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Vigue v. State (9/3/99) ap-1645
Vigue v. State (9/3/99) ap-1645
NOTICE
The text of this opinion can be corrected before the
opinion is published in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
encouraged to bring typographical or other formal errors to the
attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts:
303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501
Fax: (907) 264-0878
E-mail: corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
KASH VIGUE, )
) Court of Appeals No. A-6977
Appellant, ) Trial Court No. 3AN-97-6521 Cr
)
v. )
) O P I N I O N
STATE OF ALASKA, )
)
Appellee. ) [No. 1645 September 3, 1999]
)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial
District, Anchorage, Eric T. Sanders and Milton M. Souter, Judges.
Appearances: Averil Lerman, Assistant Public
Advocate, and Brant McGee, Public Advocate, Anchorage, for
Appellant. James L. Hanley, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Bruce M. Botelho,
Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer and
Stewart, Judges.
MANNHEIMER, Judge.
A police officer stopped Kash Vigue for a minor offense.
During their encounter, Vigue tossed or dropped something to the
ground. This "something" turned out to be several small pieces of
crack cocaine. The officer arrested Vigue and transported him to
the police station. During the ride in the patrol car, Vigue
removed a crack pipe from his clothes and tried to conceal the pipe
between the seat cushions of the vehicle. Based on this episode,
Vigue was charged with two offenses: third-degree controlled
substance misconduct (possession of cocaine) [Fn. 1] and tampering
with physical evidence [Fn. 2].
This appeal presents two issues: First, was the initial
investigative stop lawful? Second, does a person commit the crime
of tampering with physical evidence under AS 11.56.610(a)(1) when
the person drops or throws contraband to the ground in an attempt
to prevent the contraband from being found on their person?
We conclude that the police officer had probable cause to
arrest Vigue at the time of the initial stop, and thus all of the
evidence flowing from that stop was admissible against Vigue. We
further conclude that Vigue's act of dropping or throwing the
cocaine to the ground during the stop does not constitute the crime
of tampering with physical evidence, and therefore Vigue's
conviction for that crime must be reversed.
The initial stop was supported by probable cause
On August 19, 1997, while driving down Barrow Street in
downtown Anchorage, Officer Phillip Kantor noticed Vigue standing
near the corner of Barrow and Fourth Avenue. Kantor saw Vigue
"facing the building[, with] his hands down by his crotch area. It
looked to [Kantor] as if [Vigue] was urinating." Because urination
in public violates an Anchorage municipal ordinance [Fn. 3], Kantor
pulled over in order to speak with Vigue.
When Vigue walked away from Kantor and rounded a corner,
Kantor got out of his vehicle and called for Vigue to return. Upon
hearing Kantor call out, Vigue stopped, but he did not turn around
to face Kantor. Instead, Vigue again began to walk away, yelling
"What's the problem?" Kantor directed Vigue to turn around so that
Kantor could see Vigue's hands. At this point, Vigue turned around
and began walking back toward Kantor, but he kept his hands behind
his back. Kantor repeatedly asked Vigue to place his hands where
Kantor could see them, but Vigue refused to comply.
As Vigue approached Kantor's car, Kantor saw Vigue make
"a little shaking motion", as if Vigue had just dropped (or
attempted to drop) something from his hands. Because Vigue's body
blocked his view, Kantor could not see what, if anything, had fallen
to the ground.
Vigue walked over to Kantor's vehicle and placed his hands
on the hood of the patrol car. At this point, Kantor walked over
to where Vigue had been standing when he made the shaking motion.
Examining the ground, Kantor found five little white rocks that
appeared to be crack cocaine. Kantor then placed Vigue under arrest
for possession of cocaine.
Following his indictment, Vigue asked the superior court
to suppress all of the evidence stemming from this investigative
stop. Vigue argued that Kantor's claim about public urination was
a mere pretext, and that Kantor had really stopped Vigue because the
officer knew that Vigue was a drug user and he hoped to find drugs
in Vigue's possession.
At the ensuing evidentiary hearing, Officer Kantor
testified to the facts recited above. Vigue offered the testimony
of Jarrell Arnold, who stated that he was with Vigue at the time and
that Vigue did not urinate in public.
After hearing this testimony, Superior Court Judge Eric
T. Sanders found that the decision came down to a question of
"whether a police officer in Officer Kantor's position would have
probable cause to believe that there was justification to issue a
citation."
The Court: What's necessary for [the
issuance of] a citation is probable cause. The argument [is that]
... this is kind of a pretext stop[,] ... that, really, urination
had nothing to do with stopping Mr. Vigue. I don't accept [that.]
... [T]he court basically finds [Kantor's] explanation credible.
... [This really] is kind of a credibility contest between the
witness Arnold and the officer. I don't find Arnold's testimony to
be credible. ... I really think that ... [Arnold's] explanation
of what was going on was just not credible. And ... he also, in the
court's view, is probably biased in favor of Mr. Vigue. He
testified that they're good friends. So he had a reason to testify
in the way he did. So, if it comes down ... to a contest about who
is more credible, the court finds Officer Kantor to be credible and
Mr. Arnold not to be more credible than the officer[.]
... [T]he officer was ... driving down
the street [and] he saw ... Vigue in a position [where it] appeared
that he was urinating, [so] he stopped the car. The purpose was to
issue a citation. The court has no reason whatsoever ... to find
that that testimony is not credible. Having [been] stopped[,] ...
the defendant then dropped something which the officer later
determined to be cocaine. ... [B]ased on those findings, the stop
of the defendant and the subsequent arrest was not illegal. So the
motion to suppress is denied for those reasons.
On appeal, Vigue argues that Judge Sanders should not have
believed Officer Kantor and should, instead, have credited the
testimony of the defense witness, Jarrell Arnold. But the trial
court has the primary responsibility for evaluating witness
credibility. [Fn. 4] Judge Sanders observed both witnesses and
concluded that Officer Kantor's version of events was credible.
Under that version of events, Kantor had probable cause
to believe that he had observed Vigue urinating in public. Thus,
under AS 12.25.180, the officer was empowered to stop Vigue and
issue him a citation. Accordingly, Judge Sanders properly denied
Vigue's suppression motion.
Vigue's conviction for tampering with physical evidence
must be reversed
As explained above, Vigue was charged with two crimes:
possessing cocaine and tampering with physical evidence. The
tampering count was intended to cover two separate acts: Vigue's
act of tossing or dropping the cocaine to the ground when he turned
around and walked back to Kantor, and Vigue's later act of placing
the crack pipe in the seat cushions of the patrol car.
Vigue contends that his act of tossing or dropping the
cocaine to the ground does not constitute the crime of tampering
with physical evidence. Under AS 11.56.610(a)(1), a person commits
this crime if the person "destroys, mutilates, alters, suppresses,
conceals, or removes physical evidence with the intent to impair its
verity or availability in an official proceeding or a criminal
investigation". The question is whether Vigue committed the actus
reus of this offense. That is, did Vigue's act of tossing or
dropping the cocaine to the ground constitute a "suppress[ion],
conceal[ment], or remov[al]" of the evidence?
This issue has been addressed by several states that have
evidence-tampering statutes similar to Alaska's. Although these
courts rely on different rationales for their decisions, they
unanimously agree that a defendant's act of dropping or tossing away
evidence in the sight of the police does not constitute the actus
reus of tampering with physical evidence.
In Commonwealth v. Delgado [Fn. 5], the defendant tossed
away a bag of cocaine onto a garage roof as he was being pursued
down an alley by the police. [Fn. 6] The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that this conduct "discarding contraband in plain view of
the pursuing officer" did not constitute tampering with evidence.
[Fn. 7] The court concluded that the defendant had neither
destroyed, altered, nor concealed evidence within the meaning of the
statute. Rather, the court stated, the defendant's conduct amounted
to "nothing more than an abandonment of the evidence." [Fn. 8]
As a second rationale for its decision, the Pennsylvania
court noted that Pennsylvania law classifies tampering with physical
evidence as a higher degree of crime than possession of cocaine.
"Under these circumstances," the court said, "we do not believe that
the [Pennsylvania] General Assembly intended the simple act of
abandoning [contraband] in plain view of the police to constitute
the commission of an additional crime of a greater degree." [Fn.
9]
In Boice v. State [Fn. 10], the Florida Court of Appeal
relied on similar reasoning to conclude that "the simple act of
abandoning a bag of crack cocaine at the scene of an arrest, in the
clear sight of a law enforcement officer," did not constitute
tampering with physical evidence. [Fn. 11] In Boice, the defendant
threw a small bag containing a rock of cocaine out of his car window
after the car was surrounded by police. One of the officers
retrieved the bag from the road, where it was sitting in plain view.
[Fn. 12]
The Florida court noted that the defendant had neither
destroyed, altered, nor concealed the cocaine. The court further
noted that, even though the defendant had thrown the cocaine from
his car, he had not removed the drug from the immediate area of the
arrest. Under these circumstances, the court concluded, the
defendant had not committed the actus reus of the offense. [Fn. 13]
Like the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Delgado, the
Florida Court of Appeal relied on a second rationale for their
decision the conclusion that the Florida Legislature had not
intended to impose additional felony penalties on defendants like
Boice. The court stated:
If the defendant's [conduct] in this case
constituted tampering [with evidence], then a nineteen-year-old who
threw a can of beer from his car when stopped by a police officer
would commit not only the second-degree misdemeanor of possession
of alcoholic beverages, but also the third-degree felony of
tampering with the evidence. We do not believe that the legislature
intended an additional felony under such circumstances.
Boice, 560 So.2d at 1385 (footnotes omitted).
The State, in its brief, takes Vigue to task for failing
to note that the Florida Supreme Court, in a case entitled State v.
Jennings [Fn. 14], limited the holding in Boice. This is true, but
the limitation does not have particular relevance to Vigue's case.
The defendant in Jennings tossed several small objects
allegedly, rocks of cocaine into his mouth as the police
approached; the defendant succeeded in swallowing the cocaine
despite the efforts of the officers, and the evidence was never
recovered. [Fn. 15] The trial court and the intermediate court of
appeal both held that, pursuant to the interpretation of the statute
adopted in Boice, the defendant's conduct did not constitute
tampering with evidence. The Florida Supreme Court disagreed, and
they took the occasion to chastise the lower courts for their
"overly broad reading of Boice":
We disagree with Boice to the extent it
can be read to mean that tossing evidence away in the presence of
a law enforcement officer does not, as a matter of law, constitute
a violation of the statute. Depending upon the circumstances, such
an act could amount to tampering or concealing evidence.
Jennings, 666 So.2d at 133. The supreme court concluded that
Jennings had been properly charged with tampering with evidence
because "swallowing an object clearly constitutes altering,
destroying, concealing, or removing [the object] within the meaning
of [Florida's statute]." [Fn. 16]
The Florida court also expressed its approval of the
result reached in another intermediate appellate decision, Hayes v.
State. [Fn. 17] In Hayes, the defendant dropped a bag of cocaine
down a drainage pipe while he was being pursued by police. The
court of appeal refused to extend Boice to these facts; instead, the
court upheld the defendant's evidence-tampering conviction. [Fn.
18]
The State claims that the decision in Jennings undermines
Vigue's argument in this appeal. But while the Florida Supreme
Court limited the scope of the legal inferences that might be drawn
from Boice, the court did not overrule Boice's specific holding that
a defendant who tosses contraband to the ground in the sight of the
police does not violate the tampering with evidence statute. The
issue, according to the Florida Supreme Court, turns on the facts
of the case. And the facts of Vigue's case are essentially the same
as the facts in Boice. Because the Florida Supreme Court did not
express disapproval of the result reached in Boice, that case
remains valid authority in support of Vigue's claim in the present
appeal.
In State v. Patton [Fn. 19], the Tennessee Court of
Criminal Appeals held that a defendant who "toss[es] aside a bag of
marijuana during the course of flight from law enforcement
officials" does not violate Tennessee's evidence-tampering statute.
[Fn. 20] Adopting the same reasoning as Delgado and Boice, the
Tennessee court concluded that the Tennessee legislature had not
intended for the statute to reach so far:
Like the Florida District Court of Appeal,
we do not believe that the legislature intended to inflict greater
punishment upon an individual for attempting to discard evidence [of
a crime] than he would receive for commission of the crime.
Statutes must not be construed in a manner which may lead to absurd
results. [Citations omitted] If "mere abandonment" of contraband
falls within the class of [conduct] made criminal by [the Tennessee
evidence-tampering statute], there is a substantial likelihood of
an unreasonable result. Thus, ... [e]ven if the factual allegations
within the indictment are accurate, the defendant, in our view, has
not violated the [evidence-tampering] statute.
Patton, 898 S.W.2d at 736.
The appellate division of the New Jersey Superior Court
has construed that state's evidence-tampering statute even more
narrowly. In State v. Sharpless [Fn. 21], the defendant threw
twenty-three bags of heroin to the ground shortly before the police
reached him. (The police discovered this heroin when, looking for
a handgun, they searched the area where the defendant had been
standing. [Fn. 22]) The question was whether the defendant's "act
of discarding criminal contraband upon the approach of a police
officer constitute[d] evidence tampering within the intent of [the
New Jersey statute]". [Fn. 23]
The New Jersey court reviewed several decisions from other
states upholding evidence-tampering convictions for conduct such as
flushing drugs down a toilet when the police knocked on the door
[Fn. 24], swallowing drugs upon being apprehended by the police [Fn.
25], and snatching a bottle filled with contraband liquid from a
police officer and smashing it on the ground [Fn. 26]. The court
then contrasted these decisions with the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's decision in Delgado, supra (the case in which a defendant,
being chased by the police, tossed a bag of cocaine onto a garage
roof). The New Jersey court approved the Pennsylvania court's
conclusion that "[the defendant's] act of discarding contraband in
plain view of the police ... was nothing more than an abandonment
of the evidence" and did not constitute "destruction or concealment
of evidence as contemplated by the statute". [Fn. 27]
The New Jersey court noted that in a previous case State
v. Fuqua [Fn. 28] the court had given a similar construction to
a New Jersey statute that prohibits persons from "suppress[ing], by
way of concealment", any evidence of their own criminal wrongdoing.
The defendant in Fuqua was charged with violating this statute
because he concealed cocaine in his socks. [Fn. 29] The court
concluded that the statute should not be interpreted to encompass
this type of conduct:
Under ... the State's theory, [a]
defendant would [be] required to have the cocaine in plain view in
order to avoid committing this crime[.] [The State argues that,]
by placing the cocaine in his socks, [the] defendant ... committed
a separate indictable offense. ... [But if] the State is correct,
[then] all illegal substances [and] weapons ... would [have] to be
carried in plain view or else the possessor could be convicted of
a [separate] crime ... in addition to [their] substantive offense.
Sharpless, 715 A.2d at 343 (quoting Fuqua, 696 A.2d at 47).
To avoid this result, the Fuqua court ruled that, as
applied to possessory offenses, the statute should be construed to
apply only to completed crimes, and not to the concealment of
contraband in an attempt to hide an ongoing possessory offense. [Fn.
30] And in Sharpless, the New Jersey court ruled that this same
limitation should be incorporated into New Jersey's general
evidence-tampering statute a statute similar to Alaska's. [Fn.
31] The court reasoned as follows:
[Similar to our decision in Fuqua], we
conclude that a person who possesses drugs may not be found guilty
of tampering with evidence simply because he discards or hides the
drugs upon the approach of a police officer. ... [I]f such conduct
were held to constitute tampering with evidence, [then] any person
in possession of contraband who took any steps to prevent the police
from discovering the contraband could be charged not only with the
possessory offense but also with tampering with evidence. Absent
a clearer indication that this was the Legislature's intent in
enacting N.J.S.A. 2C:28-6, we decline to [infer such an intent].
Instead, consistent with [our decision] in Fuqua, we construe the
phrase "conceal[ment]" of "any article ... with the purpose to
impair its availability in [an investigation]" ... to refer only to
"evidence of a completed criminal act, not a current possessory
crime."
Sharpless, 715 A.2d at 343 (quoting Fuqua, 696 A.2d at 47).
Accordingly, the New Jersey court held that the "defendant's
abandonment of his drug supply during the course of his ongoing
possession of heroin with the intent to distribute ... did not
constitute tampering with evidence." [Fn. 32]
The State offers little response to these cases (other
than noting that the Florida Court of Appeal's decision in Boice has
been limited by the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Jennings).
Rather than responding to the reasoning of these cases, the State
urges us to ignore this issue of statutory construction. The State
suggests that we can do this because Vigue's tampering with evidence
charge actually encompassed two distinct theories of prosecution.
As explained above, the first theory was that Vigue
tampered with evidence when he tossed or dropped the bag of cocaine
to the ground in Officer Kantor's presence, while the second theory
was that Vigue tampered with evidence when he concealed the crack
pipe in the cushions of Kantor's patrol vehicle. The State argues
that, because the tampering with evidence charge incorporated both
of these theories, and because Vigue only challenges the validity
of the first theory, Vigue's conviction can be sustained even if we
agree with Vigue that the State's first theory of prosecution is
invalid.
The State's argument would be convincing if Vigue's jury
had returned a special verdict indicating that they based their
verdict on the State's second theory of prosecution. But Vigue's
jury returned only a general verdict on the evidence-tampering
charge. We therefore can not determine which of the State's
theories formed the basis for the jury's verdict.
Although the State introduced evidence tending to prove
its second theory of prosecution (the theory that Vigue hid a crack
pipe in the seat cushions of the patrol car), Vigue's guilt under
this theory was not a foregone conclusion. At trial, Vigue asserted
that the crack pipe found in the patrol car did not belong to him.
He further asserted that, because he was handcuffed during his ride
in the patrol car, it would have been physically impossible for him
to remove a pipe from his pants and place it in the seat cushions.
Thus, the jury had to resolve substantial questions of fact and
credibility before it could return a verdict on this theory of
prosecution.
Because Vigue's guilt under the second theory was actively
disputed, and because the jury returned only a general verdict on
the evidence-tampering charge, we can not determine whether Vigue
was convicted of evidence-tampering under the State's first theory
(for tossing or dropping the cocaine to the ground) or under the
State's second theory (for hiding the crack pipe in the patrol car),
or both. Because of this, if the State's first theory of
prosecution is invalid, the verdict must be reversed. [Fn. 33] We
therefore must decide whether the evidence-tampering statute covers
Vigue's act of tossing or dropping the bag of cocaine to the ground.
Vigue did not destroy, mutilate, or alter the cocaine, so the
precise question is whether Vigue, by his conduct, "suppress[ed],
conceal[ed], or remove[d]" the cocaine when he tossed or dropped it
to the ground before returning to speak to Officer Kantor. [Fn. 34]
The legislative commentary to AS 11.56.610 does not define
any of these terms. [Fn. 35] It appears, however, that if the term
"remove" is not to be redundant of the other terms used in the
statute (especially "suppress" and "conceal"), then "remove" must
refer to the act of moving an object from the scene of the crime,
or from any location where its evidentiary value can be deduced, to
some other place where its evidentiary significance may not be
detected. Using this construction, Vigue's conduct did not
constitute a "removal" of the cocaine.
If the terms "suppress" and "conceal" are construed
broadly, then it is possible to speak of Vigue's conduct as an act
of suppression or concealment. By ridding his pockets and hands of
the cocaine, Vigue probably intended to make it less likely that the
cocaine would come to Officer Kantor's attention.
But it is important not to confuse Vigue's intent with his
physical actions. The evidence-tampering statute uses the terms
"suppress" and "conceal" to define the actus reus of the crime. In
addition to this actus reus, the statute also requires proof of a
culpable mental state here, Vigue's intent to "impair [the]
availability" of the evidence. The fact that Vigue intended to make
it harder for Officer Kantor to detect the cocaine does not mean
that Vigue actually succeeded in "suppressing" or "concealing" the
cocaine when he tossed or dropped it to the ground. Indeed, under
the facts of this case, no suppression or concealment occurred:
Officer Kantor observed Vigue's action and was alerted to the
possibility that something might be on the ground at the spot where
Vigue had been standing. We agree with the courts of Pennsylvania,
Florida, Tennessee, and New Jersey that conduct such as Vigue's
amounts to nothing more than abandonment of the evidence, not
suppression or concealment of evidence.
One could argue that, even if Vigue did not succeed in
suppressing or concealing the cocaine, he nevertheless tried to do
so, and so his conviction should be reduced to attempted evidence-
tampering. Again, this would make sense if we interpreted the terms
"suppress" and "conceal" broadly. But, like the courts of our
sibling states, we are persuaded to give a narrow interpretation to
the terms "suppress" and "conceal". We are convinced that a broad
reading of these terms would lead to results that are inexplicably
harsh and probably not within the legislature's intent.
Tampering with physical evidence is a class C felony. [Fn.
36] As was pointed out in Delgado, Boice, Patton, Fuqua, and
Sharpless, if the words "suppress" and "conceal" are interpreted to
cover actions such as tossing evidence to the ground, or tossing
evidence out of a car window, or hiding evidence in one's clothing,
then minor possessory offenses would often be converted to felonies
with little reason. For example, persons under the age of 21 who
possess or drink beer (a violation punishable only by a fine [Fn.
37]) or who smoke cigarettes (another violation punishable only by
a fine [Fn. 38]) would be subjected to felony convictions and
penalties if they tossed a can of beer from their vehicle or hid
cigarettes in a pocket or purse when police officers approached.
As explained above, the New Jersey courts (in Fuqua and
Sharpless) avoided such results by giving a limiting construction
to their evidence-tampering statutes: these statutes do not apply
to a defendant's attempt to hide or toss away evidence of an ongoing
possessory offense. Although there may be merit to the New Jersey
approach, the facts of Vigue's appeal do not require us to decide
whether Alaska's evidence-tampering statute should be interpreted
in a similar fashion.
We hold that, for purposes of construing AS 11.56.610(a),
Vigue did not "suppress" or "conceal" the rocks of cocaine when he
tossed or dropped them to the ground in the officer's presence.
Accordingly, one of the theories of prosecution considered by the
jury at Vigue's trial was invalid, and Vigue's conviction for
tampering with physical evidence must be reversed.
Conclusion
Vigue's conviction for fourth-degree controlled substance
misconduct (possession of cocaine) is AFFIRMED. Vigue's conviction
for tampering with physical evidence is REVERSED.
FOOTNOTES
Footnote 1:
AS 11.71.030(a)(1).
Footnote 2:
AS 11.56.610(a)(1).
Footnote 3:
See Anchorage Municipal Code sec. 08.75.120.
Footnote 4:
See Long v. State, 772 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Alaska App. 1989).
Footnote 5:
679 A.2d 223 (Pa. 1996).
Footnote 6:
See id. at 224.
Footnote 7:
Id. at 225.
Footnote 8:
Id.
Footnote 9:
Id.
Footnote 10:
560 So.2d 1383 (Fla. App. 1990).
Footnote 11:
Id. at 1384.
Footnote 12:
See id.
Footnote 13:
See id.
Footnote 14:
666 So.2d 131 (Fla. 1995).
Footnote 15:
See id. at 132.
Footnote 16:
Id. at 133.
Footnote 17:
634 So.2d 1153 (Fla. App. 1994).
Footnote 18:
See id. at 1154.
Footnote 19:
898 S.W.2d 732 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).
Footnote 20:
Id. at 736.
Footnote 21:
715 A.2d 333 (N.J. App. 1998).
Footnote 22:
See id. at 336.
Footnote 23:
Id. at 342.
Footnote 24:
See Commonwealth v. Govens, 632 A.2d 1316, 1327-29 (Pa. App.
1993).
Footnote 25:
See Commonwealth v. Morales, 669 A.2d 1003, 1005-06 (Pa. App.
1996).
Footnote 26:
See Frayer v. People, 684 P.2d 927, 928-29 (Colo. 1984).
Footnote 27:
Sharpless, 715 A.2d at 342 (quoting Delgado, 679 A.2d at 225).
Footnote 28:
696 A.2d 44 (N.J. App. 1997).
Footnote 29:
See Sharpless, 715 A.2d at 342-43.
Footnote 30:
See Fuqua, 696 A.2d at 46-47.
Footnote 31:
New Jersey Statute 2C:28-6 declares that a person commits
evidence-tampering if the person "[a]lters, destroys, conceals or
removes any article, object, ... or other thing of physical
substance with [the] purpose to impair its verity or availability"
in an official proceeding or investigation. This statute is quoted
in Sharpless, 715 A.2d at 342.
Footnote 32:
Id. at 348.
Footnote 33:
See Alaska Criminal Rule 31(a); see also James v. State, 698
P.2d 1161, 1166-67 (Alaska 1985).
Footnote 34:
AS 11.56.610(a)(1).
Footnote 35:
See 1978 Senate Journal, Supp. No. 47 (June 12), p. 83.
Footnote 36:
AS 11.56.610(b).
Footnote 37:
AS 4.16.050.
Footnote 38:
AS 11.76.105; AS 11.81.900(b)(59).
