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Ramsey v. State (10/11/2002) ap-1832
Ramsey v. State (10/11/2002) ap-1832
NOTICE
The text of this opinion can be corrected before the
opinion is published in the Pacific Reporter. Readers
are encouraged to bring typographical or other formal
errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate
Courts.
303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
EVAN E. RAMSEY, )
) Court of Appeals No.
A-7295
Appellant, )
Trial Court No. 4BE-S97-0167 CR
)
v. )
) O P I N I
O N
STATE OF ALASKA, )
)
Appellee. )
[No. 1832 - October 11, 2002]
)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Fourth Judi
cial District, Bethel, Mark I. Wood, Judge.
Appearances: Michael Dieni, Assistant Public
Defender, and Barbara K. Brink, Public
Defender, Anchorage, for Appellant. John A.
Scukanec, Assistant Attorney General, Office
of Special Prosecutions and Appeals,
Anchorage, and Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney
General, Juneau, for Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer
and Stewart, Judges.
COATS, Chief Judge.
A jury convicted Evan Ramsey of two counts of murder in
the first degree,1 one count of attempted murder in the first
degree,2 and fifteen counts of assault in the third degree.3
Superior Court Judge Mark I. Wood sentenced Ramsey to a composite
term of 210 years to serve. Ramsey appeals both his conviction
and his sentence. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
On Wednesday morning, February 19, 1997, sixteen-year-
old Evan Ramsey entered Bethel High School with a .12 gauge
shotgun hidden under his jacket. Ramsey immediately walked
toward the student common area where several students were
sitting. At the nearest table sat Joshua Palacios, a fellow high
school student, talking with several of his friends. Palacios
began to turn around and stand up when Ramsey pulled out the
shotgun and shot Palacios in the stomach. Palacios later died
from his wounds. Two students who were sitting across from
Palacios, S.M. and R.L., were also hit by pellets from the
shotgun blast.
One of the art teachers at the high school, Reyne
Athanas, was in the teachers lounge when she heard the first
gunshot. She entered the hallway and observed Ramsey shooting
into the ceiling. She saw Palacios lying on the floor with
another student. During this episode, Ramsey paced up and down
the hall several times in a very threatening manner. She and
Robert Morris, another school teacher, attempted to convince
Ramsey to put the shotgun down and give up. Ramsey then aimed
the gun at them, but did not shoot. Ramsey walked away from
Athanas and Morris, heading in the direction of the schools main
office where the schools administrative offices were located.
Meanwhile, Ronald Edwards, the school principal, had
heard that Ramsey was in the school with a gun and had been
walking through the school looking for Ramsey. Edwards found
Ramsey as he was approaching the main office. Ramsey aimed the
shotgun at Edwards, and Edwards turned around to run back into
the schools office. As Edwards was trying to get back into the
office, Ramsey shot him in the back and shoulder. Edwards died
in his office from the gunshot wounds.
Minutes after the shooting began, Bethel police
officers arrived at the high school. Several officers entered
the high school and saw Ramsey standing in the common area with
the shotgun. Ramsey saw the officers and fired one round in
their direction. After a brief exchange of gunfire, Ramsey put
the shotgun down and gave up. According to the officers, as he
threw the shotgun down, Ramsey yelled I dont want to die.
Officers were quickly able to detain Ramsey and take him into
custody.
A grand jury indicted Ramsey on two counts of first-
degree murder, three counts of attempted first-degree murder, and
fifteen counts of third-degree assault. The States theory at
trial was that Ramsey sought revenge against both Palacios and
Edwards. The State introduced testimony that Ramsey and Palacios
got into an argument and fight two years before the shooting.
The State also introduced a letter found in Ramseys bedroom
following the shooting that indicated Edwards was one of Ramseys
intended victims. The letter read, in part,
Hi, everybody. I feel rejected.
Rejected, not so much alone. But rejected.
I feel this way because the day-to-day mental
treatment I get usually isnt positive. But
the negative is like a cut, it doesnt go away
really fast, they kind of stick. I figure by
the time you guys are reading this, Ill
probably have done what I told everybody I
was going to do. Just hope a 12-gauge doesnt
kick too hard, but I do hope the shells hit
more than one person, because I am angry at
more than one person. One of the big assholes
is Mr. Ed Ron Edwards, he should be there.
I was told that this would be his last year,
but I know it will be his last year. The
main reason that I did this is because I am
sick and tired of being treated this way
everyday. Who gives a fuck about it? Now, I
got something to say to all of those people
who think Im strange can suck my dick and
like it.
. . .
Life sucks in its own way, so I killed a
little and kill myself. Jail isnt for me
ever and wasnt.
Ramseys major defense at trial was that he was suicidal
and did not form the requisite intent to commit first-degree
murder or first-degree attempted murder. According to Ramsey,
his intent during the shooting was not to kill anyone but merely
to scare the people at the school and force the police to go to
the high school and kill him. Ramseys counsel described Ramseys
actions as suicide-by-cop.
The jury convicted Ramsey of two counts of first-degree
murder, one count of first-degree attempted murder, and fifteen
counts of third-degree assault. The jury also acquitted him of
two counts of attempted first-degree murder and one count of
third-degree assault. Judge Wood sentenced Ramsey to a composite
term of 210 years imprisonment.
Judge Woods refusal to allow Ramsey to
introduce evidence of past physical and
sexual abuse
In support of his defense, Ramsey asked the courts
permission to introduce evidence of Ramseys family history and
history of past sexual and physical abuse committed against
Ramsey while he was in foster care. Ramsey stated that he
intended to argue that the history of a dysfunctional family
combined with past incidents of physical and sexual abuse
demonstrated why Ramsey was suicidal when he went to the high
school with the shotgun. The State opposed the request and asked
Judge Wood to preclude the proposed evidence as not relevant.
In his offer of proof, made immediately before his
opening statement, Ramsey stated that in 1987 his father went to
jail for ten years. After his father went to jail, his mother
developed an alcohol problem. In 1988, the Department of Family
and Youth Services (DFYS) removed Ramsey and his two siblings
from his mothers custody. Following the removal, Ramseys oldest
brother, John Ramsey, was separated from Ramsey and the youngest
brother, William. And finally, Ramsey and his younger brother
were shuffled between ten different foster homes over a two-year
period.
In support of his claim of past physical and sexual
abuse, Ramsey stated that while Ramsey and William were in a
particular foster home, the foster parents biological son
physically and sexually abused both Ramsey and William. The
offer indicated that the biological son would come into the
Ramsey room at night to punch and pinch both Ramsey and William.
During some of the incidents, the son would urinate into their
mouths. According to the offer, a school nurse discovered the
abuse and contacted DFYS. The offer claimed a subsequent
investigation found that the abuse occurred and that DFYS removed
the Ramsey brothers from the foster home.
Judge Wood agreed with Ramsey that his family history
was relevant to explaining why Ramsey might feel suicidal, but
noted that this was not precisely the issue. The charges against
Ramsey required the State to prove that Ramsey acted with the
intent to kill others. The fact that Ramsey might have also
wished to kill himself would not be a defense. Alaska Statute
11.81.900(a)(1) declares that when intentionally causing a
particular result is an element of an offense, that intent need
not be the [defendants] only objective.
Although Judge Wood was willing to give Ramsey
considerable latitude to introduce evidence of his past, Judge
Wood believed that the proposed evidence of sexual abuse was too
likely to distract the jury from the issues in the case. He
believed that this potential for unfair prejudice would outweigh
the probative value of the evidence unless Ramsey could show
that his past subjection to sexual abuse was (1) likely to make
him suicidal and at the same time (2) not just as likely to make
him homicidal.
When Judge Wood suggested that Ramsey would need expert
testimony to establish this point, Ramsey replied that there was
no need for expert testimony that the inference was obvious.
Judge Wood disagreed. Confronted with Judge Woods ruling, Ramsey
either could not or chose not to offer expert testimony on this
point.
At the conclusion of the States case-in-chief, Ramsey
asked the court to reconsider its previous ruling about the
sexual and physical abuse. Judge Wood declined to reverse his
earlier ruling. He found that sufficient evidence had been
introduced to allow Ramsey to argue his suicidal theory and to
argue that Ramsey wasnt thinking clearly when he entered the high
school. But he reiterated his finding that past incidents of
physical and sexual abuse were not relevant to the case and found
that, even if relevant, the incidents were more prejudicial than
probative.
On appeal, Ramsey argues that Judge Wood abused his
discretion because he should have taken judicial notice of the
linkage between evidence of homosexual rape and the inclination
to commit suicide. Ramsey contends that prior physical and
sexual assaults have a clear tendency to show that Ramsey
intended to commit suicide, not homicide.
A review of the record of the trial demonstrates that
Ramsey was able to present substantial evidence about his
background to support his defense. Ramsey presented testimony
that his childhood was very difficult. Ramseys oldest brother,
John Ramsey, testified that he and his brothers were forced to
move around often with their mother after their home burned down.
This hardship was exacerbated when their father went to jail in
1986. Ramseys mother developed a drinking problem, and DFYS
removed the children from her care due to neglect. Once DFYS
took custody of them, John Ramsey and his brothers were split
apart. William, the youngest, testified how he and Ramsey
bounced back and forth between several foster placements,
ultimately ending up in Bethel, with Sue Hare. In addition to
testimony about his family history, Ramsey also called W.N., a
close friend, who testified that Ramsey threatened suicide two
years before the shooting occurred. And, Kathryn Fritch, the
mother of one of Ramseys friends, testified that Ramsey expressed
feelings of suicide and depression.
Judge Wood allowed Ramsey to introduce a substantial
amount of evidence dealing with his family history and
background. Furthermore, Judge Wood did not completely foreclose
Ramsey from introducing the disputed evidence concerning prior
physical and sexual abuse. Rather, Judge Wood questioned Ramseys
premise that such abuse would tend to make a child suicidal but
would not tend to make the child homicidal. Judge Wood told
Ramsey that he could introduce the disputed evidence if he
offered expert testimony to support this premise; otherwise, the
judge concluded, the prejudicial effect of the evidence would
outweigh its probative value. Ramsey never offered the expert
testimony.
The question, then, is whether Judge Wood abused his
discretion when he required Ramsey to offer foundational expert
testimony to support his premise that a childs subjection to
physical and sexual abuse would tend to make the child suicidal
as opposed to homicidal or whether, as Ramsey contended, this
premise was self-evident and needed no foundational support. We
hold that reasonable judges could conclude that this premise was
not self-evident and that the proponent of such evidence would
need to support it with expert testimony. Accordingly, Judge
Wood did not abuse his discretion when he required this
foundational testimony from Ramsey.
Nurse Fords testimony that Ramsey stated he
was not suicidal during the initial health
screening interview
In rebuttal, the State called registered nurse Debbie
Ford from the Department of Corrections. The State sought to
rebut Ramseys claim that he was suicidal during and after the
shootings by showing that during an initial health screening at
the jail, Ramsey denied any suicidal thoughts within the last
year.
Ford testified that she asked Ramsey about his suicidal
tendencies during an initial screening at the jail. The initial
screening was held in Ramseys holding cell that Ford described as
a typical jail cell, six to eight feet by ten feet. She
remembered two or three correctional officers in the holding cell
with her during the initial screening. Ford testified that she
was not qualified to make a psychological diagnosis of a patient
but that the highest risk for a prisoner committing suicide was
during his first twenty-four hours at the jail. The purpose of
the initial screening and medical interview was to quickly access
and determine whether a prisoner posed a suicide risk or had any
suicidal tendencies. During this initial screening, Ramsey
denied that he any suicidal thoughts at the present time. During
the second interview, which was held at the medical center, Ford
sat at a desk and Ramsey at the opposite end. Two correctional
officers stayed in the medical center with Ford and Ramsey for
safety reasons. They stood a few feet away from Ramsey. Again,
Ramsey denied having any suicidal thoughts within the past year.
Ford stated that if a prisoner showed any suicidal
tendencies, she referred the prisoner to the mental health
clinician. In Ramseys case, based on his age and the seriousness
of his offense, she referred him to the mental health clinician
following her medical screening, even though Ramsey denied any
suicidal thoughts or attempts.
Ramsey contends that Judge Wood erred in allowing Ford
to testify to his statements because his statements were covered
by the psychotherapist-patient privilege. The privilege is set
out in Alaska Rule of Evidence 504(b).
A patient has a privilege to refuse to
disclose and to prevent any other person from
disclosing confidential communications made
for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of
the patients physical, mental or emotional
conditions, including alcohol or drug
addiction, between or among the patient, the
patients physician or psychotherapist, or
persons who are participating in the
diagnosis or treatment under the direction of
the physician or psychotherapist, including
members of the patients family.
In order for the privilege to apply, the communication
in question must be confidential.4 Rule 504(a)(4) states that
[a] communication is confidential if not intended to be disclosed
to third persons other than those present to further the interest
of the patient in the consultation, examination, or interview, or
persons reasonably necessary for the transmission of the
communication, or persons who are participating in the diagnosis
and treatment under the direction of the physician or
psychotherapist, including members of the patients family.
In Plate v. State,5 we discussed when a communication
was confidential and therefore qualified for the privilege. In
Plate, we discussed the clergy communicant privilege set out in
Evidence Rule 506 and what is meant by the term confidential
communication. We noted in our discussion that the definition of
a confidential communication was the same in the attorney-client
privilege set out in Evidence Rule 503(b), the psychotherapist-
patient privilege set out in Evidence Rule 504(b), and the clergy-
communicant privilege set out in Evidence Rule 506(b).6 We
concluded that, whether a communication was confidential depended
on the reasonable expectation of the person consulting the
lawyer, psychotherapist, or clergyman. The person must believe
that the conversation is to remain private, and the persons
belief in the privacy of the conversation must be reasonable.7
Applying this test here, we conclude that a reasonable
person in Ramseys position would not believe that the contents of
his conversation with Nurse Ford about his mental condition were
confidential. The purpose of Nurse Fords questions about whether
Ramsey had suicidal feelings was clear: she wanted to find out
if Ramsey was a suicide risk and asking Ramsey was the most
direct way of obtaining this information. Also, it was clear
that Nurse Ford would not have treated this information as
confidential. Certainly if Ramsey had indicated that he was
suicidal, Nurse Ford would have alerted anyone necessary to
minimize this risk, including many people whose responsibility
was to guard Ramsey, not treat him. And it is foreseeable that
the correctional officers, if informed that Ramsey was a suicide
risk, would widely disseminate this information to minimize any
risk to Ramsey. We conclude that Ramseys communications to Nurse
Ford about his mental condition were not confidential
communications. Accordingly, Ramsey did not have the right to
prevent Nurse Ford from testifying about his statements. Judge
Wood, therefore, did not err in allowing Nurse Ford to testify
about Ramseys statements.
Did Judge Wood err in instructing the jury on
the charge of attempted murder of S.M.
When Ramsey shot Palacios, S.M. and R.L., two students
sitting across from Palacios, were also hit by pellets from the
same shotgun blast. The States theory was that if Ramsey, with
intent to kill Palacios, shot and injured S.M., he committed
attempted murder in the first degree against S.M. Ramsey
objected, contending that he could only be guilty of the
attempted murder of S.M. if he had acted with the specific intent
to kill S.M. Judge Wood disagreed and instructed the jury that:
In order to establish the crime of
Attempted Murder in the First Degree as
charged in Count III of the indictment, it is
necessary for the state to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the following:
First, that the event in question
occurred at or near Bethel . . . on or about
February 19, 1997;
Second, that Evan Ramsey intended to
commit the crime of Murder in the First
Degree as to Count II [First-Degree Murder of
Palacios] and;
Third, that the defendant shot S.M. with
a firearm, which constituted a substantial
step toward the commission of Murder in the
First Degree.
Judge Wood allowed the State to argue in summation that
if Ramsey had fired the shotgun at Palacios with the specific
intent to kill him and had simultaneously injured S.M. (thereby
taking a substantial step), Ramsey was guilty of attempted murder
in the first degree of S.M. Judge Wood precluded Ramsey from
arguing to the jury that the jury had to find that Ramsey had a
specific intent to kill S.M. to find him guilty of the attempted
murder of S.M. Ramsey contends that Judge Wood erred. We agree.
The parties point out that other jurisdictions that
have addressed this or similar issues have reached entirely
different results. Some jurisdictions hold that attempted murder
is appropriately charged if the defendants actions killed the
intended victim and also injured an unintended victim as a matter
of public policy and deterrence.8 Other jurisdictions have held
that attempted murder is an inappropriate charge under the theory
that attempt, as an inchoate offense, requires the specific
intent to kill a specific victim.9
The doctrine of transferred intent arose in early
common law to impute criminal liability to a person who, acting
with the intent to harm, caused injury to an unintended victim.10
To avoid injustice, courts developed the theory of transferred
intent, holding the individual responsible for the injury or
death to the unintended victim. Most commentators, however, note
that transferred intent is a misleading half-truth because at
common law the requisite mental state was malice aforethought,
which included the intent to kill anyone.11 These commentators
note that the law, even at common law, did not require the
ultimate person harmed be the intended victim.12
The doctrine of transferred intent is unnecessary to
ensure criminal liability under Alaskas statute defining first-
degree murder.
Alaska Statute 11.41.100 defines murder in the first
degree as:
(1) with intent to cause the death of another person,
the person
(A) causes the death of any person.
(emphasis added).
The plain language of AS 11.41.100 imputes criminal
liability to anyone who, with the intent to cause death, causes
death. The statute does not require the State to prove that a
defendant had a specific intent to cause the death of a
particular person to convict the defendant of murder. Therefore,
under Alaska law, if a defendant acts with the intent to cause
the death of another person, the defendant is guilty of murder
for the death of any person whose death is caused by his act.
The question presented in this case is whether a
similar rationale can be applied to attempted first-degree
murder. To be guilty of attempted first-degree murder in Alaska,
a person must (1) intend to cause the death of another, and (2)
take a substantial step causing the death of any person.13 The
State argues that Ramsey intended to cause the death of Palacios
and that his wounding of Palacios was a substantial step towards
causing S.M.s death.
The problem with the States argument is that its logic
leads to the conclusion that Ramsey could have been found guilty
of the attempted murder of everyone in the school. The jury
certainly found that Ramsey intended to cause the death of
Palacios. And because his actions would have placed almost any
reasonable person in the school in fear of serious physical
injury, it is hard to say where the States attempted murder
theory would stop. A defendant can be found guilty of attempted
murder whether or not he actually injures his intended victim.
Therefore, the States argument, carried to its logical extension,
would allow it to convict Ramsey of the attempted murder of
everyone in the building.
Alaska law authorizes a separate conviction for
homicide or assault for every victim of a defendants assaultive
act. See State v. Dunlop,14 (holding that a defendant who kills
and injures several victims by one assaultive act is properly
convicted of a separate homicide or assault for each victim); see
also Cooper v. State,15 (holding that a defendant who pointed a
firearm at three police officers was guilty of three counts of
assault). Thus, to determine Ramseys crimes, we must assess
Ramseys physical acts and culpable mental state pertaining to
each victim.
The jury found that Ramsey acted with intent to kill
Palacios. Thus, his act of firing the shotgun at Palacios would
constitute either attempted first-degree murder (if Palacios
survived) or completed first-degree murder (if Palacios died).
If, at the same time, Ramsey killed or injured one or more
bystanders while he was trying to kill Palacios, Ramsey would be
guilty of an additional crime for each of these bystanders not
an additional attempted murder, but rather an additional homicide
if the bystander died or, if the bystander survived, either an
attempted homicide or an assault, depending on Ramseys culpable
mental state with regard to that bystander.
Here, under the jury instructions that embodied the
States erroneous theory of attempted murder, the jury was asked
to find whether Ramsey wounded S.M. while trying to kill
Palacios. The jury so found. But the jury was not asked to
decide other pertinent matters.
For instance, if Ramsey had intended to kill S.M. (in
addition to Palacios), then Ramsey could properly be convicted of
the attempted murder of S.M. (regardless of whether he injured
S.M.). Even if Ramsey did not intend to kill S.M., if Ramsey
inflicted serious physical injury on S.M., while trying to kill
Palacios, he might properly be convicted of first-degree assault
on S.M.16 Alternatively, if Ramsey merely inflicted physical
injury on S.M. (while trying to kill Palacios), he might properly
be convicted of second-degree assault on S.M.17
Accordingly, we conclude that Judge Wood erred in
instructing the jury and allowing the State to argue that it
could convict Ramsey of attempted murder of S.M. if Ramsey
intended to kill Palacios and simultaneously injured S.M. We
conclude that the proper instruction would have required the jury
to find Ramsey had the specific intent to kill S.M. before it
could convict Ramsey of the attempted murder of S.M. Based on
this rationale, Ramseys conviction for attempted murder in the
first degree must be reversed. The State argues that, if
we conclude that the jury was improperly instructed on attempted
murder in the first degree, we should remand the case to the
trial court with directions to enter a verdict for assault in the
first degree.18 The State contends that, under the courts
instructions, it is clear that the jury had to find that Ramsey
recklessly caused serious physical injury to S.M. with the
shotgun and that this would constitute assault in the first
degree.19 But we agree with Ramsey that the record does not
conclusively establish that the jury found that Ramsey caused
serious physical injury to S.M. Consequently, all we can say
with certainty is that the jury had to have found that Ramsey
committed the crime of assault in the second degree, which
requires the State only to prove that Ramsey, with the intent to
cause physical injury to Palacios, caused physical injury to
S.M.20 On remand, the State is entitled to the entry of a
verdict against Ramsey for the offense of assault in the second
degree. Or, if the State elects, the State can retry Ramsey for
attempted murder in the first degree or any lesser offense.21
Sentencing issues
Lastly, Ramsey contends that Judge Wood made a mistake
in determining when he would be eligible for discretionary
parole. He points out that Judge Wood appears to have assumed
that Ramsey would be eligible for discretionary parole after he
had served one-fourth of his sentence. Ramsey points out that he
will not be eligible for parole until he had served at least one-
third of his sentence.
Since we have reversed Ramseys conviction for attempted
murder in the first degree, on remand, Judge Wood will be
required to resentence Ramsey. We therefore conclude it is
unnecessary for us to address Ramseys contention that Judge Wood
incorrectly relied on his parole eligibility because we are
already remanding the case for resentencing.
Ramseys conviction for attempted murder in the first
degree is REVERSED. His other convictions are AFFIRMED.
_______________________________
1 AS 11.41.100(a)(1)(A).
2 AS 11.41.100(a)(1); AS 11.31.100(a).
3 AS 11.41.220(a)(1)(A).
4 A.R.E. 504(a)(4).
5 925 P.2d 1057, 1065-67 (Alaska App. 1996).
6 Id. at 1066.
7 Id.
8 See, e.g., Ochoa v. State, 981 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Nev.
1999); State v. Fennell, 531 S.E.2d 512, 517 (S.C. 2000).
9 See, e.g., Ford v. State, 625 A.2d 984, 998 (Md. 1993),
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Robinson v.
State, 728 A.2d 698 (Md. 1999) ([T]ransferred intent makes a
whole crime out of two halves by joining the intent as to one
victim with the harm caused to another victim. Transferred intent
does not make two crimes out of one. Where the crime intended has
actually been committed against the intended victim, transferred
intent is unnecessary and should not be applied to acts against
unintended victims.); State v. Hinton, 630 A.2d 593, 602 (Conn.
1993); People v. Bland, 48 P.2d 1110, 1116-17 (Cal. 2002).
10 See Ochoa, 981 P.2d at 1203-04; see also, 1 Wayne R.
LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law 3.12(d),
399-402 (1986).
11 See LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law 3.12(d),
at 399-401; see also State v. Ward, 997 P.2d 528, 533 (Alaska
App. 2000) (Mannheimer, J. concurring) (citing Rollin M. Perkins
& Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law, 921-23 (3d ed. 1982)) (noting
that, in most cases, the doctrine of transferred intent is an
unnecessary fallacy).
12 See LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law 3.12(d),
at 400; Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law at 921-22.
13 AS 11.31.100(a); AS 11.41.100 (emphasis added).
14 721 P.2d 604 (Alaska 1986).
15 595 P.2d 648 (Alaska 1979).
16 Ramsey could be charged under AS 11.41.200(a)(1):
reckless infliction of serious physical injury by means of a
dangerous instrument. Ramsey could also conceivably be charged
under AS 11.41.200(a)(2): acting with intent to cause serious
physical injury to another, and causing serious physical injury
to anyone. The latter theory rests on the premise that a person
who acts with intent to kill necessarily acts with the lesser
culpable mental state of intent to cause serious physical injury.
17 Ramsey could be charged under AS 11.41.210(a)(1):
acting with intent to cause physical injury to another, and
causing physical injury to anyone by means of a dangerous
instrument. Again, this theory rests on the premise that a
person who acts with intent to kill necessarily acts with the
lesser culpable mental state of intent to cause physical injury.
18 See Nix v. State, 624 P.2d 823, 825 (Alaska App.
1981).
19 AS 11.41.200.
20 AS 11.41.210(a)(1) provides that a person commits the
crime of assault in the second degree if . . . with intent to
cause physical injury to another person, that person causes
physical injury to another person by means of a dangerous
instrument . . . .
21 See Nix, 624 P.2d at 824-25.
