, 26 L.Ed. 1001
(1881) (defining high seas as those waters where the law of no
particular State has exclusive force, but all are equal); see
also United States v. Romero-Galue, 757 F.2d 1147, 1149 n.1 (11th
Cir. 1985) (concluding that the high seas lie seaward of a
nations territorial sea, which is the band of water that extends
up to three miles out from the coast).
2 Law of the Sea: Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29,
1958, art. 1, 13 U.S.T. 2312.
3 In re Air Crash Off Long Island, N.Y. on July 17, 1996,
209 F.3d 200, 207 (2d. Cir. 2000).
4 Id. at 201-02.
5 Id. at 206-07; see also In re Air Crash Disaster Near
Peggys Cove, Nova Scotia on Sept. 2, 1998, 210 F. Supp. 2d 570,
580 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
6 18 U.S.C. 7(1).
7 See United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 150-59, 53
S.Ct. 580, 582-86, 77 L.Ed. 1086 (1933) (extending jurisdiction
to a United States citizen charged with the murder of another
United States citizen aboard an American ship in the port of the
Belgian Congo 250 miles up the Congo River); United States v.
Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249, 266, 14 S.Ct. 109, 116, 37 L.Ed. 1071
(1893) (extending jurisdiction to a defendant charged with
assaulting another person with a deadly weapon aboard a United
States vessel in Canadian territorial waters); United States v.
Neil, 312 F.3d 419, 421-23 (9th Cir. 2002) (extending
jurisdiction to a foreign national charged with sexually
molesting a United States minor on-board a foreign cruise ship
while in Mexican territorial waters); United States v. Reagan,
453 F.2d 165, 169-71 (6th Cir. 1971) (extending jurisdiction to a
United States citizen charged with homicide aboard an American
vessel while in a German harbor); United States v. Ross, 439 F.2d
1355, 1357-59 (9th Cir. 1971) (extending jurisdiction to an
assault committed on an American flagged vessel in a harbor of
Nha Trang in South Vietnam); see also In re Air Crash Disaster
Near Peggys Cove, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 586 (concluding that high
seas, as used in the federal Death on the High Seas Act, included
foreign territorial waters); Jennings v. Boeing Co., 660 F. Supp.
796, 803-04 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (reaching same conclusion as the
Peggys Cove court).
8 See, e.g., Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436-
38, 52 S.Ct. 252, 254-55, 76 L.Ed. 375 (1932); Chua Han Mow v.
United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1311 (9th Cir. 1984).
9 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law 402 cmt.
k (1987) (Whether a State [of the United States] may exercise
jurisdiction that the United States is entitled to exercise under
international law is ... generally a question only of United
States law.).
10 546 P.2d 530 (Alaska 1976).
11 672 P.2d 156 (Alaska App. 1983).
12 Apparently in response to this and similar cases,
the legislature recently passed AS 12.05.020, making it clear
that Alaskas jurisdiction does extend to the Alaska Ferry System.
Alaska Statute 12.05.020 states: A person may be prosecuted
under the laws of this state for an offense committed on or
against ... a ferry or other water craft owned or operated by the
state, even if the ... ferry ... is in ... water outside the
state when the offense is alleged to have occurred.
13 Corbin, 672 P.2d at 157.
14 Id.
15 Bundrant, 546 P.2d at 533 (outlining the Bering
Sea Shellfish Area Regulations).
16 313 U.S. 69, 61 S.Ct. 924, 85 L.Ed. 1193 (1941).
17 Id. at 77-79, 61 S.Ct. at 929-30.
18 761 So.2d 1027 (Fla. 2000).
19 Id. at 1029 n.1.
1 See SLA 2002, ch. 87, 1.
2 See SLA 1959, ch. 89, 1.
3 United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. at 22, 89 S.Ct. at
780.
4 Compare United States v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 93, 112-13;
105 S.Ct. 1074, 1085; 84 L.Ed.2d 73 (1985) (holding that
Mississippi Sound, which is bounded by a string of islands,
constitutes the inland waters of Mississippi and Louisiana)
with United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 161-167; 85
S.Ct. 1401, 1414-1417; 14 L.Ed.2d 296 (1965) (holding that
Californias inland waters do not extend all the way to Santa
Catalina Island).
5 United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. at 22-23, 89 S.Ct. at
780-781; United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184, 197; 95
S.Ct. 2240, 2250; 45 L.Ed.2d 109 (1975). See also American
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. M/V Cape Fear, 967 F.2d 864,
874; 1992 A.M.C. 2492 (3rd Cir. 1992). The right of
innocent passage is codified in the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), Articles 17-26.
6 See United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. at 41, 89 S.Ct.
at 791.
7 UNCLOS, Article 3. The full text of this treaty is
available at the United Nations web site (last visited March
18, 2003):
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convent
ion_overview_convention.htm
8 A listing of all the nations that signed the treaty, and
whether their governments have formally ratified the treaty,
is available at the United Nations web site (last visited
March 18, 2003):
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/status2003.pdf
9 See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law (2nd
ed. 1994), 2-2, Vol. 1, p. 23, quoting United States:
Proclamation on an Exclusive Economic Zone, 22 I.L.M. 461
(1983).
10 The United States extended its territorial sea from 3
miles to 12 miles in 1988. See Presidential Proclamation
No. 5928, 54 Fed. Register 777 (1988) (discussed in In re
Air Crash Off Long Island, New York, on July 17, 1996, 209
F.3d 200, 212-13 (2nd Cir. 2000). Although the United States
has not ratified the 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, the 1988 presidential proclamation
incorporates the provisions of UNCLOS pertaining to other
nations right of innocent passage through territorial waters
and through international straits. The proclamation states
that these matters are to be determined in accordance with
international law, as reflected in the applicable provisions
of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Canada extended its territorial sea from 3 miles to 12
miles in 1996. See Oceans Act, S.C., part 1, ch. 31, 4
(1996) (Can.) (cited in In re Air Crash Disaster Near Peggys
Cove, Nova Scotia on September 2, 1998, 210 F.Supp.2d 570,
572 (E.D. Pa. 2002)).
11 United States: Presidential Proclamation of September
2, 1999 (No. 7219), 64 Fed.Reg. 48701 (1999).
Canada: See the web site of the Canadian Oceans
Directorate (last visited March 18, 2003:
http://www.pac.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/oceans/Oceans%20Act/OAPart1.
htm
12 UNCLOS, Article 56.
13 Id.
14 United States: Presidential Proclamation No. 5030, 48
Fed. Register 10605 (1983).
Canada: See the web site of the Canadian Oceans
Directorate (last visited March 18, 2003):
http://www.pac.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/oceans/Oceans%20Act/OAPart1.
htm
15 546 P.2d 530 (Alaska 1976).
16 672 P.2d 156 (Alaska App. 1983).
17 Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S.
325, 341; 93 S.Ct. 1590, 1600; 36 L.Ed.2d 280 (1973).
18 Pacific Merchant Shipping Assn v. Aubry, 918 F.2d 1409,
1422 (9th Cir. 1990). See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 435 U.S. 151, 160, 172-73; 98 S.Ct. 988, 995, 1001-02;
55 L.Ed.2d 179 (1978) (upholding Washington state laws that
required larger ocean-going vessels to take on a state-
licensed pilot when entering Puget Sound and to be escorted
by a tug boat while in the Sound). See also Thomas J.
Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law (2nd ed. 1994), 2-5,
Vol. 1, pp. 26-27.
19 In 1959, when AS 44.03 was enacted, the high seas began
at the seaward edge of the territorial sea. One might argue
that, because the United States now claims a contiguous zone
of twenty-four miles (i.e., a zone that extends for several
miles into the high seas as that term was understood in
1959), the State of Alaska pursuant to AS 44.03.010(2)
also asserts jurisdiction over this contiguous zone. (This
is only arguable, because the presidential proclamation that
established the contiguous zone expressly declares that
[n]othing in this proclamation ... amends existing Federal
or State law.)
But for purposes of resolving the present case, even if
the United States claim of a twenty-four mile contiguous
zone were interpreted as working an extension of Alaskas
jurisdiction under AS 44.03.010(2), it would not extend
Alaskas jurisdiction into Canadian territorial waters
because the presidential proclamation that established the
contiguous zone expressly states that, although the
contiguous zone of the United States extends to 24 nautical
miles from the [coastal] baselines of the United States, the
United States disavows any claim that its contiguous zone
extends within the territorial sea of another nation.
Similarly, although the United States now claims a 200-
mile exclusive economic zone in the Pacific Ocean, that zone
does not include the territorial seas and exclusive economic
zones of other nations. In particular, it does not include
the territorial sea and exclusive economic zone of Canada.
Moreover, within this zone, the United States claims only
the economic sovereignty described in Articles 56-57 of
UNCLOS not comprehensive civil and criminal sovereignty.
Thus, even if the State of Alaskas sovereignty over the high
seas was conceivably extended when the United States
government proclaimed this countrys exclusive economic zone,
this limited sovereignty would not include the authority to
enforce Alaskas criminal laws in the territorial waters of
Canada.
