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State v. Superior Court (02/01/2002) ap-1786
State v. Superior Court (02/01/2002) ap-1786
NOTICE
The text of this opinion can be corrected before the
opinion is published in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
encouraged to bring typographical or other formal errors to the
attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts:
303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501
Fax: (907) 264-0878
E-mail: corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
STATE OF ALASKA, )
) Court of Appeals No. A-7843
Appellant, ) Trial Court No. 1KE-96-1066 Cr.
)
v. )
) O P I N I O N
SUPERIOR COURT, )
)
Appellee. ) [No. 1786 February 1, 2002]
)
)
LARRY A. REED, )
)
Real Party in Interest.
)
)
Appeal from the Superior Court, First Judicial
District, Ketchikan, Michael A. Thompson, Judge.
Appearances: W. H. Hawley, Jr., Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals,
Anchorage, and Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney General, Juneau, for
Appellant. Michael P. Heiser, Ketchikan, for the real party in
interest, Larry A. Reed.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer and
Stewart, Judges.
MANNHEIMER, Judge.
In late 1996, Steven Reed was charged with stalking and
kidnapping his former girlfriend. Reed's father, Larry A. Reed,
posted a $10,000 cash bond to secure his son's pre-trial release.
This bond was both an "appearance" bond and a "performance" bond.
That is, the money could be forfeited not only if Steven Reed failed
to appear in court when required, but also if Steven failed to
comply with the other conditions of his release.
In January 1997, Steven Reed violated the conditions of
his release by leaving his father's immediate presence and by
consuming alcohol. Based on these violations, the State asked the
superior court to order forfeiture of the $10,000 posted by Larry
A. Reed. In April, the court ordered forfeiture of $5000 (i.e.,
one-half of the bond).
Approximately three years later, in Lonis v. State, 998
P.2d 441 (Alaska App. 2000), this court ruled that the Alaska
legislature had not authorized "performance" bonds. That is, we
concluded that the legislature had authorized forfeiture of bail
only for a defendant's failure to appear in court as required, and
had not authorized forfeiture of bail for a defendant's non-
compliance with the other conditions of release. [Fn. 1]
Our decision in Lonis became final on July 18, 2000 (the
day after the supreme court denied hearing). [Fn. 2] Ten days
later, on July 28th, Larry A. Reed filed a motion asking the
superior court to refund the previously forfeited $5000. The
superior court granted Reed's motion under the authority of Alaska
Civil Rule 60(b)(4), which empowers the court to grant relief from
a void judgement. The State now appeals.
The State first argues that Civil Rule 60(b) does not
authorize relief in this case because the forfeiture of Reed's money
occurred in a criminal prosecution. From this fact, the State
concludes that the litigation over Reed's money is criminal in
nature, not civil, and therefore the Civil Rules do not apply.
Litigation can not always be neatly categorized as either
"criminal" or "civil". See, for example, State v. Clayton, 584 P.2d
1111 (Alaska 1978), in which the supreme court held that traffic
infractions are "quasi-criminal" that is, non-criminal, but
generally governed by the rules of criminal procedure. Although
bail forfeiture litigation will almost always arise from criminal
prosecutions, we conclude that bail forfeiture litigation is
governed by the rules of civil procedure.
First, forfeiture of bail does not hinge on whether the
defendant in the criminal case is ultimately found guilty or
innocent. Rather, the sole question is whether the defendant
complied with the conditions of their release. This issue is
litigated under a "preponderance of the evidence" standard. [Fn. 3]
And the person whose money is at risk is entitled to litigate this
issue in their own right, regardless of whether the defendant in the
criminal case desires to oppose the forfeiture. [Fn. 4]
Second, an order directing the forfeiture of bail is not
treated as just another mid-litigation decision in the criminal
prosecution. Instead, Criminal Rule 41 refers to the order as a
"judgment", and the court's decision is deemed a final order for
purposes of appeal. Criminal Rules 41(h)(3) and 41(i)(5) both state
that when a court orders forfeiture of bail, "[a]n appeal may be
taken from the judgment of forfeiture in the manner of other
appeals". That is, the person who has suffered forfeiture of their
money can appeal the forfeiture regardless of how or when the
underlying criminal case ends, and the deadline for filing this
appeal is calculated from the distribution date of the judgement of
forfeiture. This makes sense because, with respect to the person
whose money has been forfeited, the court's order resolves that
person's rights and ends the litigation.
For these reasons, we conclude that bail forfeiture
litigation is primarily civil in nature. It may be that, because
the litigation arises in the context of a criminal prosecution,
certain civil rules should not apply. However, we hold that Civil
Rule 60(b) applies to bail forfeiture litigation, giving the trial
court the authority to grant relief from judgements of forfeiture.
The State alternatively argues that even if Civil Rule
60(b) is applicable to bail forfeiture litigation, the superior
court was mistaken in granting relief under subsection (b)(4) of
that rule. Subsection (b)(4) authorizes a court to grant relief
from a "void" judgement. The State argues that the judgement of
forfeiture entered against Larry Reed was not "void" within the
meaning of Rule 60(b).
Generally speaking, a judgement is "void" for purposes of
Civil Rule 60(b)(4) "if the court that entered the judgment was
without jurisdiction to act, or if that court acted in a manner
inconsistent with due process of law." [Fn. 5]
It would seem that this test is plainly met here. The
superior court ordered forfeiture of Reed's money because Reed's son
failed to comply with the conditions of his pre-trial release. In
Lonis, we ruled that Alaska's bail statutes did not authorize this
type of forfeiture. Thus, the superior court lacked jurisdiction
to issue the judgement of forfeiture or, alternatively, Reed was
denied due process when the court issued an order that exceeded its
statutory powers.
The State argues, however, that the superior court had
jurisdiction to issue the judgement of forfeiture. The State points
out that, under AS 22.10.020(a), the superior court is vested with
plenary jurisdiction in all criminal matters and, under AS
12.30.020(a), the court is given broad authority to fashion
conditions of release in criminal cases.
What the State says is true, but it is beside the point.
"Jurisdiction" is a term that performs yeoman service; it refers to
many different legal concepts. This multiplicity of meanings can
sometimes engender ambiguity or confusion. Here, the pertinent
issue is not the superior court's authority to entertain criminal
litigation, nor the court's authority to formulate and impose
conditions governing a criminal defendant's release. Rather, the
question is whether the superior court had the authority to order
forfeiture of bail if a defendant failed to comply with the
conditions of release (apart from the obligation to appear in
court). In other words, the question is whether the superior court
had subject-matter jurisdiction to grant the bail forfeiture that
the State requested. Here, the term "subject-matter jurisdiction"
refers to the court's "power to issue a decree [granting] the type
of relief sought". [Fn. 6]
The State asked the superior court to issue a judgement
directing forfeiture of Larry Reed's bail money based on the
assertions that Reed's son violated the conditions of his release
by consuming alcohol and by leaving Reed's immediate custody. But
the question of the superior court's subject-matter jurisdiction
does not turn on whether the State proved these particular
assertions. Rather, "subject-matter jurisdiction" refers to the
superior court's abstract authority to issue this kind of judgement.
We say "abstract authority" because we are not dealing with
whether the court correctly determined the facts of Reed's case or
correctly applied the rules of procedure when presiding over his
particular bail forfeiture hearing. Instead, the issue is whether
the court would be wrong to issue such a judgement no matter what
evidence was presented. The superior court would lack subject-
matter jurisdiction only if, regardless of the circumstances, the
court had no authority to order forfeiture of bail based on proof
that the defendant violated a condition of release apart from the
obligation to appear in court.
That is the case here. In Lonis, we construed the bail
statutes in effect at the time that this case was litigated in the
superior court, and we concluded that the Alaska Legislature had not
authorized courts to order forfeiture of bail for a defendant's
violation of the conditions of release other than failure to appear.
Thus, the superior court had no statutory authority to order
forfeiture of Larry Reed's money even if the State proved its
allegations.
The Alaska Supreme Court has held that relief is available
under Civil Rule 60(b)(4) when a court or administrative agency acts
beyond its statutory powers. For instance, in Standifer v. State,
3 P.3d 925 (Alaska 2000), the Alaska Supreme Court held that,
following the discharge of a loan in bankruptcy, a state court is
deprived of subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce a judgement
arising from that loan and thus the debtor could obtain relief
from the court's order under Civil Rule 60(b)(4). [Fn. 7]
Similarly, in Department of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Div.
v. Maxwell, 6 P.3d 733 (Alaska 2000), the court indicated that a
judgement for past-due child support would be void, and thus subject
to attack under Civil Rule 60(b)(4), if the Child Support
Enforcement Agency had lacked statutory authority to issue the
original child support order. [Fn. 8]
As the supreme court stated in Dewey v. Dewey, 969 P.2d
1154 (Alaska 1999),
The question [is whether] the tribunal's
excess of authority was plain or has seriously disturbed the
distribution of governmental powers or has infringed a fundamental
constitutional protection.
Id. at 1161 (quoting Perry v. Newkirk, 871 P.2d 1150, 1155 (Alaska
1994)).
Turning to the present case, the question is whether,
under any possible evidence that the State might present, the
superior court had the statutory authority to order forfeiture of
bail for a defendant's violation of the conditions of release (other
than the obligation to appear in court). Although the legislature
has since granted this power to the superior court, the answer at
the time this case was litigated was "no". We held in Lonis that
the court had no statutory authority to forfeit a defendant's bail
for this type of misconduct. The superior court therefore exceeded
its statutory powers when it ordered forfeiture of Reed's money.
Accordingly, the court's judgement was "void" for purposes of Civil
Rule 60(b)(4), and Reed was entitled to seek relief under that rule.
The final question is whether, in addition to setting
aside the judgement of forfeiture, the superior court could order
the State to refund Reed's money. The answer is found in this
court's decision in State v. Stein, 806 P.2d 346 (Alaska App. 1991).
In Stein, the defendant was convicted of commercial
fishing in closed waters. The State chose to prosecute Stein's case
as a non-criminal "violation" under Beran v. State, 705 P.2d 1280
(Alaska App. 1985). After Stein was convicted, the district court
fined him $1000. [Fn. 9] But the following year, in Constantine
v. State, 739 P.2d 188, 190 (Alaska App. 1987), this court ruled
that the maximum fine for this type of violation was $300. Based
on Constantine, Stein asked for a refund of the extra $700.
Legal authorities offer conflicting views on whether a
refund is appropriate under such circumstances. But after reviewing
these conflicting authorities, this court upheld Stein's refund:
We have carefully reviewed cases cited by the
parties dealing with the appropriateness of granting restitution in
cases where citizens pay illegal fines. We are persuaded that Stein
should receive restitution of the fine he paid in excess of $300.
See United States v. Lewis, 342 F.Supp. 833 (E.D. La. 1972), aff'd,
478 F.2d 835 (5th Cir.1973); Constantine, 739 P.2d at 190. As the
[federal district] court pointed out in Lewis:
The Fifth Amendment prohibition against
the taking of one's property without due process of law demands no
less than the full restitution of a fine that was levied pursuant
to a conviction based on an unconstitutional law. Fairness and
equity compel this result, and a citizen has the right to expect as
much from his government, notwithstanding the fact that the
government and the court were proceeding in good faith at the time
of prosecution.
342 F.Supp. at 836.
In this case, Stein paid an illegal fine
under a valid statute. There is no question that Stein's conviction
was valid, and that the court could legally impose a fine.
Nevertheless, the fine actually imposed exceeded the amount the
legislature had permitted. We recognize that some courts have
refused restitution under similar circumstances, in reliance on the
rule that a payment voluntarily made pursuant to a mistake of law
is not recoverable. See, e.g., Prilliman v. City of Canon City, 146
Colo. 159, 360 P.2d 812 (1961). We are satisfied that this rule
should not be adopted in this jurisdiction. In our view, the
principles of equity favor Stein and persuade us to affirm the
[order granting him a refund].
Stein, 806 P.2d at 347.
We find that Stein is applicable to the present case as
well. Here, the superior court took $5000 of Reed's money and gave
it to the State of Alaska. We later ruled in Lonis that the court
had no statutory authority to do this. As was true in Stein, the
constitutional prohibition against the taking of property without
due process of law demands no less than full restitution of the
money taken from Reed without statutory authority. As we said in
Stein (quoting the federal court in Lewis), "Fairness and equity
compel this result, and a citizen has the right to expect as much
from his government, notwithstanding the fact that the government
and the court were proceeding in good faith at the time". [Fn. 10]
For these reasons, the superior court's order directing
the State of Alaska to refund Larry Reed's money is AFFIRMED.
FOOTNOTES
Footnote 1:
See id. at 444-45.
Footnote 2:
See Lonis v. State, Supreme Court File No. 9634. See also
Alaska Appellate Rules 507(b) and 512(a)(2)[b] which, in
conjunction, state that a decision of this court becomes final on
the day after the supreme court denies a petition for hearing.
Footnote 3:
See Criminal Rules 41(h)(3) and 41(i)(5).
Footnote 4:
See Criminal Rules 41(h)(2)-(3) and 41(i)(3)-(4).
Footnote 5:
Department of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Div. v.
Maxwell, 6 P.3d 733, 736 (Alaska 2000).
Footnote 6:
Black's Law Dictionary (7th edition, 1999), pp. 855 & 857
(combining the definitions of "jurisdiction" and "subject-matter
jurisdiction").
Footnote 7:
See id. at 928.
Footnote 8:
See id. at 736.
Footnote 9:
See Stein, 806 P.2d at 346.
Footnote 10:
Stein, 806 P.2d at 347 (quoting Lewis, 342 F.Supp. at 836).
