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Hill v State (09/28/2001) ap-1766
Hill v State (09/28/2001) ap-1766
NOTICE
The text of this opinion can be corrected before the
opinion is published in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
encouraged to bring typographical or other formal errors to the
attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts:
303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501
Fax: (907) 264-0878
E-mail: corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
SEAN R. HILL, )
) Court of Appeals No. A-7803
Appellant, ) Trial Court No. 4FA-S96-2323 CR
)
v. )
) O P I N I O N
STATE OF ALASKA, )
)
Appellee. ) [No. 1766 September 28, 2001]
)
Appeal from the Three-Judge Sentencing Panel of
the Superior Court, Donald D. Hopwood, Larry D. Card, and Michael
I. Jeffery, Judges.
Appearances: Dick L. Madson, Law Offices of
Dick L. Madson, Fairbanks, for Appellant. Jeffrey O'Bryant,
Assistant District Attorney, Harry L. Davis, District Attorney,
Fairbanks, and Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney General, Juneau, for
Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer and
Stewart, Judges.
STEWART, Judge.
In November 1997, Sean R. Hill was convicted of
manslaughter and sentenced by a three-judge sentencing panel to 6
years in prison. In addition, under the authority of AS
28.15.181(b), the three-judge panel revoked Hill's driver's license
for life. [Fn. 1]
Following Hill's release from prison in May 2000, he asked
the three-judge panel to grant him a limited license under AS
28.15.201(a) so he could drive for work-related purposes. The
three-judge panel ruled that Hill's request was actually a motion
for sentence modification. Because Criminal Rule 35(b) specifies
that such motions must be filed within 180 days of the distribution
of the judgment, the three-judge panel denied Hill's request as
untimely.
We conclude that a court's decision to grant a limited
license under AS 28.15.201(a) does not constitute a modification of
a defendant's sentence within the meaning of Criminal Rule 35(b).
Rather, a sentencing court's power to grant a post-sentencing
request for a limited license under AS 28.15.201(a) is inherent in
the defendant's original sentence, much like a sentencing court's
power to modify a defendant's conditions of probation.
Under AS 28.15.201(a), when a court has revoked a
defendant's driver's license because of a conviction for
manslaughter (or for any other offense listed in AS 28.15.181(b)),
the court may, for good cause, grant the defendant a limited license
"that will enable the [defendant] to earn a livelihood without
excessive risk or danger to the public." Thus, Hill was seemingly
entitled to ask the three-judge panel to grant him a limited license
for work-related purposes. (AS 28.15.201(a) specifies that this
power to grant a limited license only exists if no other statute
prohibits the court from doing so. In Hill's case, no statute
prohibited the three-judge panel from granting Hill a limited
license.)
The three-judge panel refused to consider Hill's request
because the panel concluded the request amounted to a late-filed
motion for modification or reduction of Hill's sentence. But the
granting of Hill's request would not require the three-judge panel
to modify the terms of Hill's sentence. By the terms of AS
28.15.201, when a sentencing court has revoked a defendant's
driver's license under AS 28.15.181(b), the court retains continuing
supervision over the license. Alaska Statute 28.15.201(a)
authorizes a sentencing court to grant a defendant a limited license
for work-related purposes, but AS 28.15.201(c) clearly envisions
that this limited license will be of limited duration as well. This
subsection specifies that, following the termination of the limited
license, the defendant's license is again revoked. As we recognized
in Howell v. State, [Fn. 2] AS 28.15.201(a) "affirmatively vests the
courts with ongoing power to issue a limited license, provided that
issuance of such license is not prohibited under a provision of law
in effect when the limited license is requested[.]" [Fn. 3]
In other words, AS 28.15.201 establishes a sentencing
court's authority to repeatedly grant a limited license when a
defendant needs one to pursue a livelihood, but the statute also
provides that the defendant's license will return to its former
revoked status when the work-related need is ended. Impliedly, the
statute also authorizes a sentencing court to terminate a previously
granted limited license when later events convince the court that
allowing the defendant to drive, even for limited purposes, poses
"excessive risk or danger to the public."
These powers of the sentencing court are inherent in the
original judgment revoking the defendant's license under AS
28.15.181(b), just as a sentencing court's power to modify the
conditions of a defendant's probation are inherent in the original
judgment suspending imprisonment and imposing probation. The
sentencing court does not modify the judgment at least, does not
modify it in the sense contemplated by Criminal Rule 35(b) when
the court grants or rescinds a limited license under AS 28.15.201.
We therefore VACATE the order of the three-judge panel and
REMAND the case to the three-judge panel to consider Hill's request
for a limited license. We express no opinion as to whether that
request should be granted.
FOOTNOTES
Footnote 1:
AS 28.15.181(b) states: "A court convicting a person of
[manslaughter resulting from driving a motor vehicle] shall revoke
that person's driver's license ... for not less than 30 days[.]"
Footnote 2:
834 P.2d 1254 (Alaska App. 1992).
Footnote 3:
Id. at 1255.
