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Watkinson v. State of Alaska (5/28/99) ap-1634
NOTICE: The text of this opinion can be corrected before the opinion is published in the
Pacific Reporter. Readers are encouraged to bring typographical or other formal errors
to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts:
303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501
Fax: (907) 264-0878
E-mail: twhitman@appellate.courts.state.ak.us
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
RICHARD R. WATKINSON, )
) Court of Appeals No. A-6738
Appellant, ) Trial Court No. 3AN-S95-9302CR
)
v. ) O P I N I O N
)
STATE OF ALASKA, )
)
Appellee. ) [No. 1634 - May 28, 1999]
______________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial
District, Anchorage, Eric T. Sanders, Judge.
Appearances: Kathleen A. Murphy, Assistant
Public Defender, and Barbara K. Brink, Public
Defender, Anchorage, for Appellant. Kenneth
M. Rosenstein, Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals,
Anchorage, and Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney
General, Juneau, for Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, Mannheimer and
Stewart, Judges.
COATS, Chief Judge.
Richard R. Watkinson was convicted, following a jury
trial, of two counts of first-degree murder, an unclassified
felony, [Fn. 1] for killing his father and stepmother, Robert and
Rosemary Watkinson. Following the conviction, Superior Court Judge
Eric T. Sanders imposed a composite sentence of 100 years of
imprisonment. On appeal, Watkinson argues that Judge Sanders erred
in refusing to suppress statements which Watkinson made to the
police. He also argues that his sentence was excessive. We
affirm.
Shortly before midnight on November 30, 1995, police
received a 911 phone call from the Watkinson residence on Upper
Hillside in Anchorage. The caller, later identified as Robert
Watkinson, said he had been shot and requested both police and
medical attention. When the police arrived, they discovered Robert
Watkinson lying in a pool of his own blood on the kitchen floor,
and Rosemary Watkinson in a similar condition in the tub in the
upstairs bathroom. Paramedics pronounced both victims dead at the
scene. As police were searching the house, an alarm clock rang at
approximately 1 a.m. The police also discovered a box of shells on
Watkinson's bedroom floor and scattered live and spent shells in
several rooms. The couple's son, Richard, was not in the house and
could not be located.
After learning that Richard Watkinson attended Service
High School, Alaska State Troopers Baty and Garrett went to Service
High School the following morning to speak with school principal
Marilyn Conaway. They told her that Watkinson's parents had been
killed, they had been unable to locate Watkinson in the intervening
hours since the 911 call, and that they wanted to speak with him if
he came to school.
A short time later, school authorities saw Watkinson at
the school. They searched him for weapons and found several
knives. Principal Conaway found out that Watkinson's mother lived
in Oregon. In the presence of the troopers, Conaway asked
Watkinson if he wanted to call his mother. Watkinson said no.
Conaway then called Jean Roth, a friend of the Watkinson family who
was listed in the school's records as an emergency contact person.
Roth gave permission for the troopers to speak with Watkinson.
Trooper Marrs then read Watkinson his Miranda [Fn. 2] rights.
Watkinson agreed to talk to the troopers.
Watkinson confessed to shooting both his father and
stepmother the previous evening. Apparently an argument had ensued
over Watkinson's behavior and the topic of who was to discipline
him. Watkinson stated he was fed up with his parents' arguments
and their attempts to control his life. Watkinson stated that he
decided to wait until both Robert and Rosemary Watkinson were
asleep, and then kill them. His original plan was to kill them at
1 a.m. on December 1, 1995. However, about an hour before that,
Watkinson grabbed his rifle, walked upstairs, and shot Robert and
Rosemary Watkinson who were not yet asleep. Watkinson then left
the house and wandered around Upper Hillside until he went to
school the following morning.
Watkinson drew a map for the troopers depicting the
location of the gun he used to commit the homicides. He again
declined contact with his mother. Watkinson was then placed into
police custody and transported to trooper headquarters. On the way
to headquarters, Watkinson showed the troopers where the gun from
the homicides was located. At police headquarters, Watkinson again
waived his rights, declined the opportunity to speak with his
mother or anyone else, and gave another statement consistent with
the first.
Prior to trial, Watkinson filed a motion to suppress his
statements to the police, arguing that he did not voluntarily waive
his Miranda rights. Judge Sanders denied this motion. A jury
convicted Watkinson of two counts of murder in the first degree.
This appeal followed.
Watkinson argues that he did not knowingly and
voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. Watkinson contends that he
was cold, exhausted from wandering around all night, and that the
troopers coerced him by using interrogation tactics which
downplayed the importance of his Miranda rights. He also argues
that his waiver was involuntary because the police did not give him
an adequate opportunity to contact his mother and never informed
him of the possibility that he faced adult criminal prosecution.
Following an evidentiary hearing, Judge Sanders concluded
that Watkinson voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Judge
Sanders found that Watkinson was sixteen and one-half years old at
the time he talked to the police. He concluded that Watkinson was
of above average intelligence, in fact, "quite intelligent." He
rejected Watkinson's contention that he was emotionally drained at
the time of the interview, and found that Watkinson was "calm and
collected." He found that Watkinson had a prior experience with
law enforcement officers in which Watkinson made a statement after
police read him his Miranda rights. Judge Sanders recognized that
Watkinson had not been advised that he might be prosecuted as an
adult, but the judge stated that this was not dispositive on the
issue of voluntariness and was merely one factor to be considered.
He found that the troopers conducted the interview in a non-
coercive way and did not make any threats, either express or
implied, that might make Watkinson's confession involuntary. He
found that Principal Conaway had offered Watkinson the opportunity
to telephone his mother and that the officers had heard Watkinson
decline the opportunity. He found that Watkinson, at the beginning
of the second interview, had again waived his right to have his
mother notified or present. He found that Watkinson did not really
want to discuss the matter with his mother. He concluded that
Watkinson had voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and that
Watkinson's statements were admissible.
In Quick v. State, [Fn. 3] the Alaska Supreme Court set
out the
factors for courts to consider in determining whether a juvenile
has voluntarily waived Miranda rights:
The mere fact that a person is under the
age of majority does not automatically render
him incapable of making a knowing and
voluntary waiver. The surrounding circum-
stances must be considered in each case to
determine whether a particular juvenile had
sufficient knowledge and maturity to make a
reasoned decision. Among the factors to be
considered are age, intelligence, length of
the questioning, education, prior experience
with law enforcement officers, mental state at
the time of the waiver, and whether there has
been any prior opportunity to consult with a
parent, guardian, or attorney.
It is unquestionably a better practice to
see to it that a juvenile consults with an
adult before he waives his Miranda rights,
but, at least in those cases where it has not
been requested, we decline to adopt a rule
requiring such consultation. The state has
always had the burden of proof to show that a
waiver was knowing and voluntary. Where a
juvenile is concerned, the burden on the state
is even heavier than it would be with an
adult. We believe that the careful scrutiny
to be afforded an unsupervised waiver is
sufficient to ensure that the rights of a
juvenile suspect will be safeguarded.[ [Fn.
4]]
Later, in State v. J.R.N., [Fn. 5] the Alaska Supreme Court
concluded that former Alaska Delinquency Rule 7(b) and former AS
47.10.140 required police to offer a juvenile who has been arrested
the opportunity to contact a parent. But the Supreme Court also
held that the juvenile could waive the right to parental
notification as long as the waiver was knowing and voluntary. [Fn.
6]
We have independently reviewed the record. We conclude
that Judge Sanders' findings are supported by the record and
support his conclusion that Watkinson voluntarily waived his
Miranda rights. The transcript of Watkinson's statements indicates
that the troopers conducted the interview in a non-coercive manner.
Watkinson's responses to the trooper's questions during the
interview were deliberate and responsive. He was not evasive in
telling the troopers what had happened the previous evening. When
asked why he decided to tell the truth and how he felt about it, he
replied: "Because I figured I was caught anyway, and there is no
use in lying anyway." The record supports the conclusion that
Watkinson presumed that the evidence against him was overwhelming
and that he had nothing to lose by talking to the troopers. We
conclude that Judge Sanders did not err in determining that
Watkinson's Miranda waiver was voluntary.
We now turn to specifically address Watkinson's
contention that his waiver of rights was involuntary because the
police did not inform him that he was exposing himself to adult
criminal liability. Watkinson asks us to adopt the minority rule,
followed in New Hampshire [Fn. 7] and South Dakota, [Fn. 8] which
requires such an advisement. Other jurisdictions have, while
shunning a per se rule, adopted the standard that for juveniles to
waive their rights, they must be aware of the possibility of adult
criminal prosecution. [Fn. 9] However, this awareness need not
stem from a specific warning, but may arise from the adversarial
nature of the police interrogation.
In contrast, the overwhelming weight of authority
considers the totality of the circumstances rather than focusing on
whether the juvenile was made aware of the possibility of being
prosecuted as an adult in determining whether there was a voluntary
waiver. [Fn. 10] We see no reason to abandon the totality of the
circumstances test for determining whether a waiver is voluntary.
This is the test adopted by the Alaska Supreme Court in Quick v.
State. [Fn. 11] It may certainly be possible to make a credible
argument in another case that a juvenile's Miranda waiver was
involuntary because, considering the totality of the circumstances,
he was unaware that his statement could subject him to prosecution
as an adult. However, under the circumstances of Watkinson's case,
we fail to see how this was an important factor. Watkinson had
just finished planning and carrying out the murder of his father
and stepmother. It seems improbable that Watkinson would not be
aware that he was confessing to extremely serious crimes and that
he faced serious consequences. We therefore reject Watkinson's
argument that his waiver of Miranda rights was involuntary because
he was not informed of the possibility that he faced prosecution as
an adult.
Watkinson next argues that his sentence is excessive.
Watkinson contends that Judge Sanders erred in finding several
statutory aggravating factors applied to his offense. However,
since Watkinson was not subject to presumptive sentencing,
aggravating factors did not control his sentence. Although
statutory aggravating and mitigating factors can certainly be
useful in helping the parties frame their sentencing arguments,
they do not control the sentence which the court can impose. [Fn.
12] We do not believe that it is necessary for us to review Judge
Sanders' findings on the aggravating factors in order to review
Watkinson's sentence.
In sentencing Watkinson, Judge Sanders fully considered
Watkinson's youth as a major factor in Watkinson's favor. Yet,
Judge Sanders totally rejected Watkinson's suggestion that his
crime was explainable by his father's and stepmother's abuse. He
concluded that the facts showed that Watkinson had planned the
murders. He found that there was no plausible explanation for the
murders other than that Watkinson was angry because his father had
divorced his mother and destroyed his original family. He noted
that Watkinson had also stated that he was sick and tired of
parental guidance and arguing. He stated that Watkinson, who
appeared calm and normal, had within him an unexplainable and
destructive rage that made him unpredictable and extremely violent.
He held that Watkinson needed to be isolated for a 100-year term in
order to protect the public from similar behavior. [Fn. 13]
This court has consistently upheld maximum sentences for
first-degree murder where the trial court has made findings
sufficient to justify such a sentence. [Fn. 14] Judge Sanders'
findings, which are supported by the record, establish that
Watkinson committed a premeditated and particularly brutal murder
of his father and stepmother. His findings support his conclusion
that Watkinson is a particularly dangerous and unpredictable
offender who needs to be isolated for the 100-year term of
imprisonment. We conclude that the sentence which he imposed is
not clearly mistaken. [Fn. 15]
The conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.
FOOTNOTES
Footnote 1:
AS 11.41.100(a)(1)(A).
Footnote 2:
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Footnote 3:
599 P.2d 712 (Alaska 1979).
Footnote 4:
Id. at 719-20 (footnotes omitted).
Footnote 5:
861 P.2d 578 (Alaska 1993).
Footnote 6:
See id. at 580-81.
Footnote 7:
See State v. Benoit, 490 A.2d 295 (N.H. 1985), limited by
State v. Dandurant, 567 A.2d 592 (N.H. 1989). In Dandurant, the
court held that a state statute, providing juveniles previously
tried and convicted as adults to be treated as adults for all
subsequent offenses, required only standard Miranda warnings for
such "adult" juveniles, thereby obviating the need for the more
specific Benoit warnings.
Footnote 8:
See State v. Lohnes, 324 N.W.2d 409 (S.D. 1982), overruled on
other grounds by State v. Waff, 373 N.W.2d 18 (S.D. 1985).
Footnote 9:
See, e.g., State v. Loyd, 212 N.W.2d 671, 676-77 (Minn. 1973);
Quiriconi v. State, 616 P.2d 1111, 1114 (Nev. 1980); State v.
Gullings, 416 P.2d 311, 313-14 (Or. 1966); State v. Luoma, 558 P.2d
756, 761 (Wash. 1977).
Footnote 10:
See, e.g., Matter of Appeal in Pinal County, Juvenile Action
No. J-677, 657 P.2d 915, 916 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); State v.
Perez, 591 A.2d 119, 125 (Conn. 1991); People v. Prude, 363 N.E.2d
371, 373 (Ill. 1977); State v. O'Connor, 346 N.W.2d 8, 10 (Iowa
1984); Edwards v. State, 608 P.2d 1006, 1009-10 (Kan. 1980); State
v. Perry, 954 S.W.2d 554, 562-63 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); State v.
Taylor, 496 S.E.2d 811, 816 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998); Harris v.
Commonwealth, 232 S.E.2d 751, 755 (Va. 1977); State v. Manns, 329
S.E.2d 865, 870 (W. Va. 1985).
Footnote 11:
See Quick, 599 P.2d at 719-20.
Footnote 12:
See Gregory v. State, 689 P.2d 508, 509 (Alaska App. 1984).
Footnote 13:
See Mutschler v. State, 560 P.2d 377, 380-81 (Alaska 1977)
(citing Cleary v. State, 548 P.2d 952, 956 (Alaska 1976)) (to
sentence a defendant to a consecutive sentence in excess of the
maximum term for his most serious offense, the court must find that
it is necessary to impose such a sentence in order to ensure
protection of the public).
Footnote 14:
See Sakeagak v. State, 952 P.2d 278, 285 (Alaska App. 1998);
Riley v. State, 720 P.2d 951, 952-53 (Alaska App. 1986).
Footnote 15:
See McClain v. State, 519 P.2d 811, 813-14 (Alaska 1974).
