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Mahan v. State (7/26/2002) ap-1812

Mahan v. State (7/26/2002) ap-1812

                             NOTICE
     The  text  of this opinion can be corrected before  the
     opinion  is published in the Pacific Reporter.  Readers
     are  encouraged to bring typographical or other  formal
     errors  to  the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate
     Courts:

             303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska  99501
                      Fax:  (907) 264-0878
       E-mail:  corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA


MIRIAM M. MAHAN,              )
                              )              Court of Appeals No.
A-7662
                                             Appellant,         )
Trial Court No. 3KN-99-1655 Cr.
                              )
                  v.          )
                              )                         O P I N I
O N
STATE OF ALASKA,              )
                              )
                                             Appellee.          )
[No. 1812    July 26, 2002]
                              )


          Appeal  from the District Court,  Third  Judi
          cial   District,  Kenai,  Jonathan  H.  Link,
          Judge, and David S. Landry, Magistrate.

          Appearances:  Carol A. Brenckle,  Kenai,  for
          Appellant.  John W. Wolfe, Assistant District
          Attorney,    Dwayne    McConnell,    District
          Attorney,   Kenai,  and  Bruce  M.   Botelho,
          Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellee.

          Before:   Coats, Chief Judge, and  Mannheimer
          and Stewart, Judges.

          MANNHEIMER, Judge.


          Miriam  M. Mahan kept over 130 animals on her property,

including 9 horses, 2 llamas, 10 cows, 18 sheep, 1 goat, 34 pigs,

21 dogs, 10 cats, 18 assorted birds, and a number of rabbits.  At

the  request  of some of Mahans relatives, a private organization

called  Alaska Equine Rescue entered Mahans property to check  on

the condition of these animals.  They found that the animals were

in ill-health and were not adequately cared for.  With the aid of

the Alaska State Troopers, Equine Rescue removed the animals from

Mahans property and found foster homes for them.

          Mahan  was  ultimately convicted  of  one  consolidated

count   of  cruelty  to  animals,  AS  11.61.140(a)(1)-(2),   for

neglecting  these  animals.  She now appeals her  conviction  and

certain aspects of her sentence.

          Mahan  raises  a number of claims on appeal.   For  the

reasons explained here, we conclude that none of these claims has

merit, and we therefore affirm Mahans conviction and sentence.



     Mahans request for a writ of assistance
     

                 After  Alaska  Equine  Rescue  rescued  the

     animals  from  Mahans  property, it  placed  them  with

     various foster families.  When Mahans attorney prepared

     for  trial, she arranged through Equine Rescue to visit

     Mahans  animals  and  the  families  caring  for  them.

     However, the defense attorneys initial visits  did  not

     go  well,  and the foster families (apparently  through

     Equine  Rescue) resisted further contacts.  Ultimately,

     Equine Rescue agreed to further visits, but only if the

     defense  attorney refrained from pressuring the  foster

     families  to  answer a questionnaire that  the  defense

     attorney had prepared.

               At  this  point,  Mahans attorney  asked  the

     district court to issue a writ of assistance   a  court

     order  directing  the state troopers to  accompany  the

     defense  attorney on her visits to the foster families.

     The  defense attorney conceded that the foster families

     were  willing to allow her to visit their property  and

     to  photograph Mahans animals, but the defense attorney

     claimed  that  the  foster families were  unwilling  to

     answer  her questionnaire.  Thus, the defense  attorney

     told the court, she needed police assistance to get the

     foster families to answer her questionnaire.

          A   writ  of  assistance  is  a  court  order

directing law enforcement officers to assist a litigant

in   enforcing  a  judgement  or  decree.   Blacks  Law

Dictionary  defines writ of assistance  as  limited  to

enforcement  of  decrees  adjudicating  title  to  real

property1, but Alaska cases use the term in  a  broader

sense.   For example, one Alaska case speaks of a  writ

of  assistance  to  aid a trustee  in  supervising  and

preventing  the removal or destruction of  assets  that

were   the  subject  of  a  pre-judgement  attachment.2

Several other supreme court decisions refer to writs of

assistance   issued  to  enforce  child   custody   and

visitation decrees3, and one case speaks of a  writ  of

assistance  issued to aid the Division  of  Family  and

Youth  Services  in entering a home  to  investigate  a

childs welfare.4

          But  although Alaska cases may use  the  term

writ  of  assistance  in  a  broader  sense  than   its

historical  origins, the gist of a writ  of  assistance

remains  the  same:  it is a court order directing  law

enforcement officers to assist a person in enforcing  a

prior court order when there is reason to believe  that

enforcement   efforts   may  be   met   with   forcible

opposition.

          Thus,  to  determine whether Mahans  attorney

was  entitled to a writ of assistance to help her force

the  foster  families to answer her questionnaire,  the

primary question to ask is whether Mahans attorney  was

legally entitled to demand answers to her questionnaire

in the first place.  The answer is no.  A person has no

legal duty to answer an attorneys questions unless  the

questions are posed after the person has been sworn  as

a witness at a deposition or court hearing.

          If  Mahans attorney believed that her  client

would be denied a fair trial unless the foster families

          were  forced to answer the questions  in  her

questionnaire, she could have asked the district  court

to  order the deposition of these families under Alaska

Criminal  Rule 15(a).  But unless and until  the  court

ordered  a  deposition  and the  foster  families  were

properly  subpoenaed  to attend  that  deposition,  the

families  were under no legal obligation to respond  to

the  questionnaire  and, thus, the defense attorney was

not   entitled  to  police  assistance  to   force   or

intimidate  the families to answer her  questions.   We

therefore  uphold the district courts denial of  Mahans

request for a writ of assistance.



Mahans request for a change of venue


          Mahan asked the district court to change  the

venue  of  her trial because of the publicity that  her

case  had generated locally.  The court chose to  defer

its  decision on this matter until it could assess  the

results  of  jury selection.5  After hearing  the  voir

dire  examinations  of  many  prospective  jurors,  the

district court denied Mahans motion.

          On  appeal,  Mahan  does not  give  a  single

example  of the publicity that she complains of.   Even

her  trial  court  motion is unsupported  by  evidence.

Instead, Mahans attorney simply made the assertion that

Mahans case had been discussed in newspaper articles in

the Peninsula Clarion and Anchorage Daily News and that

KTUU-TV ha[d] run numerous stories involving this  case

and  Equine  Rescue.  Mahans attorney did not  describe

the  content or tenor of this media coverage except  to

say that Kenai District Attorney Dwayne McConnell [was]

quoted  in  the  Peninsula  Clarion  article  and  that

Lieutenant Bowman, [the] Detachment Commander [of  the]

Soldotna  Post  [of  the  Alaska  State  Troopers]  was

featured in one of the early KTUU-TV broadcasts.

           On appeal, Mahan asserts that her jury could

not  have  been  fair  because, of the  32  prospective

jurors  summoned  to court for her case,  16  had  been

exposed  to  pre-trial publicity about the  case.   But

exposure  to  pre-trial publicity does not equal  bias.

The   question  is  whether  the  pre-trial   publicity

prejudiced these 16 prospective jurors against Mahan to

such  an extent that they would be unable to judge  her

case fairly.  Generally, these 16 people testified that

they  had  read or heard about the case  only  once  or

twice, near the time when the animals were removed from

Mahans custody.

          Moreover, all but one of these 16 prospective

jurors  were  excused,  either  for  cause  or  through

peremptory  challenges.  Even  if  we  accepted  Mahans

assertion  that these 15 excused jurors were prejudiced

against  her as a result of their exposure to pre-trial

publicity,  this would not require a change  of  venue.

As  we  explained  in Cheely v. State,  861  P.2d  1168

(Alaska App. 1993), the question is not how many biased

prospective jurors were identified and excused; rather,

the question is whether there is substantial reason  to

doubt the impartiality of the jurors who remained after

the selection process was complete.6

          Of  the  jurors  ultimately selected  to  try

Mahans  case, only one had heard or read any  pre-trial

publicity  about the case.  This one juror stated  that

she  had  read about Mahans case in the newspaper,  but

she  also declared that this newspaper coverage had not

made  a  strong impression on her and that she had  not

formed  any  opinion about Mahans guilt  or  innocence.

The  trial judge found that this juror could  be  fair,

and  Mahan  does not directly challenge this ruling  on

appeal.

          In  short,  the record contains no indication

          that the people who served as jurors at Mahans trial

were  unable  to judge the case fairly.   We  therefore

uphold the district courts denial of Mahans motion  for

a change of venue.



Mahans suppression motion


          Just   before  Mahans  trial  began,   Mahans

attorney filed a motion seeking suppression of most  of

the States evidence.  The defense attorney claimed that

Alaska  Equine  Rescue  and  the  state  troopers   had

unlawfully  entered her land when they came to  inspect

the animals and, later, to retrieve them.

          The   trial   judge,  Superior  Court   Judge

Jonathan  H.  Link, told the defense attorney  that  he

would not decide her motion before trial  because trial

was scheduled to begin before the State was obliged  to

file  its response.  (Under Alaska Criminal Rule 42(c),

the  State had ten days to file its response to  Mahans

motion.)   Upon hearing that Judge Link would wait  ten

days  for  the  State  to respond to  her  motion,  the

defense  attorney asked the judge if he would base  his

decision  on  the evidence presented at  trial.   Judge

Link  responded  that  he  would  do  so  if  it  [was]

appropriate.

          Mahans  trial  ended on March 2,  2000.   The

State  filed its response to Mahans suppression  motion

on  the following day, March 3rd.  But Judge Link never

ruled on Mahans motion, and Mahan never asked the judge

to do so.  The parties appeared in court for sentencing

on  March 13th, but Mahan did not press Judge  Link  to

decide  the  pending suppression motion,  nor  did  she

renew  her  motion based on the evidence  presented  at

trial.

          To preserve an issue for appeal, an appellant

must  obtain  an  adverse ruling. We have  consistently

held  that  a defendant who chooses to proceed  without

demanding  a  ruling from the trial  court  waives  the

potential claim of error.7  Here, Mahans failure to ask

Judge  Link  for  a  ruling on her  suppression  motion

constitutes a waiver of this claim.



Mahans term of probation


          Mahan   received  a  sentence  of   1   years

imprisonment,  all suspended.  She does  not  challenge

her  suspended term of imprisonment, but  rather  three

other facets of her sentence.

          First,  Mahan  asserts that  Judge  Link  was

clearly mistaken when he placed her on probation for 10

years.   Mahan  argues that, because she  was  a  first

offender convicted of a misdemeanor, a 5-year  term  of

probation  would  have been sufficient  to  ensure  her

rehabilitation and protect the public.

          But  Judge Link found that Mahans conduct was

among  the  worst offenses.  He declared  that  it  was

beyond argument that these animals were severely abused

over  a  long period of time.  Based on these findings,

and  given Mahans failure to explain why she  could  be

trusted  not  to  neglect animals  in  the  future,  we

conclude that Judge Link was not clearly mistaken  when

he imposed the 10-year period of probation.



Mahans conditions of probation


          Mahan  challenges  two of her  conditions  of

probation.   Judge Link ordered her not to own  (or  be

the  primary caretaker of) more than one animal  during

her  term  of  probation, and he  prohibited  her  from

owning or caring for a horse.  Mahans argument of  this

point  consists of a two-sentence description of  these

two  conditions.  She does not state why  she  believes

          that Judge Link abused his sentencing discretion when

he imposed them.

          Given Mahans conduct in this case, these  two

conditions  of probation are not facially unreasonable.

Mahans  failure to offer any argument to  the  contrary

constitutes a waiver of her claims.8



The amount of Mahans restitution


          Mahan claims that the record does not support

the  amount  of  restitution  ordered  by  Judge  Link.

Initially, on April 26, 2000, Judge Link ordered  Mahan

to pay slightly more than $30,000 restitution to Alaska

Equine  Rescue  for  the  cost  of  maintaining  Mahans

animals  pending the outcome of the prosecution against

her.   Mahan was given until May 28, 2000 to  pay  this

restitution,  but the deadline was later  postponed  to

July  16, 2000.  Because Mahans conditions of probation

barred  her  from  continuing to own the  animals,  and

because Equine Rescue would continue to pay to maintain

the  animals  until they were sold, Judge Link  ordered

that Mahans restitution debt would increase by $150 per

day until she sold the animals.  By the end of May 2000

(when  Judge  Link issued his final judgement  in  this

case),  the  amount  of restitution  had  increased  to

slightly more than $36,000.

          Mahans challenge to this figure of $36,000 is

fairly cursory.  She asserts that the figure is suspect

because   the  district  court  would  not  issue   the

requested  writ  of  assistance  to  force  the  foster

families  to answer her questionnaire.  But  Mahan  had

the opportunity to challenge Equine Rescues restitution

claims at the restitution hearing.

          On    appeal,   she   identifies   only   one

restitution  claim as questionable:   the  request  for

$1600   to  repay  one  of  the  foster  families   for

          constructing additional fencing so that all of Mahans

roughly three dozen pigs could be kept at one location.

But  Judge Link could reasonably determine that, in the

end,  it would be more cost-effective to house and feed

all  the pigs in one location.  Thus, despite the  cost

of  the additional fencing, Judge Link could reasonably

conclude that the expense of maintaining these  animals

and,  thus, the amount of Mahans restitution obligation

would ultimately be reduced if all the pigs were housed

together.  Mahan offers no argument to the contrary.



The purported forfeiture of Mahans animals


          Mahan  argues  that Judge Link  exceeded  his

sentencing  authority  when he ordered  Mahans  animals

forfeited  to  Alaska Equine Rescue.   But  Judge  Link

ordered no forfeiture.

          During the sentencing proceedings, the  State

indeed  urged Judge Link to order forfeiture of  Mahans

animals to Equine Rescue, but the judge concluded  that

he  had  no  authority to do so.   Instead,  the  judge

issued  an  order that, in effect, made Mahans  animals

the  security  for the restitution debt Mahan  owed  to

Equine Rescue.

          As  explained  above, Judge  Link  ultimately

ordered   Mahan  to  pay  slightly  more  than  $36,000

restitution   to  Equine  Rescue  for   the   cost   of

maintaining Mahans animals pending the outcome  of  the

prosecution  against her.  Mahans deadline  for  paying

this restitution was July 16, 2000.

          Because  a  separate condition  of  probation

forbade  Mahan  from continuing to own  animals,  Judge

Link  directed Mahan to sell her animals.  Under  Judge

Links  order,  Alaska Equine Rescue would  receive  the

proceeds   of  these  sales  until  Mahans  restitution

obligation was satisfied.  (As noted earlier, to offset

the  continuing cost of maintaining the  animals  until

they  were  sold,  Mahans amount of  restitution  would

increase  by  $150  per  day until  [Mahan]  divest[ed]

herself of all ownership interest in the animals.)

          To  prevent Mahan from selling the animals at

below-market  prices, Judge Link further ordered  that,

regardless  of  the sales price, Alaska  Equine  Rescue

must  be paid the fair market value of the animal prior

to the transfer of any ownership interest.

          The  next  paragraph  of  Judge  Links  order

stated that, in the event that Mahan (1) failed to sell

the  animals  and  (2)  failed  to  otherwise  pay  the

restitution  owed  to  Alaska  Equine  Rescue  by   the

deadline,  all  of [Mahans] ownership interest  in  the

remaining  animals [would] transfer  to  Alaska  Equine

Rescue  by operation of law  but, in this event, Mahans

restitution obligation would be reduced by  the  market

value  of the animals.  Based on the evidence presented

at   the  restitution  hearing,  Judge  Link  initially

calculated  the  total market value of the  animals  at

$13,775.   This  figure was later revised  to  $20,000,

exclusive  of  the  pigs,  which  were  to  be   valued

separately.

          Mahan  argues that Judge Links order amounted

to  a forfeiture of her animals to Alaska Equine Rescue

a  forfeiture [that] is not permitted under Alaska law.

But  a  forfeiture  is a penalty  a  loss  of  property

without   compensation.   Judge  Link  did  not   order

forfeiture of the animals.  Rather, he ordered Mahan to

sell  the animals to satisfy her restitution obligation

to Alaska Equine Rescue.  Two conditions governed these

sales:  Mahan could not sell the animals for less  than

fair  market value, and the sales had to take place  by

July 16, 2000.

          Judge  Link  further ordered that  if  Mahans

restitution  obligation  was  not  paid  on  time,  the

animals  would  become the property  of  Alaska  Equine

Rescue  (the entity to whom Mahan owed the  debt),  and

Mahans debt would be reduced accordingly.  Until  then,

Mahan remained free to sell the animals to anyone,  but

she  had to do so within the time allotted, and not for

less than fair market value.

          In other words, Judge Link effectively placed

a  lien on the animals, making them security for Mahans

restitution debt if that debt was not satisfied by July

16,  2000.  The judge declared that if Mahan failed  to

sell  the  animals  as prescribed,  the  animals  would

become the property of Equine Rescue, but Equine Rescue

would  have  to  pay Mahan fair market value  for  them

i.e.,  Mahans restitution debt would be reduced by  the

fair market value of the animals.

          We  have  already  upheld  the  condition  of

probation that forbids Mahan from owning more than  one

animal  (and no horses), so it follows that Judge  Link

could  order  Mahan to divest herself of  the  animals.

Because  Mahan owed a substantial amount of restitution

to  Alaska  Equine Rescue, Judge Link could  reasonably

require Mahan to pay that restitution from the proceeds

of  the  animal sales if she did not otherwise  satisfy

her restitution obligation.  Likewise, Judge Link could

reasonably prohibit Mahan from selling the animals  for

less than fair market value.

          Because  Alaska Equine Rescue was spending  a

considerable  amount of money to maintain  the  animals

for  each  day  that  their  final  ownership  remained

unsettled, it was reasonable for Judge Link to place  a

time limit on Mahans efforts to sell the animals.   And

finally,  it  was  reasonable for Judge  Link  to  give

Equine  Rescue a lien on the animals so that, if  Mahan

would  not or could not sell them for fair market value

within  the  time  allotted, Equine Rescue  would  gain

ownership  of  the  animals and Mahan  would  have  her

restitution debt reduced by their fair market value.

          One  might,  perhaps, debate whether  Alaskas

restitution  statutes actually authorize  a  sentencing

judge  to  place  this sort of lien on  the  defendants

property.  But Mahan does not address this issue.   She

argues  only  that  Judge  Links  order  constituted  a

forfeiture  a contention that we reject.

          Mahan  also complains that Judge Link refused

to  recognize her purported sale of the animals to RPM,

Inc.  on April 28, 2000 for the price of $13,375.   But

Judge  Link considered this issue and ultimately  ruled

that no sale had occurred.  Mahan does not address this

ruling  or  argue  why it is erroneous.   Moreover,  as

already explained, Judge Link eventually concluded that

the  animals (leaving aside the pigs) had a fair market

value  of  $20,000.  Under the terms of the  sentencing

order,  any  sale  of the animals for  less  than  this

amount would be void.



Whether  Mahans  restitution should be reduced  by  the
amount  of donations that Alaska Equine Rescue received
from members of the community


          Finally,  Mahan  claims that her  restitution

obligation  should  be  reduced  by  the  approximately

$20,000 in donations that Alaska Equine Rescue received

from  members of the community to help defray the  cost

of maintaining Mahans animals.

          Mahans  argument is facially appealing.   The

purpose of restitution is to make someone whole, not to

enrich   them.9   Because  members  of  the   community

responded  to  the call for help and donated  money  to

Alaska  Equine Rescue, there is a distinct  possibility

that the total money received by that organization  the

          donations, plus the amount that Mahan pays in

restitution   will more than offset the costs  incurred

by the organization and the foster families that Equine

Rescue enlisted to care for Mahans animals.

          On  the  other hand, it is unlikely that  the

people  who  donated  money  to  Alaska  Equine  Rescue

intended   for   their  donations  to   reduce   Mahans

restitution obligation.  It is more probable that these

people  intended  their  donations  to  accomplish  two

goals:   first, to make sure that Equine  Rescue  could

meet the current expenses of maintaining Mahans animals

until Mahan ultimately paid any restitution ordered  by

the  court; and second, to make sure that Equine Rescue

would  be  able  to bear the full cost  of  maintaining

Mahans  animals  even  if  Mahan  herself  never  fully

reimbursed the organization for its expenses.

          This  is not the first time that we have  had

to  decide  how  contributions to  crime  victims  from

members  of the community affect a defendants  duty  to

pay restitution.  In Demers v. State, 42 P.3d 1 (Alaska

App.  2002),  we addressed a different aspect  of  this

restitution  problem:   whether a  defendant  could  be

ordered  to  pay  restitution for  the  value  of  non-

monetary  donations (donations of goods  and  services)

made   by  members  of  the  community  to  offset   or

ameliorate the victims loss.  To the extent  that  such

non-monetary  donations reduce the  expenses  that  the

victim   would   otherwise   have   to   bear,    these

contributions  from  members  of  the  community  might

reasonably be considered part of the total social  cost

of  the  defendants crime.  Nevertheless, we  concluded

that  Alaskas restitution statutes do not  authorize  a

sentencing court to order a defendant to reimburse  the

value of these non-monetary contributions.10

          Mahans case presents a different issue.   The

          amount of costs occasioned by Mahans crime is not at

issue  or, more precisely, we have already upheld Judge

Links  valuation of these costs.  Rather, the  question

is  whether Mahans duty to repay these costs should  be

reduced  by the amount of monetary donations  that  the

victim has received from members of the community.

          As  we remarked above, the probable intent of

the  contributors was to make sure that  Alaska  Equine

Rescue  would  be able to bear the cost of  maintaining

Mahans   animals   even  if  Mahan  never   made   full

restitution  for the organizations expenses.   In  this

respect, the private contributors played much the  same

role as an insurance or indemnity company.  Because  of

this, we conclude that our decision in Dorris v. State,

656 P.2d 578 (Alaska App. 1982), provides the rule that

governs Mahans case.

          In Dorris, we upheld a restitution award even

though  the victim was insured for the loss  caused  by

the defendant.  We held that the sentencing court could

properly  order  the defendant to pay  the  restitution

even  though  the  victim might  be  obligated  (either

legally or morally) to turn over any extra money to the

insurance company.11

          Obviously, the private contributors  in  this

case  are  not  the legal equivalent  of  an  insurance

company   for they were not contractually obligated  to

reimburse  Alaska Equine Rescue for its expenses.   But

we  believe that the underlying principle is the  same:

when  the victim of a crime receives money from a third

party   either  contractual payments from an  insurance

company  or  voluntary donations from  members  of  the

public   this  money should not reduce  the  amount  of

restitution that the offender can be ordered to pay.

          We  note  that  Alaska Equine  Rescue  is  an

ongoing  non-profit organization, part of a nation-wide

          network of similar organizations whose goal is to

identify  and care for abused animals (and  secure  the

return of stolen animals).12  Although the impetus  for

the  private donations at issue here may have been  the

particular expenses caused by Mahans crime,  we  assume

that,  in  the event these donations exceeded expenses,

the  people who gave the money would want it to be used

for the continuing efforts of Alaska Equine Rescue,  or

refunded, rather than having it turned over to Mahan.

          Additionally,   as   we  noted   in   Dorris,

restitution  serves  two  goals:   not  only  restoring

victims,  but  also making defendants pay the  expenses

they  have  caused by their criminal  conduct.13   This

second  goal would not be served if defendants received

credit  for  money  that  crime victims  received  from

sympathetic  members of the community.   Under  such  a

rule, defendants would, in effect, be enriched by these

donations:   either  the  donations  would  reduce  the

amount  of the defendants unpaid restitution obligation

or,  if  the  defendant  had  already  satisfied  their

restitution obligation, the donated money would have to

be  turned over to the defendant to reimburse the extra

restitution   they   had  paid.   This   result   would

discourage the community from coming to the  aid  of  a

crime victim.

          For   these  reasons,  we  conclude  that   a

defendant  who  is  ordered to pay restitution  is  not

entitled  to  a  credit, an offset,  or  a  refund  for

monetary  donations received by the crime victim.   The

district court therefore properly denied Mahans request

to  have  her  restitution reduced by the approximately

$20,000 in donations that Alaska Equine Rescue received

from the community.



Conclusion


          The  judgement  of  the  district  court   is

AFFIRMED.

_______________________________
1 Id. (7th edition, 1999), p. 1603.

2  See Eagle Air, Inc. v. Corroon and Black / Dawson and Co.
of Alaska, Inc., 648 P.2d 1000, 1006 (Alaska 1982).

3  See  Pauley v. Anchorage School District, 31  P.3d  1284,
1285  (Alaska  2001); Puhlman v. Turner, 874 P.2d  291,  292
(Alaska 1994); Adoption of N.P.S., 868 P.2d 934, 936 (Alaska
1994).

4  See  D.M. v. Div. of Family and Youth Services, 995  P.2d
205, 207 (Alaska 2000).

5  This  is  the preferred course of action.  See  Wylie  v.
State,  797  P.2d  651,  656 (Alaska App.  1990),  where  we
endorsed  the  rule  that, generally speaking,  motions  for
change  of venue based on pre-trial publicity should not  be
decided until jury selection has been attempted.

6 Id. at 1175.

7  See  Marino  v. State, 934 P.2d 1321, 1327  (Alaska  App.
1997)  (defendant  proceeded to trial  without  demanding  a
ruling  on  his discovery request); Erickson v.  State,  824
P.2d  725, 733 (Alaska App. 1991) (defendant failed to press
the  trial judge for a ruling on his motion to suppress  his
statements to the police); Jonas v. State, 773 P.2d 960, 963
(Alaska  App.  1989) (defendant proceeded to  trial  without
demanding   a   ruling  on  his  motion  for  a  psychiatric
evaluation of the complaining witness).

8 See Petersen v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York, 803
P.2d  406,  410  (Alaska 1990) (when a claim is  given  only
cursory treatment in a partys brief, the appellate court can
deem the point waived and not consider it).

9  See  Demers  v.  State, 42 P.3d 1, 3 (Alaska  App.  2002)
(Mannheimer, J., concurring) (The aim of restitution  is  to
restore  victims  to  their financial condition  before  the
crime.).

10   See id. at 2.

11   See id. at 583-84.

12                          See,                       e.g.,
http://www.equinerescue.com/staterescues.html .

13   See Dorris, 656 P.2d at 584.