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Pearce v. State (4/19/2002) ap-1799

Pearce v. State (4/19/2002) ap-1799

                             NOTICE
     The  text  of this opinion can be corrected before  the
     opinion  is published in the Pacific Reporter.  Readers
     are  encouraged to bring typographical or other  formal
     errors  to  the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate
     Courts:

             303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska  99501
                      Fax:  (907) 264-0878
       E-mail:  corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA


DEWELL WAYNE PEARCE,          )
                              )              Court of Appeals No.
A-7445
                                             Appellant,         )
Trial Court No. 3VA-94-139 Cr.
                              )
                  v.          )
                              )                       O  P  I   N
I  O  N
STATE OF ALASKA,              )
                              )
                                             Appellee.          )
[No. 1799    April 19, 2002]
                              )


          Appeal  from the Superior Court,  Third  Judi
          cial District, Valdez, Joel H. Bolger, Judge.

          Appearances:   J. Randall Luffberry,  Palmer,
          for Appellant.  Douglas H. Kossler, Assistant
          Attorney    General,   Office   of    Special
          Prosecutions  and  Appeals,  Anchorage,   and
          Bruce  M. Botelho, Attorney General,  Juneau,
          for Appellee.

          Before:   Coats, Chief Judge, and  Mannheimer
          and Stewart, Judges.

          MANNHEIMER, Judge.


          In  the  summer of 1994, Dewell Wayne Pearce  tried  to

abduct  a young woman at gunpoint.  He was subsequently convicted

of  attempted  kidnapping, third-degree assault, and third-degree

weapons   misconduct  (felon  in  possession  of  a   concealable

firearm).1

          In  this appeal, Pearce argues that the superior  court

          should have suppressed one piece of the States evidence:  an

apparent suicide note, handwritten by Pearce, that was discovered

on  his  boat  during  the execution of a  search  warrant.   The

warrant  authorized  the  police to  search  for  a  handgun  and

holster,  ammunition, and possible photographs  of  the  handgun.

Pearce  points out that the handwritten note did not fall  within

any of these categories, and he therefore argues that the officer

who  found the note violated Pearces privacy rights when he  read

the note (and, after reading it, seized it).

          We  reject  Pearces argument because  the  trial  judge

found that Pearce had no subjective expectation of privacy in the

note, and that finding is not clearly erroneous.



     Underlying facts
     

               On  July  21, 1994, a young woman, L.W.,  was

     rollerblading alongside the Richardson Highway  between

     Valdez  and  Glennallen.  A faded red Chevrolet  pickup

     truck  passed  her, then turned around and  passed  her

     again.  On this second pass, the driver  Pearce   asked

     L.W.  how  far she intended to skate.  Pearce proceeded

     down the highway, then turned around and passed L.W.  a

     third  time.  Finally, Pearce turned around and  passed

     L.W.  a  fourth time.  This fourth time, Pearce stopped

     his  truck  in  front of L.W., pointed a  long-barreled

     revolver at her, and ordered her to get into the truck;

     Pearce  threatened to kill L.W. if she did not  comply.

     L.W.  stalled  for time.  When she saw another  vehicle

     approaching, she skated toward it.  Pearce  fled  while

     L.W. was flagging down this other car.

          Having reached safety, L.W. immediately wrote

down the portion of the red trucks license plate number

that  she  remembered:  4 6 7 3.   Using  this  partial

number  and L.W.s description of the truck, the  police

located   Pearces  truck  later  that  evening   in   a

subdivision  outside Valdez.  However, the  police  did

not  find  Pearce,  for  he had left  on  an  overnight

fishing trip.  Pearce was arrested on his boat after he

returned the next day.

          L.W.  identified Pearces truck as  the  truck

that  had  followed  her  on  the  highway.   She  also

positively identified Pearce from a photographic  line-

up.



The discovery of the apparent suicide note


          As  part  of the investigation of this  case,

the  superior court issued a search warrant for Pearces

boat.  This warrant authorized the police to search for

the revolver  and holster, ammunition for the revolver,

and any photographs depicting the revolver.

          While  searching  for  these  items,  Trooper

Burke Waldron examined a duffel bag that was resting on

a  dinette  table in the boat.  When he picked  up  the

duffel bag, he saw a handwritten note lying face-up  on

the   table,  underneath  where  the  duffel  had  been

resting.   This  note consisted of one  8-  by  11-inch

sheet of paper, filled with handwriting large enough to

cover the whole page.  The note read:

     
     Dearest Mom, Dad, & Granny,
          I  Love  you with all my heart.   Please
     forgive me for taking my own life, but I just
     had  too.  I Hope to see you in Heaven.  Tell
     the family that my last thoughts were of you.
     My Heart goes out to you.
                              Love Wayne
     [xxx  xxx  xxxx]2
     My Folks
     Please Call them
     
Waldron  read  the  note and  concluded  that

Pearces  apparent suicide threat was relevant

to  the criminal investigation.  He therefore

seized the note.



The litigation of Pearces motion to suppress the note


     Before trial, Pearce asked the superior court

to  suppress  the handwritten note,  arguing  that

Waldrons seizure of the note was not authorized by

the  warrant.  The State responded that  the  note

was  found  in  plain view and that its  potential

importance  (as  an indication of  Pearces  guilty

conscience) was evident from a cursory reading.

     Superior  Court  Judge pro  tempore  Joel  H.

Bolger held a hearing on Pearces motion.  Only one

witness   testified  at  this  hearing:    Trooper

Waldron.   He described his discovery of the  note

and his decision to seize it after he read it.

     Pearces  attorney  did not  actively  dispute

Waldrons   version  of  events,  but   he   argued

strenuously  that Waldron exceeded  his  authority

under  the  warrant when he read  the  handwritten

note.   The  defense  attorney  pointed  out  that

Waldron   could   immediately   see   that    this

handwritten note was neither a handgun, a holster,

ammunition, or a photograph (i.e., that  the  note

was  not  among  the items listed  in  the  search

warrant).  The defense attorney argued that, under

the   plain   view   exception  to   the   warrant

requirement,  the  State  must  prove   that   the

relevance  of  the unlisted item  was  immediately

apparent   to   the   police.   Pearces   attorney

contended  that  the relevance of the  handwritten

note  was  not  immediately apparent  because,  as

Waldron  conceded on the stand, it took him  about

five seconds to read the note and realize that  it

spoke   of  suicide.   According  to  the  defense

attorney,  Waldrons  act  of  reading   the   note

constituted    an   additional   and   warrantless

intrusion into Pearces privacy.

     After  hearing Waldrons testimony (and  after

examining  the note), Judge Bolger denied  Pearces

motion on several grounds.

          Judge  Bolger  concluded that Pearce  had  no

subjective  expectation of privacy in  the  note.   The

judge pointed out that the note was found lying face-up

on  a table in Pearces boat.  Additionally, even though

the  main portion of the note was addressed to  members

of  Pearces  family,  the closing notation   i.e.,  the

telephone  number  and the request, My  Family;  Please

Call them  was clearly addressed to whoever happened to

find  the note.  From this, Judge Bolger concluded that

Pearce  left the note on the boat, hoping and expecting

that  it  would be discovered and read by one  or  more

third persons.

          This  finding was sufficient, by  itself,  to

justify  Judge  Bolgers denial of  Pearces  suppression

motion.  However, Judge Bolger also concluded that  the

handwritten  note  was seizable under  the  plain  view

exception  to  the  warrant  requirement.   The   judge

pointed out that Waldron was executing a search warrant

on  Pearces  boat,  and the judge  found  that  it  was

reasonable for Waldron to examine the duffel bag  as  a

potential  place for finding the items  listed  in  the

warrant.   Pearces handwritten note was  revealed  when

Waldron lifted the duffel bag from the table; thus,  it

lawfully  came  into  Waldrons  view.   Finally,  Judge

Bolger ruled that Waldrons act of reading the note  was

not an additional search for Fourth Amendment purposes.



The evidence supports Judge Bolgers finding that Pearce
had   no  subjective  expectation  of  privacy  in  the
handwritten note


          Before  a person can complain of a search  or

seizure  conducted by the government, the  person  must

establish that they had a protected privacy interest in

whatever   was  searched  or  seized.   The  test   for

assessing  whether  a  person has a  protected  privacy

interest  (for search and seizure purposes)  was  first

enunciated  by  Justice John Harlan in  his  concurring

opinion in Katz v. United States:

     
[T]here  is  a twofold requirement,  first[,]
that   a  person  have  exhibited  an  actual
(subjective)  expectation  of  privacy   and,
second,  that  the expectation  be  one  that
society   is   prepared   to   recognize   as
reasonable.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361;  88

S.Ct. 507, 516; 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 588 (1967).

          In  Smith  v. State, 510 P.2d  793,

797  (Alaska 1973), the Alaska Supreme  Court

adopted this test as the appropriate standard

for  determining what constitutes a protected

privacy    interest    under    the    Alaska

Constitution.   Thus,  Pearces  rights  under

both  the federal and the state constitutions

hinge on whether (1) he subjectively expected

the  handwritten note to remain private,  and

(2)  if  so,  whether  that  expectation  was

reasonable.

          Typically, litigation in this  area

commences   with   the  assumption   or   the

unrebutted  proof that the  defendant  had  a

subjective expectation of privacy in the item

searched or seized; the disputed question  is

whether the defendants expectation of privacy

was  reasonable.  Pearces case is  different.

Here, Judge Bolger found that Pearce did  not

expect   the  handwritten  note   to   remain

private.

          If  this  finding is  upheld,  then

Pearce  loses  this  appeal   regardless   of

whether  the note was independently  seizable

under the plain view exception to the warrant

requirement.   The search or  seizure  of  an

object, even from a defendants house or boat,

does   not  violate  the  defendants   Fourth

Amendment  rights  if the defendant  can  not

demonstrate  a protected privacy interest  in

that  object.   As the United States  Supreme

Court said in Katz,


[T]he  Fourth Amendment protects people,  not
places.   What a person knowingly exposes  to
the  public, even in his own home or  office,
is   not   a   subject  of  Fourth  Amendment
protection.

389  U.S. at 351, 88 S.Ct. at 511, 19 L.Ed.2d

at  582.  Thus, if Pearce lacked a subjective

expectation  of  privacy in  the  handwritten

note, the troopers act of reading and seizing

the  note  did  not  violate  Pearces  Fourth

Amendment rights.

          As   noted  above,  the  defendants

subjective   expectation   of   privacy    is

typically not disputed, and so this court  is

most  often  asked  to  determine  whether  a

subjective   expectation   of   privacy   was

reasonable.  This is a question of law  which

we  decide  de novo.  But whether a defendant

indeed   had  a  subjective  expectation   of

privacy is a question of fact.  Because  this

is  a question of fact, we defer to the trial

judges  finding.  In Dye v. State,  650  P.2d

418, 420 n.5 (Alaska App. 1982), we held that

a  trial judges finding on this issue will be

affirmed  on  appeal unless  the  finding  is

clearly erroneous.  Federal courts follow the

same rule.3

          On appeal, Pearce acknowledges that

Judge  Bolger found that he had no subjective

expectation  of privacy with respect  to  the

handwritten  note,  but  Pearce  argues  that

Judge Bolgers finding was really only a guess

and   that  the  judges  conclusion  is   not

supported by the evidence.  We disagree.

          Although  the main portion  of  the

note  is  a letter to Pearces relatives,  the

last  portion of the note is addressed to  an

unknown audience  indicating that Pearce  did

not expect his family to be the first readers

of  the  note.  As Judge Bolger pointed  out,

Pearces  concluding notation  his  plea  that

the reader(s) of the note call his family  is

strong  evidence  that  Pearce  expected  and

hoped  that other people would find the note,

read  it, and forward his message.  The  fact

that  Pearce placed the note on the table  of

his  boat,  rather  than mailing  it  to  his

family or taking other steps to hide it  from

the  eyes  of  strangers, corroborates  Judge

Bolgers  conclusion that  Pearce  wanted  the

note to be found and read by third parties.

          Pearce   presents  an   alternative

argument  in which he likens his  note  to  a

will.   That is, Pearce argues that  even  if

Judge  Bolger could reasonably conclude  that

he expected other people to read his note, he

did  not intend for the note to be read until

after  he was dead, and thus he still  had  a

subjective expectation of privacy in the note

while he lived.

          This is an intriguing argument, but

again  we  must uphold Judge Bolgers  finding

unless  it  is shown to be clearly erroneous.

Pearces  argument fails because it  rests  on

viewing the facts in the light most favorable

to Pearce.

          First, Pearces argument is premised

on  the assumption that the handwritten  note

reflected  Pearces honest intention  to  kill

himself.   No  evidence was offered  on  this

point  at  the  pre-trial hearing,  and  this

conclusion  is not self-evident.  People  who

are  being  investigated for  serious  crimes

have  been known to stage an apparent suicide

in an attempt to deceive the authorities into

abandoning  the investigation.  For  example,

in  Sharp v. State, 837 P.2d 718 (Alaska App.

1992),   a   defendant  accused  of  sexually

abusing  several  minors  fled  Alaska  after

manufacturing   an   apparent   suicide    in

Turnagain Arm.4  (Sharp enlisted his  parents

as  accomplices in this endeavor:   see  Jean

and   Homer  Sharp  v.  State,  Alaska   App.

Memorandum   Opinion  No.  2370  (March   11,

1992)).

          The  evidence presented at  Pearces

pre-trial  hearing  was consistent  with  the

possibility that Pearces note was part  of  a

similar plan  a scheme in which Pearce  would

disappear  and  his  note  would   lead   the

authorities to conclude that he had committed

suicide  in  the ocean.  If this was  Pearces

intention  when he penned the note,  then  he

obviously  intended people to read  the  note

well before his death.

          Alternatively, Pearces  note  might

have been a cry for help  not a reflection of

a  true intent to kill himself, but rather  a

way of getting people to notice his distress.

But a cry for help works only if other people

hear   the   cry.    Thus,   this   alternate

interpretation  of  the  note  also  supports

Judge  Bolgers conclusion that Pearce  wanted

people  to read the note and, thus,  that  he

had no subjective expectation of privacy.

          But  even if Pearces note reflected

an  honest  intention to kill himself,  Judge

Bolgers finding that Pearce had no subjective

expectation of privacy in the note  is  still

supported by the evidence.  Taking the  words

of the note at face value, Pearce intended to

kill himself and he wanted his family to know

that  he  still loved them.  It  is  possible

that, after Pearce left the note in his boat,

his  plan to kill himself was delayed  or  he

ultimately  repented  the  idea  of  suicide.

Nevertheless, the evidence still supports the

inference that Pearce wrote the note and then

purposefully left it where other people would

find  it  and read it.  There was no evidence

that  he ever took steps to retrieve the note

and re-assert his privacy interests.

          At   trial,   Pearce   offered    a

different  explanation of the  note.   Pearce

testified  that  he wrote  the  note  several

months   earlier,   when   he   was   feeling

despondent   over   the  breakdown   of   his

marriage.   But  Pearce did  not  offer  this

testimony  to  Judge Bolger at the  pre-trial

hearing,  nor did Pearce ask Judge Bolger  to

re-open   the  suppression  issue  after   he

offered   this  alternative  explanation   at

trial.  Moreover, we are obliged to view  the

evidence in the light most favorable to Judge

Bolgers  ruling,  not  the  light  that  best

undermines it.5

          In  conclusion, the evidence  amply

supports  Judge Bolgers finding  that  Pearce

lacked a subjective expectation of privacy in

the  handwritten  note that  Trooper  Waldron

found  on the boat.  We therefore uphold  the

judges  finding.  And because Pearce  had  no

subjective   expectation   of   privacy,   we

conclude that Waldrons reading and seizure of

this  note  did  not violate  Pearces  Fourth

Amendment rights.

          Given   our  disposition  of   this

issue,  we need not reach these other  issues

briefed   by   the  parties:    (1)   Pearces

assertion  that Waldron picked  up  the  note

from the table to bring it within comfortable

reading  distance and, by doing so,  exceeded

the  limits of plain view (an issue that was,

in  any  case,  not preserved);  (2)  Pearces

assertion  that Waldrons act of  reading  the

note  (as  opposed  to merely  observing  it)

exceeded  the limits of plain view;  and  (3)

the  States  assertion that even  if  Waldron

violated  Pearces Fourth Amendment rights  by

reading  the  note,  any error  was  harmless

beyond  a  reasonable doubt, given the  minor

role  that  this evidence played  at  Pearces

trial.



Conclusion


     The  judgement  of  the  superior  court   is

AFFIRMED.



_______________________________
     1   AS   11.41.300(a)(1)(C),  AS  11.41.220(a)(1),  and   AS
11.61.200(a)(1), respectively.

2  In  the  original  note,  this bracketed  material  is  a
telephone  number.   We  have  masked  the  digits  of  this
telephone number to preserve the privacy of Pearces family.

3 See United States v. Hayes, 120 F.3d 739, 743 (8th Cir.
1997);  United  States v. Garzon, 119 F.3d  1446,  1449
(10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Taylor, 90 F.3d 903,
908  (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Blanco, 844 F.2d
344, 349 (6th Cir. 1988).

4 See id. at 720.

5 See Schaffer v. State, 988 P.2d 610, 612 (Alaska App.
1999).