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Greinier v. State (2/16/01) ap-1724
Greinier v. State (2/16/01) ap-1724
NOTICE
Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal
precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the
Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of
Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not
be cited for any proposition of law, nor as an example of the proper
resolution of any issue.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
MICHELE A. GREINIER, )
) Court of Appeals No. A-7441
Appellant, ) Trial Court No. 1JU-99-185 Cr
)
v. )
) O P I N I O N
STATE OF ALASKA, )
)
Appellee. ) [No. 1724 February 16, 2001]
)
Appeal from the Superior Court, First Judicial
District, Juneau, Larry R. Weeks, Judge.
Appearances: Roger D. Snippen, Juneau, for
Appellant. Marcelle K. McDannel, Assistant Attorney General, Office
of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Bruce M.
Botelho, Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer and
Stewart, Judges.
MANNHEIMER, Judge.
Michele A. Greinier was romantically involved with Robert
Harris. On September 16, 1998, Harris broke the arm of their six-
month-old daughter, Sierra. Greinier took the baby to the hospital,
but she lied to medical personnel, and later the police, about how
the injury occurred. Greinier told them that her other child, a
three-year-old, was playing with Sierra and had caused the injury
to the baby's arm.
Based on these lies, Greinier was convicted of hindering
prosecution in the first-degree. [Fn. 1] The State's theory was
that Harris had committed a felony assault on Sierra and that
Greinier, through her deception, had obstructed the discovery and
investigation of that assault. Following a jury trial, Greinier was
convicted of this crime.
Sufficiency of the evidence
Greinier argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support her conviction. Under AS 11.56.770(a)(1), a defendant
commits the crime of first-degree hindering prosecution if the
defendant "renders assistance to a person who has committed a crime
punishable as a felony" and if the defendant renders that assistance
"with intent to hinder the apprehension, prosecution, conviction,
or punishment of that person".
Greinier concedes that her lies about how Sierra was
injured could constitute "assistance" for purposes of the statute.
[Fn. 2] However, she argues that the State presented insufficient
evidence that Harris committed a felony assault on Sierra.
Alternatively, Greinier argues that even if Harris did commit a
felony assault, the State failed to prove that Greinier's lies about
the cause of Sierra's injury were motivated by an intent to hinder
Harris's prosecution or punishment for this assault.
(a) The State's proof that Harris committed a felony
assault on the baby
To establish that Harris committed a felony assault on
Sierra, the State had to prove that Harris intentionally or
recklessly inflicted serious physical injury on the child, or that
Harris recklessly caused physical injury to the child and this
injury reasonably required medical treatment. [Fn. 3] At trial,
Greinier testified that Sierra's injury occurred while Greinier was
talking on the telephone, watching Harris and the baby from a few
feet away. According to Greinier, Harris was putting Sierra down
for a nap. Greinier declared that Sierra's arm was broken
unexpectedly when Harris rolled the baby over. Based on this
testimony, Greinier argues that there was insufficient evidence to
support the conclusion that Greinier knew or was aware of a
substantial probability [Fn. 4] that Harris had committed a felony-
level assault on Sierra.
But Greinier's argument hinges on viewing the evidence in
a light favorable to herself. We must view the evidence in the
light most favorable to upholding the jury's verdict. [Fn. 5]
Sierra sustained a spiral fracture of her arm. The State presented
evidence that such an injury is rare in children and generally
occurs when the arm is twisted with great force. Viewing the
medical testimony in the light most favorable to the State, it is
unlikely that such a fracture would result from turning a baby over.
Babies' arms are pliable, able to withstand considerable force, and
thus the baby would normally flip over before its arm would break.
To inflict such an injury, one would normally have to grab the
baby's forearm and twist with great force.
When this evidence is viewed in the light most favorable
to upholding the verdict, reasonable jurors could conclude that
Greinier was not truthful when she described how Sierra's arm was
broken. The jurors could reasonably conclude that Greinier knew
that Harris had intentionally or recklessly injured the child.
(b) Greinier's argument that she could not be
convicted absent proof that Harris was convicted of felony assault
on the baby
Greinier also argues that even if the evidence was
theoretically sufficient to prove that Harris committed a felony
assault on Sierra, the fact remains that Harris was never convicted
of a felony for his conduct. Although Harris was initially charged
with felony assault, he ultimately was convicted of misdemeanor
assault (fourth-degree assault) under a plea agreement with the
State. Greinier argues that a defendant can not lawfully be
convicted of first-degree hindering prosecution unless the person
who received the defendant's assistance is convicted of a felony.
Because no felony judgement was ever entered against Harris,
Greinier contends that she could not legally be convicted of first-
degree hindering prosecution even if the State presented sufficient
evidence to establish Harris's guilt of felony assault.
The language of the first-degree hindering statute does
not support Greinier's argument. Under AS 11.56.770(a), the State
must prove that the defendant rendered assistance "to a person who
has committed a crime punishable as a felony". The legislature's
use of the word "punishable" indicates that the legislature did not
intend to require proof that the person who committed the underlying
felony was actually prosecuted and convicted of the offense.
Indeed, the legislative commentary to this statute
contemplates that people who render aid to felons can be prosecuted
for hindering prosecution even when the person who committed the
underlying felony successfully evades justice. In its commentary,
the legislature declared that the level of a defendant's guilt (for
either first-degree or second-degree hindering) will depend on "the
class of crime committed by the fugitive". [Fn. 6]
Finally, Greinier's interpretation of the hindering
prosecution statute conflicts with one of the rules governing
vicarious criminal responsibility the rules that define when a
person can be prosecuted for a crime based on someone else's
conduct. AS 11.16.120(a)(2)(A) declares that when a defendant is
prosecuted "for an offense in which legal accountability is based
on the conduct of another person,
it is not a defense that ... the other person
has not been prosecuted for or convicted of an offense based on the
conduct in question[,] or has been convicted of a different offense
or [a different] degree of offense.
Thus, even though Harris was convicted of only misdemeanor assault,
Greinier could lawfully be convicted of felony-level hindering
prosecution under AS 11.56.770(a) if the State established that
Harris was in fact guilty of "a crime punishable as a felony".
(c) Greinier's argument that, even though she lied
about how her baby was injured, her intent was not to hide the
assault on the child, but rather to hide the fact that Harris was
present at her house in violation of his bail conditions
Two months before the assault on Greinier's baby daughter,
Harris committed an assault on Greinier herself. When Greinier's
six-year-old son intervened in an attempt to protect his mother,
Harris assaulted the boy too. Harris was arrested for these
assaults and was jailed pending trial.
Several weeks later, on September 11, 2000, Greinier
borrowed $1500 and helped to bail Harris out of jail. One of
Harris's conditions of release forbade him from having any contact
with Greinier. Greinier understood this, but she nevertheless
welcomed Harris back into her home. Five days later, Harris
assaulted the baby.
Greinier contends that when she lied to the hospital
personnel and the police about how Sierra was injured, her
motivation was to prevent the police from finding out that Harris
had violated the terms of his bail release by moving back in with
Greinier for if this became known, Harris would be sent back to
jail and Greinier might lose the $1500 bail money. Greinier argues
that if this was her motivation for lying, she could not be guilty
of hindering prosecution, for the offense of hindering prosecution
required the State to prove that Greinier lied "with intent to hinder
[Harris's] apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment" for
a criminal offense.
Greinier's argument is premised on the underlying
contention that the State was obliged to prove that she acted with
a single identifiable intent. But under AS 11.81.900(a)(1), "when
intentionally causing a particular result is an element of an
offense, that intent need not be the [defendant's] only objective".
Thus, even if the jury believed that Greinier lied to prevent the
revocation of Harris's bail release and the forfeiture of her $1500,
the jury could still lawfully convict Greinier of hindering
prosecution if they concluded that Greinier was also motivated by
an intent to hinder Harris's apprehension, prosecution, conviction,
or punishment for the assault on the baby.
As we explained above, the evidence was sufficient to
prove that Harris committed a felony assault on Sierra and that
Greinier knew this. This same evidence was likewise sufficient to
support the conclusion that Greinier lied to the hospital personnel
and the police in an effort to conceal Harris's commission of this
assault.
Greinier's due process argument
Greinier's final argument on appeal is that the State
violated her right to due process of law when it indicted her for
hindering prosecution. Greinier contends that her situation is
analogous to the legal conundrum faced by the defendants in
Gudmundson v. State. [Fn. 7]
The defendants in Gudmundson were hunters who killed a
sheep in an area that was closed to hunting. They then faced the
following dilemma: if they left the sheep where it was and returned
home, they would be guilty of wanton waste of game; but if they
retrieved the sheep and brought it back with them, they would be
guilty of transporting illegally-taken game. [Fn. 8] In other
words, no matter what course of action the defendants pursued, they
would commit another crime. The supreme court ruled that, under
these circumstances, the defendants' right to substantive due
process was violated when the State charged them with wanton waste.
[Fn. 9]
Greinier asserts that she faced the same unsolvable
dilemma. She notes that she invited Harris to come live with her
in violation of the conditions of his bail release. When Harris
returned to live with Greinier in violation of his bail condition,
he committed the crime of first-degree unlawful contact. [Fn.
10] Harris then assaulted Greinier's child. If Greinier accurately
reported how the baby's injury occurred, she would divulge
information (Harris's invited presence in her house) that the State
might later use to charge her as an accomplice to Harris's crime of
unlawful contact. And if Greinier lied about how the injury
occurred, she could be charged with hindering prosecution.
But this is not the same dilemma faced by the defendants
in Gudmundson. The essential problem in Gudmundson was that, no
matter how the hunters reacted to the situation, they would
inevitably commit a new crime in addition to their already-completed
crime of illegal hunting. Greinier did not face this problem.
True, if she told the truth about how her baby came to be injured,
her statements could conceivably be used to prove her complicity in
a previous crime (Harris's return to her home). [Fn. 11] But
Greinier would not commit a new crime by truthfully explaining how
her baby was injured, or by declining to explain how the injury
occurred. She would commit a new crime only if she lied (and if she
acted with the knowledge and intent required by the hindering
prosecution statute). [Fn. 12] We therefore conclude that
Greinier's indictment and conviction for hindering prosecution did
not violate her right to substantive due process.
Conclusion
The judgement of the superior court is AFFIRMED.
FOOTNOTES
Footnote 1:
AS 11.56.770(a).
Footnote 2:
See AS 11.56.770(b)(4).
Footnote 3:
See AS 11.41.200(a)(2), AS 11.41.210(a)(2), and AS
11.41.220(a)(1)(C)(i).
Footnote 4:
See AS 11.81.900(a)(2), the definition of "knowingly".
Footnote 5:
Dorman v. State, 622 P.2d 448, 453 (Alaska 1981); Silvernail
v. State, 777 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Alaska App. 1989).
Footnote 6:
1978 Senate Journal, Supp. No. 47 (June 12), p. 86 (emphasis
added).
Footnote 7:
822 P.2d 1328 (Alaska 1991).
Footnote 8:
See AS 16.30.010(a) (wanton waste of game) and 5 AAC 92.140
(transportation of illegally-taken game).
Footnote 9:
Gudmundson, 822 P.2d at 1333.
Footnote 10:
AS 11.56.750(a)(1)(B)(i).
Footnote 11:
But see AS 11.16.120(b)(1).
Footnote 12:
At the time of the events in this case, the offense of "failure
to report a violent crime committed against a child", AS 11.56.765,
had been enacted but had not taken effect.
