Touch N' Go®, the DeskTop In-and-Out Board makes your office run smoother. Visit
Touch N' Go's Website to see how.
Shearer v. Municipality of Anchorage (6/23/00) ap-1678
Shearer v. Municipality of Anchorage (6/23/00) ap-1678
NOTICE
The text of this opinion can be corrected before the
opinion is published in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
encouraged to bring typographical or other formal errors to the
attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts:
303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501
Fax: (907) 264-0878
E-mail: corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
DANIEL P. SHEARER )
) Court of Appeals No. A-7467
Appellant, ) Trial Court No. 3AN-M99-572 CR
)
v. ) O P I N I O N
)
MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, )
)
Appellee. ) [No. 1678 - June 23, 2000]
)
Appeal from the District Court, Third Judicial
District, Anchorage, Sigurd E. Murphy, Judge.
Appearances: Brent R. Cole, Anchorage, for
Appellant. Carmen E. ClarkWeeks, Assistant Municipal Prosecutor,
and Mary K. Hughes, Municipal Attorney, Anchorage, for Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer and
Stewart, Judges.
COATS, Chief Judge.
MANNHEIMER, Judge, dissenting.
Daniel Shearer was charged with one count of driving while
intoxicated (DWI). [Fn. 1] Shearer moved to suppress evidence on
the grounds that an off-duty police officer's encounter with Shearer
in his driveway constituted an invalid investigatory stop. After
District Court Judge Sigurd E. Murphy denied the motion, Shearer
pled no contest to, and was found guilty of, DWI. [Fn. 2] Shearer
appeals, claiming that Judge Murphy erred in denying the motion to
suppress evidence. We affirm.
On January 20, 1999, just after midnight, Anchorage Police
Officer Anthony Provost was driving toward the northbound Glenn
Highway exit on Muldoon Road when he observed a black Jeep Cherokee
pull out of a strip mall and partially obstruct the oncoming lane
of traffic. Provost did not attempt to stop the Jeep because he was
already committed to the Glenn Highway. Provost had just finished
his shift and was on his way home to Eagle River. He was driving
an unmarked Ford Aerostar van.
Provost was driving in the right hand lane on the Glenn
Highway when he noticed a vehicle similar to the Jeep he had just
seen pass him in the left lane at a "high rate of speed." Provost
then observed the Jeep slow down to a speed of 55 miles per hour as
it approached two other vehicles. The Jeep pulled over to the
right hand lane and passed those vehicles. Provost testified that
he watched the Jeep move back and forth between lanes, generally
without signaling first (although at times the driver would signal
after he entered a new lane). At one point, Provost observed the
Jeep move into the right lane with its left signal on.
Provost testified that based on his training, his 20 years
of experience as a police officer, and the "speeding, the slowing,
the passing, the lane changes, the movement . . . from one lane to
another and then the signal comes on and then back into the first
lane," his impression was that the driver of the Jeep was
intoxicated. Provost characterized the Jeep's movement as "gross
weaving" over several lanes of the Glenn Highway. After observing
the Jeep for several minutes, Provost telephoned Anchorage Police
Department (APD) dispatch and advised them that he suspected that
the driver of the Jeep was intoxicated. Provost asked APD to run
a check on the Jeep's license plates and eventually called for
assistance.
According to Provost, the Jeep took the Highland Road exit
and traveled at an excessive rate of speed as it proceeded down the
Loop Road toward Eagle River. Provost noted in his report that the
Jeep moved from the right into the left lane and then back into the
right lane traveling faster than the posted speed limit down the
Loop Road. As the Jeep (and Provost) approached Kantishna Drive on
the Loop Road, dispatch reported to Provost the address to which the
vehicle was registered. Provost advised dispatch that the driver
appeared to be headed to that address. The Jeep turned left on
Kantishna Drive and spun out, turning 270 degrees. The driver
corrected the turn and continued to his residence.
Although the driver of the Jeep used his remote control
to open the garage door, he parked the Jeep in his driveway.
Provost testified that he contacted the driver of the Jeep (Daniel
Shearer) as he stepped out of the vehicle. Provost identified
himself as a detective with the APD and asked Shearer to step away
from the vehicle. Provost conducted a pat down search and obtained
Shearer's identification. Provost testified that he detected the
odor of alcoholic beverages on Shearer's person. Provost asked
Shearer to perform the balance and alphabet field sobriety tests.
The alcohol odor and Shearer's difficulty in performing the field
sobriety tests, confirmed Provost's initial impression that Shearer
was intoxicated.
Shearer had a different account of his initial contact
with Provost in the driveway. Shearer testified that he got out of
his car and walked up the driveway to enter his home through the
basement garage. He had just entered the garage, when he heard
someone call out "hey buddy." Shearer turned around and saw a man
in civilian clothes signaling at him. Shearer testified that he
thought the man was in trouble and needed help, so he walked out of
the garage and approached the man. When Shearer got to the end of
the driveway, the man identified himself as a police officer.
Shearer was arrested and transported to the Eagle River
police substation for an Intoximeter test. Shearer submitted a
breath sample, with a resulting .172 blood alcohol level. Shearer
was subsequently charged with DWI, in violation of AMC 9.28.020.
Shearer moved to suppress the evidence obtained after his initial
contact with Provost. Following an evidentiary hearing, Judge
Murphy denied the motion. Shearer subsequently pled no contest to
DWI.
The question before us is whether the reasonable suspicion
standard for an investigatory stop, adopted by the supreme court in
Coleman v. State, [Fn. 3] was satisfied in this case. Under
Coleman, an investigatory stop is only permitted in situations where
the police officer has "a reasonable suspicion that imminent public
danger exists or serious harm to persons or property has recently
occurred." [Fn. 4] Shearer admits that he "arguably posed an
imminent public danger" when he was driving home. Nevertheless,
Shearer claims that because he parked his Jeep in his driveway,
exited the vehicle and was headed towards his home when Provost
contacted him, Provost had no basis to reasonably suspect that
Shearer continued to pose an imminent danger to the motoring public.
Judge Murphy disagreed.
In addressing the question of reasonable suspicion, Judge
Murphy found that Provost had enough information, based on his
observations of Shearer's driving, to reasonably believe that
Shearer was driving while intoxicated. Judge Murphy next addressed
what happened once Shearer arrived home and found that there was
nothing to prevent Shearer from getting back into his vehicle and
driving again that night. Thus, Judge Murphy concluded that Shearer
continued to pose a potential imminent danger to the driving public,
even though he had parked his car in his driveway.
Judge Murphy's findings are consistent with prior
decisions of this court and the supreme court that have applied the
Coleman standard to investigatory stops. As Shearer concedes, it
is well established that the crime of driving while intoxicated
poses significant dangers to the public. [Fn. 5] In addition, a DWI
suspect does not have to actually be driving the vehicle in order
to pose imminent danger to the public. [Fn. 6] Nevertheless,
Shearer claims that Judge Murphy's finding that he posed a
continuing danger to the motoring public is not supported by the
record because there is no evidence that he would have driven again
that night. We rejected similar arguments in Larson v. State [Fn.
7] and Romo v. Anchorage. [Fn. 8]
In Larson, a police officer observed the defendant's car
stopped in the middle of a dirt road, with the defendant behind the
wheel. The officer watched as the defendant pulled up next to two
pedestrians, talked to them and then drove north on the wrong side
of the road. [Fn. 9] The officer decided to follow the defendant
and he subsequently witnessed several instances of suspicious
driving by the defendant. Finally, the officer saw the defendant
pull over next to two pedestrians. One of them got into the
driver's seat and the defendant slid into the passenger seat. [Fn.
10] The new driver proceeded to drive down the road and was stopped
by the officer. The officer went immediately to the passenger side,
contacted the defendant and arrested him for DWI. [Fn. 11]
The primary issue on appeal in Larson was whether the
officer made a valid investigatory stop. We agreed with the trial
court's finding that the officer had reasonable suspicion (based on
his observations of the defendant's driving) that the defendant's
driving posed an imminent danger to public safety and that the stop
was justified. [Fn. 12] But, we also addressed the defendant's
argument that the "requisite element of danger terminated when [the
defendant] allowed an apparent stranger to drive the car in his
place." [Fn. 13] We upheld the trial judge's finding that the
defendant would have resumed driving at a later point and that the
officer was not unreasonable in believing that the change in drivers
did not eliminate the need to make an investigatory stop. [Fn. 14]
Similarly, in this case Judge Murphy found that Provost
had reasonable suspicion, based on his observations of Shearer's
driving, that Shearer posed an imminent danger to public safety.
Judge Murphy recognized that the element of danger did not terminate
when Shearer exited his vehicle. Although Shearer claims he was
home for the night, Judge Murphy found that there was nothing to
prevent Shearer from going inside his house, coming back out, and
driving again. We agree that the imminent danger Shearer posed to
the driving public did not cease simply because Shearer pulled into
his driveway and exited his vehicle. Our conclusion is supported
by our decision in Romo.
In Romo, a police officer decided to follow the defendant
after recognizing a prostitute in the front seat of his vehicle.
The officer saw no indication from defendant's driving that he was
intoxicated. The defendant pulled into a parking lot. The officer
followed, but did not activate his lights. [Fn. 15] The defendant
voluntarily got out of his vehicle and approached the officer, who
then noticed the odor of alcohol on the defendant. In response to
questioning from the officer, the defendant admitted that he had
been drinking. The officer then asked the defendant to perform
field sobriety tests, which he failed. [Fn. 16]
Based on the above facts, we found that the police officer
had "sufficient reasonable suspicion" that the defendant in Romo was
driving while intoxicated. We thus concluded that the officer was
justified in performing an investigatory stop in order to administer
field sobriety tests. [Fn. 17] We also rejected the defendant's
contention that since he stopped his car in his apartment parking
lot and exited his car, the officer could not reasonably believe,
as required by Coleman, that "imminent public danger" existed any
longer from his driving:
In the instant case, Judge Finn made no
specific finding as to the likelihood of Romo's driving again or the
reasonableness of Officer Plummer's belief of imminent public
danger. We are satisfied as a matter of law that an investigatory
stop was proper in this case. The fact that Romo was driving just
prior to his encounter with Officer Plummer demonstrated Romo's
willingness to drive in his current condition. At the time of the
encounter, Romo retained possession of his car and it remained
immediately accessible for him to drive. Under these circumstances
there was a sufficient risk of imminent public danger to warrant an
investigatory stop. [Fn. 18]
We believe that our reasoning in Romo is also applicable
to this case. Provost's observations of several miles of suspicious
driving by Shearer provided him with a particularized and objective
basis to suspect that Shearer was driving while intoxicated. Judge
Murphy found that the fact that Shearer had exited his vehicle and
was headed towards his home did not eliminate the risk that Shearer
would get back in his vehicle and resume driving. We do not believe
that this finding is clearly erroneous. The fact that Shearer drove
his Jeep just prior to his encounter with Provost demonstrated his
willingness to drive while intoxicated. Further, at the time of
Shearer's encounter with Provost, Shearer retained possession of the
vehicle and it remained "immediately accessible" for him to drive.
We conclude that, under Romo, there was a sufficient risk of
imminent public danger in this case to warrant an investigatory
stop. [Fn. 19]
Shearer attempts to distinguish Romo by arguing that the
encounter in Romo did not become an investigatory stop until after
the officer asked the defendant to perform field sobriety tests, and
that in this case, the encounter was an investigatory stop as soon
as Provost made contact with Shearer. We believe that this
distinction is immaterial. The ultimate issue in this case whether
Provost could reasonably believe that "imminent public danger"
continued to exist after Shearer exited his vehicle is answered
affirmatively by Romo. [Fn. 20] Shearer also argues that the
officer in Romo didn't know the defendant lived in the apartment
complex next to the parking lot, nor did the defendant start walking
towards his house. However, this distinction does not change the
fact that, like the defendant in Romo, Shearer still had access to
his car at the time of the encounter with Provost. Further, Shearer
had just demonstrated his willingness to drive while intoxicated.
Thus, Provost could reasonably believe that there was a sufficient
risk of imminent public danger to justify an investigatory stop.
[Fn. 21]
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that Judge
Murphy properly denied Shearer's motion to suppress evidence. The
judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
MANNHEIMER, Judge, dissenting.
Under Alaska law, a police officer who has reason to
believe that a person is driving while intoxicated can stop the
motorist to investigate. In Ebona v. State [Fn. 1], the supreme
court held that this investigative stop is justified because a
person who is driving while intoxicated presents an "imminent public
danger". The question in this case is whether an investigative stop
remains justified even after the motorist parks the car, turns off
the engine, and walks away, with no indication that the motorist
intends to resume driving. I conclude that, under such
circumstances, there is no imminent public danger, and so an
investigative stop is not allowed.
Underlying facts
Police Officer Anthony Provost saw Daniel Shearer driving
erratically just after midnight on January 20, 1999. Shearer
concedes that his erratic driving gave Provost a reasonable basis
to suspect that Shearer was driving while intoxicated. Because of
this reasonable suspicion, Provost would have been justified in
stopping Shearer's vehicle to investigate this potential crime. [Fn.
2] But the traffic stop would have been difficult because Provost
was off-duty: he was dressed in civilian clothes, and he was
driving a private vehicle without emergency lights or a siren. So
instead of performing a traffic stop, Provost followed Shearer. He
called for a backup officer, and he also asked police dispatch to
run a check on Shearer's vehicle registration.
The dispatcher told Provost that Shearer lived on
Kantishna Drive in Eagle River. With Provost behind him, Shearer
drove to the Kantishna Drive address, turned into the driveway, and
parked his car. Provost parked his own vehicle on the street. As
Provost watched, Shearer used a remote control to open his garage
door. He then walked toward the house, preparing to enter through
the garage.
At this point, Provost called out to Shearer and asked
him to come back down the driveway. Shearer did not know that
Provost was a police officer; he assumed that Provost was a motorist
who was either lost or was having car trouble. But as soon as
Shearer walked up to Provost, Provost displayed his badge. He
directed Shearer to perform field sobriety tests. Based on
Shearer's performance, Provost arrested him for driving while
intoxicated.
The Municipality of Anchorage concedes that, before
Shearer performed the field sobriety tests, Provost had only a
reasonable suspicion that Shearer was under the influence rather
than probable cause to make an arrest. The Municipality further
concedes that Provost coerced Shearer to perform the field sobriety
tests through a display of authority. For his part, Shearer
concedes that, by the end of the field sobriety tests, Provost had
obtained enough information about Shearer's level of intoxication
to justify an arrest. That is, by the end of the field sobriety
tests, Provost had probable cause to believe that Shearer was under
the influence. The problem is the manner in which Provost obtained
this information.
Shearer voluntarily walked down the driveway to speak to
Provost. Had Provost merely engaged in conversation with Shearer,
the officer conceivably could have gleaned sufficient information
from Shearer's speech, demeanor, and balance to establish probable
cause to make an arrest. But Provost immediately displayed his
badge and directed Shearer to perform field sobriety tests. These
actions constituted an investigative stop a seizure for Fourth
Amendment purposes. The question is whether this seizure was legal.
The requirement of "imminent public danger"
In Coleman v. State [Fn. 3], the Alaska Supreme Court was
asked to decide whether the Alaska Constitution permits a police
officer to conduct an investigative stop based on reasonable
suspicion (i.e., less than probable cause). The court ruled that
investigative stops based on reasonable suspicion are permitted in
two instances: when the officer has reason to believe that "imminent
public danger exists", or when the officer has reason to believe that
"serious harm to persons or property has recently occurred". [Fn.
4]
Shearer's case points out a crucial distinction between
these two categories. If an investigative stop is justified because
there is reason to believe that "serious harm ... has recently
occurred", it does not matter whether the crime is continuing or has
been completed. In either case, Coleman authorizes the
investigative stop. But if the investigative stop is justified
because there is reason to believe that "imminent public danger
exists", then the government must establish reason to believe that
the crime is ongoing or that the crime has set events in motion that
will endanger the public unless the crime is revealed or the events
interrupted.
Neither the supreme court nor this court has ever decided
whether the crime of driving while intoxicated falls within
Coleman's second category of "serious harm to persons or property".
[Fn. 5] But in Ebona v. State [Fn. 6], the supreme court held that
a motorist who drives while intoxicated constitutes an "imminent
public danger". Thus, when a police officer sees a person driving
a motor vehicle and the officer has reason to believe that the
driver is intoxicated, the officer is authorized to conduct a
traffic stop and investigate. [Fn. 7]
But Shearer's case is different: Shearer was no longer
driving a motor vehicle when Provost performed the investigative
stop. Shearer had reached his residence, he had parked his car and
turned off the engine, and he was entering his house. Shearer
contends that Provost violated Coleman when he performed the
investigative stop at the foot of Shearer's driveway because, by the
time Provost conducted the stop, Shearer no longer posed an imminent
danger to the public safety or welfare. Shearer points out that his
act of driving was over, and he argues that there was no reason to
believe that he would resume driving in the near future.
The Municipality of Anchorage offers two answers to
Shearer's argument.
First, the Municipality asserts that driving while
intoxicated falls within Coleman's second category that this
offense constitutes "serious harm to persons or property". If so,
then Provost would have been justified in performing an
investigative stop even though Shearer's offense was over.
But the Municipality did not raise this argument in the
trial court, and the district court did not decide this issue.
Rather, the district court ruled that the investigative stop was
justified under Coleman's first category (imminent public danger).
Moreover, the Municipality did not raise this issue in its brief to
this court. Instead, the Municipality raised this issue for the
first time during oral argument. Given these circumstances, the
Municipality has waived its contention that DWI falls within
Coleman's second category. [Fn. 8]
The Municipality's remaining contention is that, even
though Shearer had stopped driving, he continued to pose a danger
to the public. The district court upheld the investigative stop on
this basis. The court ruled that, even though Shearer had parked
his car and was on his way into the house, it was at least possible
that Shearer might shortly return to his car and begin driving
again.
Why I conclude that the Municipality failed to establish a
reasonable suspicion that Shearer posed an imminent public danger
It is the government's burden to justify any warrantless
seizure. An investigative stop must be based on reasonable
suspicion "specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with [the] rationale inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant
the intrusion." [Fn. 9] Because Coleman's first prong requires
proof of imminent public danger, we must ask the following question:
When Officer Provost performed the investigative stop at the foot
of Shearer's driveway, was he aware of specific and articulable
facts indicating that Shearer posed an imminent danger to the
public? Or, to rephrase this question with reference to the
particular facts of this case: Did Provost have specific and
articulable reasons for believing that Shearer would leave his house
and resume driving before he regained sobriety?
The majority believes that the answer is supplied by Romo
v. Anchorage. [Fn. 10] In Romo, a police officer followed the
defendant's pickup truck because he recognized the woman passenger
as a known prostitute. Romo pulled into the parking lot of his
apartment building and stopped his truck. The officer stopped his
patrol car some forty to fifty feet away, but he did not attempt to
make contact with Romo. [Fn. 11] After a few moments, Romo got out
of his truck and walked back to the patrol car to engage in
conversation with the officer. During that conversation, the
officer smelled alcoholic beverages on Romo's breath, and Romo
admitted that he had been drinking. When Romo failed various field
sobriety tests, the officer arrested him for driving while
intoxicated. [Fn. 12]
One of Romo's arguments on appeal was that, even after
the officer observed signs of his intoxication, the officer had no
authority to ask Romo to perform the field sobriety tests or to take
any other action amounting to an investigative stop. Romo contended
that, because he stopped his truck in the parking lot of his
apartment building, and because he got out of his car to talk to the
officer, there was no longer an "imminent public danger" as required
by Coleman. This court rejected Romo's argument:
We are satisfied as a matter of law that an
investigatory stop was proper in this case. The fact that Romo was
driving just prior to his encounter with Officer Plummer
demonstrated Romo's willingness to drive in his [intoxicated]
condition. At the time of the encounter, Romo retained possession
of his car and it remained immediately accessible for him to drive.
Under these circumstances[,] there was a sufficient risk of imminent
public danger to warrant an investigative stop.
Romo, 697 P.2d at 1069-1070.
My colleagues interpret Romo to mean that, even after a
suspected intoxicated driver stops driving, a police officer will
always be authorized to conduct an investigative stop because there
is always some conceivable possibility that the motorist will resume
driving. This is stretching Romo too far.
In Romo, the officer could reasonably conclude that Romo
had merely interrupted his driving in order to talk with the
officer. Romo stopped his vehicle and walked over to the officer's
patrol car, but he gave no indication that he had reached his final
destination or that he intended to stop driving. As this court
stressed, "Romo retained possession of his car and it remained
immediately accessible for him to drive."
The majority concedes that Shearer's case is different.
Shearer parked his car in his driveway, he turned off the engine,
and he was proceeding into his house when Officer Provost called him
back. The hour was midnight a time when people ordinarily return
home for the night. Nevertheless, the majority concludes that
Officer Provost had a specific, articulable basis for believing that
Shearer continued to pose an imminent danger to the public safety.
The district judge who upheld the investigative stop
reasoned that Shearer might conceivably have been going home just
to retrieve more alcoholic beverages and then resume driving. One
can also imagine other scenarios in which Shearer might resume
driving even though he initially intended to remain at home for
example, if his children demanded that he take them out for a
midnight snack, or if Shearer's wife threw him out of the house,
forcing him to seek new lodgings.
These (and other) speculative possibilities can not be
ruled out. But Coleman and Terry v. Ohio require more than
speculative possibilities. To justify the investigative seizure in
this case, the government must point to specific and articulable
facts that would lead a reasonable person to believe that Shearer
intended to return to his car and resume driving while he was still
intoxicated. In the absence of an affirmative reason to suspect
that Shearer would resume driving, the investigative stop is
illegal.
Romo does not alter this rule of law. Rather, the result
in Romo rests on application of this rule to the particular facts
of Romo's case. This becomes clearer if we consider a slight
variation of the facts in Shearer's case.
Suppose that Officer Provost, unsure of how to proceed,
had simply watched while Shearer entered his garage, walked into his
house, and closed the garage door behind him. After waiting several
minutes for Shearer to re-emerge, Officer Provost contacts a police
supervisor and asks for advice. The supervisor tells Provost to
knock on Shearer's front door and see if Shearer will come outside
to talk. By now, twenty minutes have gone by, and Shearer's house
is dark. Provost knocks for several minutes. At length, Shearer
answers the door. He is dressed in pajamas, he is barefoot, and he
has a toothbrush in his hand. He is obviously preparing for bed.
Under these hypothetical facts, there is no specific,
articulable reason to believe that Shearer would resume driving.
Thus, even if there was reason to believe that Shearer was
intoxicated, there would be no reason to believe that he presented
an "imminent public danger", and so a Coleman investigatory stop
would not be permitted.
Concededly, the actual facts of Shearer's case do not so
clearly prove Shearer's lack of intent to resume driving. But it
is not Shearer's burden to negate all speculative possibility that
he might decide to leave his house and begin driving again. Rather,
it is the Municipality's burden to come forward with specific,
articulable facts that affirmatively indicate that Shearer might
resume driving. There are no such facts in this case.
Accordingly, Provost's investigative stop of Shearer was
unlawful, and the evidence obtained during that investigative stop
should have been suppressed. I would reverse Shearer's conviction.
FOOTNOTES
Footnote 1:
AMC 9.28.020.
Footnote 2:
Shearer preserved for appeal, pursuant to Cooksey v. State,
524 P.2d 1251 (Alaska 1974), the question of whether the district
court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence.
Footnote 3:
553 P.2d 40 (Alaska 1976).
Footnote 4:
Id. at 46.
Footnote 5:
See Ebona v. State, 577 P.2d 698, 701 (Alaska 1978); State v.
Moran, 667 P.2d 734, 735 (Alaska App. 1983).
Footnote 6:
See Jacobson v. State, 551 P.2d 935, 938 (Alaska 1976) ("An
intoxicated person seated behind the steering wheel of a motor
vehicle [that is not moving] is a threat to the safety and welfare
of the public") (citations omitted). See also State, Department of
Public Safety v. Conley, 754 P.2d 232, 236 (Alaska 1988); Lathan v.
State, 707 P.2d 941, 943 (Alaska App. 1985).
Footnote 7:
669 P.2d 1334 (Alaska App. 1983).
Footnote 8:
697 P.2d 1065 (Alaska App. 1985).
Footnote 9:
669 P.2d at 1335.
Footnote 10:
Id. at 1336.
Footnote 11:
Id.
Footnote 12:
Id.
Footnote 13:
Id. at 1337.
Footnote 14:
Id.
Footnote 15:
697 P.2d at 1067.
Footnote 16:
Id.
Footnote 17:
Id. at 1069.
Footnote 18:
Id. at 1069-1070.
Footnote 19:
Id.
Footnote 20:
Id.
Footnote 21:
Id.
FOOTNOTES (Dissent)
Footnote 1:
577 P.2d 698, 700-701 (Alaska 1978).
Footnote 2:
See Ebona, 577 P.2d at 700-701.
Footnote 3:
553 P.2d 40 (Alaska 1976).
Footnote 4:
Id. at 46.
Footnote 5:
See Romo v. Anchorage, 697 P.2d 1065, 1070 n.2 (Alaska App.
1985).
Footnote 6:
577 P.2d at 700-701.
Footnote 7:
Ebona, 577 P.2d at 701.
Footnote 8:
Petersen v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 803 P.2d 406, 411 n.8
(Alaska 1990) (issues not briefed are waived).
Footnote 9:
Coleman, 553 P.2d at 45 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
21; 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880; 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906 (1968)).
Footnote 10:
697 P.2d 1065 (Alaska App. 1985).
Footnote 11:
See id.
Footnote 12:
See id.
