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Tipikin v. Municipality of Anchorage (3/14/2003) ap-1858

Tipikin v. Municipality of Anchorage (3/14/2003) ap-1858

                             NOTICE
     The  text  of this opinion can be corrected before  the
     opinion  is published in the Pacific Reporter.  Readers
     are  encouraged to bring typographical or other  formal
     errors  to  the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate
     Courts.

             303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska  99501
                      Fax:  (907) 264-0878
       E-mail:  corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us


         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA


SERGEY  TIPIKIN,                )                      Court   of
Appeals No. A-7881
                              )         Trial Court Nos. 3AN-M99-
7673 CR
                                             Appellant,         )
                              3AN-M98-0813 CR
                              )
3AN-M98-4490 CR.
                              )
                                   v.                           )
O P I N I O N
                              )
MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE,    )
                              )
                                             Appellee.          )
[No. 1858 - March 14, 2003]
                              )


          Appeal  from the District Court,  Third  Judi
          cial   District,  Anchorage,  Peter   Ashman,
          Judge.

          Appearances: James V. Gould, Gorton &  Logue,
          Anchorage,   for   Appellant.    Joseph    D.
          OConnell,   Assistant  Municipal  Prosecutor,
          Anchorage,  and William A. Greene,  Municipal
          Attorney, Anchorage, for Appellee.

          Before:   Coats, Chief Judge, and  Mannheimer
          and Stewart, Judges.

          COATS,  Chief Judge.


          Sergey   Tipikin   was  convicted  of  assaulting   his

stepdaughter, H.T., by slapping her across the face.  He also was

convicted of disorderly conduct for fighting with his wife, L.T.,

and  of  violating probation in two cases.  Tipikin was sentenced

to  730  days to serve for these offenses.  He argues that  there

was  insufficient  evidence  for  the  jury  to  convict  him  of

assaulting H.T.  He also argues that his sentence is excessive.

          Having reviewed the record, we conclude that there  was

sufficient  evidence for a fair-minded jury to find that  Tipikin

assaulted H.T.  Furthermore, Tipikins composite sentence was  not

clearly  mistaken given his ongoing pattern of domestic  violence

and  his poor prospects for rehabilitation.  We therefore  affirm

Tipikins conviction and sentence.



          Facts and proceedings

          Tipikin was charged with assaulting his wife, L.T., his

stepdaughter, H.T., and his son, S.T., Jr., on May 13,  1999,  in

the  familys Anchorage apartment.  The jury convicted Tipikin  of

assaulting  H.T. by slapping her across the face,1 but  acquitted

him  of  the  other  assault charges.  For his conduct  involving

L.T.,  the jury convicted Tipikin of the lesser-included  offense

of  disorderly  conduct.2   District  Court  Judge  Peter  Ashman

sentenced Tipikin to 1 year to serve for these two offenses:  the

maximum 6-month sentence for disorderly conduct, and 6 months out

of  a possible 1-year sentence for assault.  The court also found

that  Tipikin  had violated probation in two separate  cases  and

imposed  370  days of suspended time.  Tipikin  thus  received  a

total sentence of 730 days.



          Discussion

          Was there sufficient evidence for the jury to

          convict    Tipikin    of    assaulting    his

          stepdaughter?

          Tipikin argues that there was insufficient evidence  to

convict  him  of assaulting his stepdaughter, H.T.   He  concedes

that  he  slapped H.T. but argues that his conduct was authorized

under   AS   11.81.430(a)(1)  because  the  slap  was  reasonably

necessary and appropriate to promote the welfare of the child.  .

          . .3

          To determine if there is sufficient evidence to support

the  jurys  verdict,  we  must decide whether  there  was  enough

relevant  evidence for a fair-minded juror exercising  reasonable

judgment to find that the Municipality met its burden of  proving

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.4  In reaching this decision,  we

view  the  evidence  and the inferences to  be  drawn  from  that

evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the verdict.5

          On the day of the assault, twelve-year-old H.T. had two

friends,  E.M. and A.S., over for a sleepover.  While  the  girls

were  having  a  pillow  fight  in  one  of  the  bedrooms,  they

accidentally knocked Tipikins eighteen-month-old son, S.T.,  Jr.,

off  the  bed,  giving  him a bloody nose.  L.T.,  H.T.s  mother,

testified  that this incident prompted Tipikin to smack  H.T.  on

the  back  of  the head to discipline her for being irresponsible

with  the baby.  But H.T.s girlfriends testified that the assault

occurred  later  and had nothing to do with this incident.   A.S.

testified that after Tipikin came out of the bathroom, he slapped

H.T. across the face really hard . . . because we were being  too

loud,  I  guess.  E.M. was in the living room but testified  that

she  heard  the smack and saw H.T. run down the hall  crying  and

covering  her  reddened face.  E.M. said A.S. and H.T.  told  her

Tipikin  had  hit H.T.   Tipikin testified that he  slapped  H.T.

outside  the bathroom because she was rude and refused to listen.

However,  all the witnesses testified that Tipikin and  L.T.  had

been fighting and pushing all night.  L.T. testified that it  was

just  basically  a  whole night of arguing and yelling  and  ugly

words said and it was . . . really [a] bad argument.

          Tipikin argued to the jury that as a stepparent he  was

justified  in  slapping H.T. to discipline her for talking  back.

The  prosecutor  countered that Tipikin had no authority  to  use

force to discipline H.T. because L.T., H.T.s natural parent,  had

never given him that authority.  The prosecutor also argued  that

Tipikin  had slapped H.T. not to discipline her, but  because  he

was  angry.   The court left resolution of these  issues  to  the

          jury, instructing the jurors that a parent, guardian, or other

person entrusted with the care and supervision of a child may use

reasonable   and  appropriate  force  to  the  extent  reasonably

necessary and appropriate to promote the welfare of the child.6

          The  jury  rejected Tipikins justification defense  and

convicted  him  of  assault.   Having  reviewed  the  record,  we

conclude  that  there was enough relevant evidence  for  a  fair-

minded  juror to reasonably find that Tipikin slapped  H.T.,  not

because  doing  so  was reasonably necessary and  appropriate  to

promote  her welfare, but because he was angry.  For this reason,

we affirm the jurys verdict.

          As  Tipikin  points out, the jury might have  convicted

him because it believed (as the prosecutor argued) that he had no

authority  to  use force to discipline H.T. because H.T.s  mother

had  never  given  him that authority.  Tipikin asserts,  without

argument or authority, that this interpretation of the statute is

wrong.   Moreover, he suggests that the jury must have  convicted

him based on this faulty interpretation because a reasonable jury

could not have concluded that he was unjustified in slapping H.T.

unless  it  found  he  had no authority  to  use  reasonable  and

appropriate force to discipline the child.

          But  Tipikin never asked the district court to rule  on

this legal issue; nor did he object below to L.T.s testimony, the

prosecutors  argument,  or  the  courts  jury  instruction.7   In

addition,  Tipikin  has not briefed this claim  on  appeal.8   We

therefore do not decide whether, as Tipikin asserts, a stepparent

has   independent  authority  under  AS  11.81.430(a)(1)  to  use

reasonable  and appropriate force to discipline a stepchild  when

that  authority  has  not been delegated by  the  childs  natural

parent or legal guardian.



          Is Tipikins sentence excessive?

          As  noted above, Judge Ashman sentenced Tipikin to  730

days to serve for fourth-degree assault, disorderly conduct,  and

two violations of probation.  Tipikin challenges these individual

          sentences and his composite sentence.  However, when reviewing a

composite  sentence imposed for two or more criminal convictions,

we  assess only whether the combined sentence is clearly mistaken

given  the  whole  of the defendants conduct and  history.9    In

doing  so,  we  do  not require that a specific  sentence  for  a

particular  offense be individually justifiable as  if  that  one

crime were considered in isolation.10

          Before   imposing   sentence,  Judge  Ashman   reviewed

Tipikins history of domestic violence, the conduct underlying his

current  offenses,  and his repeated failures at  rehabilitation.

Tipikin  had been convicted of assaulting L.T. twice in 1998  and

again in 2000 (after the 1999 convictions in this case).  He also

had  convictions dating back to 1987 for harassing communication,

driving  while intoxicated, negligent driving, furnishing  liquor

to a minor, and minor consuming alcohol.  Judge Ashman found that

L.T.  clearly had minimized Tipikins violence when she  testified

about  the current offenses.  Moreover, the offenses occurred  in

front  of  the couples eighteen-month-old son, L.T.s twelve-year-

old daughter, and the daughters two friends.

          Judge  Ashman  found,  based  on  Tipikins  pattern  of

domestic  violence, his failure at counseling, and his  testimony

at  trial   which  revealed his arrogance, his lack  of  insight,

[and]  self-centeredness  that Tipikin had no intention of taking

responsibility  for  his  actions  or  of  changing  his  violent

behavior toward women and children.  He noted that Tipikin in his

testimony  had  offered the classic batterers  justification  for

slapping  H.T.: she had challenged his authority.   He  concluded

that  the  Chaney11  criteria  of rehabilitation  and  individual

deterrence  were not important sentencing goals in Tipikins  case

and, instead, emphasized the need to reaffirm societal norms  and

isolate Tipikin from his victims.  We conclude that Judge Ashmans

findings  are  supported  by the record and  that  the  composite

sentence  he  imposed for Tipikins four offenses was not  clearly

mistaken.12



          Conclusion

          Tipikins conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.







_______________________________
     1 Anchorage Municipal Code (AMC) 8.10.010(B)(1).

     2 AMC 8.30.120(A)(6).

3 AS 11.81.430 provides in relevant part:

          (a)  The use of force upon another person  that
       would otherwise constitute an offense is justified
       under any of the following circumstances:

               (1)  When  and to the extent  reasonably
          necessary  and  appropriate  to  promote  the
          welfare of the child or incompetent person, a
          parent,  guardian, or other person  entrusted
          with  the  care and supervision  of  a  child
          under  18  years  of  age or  an  incompetent
          person  may  use  reasonable and  appropriate
          nondeadly   force   upon   that   child    or
          incompetent person.
          
     4 Collins v. State, 977 P.2d 741, 747 (Alaska App. 1999).

     5 Shafer v. State, 456 P.2d 466, 469 (Alaska 1969).

6 Jury Instruction No. 15 provided:

          The use of force upon another person that would
       otherwise constitute an offense is justified  when
       and   to  the  extent  reasonably  necessary   and
       appropriate to promote the welfare of the child, a
       parent,  guardian, or other person entrusted  with
       the care and supervision of a child under 18 years
       of   age   may   use  reasonable  and  appropriate
       nondeadly force upon that child.

          Therefore,  unless the Municipality has  proven
       beyond  a reasonable doubt that the defendant  did
       not act in these circumstances, you shall find the
       defendant not guilty.
       
     7  See R.M. v. S.G., 13 P.3d 747, 752 (Alaska 2000) (holding
that the defendant waived a claim by not objecting below).

     8  See  State v. ONeill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d  520,
528   (Alaska  1980)  (noting  that  failure  to  argue  a  point
constitutes an abandonment of it).

     9  Brown  v.  State,  12 P.3d 201, 210 (Alaska  App.  2000);
Comegys v. State, 747 P.2d 554, 558-59 (Alaska App. 1987).

     10   Waters v. State, 483 P.2d 199, 202 (Alaska 1971); Jones
v. State, 765 P.2d 107, 109 (Alaska App. 1988); Comegys, 747 P.2d
at 558-59.

     11   State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 443-44 (Alaska 1970).

     12    See  McClain  v. State, 519 P.2d 811,  813-14  (Alaska
1974).