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Beaudoin v. State (10/25/2002) ap-1837
Beaudoin v. State (10/25/2002) ap-1837
NOTICE
The text of this opinion can be corrected before the
opinion is published in the Pacific Reporter. Readers
are encouraged to bring typographical or other formal
errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate
Courts:
303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501
Fax: (907) 264-0878
E-mail: corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
GREGORY J. BEAUDOIN, )
) Court of Appeals No.
A-7739
Appellant, )
Trial Court No. 3AN-97-7366 Cr
)
v. )
) O P I N
I O N
STATE OF ALASKA, )
)
Appellee. )
[No. 1837 October 25, 2002]
)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judi
cial District, Anchorage, Milton M. Souter,
Judge.
Appearances: Sharon Barr, Assistant Public
Defender, and Barbara K. Brink, Public
Defender, Anchorage, for Appellant. James L.
Hanley, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage,
and Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney General,
Juneau, for Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer
and Stewart, Judges.
MANNHEIMER, Judge.
In the summer of 1995, Gregory Justin Beaudoin was
struck by a motor home; the resulting brain injury left him
permanently disabled and mentally ill. On the evening of
September 14, 1997, Beaudoin argued with his mother and fatally
stabbed her. Beaudoin then called 911 to report what he had done
and to request help for his mother.
Beginning with this 911 call, Beaudoin repeatedly
confessed to a number of people. Beaudoin stayed on the
telephone, talking to the 911 dispatcher, while emergency medical
technicians, officers of the Alaska State Troopers, and a
security officer employed by the Alyeska Resort arrived at his
Girdwood home. Beaudoin repeatedly confessed to the 911
dispatcher that he had stabbed his mother; he described how many
times he had stabbed her, he said that he was fairly sure that he
had stabbed her in the heart, and he told the dispatcher where he
had put the knife after the attack. Beaudoin also walked up to
the Alyeska security officer, announced, I stabbed my mother, and
began to describe the assault.
After the emergency medical technicians determined that
Beaudoins mother was dead, Trooper Gary Pacolt placed Beaudoin in
handcuffs and led him outside to a patrol vehicle. As they
walked down the hallway, another tenant in the building opened
his door and looked out. Beaudoin announced to this neighbor
that he had just stabbed and killed his mother.
After Trooper Pacolt put Beaudoin in the patrol car, he
began to question him. Pacolt was a rookie, and he neglected to
give Beaudoin Miranda warnings until a trooper sergeant arrived
and reminded Pacolt to do this. After Beaudoin received Miranda
warnings, the trooper sergeant took up the interrogation.
Beaudoin continued to confess. Beaudoin was then taken to the
trooper station, where he was questioned by a trooper
investigator. The trooper investigator again warned Beaudoin of
his Miranda rights, but Beaudoin continued to confess (at
length).
Beaudoin was indicted for first-degree murder; he was
ultimately found guilty but mentally ill. (That is, the jury
found that the crime of first-degree murder was proved, but that
Beaudoin, because of his mental illness, was unable to appreciate
the wrongfulness of his conduct or, alternatively, was unable to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law. See AS
12.47.030.)
Beaudoin now appeals his conviction and his sentence on
various grounds. For the reasons explained here, we affirm the
judgement of the superior court.
The admissibility of Beaudoins statements to the
trooper sergeant and the trooper investigator
Because Beaudoin did not receive Miranda
warnings during the first segment of his custodial
interrogation (his interview in the patrol car with
Pacolt), the State conceded that Beaudoins statements
to Pacolt should be suppressed. However, the superior
court allowed the State to introduce the statements
that Beaudoin made during the second and third segments
of his custodial interrogation his statements to the
trooper sergeant at the scene and, later, to the
trooper investigator at the station.
On appeal, Beaudoin argues that these second
and third segments should also be suppressed as the
tainted fruit of the Miranda violation. Beaudoin
contends that he let the cat out of the bag when he
spoke to Trooper Pacolt before receiving Miranda
warnings, and that he therefore believed that he had
nothing to lose when he continued to confess during the
second and third segments of the interrogation.
Because Beaudoin takes this view of the
matter, he argues that his appeal requires us to decide
a legal issue that has not yet been resolved by the
appellate courts of Alaska: whether Alaska will follow
the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Oregon v. Elstad.1 In Elstad, the Supreme Court
rejected Beaudoins cat out of the bag theory of taint;
instead, the Supreme Court concluded that the
administration of Miranda warnings will normally
dissipate whatever coercive pressure might have been
exerted earlier on a suspect in custody so that the
suspects ensuing confession will be admissible despite
the arguable psychological effects of the suspects
prior, un-Mirandized confession.2
In his brief, Beaudoin argues that we should
adopt the position espoused by Justice Brennan in his
Elstad dissent. That is, Beaudoin asks us to reject
Elstad as a matter of state constitutional law and
instead adopt the pre-Elstad rule that an illegally
obtained confession presumptively taints a suspects
ensuing confession unless the government rebuts this
presumption by proving, under the totality of the
circumstances, that the ensuing confession was
sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary
taint that there was a break in the stream of events
sufficient to insulate the subsequent statement from
the effect of all that went before.3
Having considered this matter, we conclude
that Beaudoins case does not present an Elstad issue.
The issue that divided the Elstad majority
from the Elstad dissenters (and the issue that has
fueled the ensuing debate in state courts) is whether a
confession obtained in violation of Miranda will be
presumed to taint any subsequent confession that a
suspect makes after receiving Miranda warnings. The
underlying premise of this debate and the premise of
the cat out of the bag theory of taint is that the
suspects initial confession was obtained illegally as
the result of a Miranda violation.
In his Elstad dissent, Justice Brennan
criticized the majority for reject[ing] ... the long-
recognized presumption that an illegally extracted
confession causes the accused to confess again out of
the mistaken belief that he already has sealed his
fate.4 (Emphasis added) Justice Brennan then
approvingly quoted the separate opinion of Justice
Harlan in Darwin v. Connecticut:5
A principal reason why a suspect might
make a second or third confession is simply
that, having already confessed once or twice,
he might think that he has little to lose by
repetition. If a first confession is not
shown to be voluntary, I do not think a later
confession that is merely a direct product of
the earlier one should be held to be
voluntary. It would [not be] fair to a
suspect to allow the erroneous impression
that he has nothing to lose to play the major
role in a defendants decision to speak a
second or third time.
In consequence, when the prosecution
seeks to use a confession uttered after an
earlier one not found to be voluntary, it has
the burden of proving ... that [the later
confession] was not directly produced by the
existence of the earlier [involuntary]
confession.
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 326, 105 S.Ct. at 1302
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).6
Thus, the reasoning of the pre-
Elstad cases and Justice Brennans Elstad
dissent hinges on the premise that a suspects
initial confession was obtained illegally.
The concern expressed by Justice Brennan is
that the state takes unfair advantage of a
suspect if (a) the police induce the suspect
to confess by failing to inform him of his
Miranda rights and then (b) the suspect,
laboring under the psychological effects of
the illegally obtained confession, repeats
the confession (even after receiving Miranda
warnings) because the suspect believes that
there is nothing to lose by continuing to
confess. The pre-Elstad rule and the Elstad
dissent are premised on skepticism as to
whether Miranda warnings, standing alone, can
dispel the psychological effects of an
earlier, illegally obtained confession.
But that is not the issue in
Beaudoins case. Even if we assume that
Beaudoins willingness to confess to the
trooper sergeant and the trooper investigator
can be attributed to the psychological
effects of his many earlier confessions, the
fact remains that all but one of these
earlier confessions were lawfully obtained.
Beaudoin freely and repeatedly
confessed to several people before he was
taken into custody and questioned by Trooper
Pacolt in the patrol car. If Beaudoin indeed
felt that he had nothing to lose by
continuing to confess, that feeling did not
stem from his conversation with Pacolt and
Pacolts failure to advise Beaudoin of his
Miranda rights. Beaudoins un-Mirandized
conversation with Pacolt was a minor
interruption in what was otherwise a stream
of legally obtained confessions. Under these
circumstances, no matter whether we apply the
Elstad rule or the pre-Elstad rule, Beaudoins
subsequent confessions to the trooper
sergeant and the trooper investigator were
not tainted by the Miranda violation.
The admissibility of evidence that Beaudoin assaulted a
corrections officer
While Beaudoin was imprisoned in Anchorage
awaiting his trial, he assaulted a corrections
officer. (The officer had ordered Beaudoin to
return to his cell; Beaudoin moved behind the
officers desk, then struck the officer in the eye,
breaking her glasses and cutting her face. The
wound required several stitches.) At Beaudoins
trial, this assault became a point of contention.
Beaudoin was charged with first-degree
murder. He defended on the theory that, due to his
mental illness, he did not act with the intent to kill
his mother. (Beaudoin conceded that he was guilty of a
lesser degree of homicide.) To support this defense,
Beaudoin called several expert witnesses (a
neurologist, a neuropsychologist, a psychiatrist, and a
psychologist) to analyze his mental functioning and to
reconstruct his likely mental state when he attacked
his mother.
When the prosecutor received a copy of the
notes prepared by one of Beaudoins witnesses,
psychologist Fred Wise, the prosecutor observed that
Dr. Wise had been informed of, and had considered,
Beaudoins assault on the corrections officer. The
prosecutor therefore asked the trial judge, Superior
Court Judge Milton M. Souter, for permission to cross-
examine Dr. Wise concerning this incident.
Before ruling on the prosecutors request,
Judge Souter conducted a voir dire examination of Dr.
Wise outside the presence of the jury. Dr. Wise
testified that, when he interviewed Beaudoin, he asked
Beaudoin about the assault on the corrections officer.
Beaudoin told Dr. Wise that he struck the officer three
times: once because she reminded him of his mother,
once because she would not let another inmate use the
telephone, and once because he thought he was cool.
Dr. Wise acknowledged that Beaudoins assault on the
corrections officer was one factor that he considered
when assessing Beaudoins thinking processes and his
mental state on the night of the murder.
After hearing Dr. Wises voir dire testimony,
Judge Souter concluded that evidence of the assault on
the corrections officer, and Beaudoins explanation of
this assault, was relevant to the jurys evaluation of
Dr. Wises analysis and conclusions concerning Beaudoins
mental state. The judge therefore allowed the
prosecutor to pursue the requested cross-examination.
On appeal, Beaudoin argues that this ruling
was error. He contends that evidence of his assault on
the corrections officer was barred by Alaska Evidence
Rule 404(b)(1) because the only real purpose of this
evidence was to portray Beaudoin as a
characteristically assaultive person.
As we explained in Smithart v. State7,
Evidence Rule 404(b)(1) bars the admission of evidence
of a persons other bad acts if this evidence is
introduced for a particular prohibited purpose: to
prove a persons character so that this character can be
used as circumstantial evidence that the person acted
true to character during the incident being litigated.
But Rule 404(b)(1) does not bar evidence of a persons
bad acts if this evidence is introduced for any other
valid purpose.
In Beaudoins case, Judge Souter found that
the evidence of Beaudoins assault on the corrections
officer was relevant, not because of what it might show
about Beaudoins character, but rather because this
information was pertinent to the jurys evaluation of
Dr. Wises testimony (his assessment of Beaudoins mental
state) and, ultimately, Beaudoins claim of diminished
capacity. The record fully supports Judge Souters view
of this matter. Thus, the disputed evidence was not
barred by Evidence Rule 404(b)(1) because it was
relevant for a purpose other than the one purpose
prohibited by Rule 404(b)(1).
Beaudoin argues in the alternative that the
disputed evidence still should have been excluded under
Evidence Rule 403 because its potential for unfair
prejudice outweighed any proper probative value that it
might have. But the potential for unfair prejudice was
slight. Beaudoin did not dispute that he had attacked
and killed his mother. The issue litigated at his
trial was whether Beaudoin acted with the intent to
kill his mother when he attacked her or whether,
because of his mental illness, he lacked the intent to
kill. In this context, it is inconceivable that the
jury would be moved to overmastering hostility8 against
Beaudoin because he struck and injured a corrections
officer. Rather, the jurors could be expected to use
the disputed evidence in the proper way as information
pertinent to their decision concerning Beaudoins mental
state at the time of the homicide. Judge Souter did
not abuse his discretion when he allowed the prosecutor
to cross-examine Dr. Wise concerning this incident.9
Judge Souter did not violate the rule of Jackson v.
State when he sentenced Beaudoin
In Jackson v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court
criticized trial court judges for sentencing defendants
to a much longer prison term than the amount of
imprisonment that the judge thought the defendant
really should serve, under the assumption that the
Parole Board would release the defendant soon after the
defendant became eligible to apply for parole.10
Beaudoin argues that Judge Souter violated the Jackson
rule when he sentenced Beaudoin.
Beaudoin was convicted of first-degree
murder. The maximum sentence for this crime is 99
years imprisonment, while the mandatory minimum
sentence is 20 years imprisonment.11 Judge Souter
sentenced Beaudoin to 99 years with 39 years suspended
i.e., 60 years to serve.
Under Alaska law, defendants who are not
subject to presumptive sentencing are generally
eligible to be considered for discretionary parole
release after they have served either one-fourth or one-
third of their sentence (depending on the class of
crime they have been convicted of).12 Because Beaudoin
was convicted of first-degree murder, he was sentenced
under AS 12.55.125(a), and thus the one-third limit
applied to him.13 However, two other factors also
limited Beaudoins eligibility for parole.
First, the parole statute provides that,
regardless of any other limit on parole, defendants
must serve the mandatory minimum sentence for their
crime before they become eligible for parole release.
For Beaudoin, this mandatory minimum sentence was 20
years. Second, Alaska law restricts the parole
eligibility of defendants who, like Beaudoin, are found
guilty but mentally ill. Under AS 12.47.050(b) and
050(d)(2), such defendants can not be released on
parole until they no longer suffer from a mental
disease or defect that causes them to be dangerous to
the public.
It is apparent from Judge Souters sentencing
remarks that one of his reasons for sentencing Beaudoin
to serve 60 years was to make sure that Beaudoin would
be eligible for parole at the earliest opportunity if
Beaudoin was no longer a danger to the public.
Regardless of what sentence Beaudoin
received, he could not be paroled until he had served
the 20-year mandatory minimum term for first-degree
murder. Judge Souter noted that, because one-third of
60 is 20, these two limitations on Beaudoins parole
eligibility the requirement that he serve one-third of
his sentence, and the requirement that he serve the
mandatory minimum sentence would coincide.
Judge Souter explained that the only
remaining restriction on Beaudoins parole eligibility
stemmed from the jurys guilty but mentally ill verdict:
because of this verdict, Beaudoin would not be
eligible for parole until he no longer suffered from a
mental disease or defect that caused him to be
dangerous. The judge expressed the hope that, with
advances in medicine (pharmacology, mental health
treatment, and even reconstructive surgery of the
brain), that time would arrive within the next two
decades. But Judge Souter added that if Beaudoins
mental illness could not be cured or controlled, then
his aim in imposing a 60-year sentence was to make sure
that Beaudoin remained in prison for the protection of
the public.
Given these remarks, it is obvious that Judge
Souter did not calculate Beaudoins term of imprisonment
using the assumption forbidden by Jackson the
assumption that Beaudoin should be sentenced to three
times the proper term of imprisonment because the
Parole Board would release Beaudoin as soon as he
became eligible to apply for parole.
It is true that Judge Souter took parole
eligibility into account when he sentenced Beaudoin to
serve 60 years. But the judges aim in doing so was not
to ensure that Beaudoin served at least 20 years.
Beaudoin faced a mandatory 20 years in prison no matter
what Judge Souter did. Rather, Judge Souters aim was
to leave the possibility open that Beaudoin might be
released in as little as 20 years. This was not a
violation of Jackson.
Judge Souter did not abuse his discretion when he
denied Beaudoins motion to reduce the sentence
Following his sentencing, Beaudoin filed a
motion for sentence reduction under Alaska Criminal
Rule 35(b). In this motion, Beaudoin presented a new
evaluation from neuropsychologist Paul Craig. Dr.
Craig stated that Beaudoin was responding well to drug
treatment, that Beaudoins behavior in jail had been
excellent, and that there had been a dramatic
improvement in [Beaudoins] interpersonal skills,
clarity of thought, and capacity to communicate. Based
on Dr. Craigs evaluation, Beaudoin asked Judge Souter
to reduce his time to serve to 20 years (i.e., change
the overall sentence to 99 years with 79 years
suspended).
Judge Souter denied this motion. He declared
that, despite Dr. Craigs evaluation, the Courts reasons
for imposing the [original] sentence ... remain valid
and undiminished.
As already explained, Judge Souter wanted
Beaudoin to be eligible for supervised release after 20
years if Beaudoin no longer suffered from a mental
disease or defect that caused him to be dangerous. At
the same time, Judge Souter wanted to make sure that
Beaudoin remained in prison for a much longer time if
Beaudoin continued to suffer from a mental condition
that caused him to be dangerous.
Dr. Craigs new evaluation suggested that
Beaudoin was making rapid steps toward mental health.
But this improvement in Beaudoins condition would not
necessarily call for a change in Judge Souters
evaluation of the case or a change in the terms of
Beaudoins sentence. No matter what Judge Souter did,
Beaudoin would have to serve the 20-year minimum
sentence for first-degree murder. And Judge Souter
could reasonably conclude that, if Beaudoins progress
toward mental health turned out to be temporary or was
halted short of complete recovery, a 60-year sentence
was still needed to protect the public. We therefore
conclude that Judge Souter did not abuse his discretion
when he declined to reduce Beaudoins time to serve to
20 years.
Beaudoins sentence of 60 years to serve is not clearly
mistaken
As explained above, Judge Souter fashioned a
sentence that would allow Beaudoin to be released in 20
years if he was no longer dangerous, but would hold
Beaudoin in prison for as much as 60 years if he
continued to be dangerous. Beaudoin contends that this
sentence is clearly mistaken because Judge Souter
failed to give adequate weight to the expert testimony
offered by Beaudoin concerning the nature of his mental
illness and the prospects for his successful treatment.
As the jury found, Beaudoins act of murder
was substantially influenced by his mental illness.
Because of this linkage between his mental illness and
his crime, Beaudoin argues that it is not necessary to
incarcerate him for 60 years. He relies on
psychological evaluations which conclude that his
mental illness is treatable with medication, that he
understands his condition, and that he is willing to
follow any regimen of treatment. Based on these
factors, Beaudoin cites the Alaska Supreme Courts
decision in Hansen v. State14 as authority for the
proposition that Judge Souter should have imposed a
more lenient sentence.
In Hansen, the supreme court reversed a third
felony offenders sentence reducing it to time served
and directing the sentencing judge to release the
defendant on probation when the facts showed that the
defendant
[suffered from] a clearly diagnosed mental
illness; [that he had excellent] amenability
to treatment; [that his] mental illness [was
clearly linked to his] past anti-social
behavior; [and that there was a] definite,
prescribed course of treatment to mitigate
the possibility of future criminal behavior
... .
Hansen, 582 P.2d at 1047-48.
However, as the State notes in its
brief, the true lesson of Hansen may be that
an appellate court should hesitate before
rejecting a trial judges sentencing
assessment in favor of the competing
predictions of mental health experts
regarding a defendants future behavior. For
despite the arguable reasons for optimism
recited in the supreme courts opinion, Robert
C. Hansen was already on his way to becoming
the worst mass murderer in Alaska history.
(Between the summer of 1971 and the time of
his arrest in 1983, Hansen abducted, raped,
and murdered at least seventeen women. He
committed one of these murders just a few
weeks after the supreme court ordered his
release on probation.)15
This is not to suggest that
Beaudoin can be likened in any way to Hansen.
Beaudoin is a youthful first offender whose
criminal behavior, Judge Souter found, was
clearly linked to his brain injury and
resulting mental illness. And, for the most
part, Judge Souter agreed with the experts
characterization of the sources of Beaudoins
criminal behavior and their conclusion that
the real solution was to cure Beaudoin of
his mental illness. But as a result of that
mental illness, Beaudoin attacked and killed
his mother with little or no provocation.
Given Beaudoins demonstrated level of
dangerousness, Judge Souter wanted to craft a
sentence that would protect the public in
case the predictions of Beaudoins rapid
recovery proved to be too optimistic.
Given all of these circumstances,
Judge Souters sentencing decision was a
reasonable effort to protect the public and
yet foster Beaudoins treatment and
rehabilitation. The judge was not obliged to
accept the most sanguine view of Beaudoins
prospects for recovery. In short, we do not
find that Beaudoins sentence is clearly
mistaken.16
Conclusion
The judgement of the superior court is
AFFIRMED.
_______________________________
1 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985).
2 See id., 470 U.S. at 310-11, 105 S.Ct. at 1294.
3 Halberg v. State, 903 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Alaska App. 1995),
quoting (respectively) Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602;
95 S.Ct. 2254, 2261; 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), and Clewis v.
Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 710; 87 S.Ct. 1338, 1340; 18 L.Ed.2d
423 (1967).
4 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 319, 105 S.Ct. at 1298.
5 391 U.S. 346, 88 S.Ct. 1488, 20 L.Ed.2d 630 (1968).
6 Quoting Darwin, 391 U.S. at 350-51, 88 S.Ct. at 1490
(Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
7 946 P.2d 1264, 1270-71 (Alaska App. 1997), reversed on
other grounds, 988 P.2d 583 (Alaska 1999).
8 Adkinson v. State, 611 P.2d 528, 532 & n.15 (Alaska 1980)
(citing Charles McCormick, The Law of Evidence (2nd ed.
1972), 190, p. 453, and the Commentary to Alaska Evidence
Rule 403, fifth paragraph).
9 See Betts v. State, 799 P.2d 325, 330 (Alaska App. 1990)
(a trial judges decision to admit or exclude evidence of a
persons bad acts is to be affirmed unless it constitutes an
abuse of discretion).
10 616 P.2d 23, 24-25 (Alaska 1980).
11 See AS 12.55.125(a).
12 See AS 33.16.090 100, especially AS 33.16.100(c)-(d).
13 See id.
14 582 P.2d 1041 (Alaska 1978).
15See Bernard DuClos, Fair Game (St. Martins, 1993). This
book is now out of print, but it is summarized at the
following web site:
http://www.explorenorth.com/library/weekly/aa021100a.htm
(last visited September 30, 2002). See also Walter Gilmour and
Leland E. Hale, Butcher, Baker (Onyx Books, 1991).
16See McClain v. State, 519 P.2d 811, 813-14 (Alaska 1974)
(an appellate court is to affirm a sentencing decision
unless the decision is clearly mistaken).
